Price v. United States Government et al

Filing 36

OPINION: Ordered that the 35 MOTION for Vacation, Set Aside Judgment Due to Judicial Conduct, Prevent Manifest Injustice filed by Ora Price is Denied. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 6/23/2017.(ijg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ORA PRICE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 16-17910

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, ET AL.

SECTION “B”(2)

OPINION
Before
Vacation/Set

the

Court

Aside

is

“Plaintiff’s

Judgment

Due

to

Ex

Parte

Judicial

Motion

for

Conduct/Prevent

Manifest Injustice.” Rec. Doc. 35. Plaintiff Ora Price and various
members of her family have been involved in several suits in this
Court during the past six years. A brief review of those cases
will provide the appropriate context.1

In the body of this Order and Reasons, the Court will discuss only those cases
that are related to the instant action. However, it is also worth noting that
Plaintiff Ora Price’s son, Stanley, who was not a plaintiff or a prospective
plaintiff in the instant action pursuant to either the complaint or the motion
for leave to file an amended complaint, but who signed the instant motion for
reconsideration, has also been involved as a plaintiff in numerous suits filed
in this Court: Stanley Price v. New Orleans City, et al., CV-98-1423, Section
“I” (dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement, Rec. Docs. 52-54); Stanley
Price v. Housing Auth of NO, et al., CV-01-3016, Section “K” (dismissed with
prejudice after granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Rec. Docs.
72-73); Stanley Price v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, et al., CV-07-9741,
Section “S” (related to CV-01-3156 and dismissed after granting defendants’
motions for summary judgment and to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Rec.
Docs. 61-62); Stanley Price v. Mary Ann Vial Lemmon, et al., CV-09-7563, Section
“I”(3) (also related to CV-01-3156 and dismissed on the basis of judicial
immunity and for failure to timely serve under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(5), Rec. Docs. 13, 25); Stanley Price v. Rose Ledet, et al., CV-10-411,
Section “F” (dismissed with prejudice after adopting the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation to dismiss claims against Judge Ledet on the basis of
judicial immunity and granting the remaining defendants’ motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, Rec. Docs. 31-32); Christy S. Morgan, et al. v.
Regional Loan Corporation, et al., CV-10-1436, Section “F”(2) (dismissed because
plaintiffs lacked standing, Rec. Doc. 28); and Stanley Price v. BP Exploration
& Production, Inc., et al., CV-11-943, Section “J”(2) (consolidated with CV10-2179 and other cases arising from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and
currently pending in this Court).
1

1

I.

HISTORY IN THIS COURT
A. CIVIL ACTION 01-3156, CONSOLIDATED WITH 01-3180, 03-1145
Desire Area Resident, et al. v. Housing Auth of NO, et al.,

CV-01-3156, Section “S,” was a class action suit filed by members
of the Desire Housing Development; both Ora Price and her son,
Stanley, were listed as Plaintiffs. The original petition and
amended complaint alleged that the Housing Authority of New Orleans
(“HANO”) failed to comply with United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (“HUD”) regulations and the requirements of
federal HOPE VI grant guidelines. Rec. Doc. 99 at 2. A settlement
agreement, ultimately approved by the Court, committed HANO to
funding programs and activities for Desire residents at a minimum
of three million dollars. Id. at 8. Stanley Price appealed the
dismissal of his claims under Federal Rule of 12(b)(6) (Rec. Doc.
100), but the Fifth Circuit granted the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the appeal and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
Stanley Price’s claims (Rec. Docs. 103-04).
B. CIVIL ACTION 11-114
In Ora Price, et al. v. Michaels Group, LLC, et al., CV-11114, Section “J”(2), Ora, Leonard, and Darryl Price asserted claims
against

Michaels

Group,

LLC,

Michaels

Development

Company

(collectively “Michael’s”), Interstate Management Company (“IMC,”
incorrectly named as Interstate Realty Management), Calisha Jolla
(“Jolla”), and Connie Abdul (“Abdul”). Defendants IMC, Jolla, and
2

Abdul were represented by James Ryan, III (“Ryan”) of James Ryan
III & Associates, LLC (“Ryan & Associates”), Jeffrey A. Clayman
(“Clayman”),

and

Timothy

essentially

claimed

that

threatened

with

wrongful

Plaintiffs

sought

a

Roniger
they

(“Roniger”).

were

eviction.

declaratory

defamed
Rec.

and

Doc.

judgment,

1.

