Howard v. Vannoy et al
Filing
16
ORDER AND REASONS ADOPTING 13 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 02/27/2019.(am)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RONNIE HOWARD SR.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 16-17273
DARREL VANNOY
SECTION: B(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Petitioner
Ronnie
Howard
Sr.
filed
a
pro
se
petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. Rec. Doc.
1. In a Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson
recommended that the petition be dismissed with prejudice. See
Rec. Doc. 13. Petitioner timely filed objections to the latter
Recommendations, as well as a “supplemental objection”. See Rec.
Doc. 14-15.
For the reasons below, it is ORDERED that the Report and
Recommendation are ADOPTED as the opinion of the court, overruling
Petitioner’s objections, and dismissing the instant habeas corpus
petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary
in
Angola,
Louisiana.
On
December
14,
2011,
Petitioner was indicted by a Terrebonne Parish grand jury and
1
charged with aggravated rape of a juvenile male, J.V.1 See St. Rec.
Vol. 2 of 3, Indictment, 12/14/11; Grand Jury Return 12/14/11.
A. State Trial
On May 15, 2014, a jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated
rape of a juvenile male. See St. Rec. Vol. 2 of 3, Trial Minutes;
Jury Verdict; Trial Transcript. Petitioner filed a timely motion
for a new trial based on alleged problems with jurors. See St.
Rec. Vol. 2 of 3, Appeal Brief, 2014-KA-1048, 9/19/14. It was
denied on June 12, 2014. See Id. The court sentenced Petitioner to
life in prison without benefits of parole, probation, or suspension
of sentence. See Id.
Petitioner
appealed
his
sentence
to
the
Louisiana
First
Circuit, asserting that the victim’s mother should not have been
exempted from the witness sequestration order because of the
victim’s age at the time of trial2. See Id. On March 9, 2015, the
First Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding no
merit in the claim. See State v. Howard, No. 2014-KA-1048, 2015 WL
1019513, at *1 (La. App. 1st Cir. Mar. 9, 2015)(unpublished); St.
Rec. Vol 2. of 3. 1st Cir. Opinion, 2014-KA-1048, 3/9/15.
On
April
8,
2016,
The
Louisiana
Supreme
Court
denied
Petitioner’s related writ application, without stated reasons.3
In accordance with La. Rev. Stat. § 46:1844(W), initials are to be used when
state courts refer to a minor victim of sex crime. This court will do the
same.
2 The victim, J.V., was 19 years old at the time of trial.
3 The state failed to produce a copy of this writ application.
1
2
State v. Howard, 191 So.3d. 583 (La. 2016); St. Rec. Vol. 3 of 3,
La. S. Ct. Order, 2015-KH-0761, 4/8/16; St. Rec. Vol 2 of 3, La.
S. Ct. Letter, 2015-KH-761, 4/16/15 (showing postmark 4/14/15). 90
days after the Louisiana Supreme Court denial, on July 8, 2016,
Petitioner’s conviction became final due to Petitioner’s failure
to file a timely writ application with the United States Supreme
Court. See Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the period for filling certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court is considered in the finality determination
under
28
U.S.C.
2244(1)(1)(A)),
cert.
denied.
529.
529
U.S.
1099(2000); U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 13(1).
B. State Collateral Review
On
April
19,
2016,
Petitioner
requested
post-conviction
relief from the state trial court, asserting that: (1) he received
ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to
(a) develop a pretrial strategy, (b) challenge the indictment and
raise the issue of untimely prosecution, (c) obtain a medical
analysis to refute the charges, and (d) effectively cross-examine
the State’s witness; (2) he was denied effective assistance of
counsel when appellate counsel failed to (a) assert ineffective
assistance of trial counsel and (b) challenge the insufficiency of
evidence; (3) the state trial court erred in exempting the victim’s
mother from the witness sequestration order; (4) the state trial
court erred in denying the motion for mistrial based on the
3
multiple juror issues; (5) the evidence at trial was insufficient;
(6) the state trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial
based on the juror issues; (7) the state trial court was without
jurisdiction to commence trial because the statutory prescriptive
period had expired. See Rec. Doc. 13.
On
June
22,
2016,
the
state
trial
court
denied
the
application. See St. Rec. Vol. 2 of 3, Trial Court Judgment,
6/22/16. Regarding Petitioner’s first two claims, the state trial
court found that under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688
(1984) and related state law, there was no ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial or on appeal. St. Rec. Vol. 2 of 3, Trial Court
Judgment,
6/22/16;
Reasons
for
Judgment,
6/22/16.
