KFC Corporation v. Iron Horse of Metairie Road, LLC et al

Filing 140

ORDER AND REASONS denying 118 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 7/16/2018. (ajn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KFC CORPORATION

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 16-16791

IRON HORSE OF METAIRIE ROAD,
LLC AND IRON ROOSTER, LLC

SECTION “R” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff KFC Corporation’s motion for
reconsideration1 of the Court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment (the May 8 Order). 2 The May 8 Order was issued by Judge Kurt
Engelhardt, who presided over this case before it was reassigned to this
Section on May 18, 2018.3 Defendants Iron Horse of Metarie Road, LLC and
Iron Rooster, LLC oppose the motion. For the following reasons, the Court
denies plaintiff’s motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that an order that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims among all the parties “may be revised
at any time” before the entry of a final judgment. As Rule 54 recognizes, a
district court “possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider,

1
2
3

R. Doc. 118.
R. Doc. 13.
R. Doc. 94.

rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.”
Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981). Under Rule
54(b), “the trial court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any
reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an
intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law.” Austin v.
Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff asserts that reconsideration is proper for two reasons.4 First,
plaintiff argues that the same judge should decide all of the motions in this
case in order to “ensure consistency and fairness.” 5 Plaintiff suggests that
proceeding otherwise would lead to “manifest injustice.”6 Second, plaintiff
argues that reconsideration is justified because the Court’s recent order (the
May 30 Order) granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on
defendants’ counterclaim for detrimental reliance “cast[s] doubt on the
propriety” of the May 8 Order.7 Plaintiff suggests that the May 30 Order is

Plaintiff’s arguments are based in part on the standards used for a
motion to alter or amend a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). The Court will address plaintiff’s arguments to the extent
necessary, but nevertheless applies the more lenient standard pursuant to
Rule 54(b). See Austin, 864 F.3d at 336.
5
R. Doc. 118-1 at 2-3.
6
R. Doc. 136 at 4.
7
Id. at 3.
2
4

akin to a “clarification in the applicable law from a higher court,” justifying
reconsideration. 8
Both of plaintiff’s arguments suffer the same flaw—a mistaken belief
that the May 8 and May 30 Orders are inconsistent. Judge Engelhardt ruled
that for the parties’ breach of contract claims, there existed a genuine factual
dispute as to whether plaintiff or its consultant made material
misrepresentations regarding the status of the environmental remediation. 9
In the May 30 Order, the Court held that defendants’ detrimental reliance
claim was prescribed because defendants had constructive knowledge of the
facts underlying their claim more than one year before they filed their
counterclaim.10 See Campo v. Correa, 828 So. 2d 502, 510 (La. 2002).
Plaintiff wrongly asserts that in its May 30 Order, the Court ruled that
plaintiff did not make any misrepresentations to defendants.11 The Court in
fact ruled that the allegations in defendants’ counterclaim for detrimental
reliance sounded in tort rather than contract, and were thus subject to
Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions. 12 In doing so,
the Court found that defendants’ counterclaim alleged a breach of a general

8
9
10
11
12

R. Doc. 136 at 4.
R. Doc. 87 at 9.
R. Doc. 112 at 17-18.
See R. Doc. 118-1 at 4.
R. Doc. 112 at 12.
3

duty

to

disclose,

rather

than

a

breach

of

specific

contractual

representations.13 This holding addressed only the nature of the specific
allegations in defendants’ counterclaim and when defendants were on
inquiry notice of those claims. It is thus entirely consistent with the May 8
Order, which held that in the context of defendants’ defenses to plaintiff’s
complaint, there was a genuine dispute as to whether plaintiff should be
estopped from enforcing the relevant contracts because of plaintiff’s alleged
misrepresentations about the status of the remediation.14
Plaintiff has failed to convince the Court that reconsideration of the
May 8 order is proper. First, plaintiff does not explain how two orders
decided by different judges necessarily cause fundamental unfairness. 15 It is
not infrequent that a case must be reassigned to a different judge before it is
concluded. By plaintiff’s logic, each reassignment could require the new
judge to reconsider every decision made by the prior judge. The Court fails
to see how this would increase “judicial economy,” as plaintiff suggests. 16
Second, the May 30 Order is not a “clarification in the applicable law from a
higher court” justifying reconsideration. 17 The May 30 Order is wholly

13
14
15
16
17

Id.
R. Doc. 87 at 5, 9.
R. Doc. 118-1 at 3; R. Doc. 136 at 4.
R. Doc. 118-1 at 3.
R. Doc. 136 at 4.
4

consistent with the May 8 Order and, in any event, the May 30 Order is not
a clarification of controlling law from a higher court, but a decision on a
different issue by the same court in the same case. Cf. Clark v. Am.’s Favorite
Chicken Co., 190 B.R. 260, 263 (E.D. La. 1995) (in a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 54(b), district court granting motion when a
recent Fifth Circuit decision changed and/or clarified existing law).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration.

16th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of July, 2018.

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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