Plaintiffs
were

being

Thereafter,

preliminary

and

permanent injunctions, and a temporary restraining order. Rec.
Doc. 9. On March 10, 2011, Judge Carl Barbier denied the motion
after a conference in which it was discovered that Plaintiffs
allegedly violated their lease, but no eviction proceedings were
currently

set;

the

court

further

noted

that

when

eviction

proceedings were set, “Plaintiffs will have another opportunity to
contest those proceedings in state court.” Rec. Doc. 19.
Defendants IMC, Jolla, and Abdul filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).
Rec. Doc. 24. After a hearing, with a ruling in open court, Judge
Barbier granted the motion to dismiss and entered judgment in favor
of all of the Defendants and against Plaintiffs. Rec. Docs. 3637. Plaintiffs appealed. Rec. Doc. 38. On February 23, 2012, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed finding that “[a]lthough they allege in
general terms that appellees have violated federal law and their
constitutional rights, they do not present any facts that would
support

these

claims”

and

“if

and

when

eviction

proceedings

actually come to pass in this case, the appellants will have the
3

‘opportunity to contest those proceedings in state court.’” Rec.
Doc. 44 at 3-4.
C. CIVIL ACTION 12-992
Less than two months after the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, Ora,
Leonard, and Darryl Price filed Ora Price, et al. v. Housing
Authority of New Orleans, et al., CV-12-992, Section “B”(2). They
asserted claims against HANO, Michael’s, IMC, Treasure Village
Associates,

LP

(“Treasure

Village”),

Jolla,

Ryan,

Clayman,

Roniger, Ryan & Associates, Rhonda Brown, First Choice Security,
Kevin

Johnson,

Veronica

Henry

Joseph
(“Judge

C.

Hensley,

Henry”).

Robin

Maxfield,

Essentially,

they

and
sued

Judge
the

defendants from the earlier suit, those defendants’ lawyers, HANO,
and

the

state

court

judge

presiding

over

their

eviction

proceedings. They again moved for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction. Rec. Docs. 8, 10. This Court denied
the motion, noting the “longstanding precedent against federal
court interference with the state court system where that system
affords available relief on asserted claims and there is a pending
writ in the state appellate system to obtain such relief” and that
federal district courts “cannot sit as appellate courts in review
of state court judgments.” Rec. Doc. 11 at 1-2 (citing Matter of
Gober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1206 (5th Cir. 1996)) (quoting De Spain v.
Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1984); Weekly v. Morrow,
204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiffs filed motions for
4

entry of default against Defendants Hensley, Johnson, First Choice
Security, Maxfield, Jolla, IMC, Michael’s, Treasure Village, and
Brown. Rec. Docs. 38-40, 48-53. These motions were either dismissed
as moot or denied. Rec. Docs. 65-68. Defendants Ryan, Ryan &
Associates, Judge Henry, HANO, IMC, Michael’s, Treasure Village,
Brown, Maxfield, Roniger, Jolla, and Clayman filed motions to
dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6). Rec. Docs. 12, 31-32, 41,
54, 76.
The Court first granted the motion to dismiss filed by Ryan
and Ryan & Associates, finding that there was “nothing in the
record to show that Defendants, as retained counsel for a private
entity, acted under color of law with public actors,” “Plaintiffs
have cited no federal law that would allow them, third parties, a
cause of action against Defendants, as the retained counsel for
[IMC]

in

filing

the

Rule

to

Evict,”

that

“[e]ven

liberally

construed, it is difficult to ascertain any possible federal claim
against Defendants that would not facially flow from state law,”
and ultimately that “Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden
in showing that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists for
this Court.” Rec. Doc. 44 at 5-6.
The Court then granted the motion to dismiss filed by Judge
Henry. Rec. Doc. 58. We found that there was “nothing in the record
to show that Defendant’s conduct was improper or outside of her
judicial role in issuing a ruling in an eviction proceeding,” that
5

“[e]ven if Plaintiffs were able to state a claim against Defendant,
a judge acting within her judicial capacity is immune from suit
for actions performed within that judicial capacity,” “[t]o the
extent that any of these claims have already been raised and
litigated in state court, they may be considered barred under res
judicata,” and “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not allow for
district courts to entertain collateral attacks on state court
judgments, which is precisely what Plaintiffs urge in this case.”
Id. at 8-10.
The Court then granted the motion to dismiss filed by HANO,
finding that Plaintiffs merely alleged that HANO revoked their
Section 8 voucher, not that it was involved in the eviction. Rec.
Doc. 60 at 7-8. Under the law, HANO must revoke such a voucher
when a family is evicted for a serious violation of the lease. Id.
at 8 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b)(2)). “Given the state court
findings

in

the

eviction

proceeding

that

Plaintiffs

were

in

violation of several of these obligations, there does not appear
to be anything improper about Defendant’s action in revoking
Plaintiffs’ Section 8 voucher.” Id. at 8-9. This Court again noted
that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not allow for district
courts to entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments,
which is precisely what Plaintiffs urge in this case.” Id. at 9
(citations omitted).