The
court
declined to consider the third claim regarding the sequestration
order exemption because the substance of the claim had been fully
litigated on direct appeal, citing La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.4(A).
See Rec. Doc. 13. The court found review of the fourth, fifth and
sixth claims barred under La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.4(C) because
Petitioner failed to assert the claims on direct appeal. See Rec.
Doc.
13.
The
court
also
found
that
the
seventh
claim
of
prescription was barred from post-conviction review as untimely
under La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.4(B). Rec. Doc. 13.
C. Petition for Federal Habeas Corpus Relief
4
On December 9, 2016 Petitioner filed the instant petition for
federal habeas corpus relief. See Rec. Doc. 1. Petitioner’s habeas
allegations are as follows:
1) He received ineffective assistance of counsel when his
trial counsel failed to consult with him, effectively
investigate the facts and present a viable defense in
light of insufficient evidence;
2) He
was
denied
effective
assistance
of
counsel
when
appellate counsel failed to assert claims regarding
insufficient
evidence,
time-barred
prosecution
and
prejudicial juror problems;
3) The state trial court erred in exempting the victim’s
mother from the witness sequestration order;
4) The state trial court erred in denying the motion for
mistrial based on multiple juror issues;
5) The evidence at trial was insufficient;
6) The state trial court erred in denying the motion for
new trial based on the juror issues; and
7) The state trial court erred in commencing trial after
the limitations period expired. See Rec. Doc. 1.
The State filed a response in opposition to the Petition,
arguing that Petitioner failed to establish entitlement to relief
and that the claims are barred from review in this court as
procedurally defaulted in part because they were dismissed based
5
on independent and adequate state law grounds. See Rec. Doc. 7;
Rec. Doc. 13.
On July 24, 2017, this Court granted Petitioner’s motion to
stay proceedings to allow him to completely exhaust state court
review. Rec. Doc. No. 10, 2. At the time he filed this federal
petition, his post-conviction writ application was pending before
the Louisiana Supreme Court. See Rec. Doc. 13. After receiving the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s November 28, 2017 ruling, Petitioner
moved to reopen his federal case and that motion was granted. See
Rec. Doc. 13.
PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS
On July 26, 2018, Petitioner filed his initial objection to
the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation. In his objection,
Petitioner argues that the following grounds justify relief:
(1)
the
state
failed
to
produce
a
copy
of
his
Writ
Application;
(2)
the state court failed to provide reasoning for denial;
(3)
there was a fundamental miscarriage of justice because
the
state
courts
failed
to
give
petitioner
an
evidentiary hearing to establish petitioner’s innocence;
(4)
ineffective
assistance
of
both
trial
and
appellate
counsel;
(5)
Petitioner’s persistent contention of actual innocence;
6
(6)
a list of cases that Petitioner feels evidence his
position; and
(7)
that the State Courts never adjudicated the Claims on
their merits. See Rec. Doc. 14.
On September 26, 2018, Petitioner filed his supplemental
objection to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation. Rec. Doc.
15. Petitioner’s supplemental objections center upon procedural
bar issues. Id. Specifically, Petitioner argues that his claims
(4), (5), (6) and (7) procedurally defaulted because he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966
(AEDPA) controls this Court’s review of a § 2254 petition. The
threshold questions in a habeas review are whether the petition is
timely and whether petitioner’s claims were adjudicated on the
merits in state court. Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 419-20
(5th Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b), (c)).
Accordingly,
a petitioner must have exhausted state court remedies and their
claims must not be in “procedural default.” Id.
When considering a pure question of fact, the Court presumes
factual findings to be correct and defers to the state court’s
decision unless it “was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
7
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) – (e)(1) (requiring “clear and
convincing evidence” to rebut that presumption).
When considering a pure question of law or a mixed question
of fact and law, the Court defers to the state court’s decision
unless it was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States.”
28
§
2254(d)(1).
Under
the
“unreasonable application” standard, the only question is “whether
the state court’s determination is objectively unreasonable.” Neal
v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2002).
DISCUSSION
A. Procedural Default
The State contends that four of Petitioner’s claims are in
procedural default. (1) The state trial court erred in denying the
motion for mistrial based on the multiple juror issues. (2) The
evidence at trial was insufficient. (3) The state trial court erred
in denying the motion for new trial based on the juror issues. (4)
The
state
trial
court
erred
in
commencing
trial
after
the
limitations period expired.