6

Plaintiffs sought to disqualify the undersigned Judge (Rec.
Doc. 69), but this motion was dismissed as frivolous (Rec. Doc.
74). Plus, the Fifth Circuit denied Plaintiffs’ petition for a
writ

of

mandamus/recusal

exceptional

circumstances

because

they

necessary

to

“failed

to

invoke

show

the

writ

the
of

mandamus.” Rec. Doc. 84 at 2.
Thereafter, this Court granted the motions to dismiss filed
by IMC, Michael’s, Treasure Village, Brown, Maxfield, and Roniger
(Rec. Doc. 63), by Jolla (Rec. Doc. 73), and by Clayman (Rec. Doc.
86) for the same reasons stated in the previous orders (see Rec.
Docs. 44, 58, and 60). Accordingly, the case was dismissed without
prejudice. Rec. Doc. 87.
More than a year later, Plaintiffs hired counsel (Rec. Doc.
91) who moved to reopen the case (Rec. Doc. 90). In denying the
motion to reopen, this Court noted that twelve of the original
sixteen Defendants were dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, “Plaintiffs repeatedly failed to comply with this
Court’s

orders

regarding

their

attempts

at

garnering

default

judgments against the four remaining Defendants,” the motion to
reopen “fail[ed] to follow this Court’s rules for citation of
authorities, and, as a result, it has proven a significant waste
of this Court’s time and resources;” plus, the motion was untimely
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Rec. Doc. 92 at 13.
7

Plaintiffs appealed. Rec. Doc. 96. The Fifth Circuit found
that it lacked jurisdiction to review the underlying dismissal and
that the arguments made in the Rule 60(b)(1) motion should have
been raised in an appeal. Rec. Doc. 104 at 4-5 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal from the
dismissal order for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the order
denying the Rule 60(b)(1) motion. Id. at 6.
D. CIVIL ACTION 12-2021
In Ora Price v. James A. Ryan III & Association LLC, et al.,
CV-12-2021,

Section

“B”(2),

Ora

Price

again

asserted

claims

against Ryan, Ryan & Associates, Judge Henry, and IMC. Judge Henry
filed a motion to dismiss. Rec. Doc. 11. Instead of acting on that
motion, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the action
should not be dismissed as duplicative and harassing in light of
CV-12-992. Rec. Doc. 19. Plaintiff responded to the Order, but
merely recited the facts alleged in her earlier pleadings. Rec.
Doc. 24. Consequently, the case was dismissed with prejudice. Rec.
Doc. 25.
E. CURRENT CIVIL ACTION 16-17910
On December 30, 2016, Plaintiff Ora Price filed a complaint
asserting claims for breach of the “Memorandum of Understanding”
arising from CV-01-3156 and claims arising from the eviction
proceedings. Rec. Doc. 1. As Defendants, she named the United
States Government, HUD, HANO, Kevin Oufnac (general counsel for
8

HANO), the Desire Area Resident Council (“DARC”), Kathleen Matthew
(in her capacity as president of the DARC), Bonnie Rogers (in her
capacity as the former president and a current member of DARC),
Treasure Village, Michael’s, IMC, First Choice Security, Inc.,
Judge Henry, Ryan & Associates, Ryan, Roniger, and Clayman.
Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to supplement the complaint to
add Leonard and Darryl Price as Plaintiffs. Rec. Doc. 7.
On April 5, 2017, Defendants Clayman, IMC, Ryan & Associates,
Roniger, Ryan, and Judge Henry filed motions to dismiss. Rec. Docs.
18-19.
At that time, Chief Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt transferred the
case to this section. Rec. Doc. 23. Thereafter, Defendant Clayman
moved to join the pending motions to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 25), HANO
and Kevin Oufnac filed a motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 27), and
HANO filed a motion for pre-filing rule (Rec. Doc. 28).
Given the Price family’s extensive history in this Court, and
to save time and judicial resources, the Court did not act on any
of these pending motions. Instead, we ordered Plaintiff to show
cause

why

her

case

should

not

be

dismissed

as

duplicative,

harassing, barred by collateral estoppel, and for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Rec. Doc. 30. She was explicitly warned that
failure to timely comply could lead to dismissal without further
notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Id. at
2.
9