On post-conviction review, the state trial court declined to
consider the claims because they could have been asserted on direct
appeal but were not, citing La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.4(C), and
because the prescriptive period claim was not asserted before
trial, citing La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.4(B). Rec. Doc. 13. The
8
Louisiana Supreme Court echoed that application of 930.4 in its
decision addressing the claims. St. Rec. Vol 12 of 12, 5th Cir.
Order, 15-KH-241, 5/21/15; State ex rel. Harris v. State, 193 So.
3d 133 (La. 2016).
1. Independent and Adequate
Federal courts will not review a question of federal law in
a habeas petition if the state court’s decision rests on a state
law ground that is both “independent of the federal question and
adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 729 (1991); Glover v. Cain, 128 F.3d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1997).
When a state court declines to address petitioner’s federal claims
because the petitioner failed to comply with a state procedural
requirement,
the
court’s
judgment
“rests
on
independent
and
adequate state procedural grounds.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30;
see also Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009). A federal court
can only review such a claim if the petitioner can demonstrate
“cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of federal law” or that “failure to consider the
claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
For a state law procedural rule to prevent review by a federal
court, the rule must be independent and adequate. Id. at 730-732.
A procedural rule is “independent” when the state court “clearly
and expressly” indicates that it is independent of federal law.
9
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985). A procedural
bar is “adequate” when it is strictly or regularly followed and
evenhandedly applied to the majority of similar cases. Walker v.
Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316-17 (2011); Glover, 128 F.3d at 902.
The Louisiana courts relied on La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.4(B)
and (C) to bar Petitioner’s fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh
claims. Under Article 930.4(B), a court must deny relief when a
habeas application alleges a claim which petitioner had knowledge
of and failed to raise in the proceedings leading up to the
conviction. La. Code Crim. Proc. Art 930.4(B). Under Article
930.4(C), a court must deny relief when a habeas application
alleges a claim that petitioner raised in the trial court but
inexcusably failed to raise on appeal. La. Code Crim Proc. Art
930.4(C). Rules like Articles 930.4(B) and (C) are meant to bar
review by this court because they establish the state procedural
requirements for presenting post-conviction relief claims. See
Fischer v. Texas, 169 F. 3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that
state
courts’
clear
reliance
on
state
procedural
rules
is
determinative of the issue).
In Martinez v. Ryan, involving the crime of sexual contact
with a person under the age of 15, the Supreme Court held that a
state imposed “procedural default will not bar a federal habeas
court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance
at
trial
if,
in
the
[State’s]
10
initial-review
collateral
proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceedings
was ineffective.” 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012). Here, the record doesn’t
indicate that the Petitioner had access to counsel during state
collateral review. However, that fact is not dispositive of the
issues presented here.
2. Cause and Prejudice
If a federal habeas petitioner can show “cause” for his
procedural default and “prejudice” attributed to it, he may be
exempt from the procedural default rule. Fisher, 169 F.3d at 301;
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748-50. To establish cause for procedural
default, Petitioner must show that a factor external to the
defense hindered his or his counsel’s efforts to comply with the
state’s procedural rule.
(1986).
The
fact
that
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
petitioner
or
his
counsel
failed
to
recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to
raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause
for a procedural default. Id. at 486.
Here, Petitioner has not offered any cause for his default
that would excuse the procedural bar imposed by the Louisiana
courts.
The record does not support a finding that any factor
external
to
the
defense
prevented
Petitioner
from
properly
asserting his claims.4 The record neither supports any
While it’s not explicitly stated by him, it appears that there is confusion
between the writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court and the United
4
11
factor external to the defense, nor any action or inaction by the
State which prevented him from properly asserting these claims
in the state courts. Failing to show “cause” is fatal to the
invocation of the “cause and prejudice” exception. Hogue v.
Johnson, 131 F.3d 466, 497 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982).
Petitioner has failed to
show an objective cause for his default, and has not alleged any
basis for actual prejudice. Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474,
477 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing
Lumpkin
v.
Ricketts,
551
F.2d
680, 681-82 (5th Cir. 1977)).
3. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice
Alternatively, a petitioner is exempt from a procedural bar
if
a
fundamental
miscarriage
of
justice
will
occur
by
not
reviewing the merits of his claim. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S.
333, 339 (1992)). To establish a fundamental miscarriage of
justice, Petitioner must provide this court with evidence that
would
support
a
“colorable
showing
of
factual
innocence.”
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986); accord Murray, 477
U.S.
at
496;
petitioner
can
Glover,
128
satisfy
F.3d
the
900,
factual
902
(5th
innocence
Cir
1997).
standard
States Supreme Court. Petitioner never explicitly stated it, but to make
things clear, the failure to produce a copy of the writ is not cause for
default.
12
A
by
establishing a fair probability that, in light of all presently
available evidence, the trier of fact would have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. Campos v. Johnson,
958 F. Supp. 1180, 1195 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (footnote omitted); see
Nobles, 127 F.3d at 423 n.33 (finding that the actual innocence
factor requires a showing by clear and convincing evidence that,
“but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”). An
inadequate
assertion
of
actual
innocence
will
not
qualify
Petitioner for the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception
from procedural default. Glover, 128 F. 3d. at 903.
Here, Petitioner argues that “[t]here is/was ‘NO’ Probative
Material Evidence” and notes his “persistent contention... of
Actual Innocence.” Rec. Doc. 14. Petitioner then cites a long
list of cases in his opposition, but
Petitioner’s
objection
includes
an
presents no analysis.
attached
transcript
from
trial, of his attorney questioning the lead detective, likely to
highlight the evidentiary basis had been a statement from the
victim’s mother, a statement from the victim, a statement from
Petitioner, and some pictures of a house and a mirror in the
bathroom. Notably, the transcript also highlights there were no
hospital
records.
The
record
shows
substantial
evidence
of
Petitioner’s guilt. No reasonable doubt of guilt has been shown.
13
Petitioner’s
supplemental
objections
cites
two
cases,
arguing that a certificate of appealability (COA) should be issued
if his habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds without
assessing his constitutional claims. Rec. Doc. 15 at 1-2. (citing
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474) (citing
Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336). The supplemental objections also
seem to correlate the ineffective assistance of counsel and issues
at trial, in combination with his persistence of innocence as an
argument
for
an
exception
to
procedural
default
under
the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. See Rec. Doc. 2.
Regardless, Petitioner fails to meet the necessary standards of
showing
his
innocence.
There is no record
support
for
the
fundamental miscarriage of justice claim.
B. Petitioner Failed to Establish Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
Petitioner
counsel
asserts
provided
that
ineffective
his
trial
counsel
assistance.
In
and
appellate
Strickland,
the
Supreme Court established a two-part test for evaluating claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring petitioner to prove
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. 466 U.S. Ct.
687.
First,
“the
representation
defendant
fell
below
must
an
14
demonstrate
objective
that
counsel’s
standard
of
reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88. Under this prong and on habeas
review, the proper inquiry is whether an attorney’s representation
would be considered incompetent under prevailing professional
norms. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). Second,
the defendant must prove “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would
have
been
different.”
Strickland,
466
U.S.
at
694.
A
reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine
the confidence in the outcome.” Id.
Under
Strickland,
there
is
a
strong
presumption
that
counsel’s conduct “falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance” so that deference is given to counsel’s
performance. Id. at 689. In assessing an attorney’s performance,
a federal habeas court must make every effort “to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances
of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the counsel’s
perspective at the time.” Id. Tactical decisions, when supported
by the circumstances, are “objectively reasonable, and therefore
[do] not amount to deficient performance.” Rector v. Johnson, 120
F.3d 551, 564 (5th Cir. 1997).
1. Trial Counsel
Petitioner
deficient
claims
because
his
counsel
trial
failed
counsel’s
to
properly
challenge the state’s case against petitioner.
15
performance
was
investigate
and
“A defendant who
alleges a failure to investigate on the part of his counsel must
allege with specificity what the investigation would have revealed
and how it would have altered the outcome of the trial.” Druery v.
Thaler, 647 F.3d 535, 541 (5th Cir. 2011)(quotation omitted,
emphasis added); accord Moawad v. Anderson, 143 F.3d 942, 948 (5th
Cir. 1998). A petitioner cannot show prejudice as to a claim that
his
counsel
failed
to
investigate
without
adducing
what
the
investigation would have shown. Diaz v. Quarterman, 239 F. App’x
886, 890 (5th Cir. 2007) - quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696
(finding some evidence is required to show that “the decision
reached would reasonably likely have been different.”). As noted
in the R&R, prevailing on such claims requires Petitioner to
provide factual support showing what exculpatory evidence further
investigation would have revealed. See Brown v. Dretke, 419 F.3d
365, 375 (5th Cir. 2005); Moawad, 143 F.3d at 948; Davis v. Cain,
No. 07-6389, 2008 WL 5191912, at *10 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2008).
Without basis to challenge it, the trial transcript illustrates
that trial counsel was prepared for trial.