In response, Plaintiff filed an “Exparte [sic] Motion for
Stay of All Proceedings Pending Writ of Recusation Mandamus for
Reassignment of Case to Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,” in which
Plaintiff requested that this Court stay the proceedings pending
the filing of a writ of recusal or, alternatively, “to act with
dignity because of [the Court’s] bias to recuse himself without
further proceedings of filing a writ of recusation and mandamus.”
Rec. Doc. 31 at 1-2 (emphasis added). Based on the memorandum
attached the motion, it was clear that Plaintiff had not filed any
writs with the Fifth Circuit. Rec. Doc. 31-1 at 3 (“A brief
containing specificity of their concerns will be filed in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for judicial
determination of recusal, mandamus and reassignment of the case”).
Plaintiff also filed a motion for an extension of time within which
to respond to the show cause order. Rec. Doc. 32. This Court denied
that motion. Rec. Doc. 33.
Consequently, on May 12, 2017, this Court dismissed the case
with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and for
the reasons described in the Court’s earlier orders (Rec. Docs.
30, 33), “[b]ecause it appear[ed] that this Court lacks subject
matter

jurisdiction,

the

instant

action

is

duplicative,

and

Plaintiff failed to timely comply with this Court’s show cause
order . . . .” Rec. Doc. 34.

10

II.

THE INSTANT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically
recognize a motion for reconsideration.” Jenkins v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb, No. 14-2499, 2016 WL 5874984, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2016)
(citing St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 123 F.3d
336, 339 (5th Cir. 1997)). Nonetheless, “[a] motion asking that
the court reconsider a prior ruling is evaluated either as a motion
to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) or as a motion for relief from a final judgment, order[,] or
proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).” In re
FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-1873, 2011
WL 6130788, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The determination of which rule applies turns on the
timing of the motion. Tex. A&M Research Found. v. Magna Transp.,
Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2003). “If the motion was filed
within twenty-eight days after the entry of the judgment or order
at issue, the motion can be brought under Rule 59(e). If it is
filed after that time, it falls under Rule 60(b).” In re FEMA,
2011 WL 6130788, at *3 (internal citations omitted).
Here, the Court’s Order dismissing the case was entered on
May 12, 2017. Rec. Doc. 34. The instant motion for reconsideration
was filed with the Court on June 12, 2017. Rec. Doc. 35. Therefore,
the motion will be considered under Rule 60.

11

Rule 60(b) provides that a court, “[o]n motion and just
terms,” may relieve a party “from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding” due to:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party;
the judgment is void;
the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that
has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
any other reason that justifies relief.

“The purpose of Rule 60(b) is to balance the principle of finality
of a judgment with the interest of the court in seeing that justice
is done in light of all the facts.” Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Seven Elves, Inc. v.
Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1981)).
In the instant motion, Stanley, Leonard, and Darryl Price
argue in a conclusory fashion that the dismissal should be set
aside

because

shopping;

(2)

it

(1)

was

violated

the

“due

result

process

of

impermissible

under

the

5th

forum

and

7th

Amendments”; (3) violated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 15,
and 38 and the rights to amend the complaint and trial of all
issues

triable

by

a

jury;

and

(4)

assigned

credibility

dispositive motions filed by Defendants. Rec. Doc. 35.

12

to

First, the Price’s argue that this case is related to CV-11114, not CV-12-992, and therefore should have been transferred to
Judge Barbier. Rec. Doc. 35 at 7. The Price family is correct that,
pursuant to Local Rule 3.1.1, “[t]o promote judicial economy,
conserve judicial resources, and avoid potential forum shopping
and conflicting court rulings, [collateral proceedings and refiled
cases] must be transferred to the section with the lowest docket
number . . . .” However, the instant action is more closely related
to CV-12-992, not CV-11-114, because the latter did not involve
claims against the lawyers representing the defendants in the
lower-numbered action, the state court judge presiding over the
eviction proceeding, or HANO. This Section previously considered
those claims, not Section “J.” Therefore, this argument is without
merit.
Second, there is no evidence that this Court violated due
process. Plaintiff Ora Price previously pursued these exact claims
in three other actions and those claims were dismissed each time.2