Petitioner’s objection notes that his trial counsel, Harold
D. Register, has been disbarred for misappropriating clients’
funds. Rec. Doc. 14. Petitioner goes on to paint a conspiracy that
Register’s
suspension
representation
of
is
illustrative
petitioner’s
16
of
counsel
alleged
“tainted
ineffectiveness...
collusion
with
prosecution
[ADA,
Bud
Barnes]
and,
created
a
Miscarriage of justice, inter alia, that rendered the adversarial
tribunal
fundamentally
unfair.”
Rec.
Doc.
No.
14.
However,
beyond the irrelevant period of counsel’s suspension, none of
the conclusory claims have factual support. Because there is no
evidence
Petitioner
of
is
a deficient performance and resulting prejudice,
not entitled to federal habeas relief on this
claim.
1. Appellate Counsel
Petitioner also asserts his appellate counsel was ineffective
when counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of evidence, the
prosecution’s timeliness and juror problems that were addressed in
the motion for new trial. The Strickland standard for judging
performance of trial counsel also applies to claims of ineffective
appellate counsel. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). To
successfully argue that appellate counsel was constitutionally
ineffective, a petitioner must show that his appellate counsel
unreasonably failed to discover and assert a non-frivolous issue
and establish a reasonable probability that but for his counsel’s
deficient representation he would have prevailed on this issue on
appeal. Id. at 285-86. The law does not require appellate counsel
to
assert
every
non-frivolous
argument
on
appeal
to
be
an
effective, but instead only those arguments that are more likely
to succeed. See Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2067 (2017).
17
Petitioner will overcome the presumption of effective counsel only
when appellate counsel ignores issues which are clearly stronger
than those presented. See Kossie v. Thaler, 423 F. App’x 434, 437
(5th Cir. 2011) (citing Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288).
Here, Petitioner’s objection does not provide any specificity
regarding
appellate
counsel,
Bertha
Hillman.5
Petitioner’s
objection does include and reference a trial transcript, arguing
the prosecution did not have “substantive material [probative]
fact”
and
highlighting
that
“[t]here
is/was
“No”
Probative
Material Evidence” involved in the case.6 While Petitioner may feel
that Appellate Counsel’s decision to not use the transcript and
file that claim is indicative of deficient representation, there
was no obligation for counsel to argue all of those claims.
Appellate
counsel
had
access
to
transcripts
from
the
trial,
including the transcript attached to the objection, as well as the
arguments on both sides at trial, as well as the state trial
court’s
reasoning.
appellant
argument.
Petitioner
There’s
fails
no
to
show
indication
a
non-frivolous
that
appellate counsel ignored is stronger than the ones
on
appeal.
Accordingly,
Petitioner
has
not
the
issue
presented
established
that appellate counsel’s performance was flawed.
C. State Trial Court’s Sequestration Exemption
This was noted as a deficiency in the Magistrate’s R&R.
Petitioner specifically cites “Rec. Pg., 741-742, Exhibit B” in referencing
his objection’s exhibits
5
6
18
Petitioner alleges that the state trial court erred when it
exempted the victim’s mother from the witness sequestration order.
Neither the petition nor objection has presented a cognizable
federal claim in connection with his assertion that exempting the
victim’s mother from the witness sequestration order was a mistake
of constitutional proportions. Violation of a sequestration order
is insufficient to raise a claim cognizable on federal habeas
review. Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 569 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding
that
a
state
court’s
failure
to
follow
its
own
sequestration of witnesses procedural rules does not itself raise
a federal constitutional question cognizable in habeas corpus).
Federal courts do not have grounds to consider a habeas claim
unless there is a constitutional issue. A federal court’s habeas
review focuses on due process considerations. Due process requires
that the court grant habeas relief only when the errors of the
state courts make the underlying proceeding fundamentally unfair.
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
Petitioner’s
notably
with
no
objections
background
cite
five
information
or
different
cases7,
parenthetical,
as
examples to support claim (3). See Rec. Doc. 14. The common
thread between these cases seems to be that they all refer to due
process. None would involve a due process issue, relative to purely
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); In Re Winship, 397 U.S.
362 (1970); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Bragg v. Norris, 128 F.
Supp. 2d 587 (E.D. Ark. 2000); Edward v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 466 (2000)
7
19
state procedural rulings over witness sequestration under state
law. Petitioner has not established that the state courts’ denial
of relief is on opposing grounds to United States Supreme Court
law. He is not entitled to relief on this claim.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of February, 2019.
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
20
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?