2 The only claim that could be considered “new” is the claim for breach of the
“Memorandum of Understanding” in CV-01-3156. First, it is unclear whether or
not Plaintiff Ora Price was claiming breach of the settlement agreement
disposing of that action (found at Rec. Doc. 99 in that case) or a separate
1996 document titled “Memorandum of Understanding” and repeatedly referred to
in that case (see id. at 5, 8). In either case, it is not clear that this Court
would have subject matter jurisdiction. A breach of either document is subject
to state contract law and therefore should generally be raised in state court,
especially where the Memorandum of Understanding did not arise out of any matter
before the district court and this Court did not retain jurisdiction when it
approved of the settlement agreement in CV-01-3156. See Premiere Network Servs.,
Inc. v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 440 F.3d 683, 692 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994)). At this stage, the
breach of contract claim also poses a standing problem. Ora and Stanley Price
were named as plaintiffs in CV-01-3156. Ora Price has passed away and she never

13

Nevertheless, this Court provided an opportunity for Plaintiff to
show why her claims should not be dismissed and explicitly warned
her that failure to comply with that show cause order could lead
to dismissal.
Third, while it is true that Plaintiff moved to amend her
complaint to add Leonard and Darryl Price as Plaintiffs (for no
stated reason, see Rec. Doc. 7 at 1-2) and that this Court did not
act on that motion before dismissing the case, the granting of
that motion would have had no effect on the ultimate dismissal.
When the Court denied the motion for an extension of time within
which to file a response to the show cause order, the Court noted
in a footnote that Plaintiff Ora Price had passed away and that
her passing “raise[d] serious questions about who is filing and
signing documents on her behalf, including the authority for doing
so, if any.” Rec. Doc. 33 at n.1. However, the Court did not deny
the motion for an extension because Plaintiff had passed away.
Instead, the Court denied the motion because the point of the show
cause order was “[t]o save time, money, and judicial resources”
where “Plaintiff ha[d] a long history in this Court, having filed
numerous, related lawsuits over the course of several years,” “most

requested leave to add Stanley Price as a plaintiff in this action. Even if she
had, Stanley Price objected to the settlement in CV-01-3156 (see Rec. Doc. 99
at 5, 12) and those who objected or “opted out of the settlement have no standing
to object to it” (id. at 12). If the breach of contract claim was raised not as
a claim for breach of the settlement agreement, but for breach of the Memorandum
of Understanding, there remains a standing problem, because the Memorandum was
signed in 1996 by Bonnie Peters, not Ora or Stanley Price. See id. at 5.
14

[of those cases] were dismissed for failure to comply with Court
orders, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or as duplicative,”
and Plaintiff failed to timely comply with the show cause order
despite being warned that it could lead to dismissal. Id. at 1.3
Indeed, when the Court considers the fact that the Price family
was asked about this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over these
claims five years ago in a related case, it should come as no
surprise that the Court was unwilling to grant an extension of
time. Similarly, the Court did not ultimately dismiss this case
because Ora Price passed away. Rather, the case was dismissed
pursuant to Rule 41(b) after Plaintiff failed to timely comply
with the show cause order and because it appeared that this case
was

duplicative

and

that

the

Court

lacked

subject

Darryl

Price

matter

jurisdiction.
Further,

even

though

Leonard

and

were

not

officially added as Plaintiffs, they were actively involved in the
litigation, as evidenced by their signatures on the motion for an
extension. Rec. Doc. 32 at 2. At any time, they could have filed
a response to the show cause order, asserting their standing based
on the pending motion to amend the complaint and the passing of
the named Plaintiff. However, the motion for an extension merely

It is worth noting that Plaintiff’s motion for an extension, though timely
filed on April 20, 2017 before a response to the show cause order was due on
April 24, 2017, was not entered into the record until May 8, 2017. Rec. Doc.
32. This means that the Court waited an additional two weeks just to see if
Plaintiff was going to respond.
3

15

indicates that they wanted “to exercise their U.S. Constitutional
right to acquire an attorney,” “justification exists to present
their claims and right to access to court to vindicate their
reputations,” and that “[t]he Prices recognizes [sic] the ability
of

these

prominent

white

attorneys

and

government

agency

to

manipulate and obstruct justice through the use of the judiciary
and judicial officials which tantamount to commission of criminal
activities by dishonest and substandard lawyers.” Rec. Doc. 32 at
1. At no time did anyone in the Price family address this Court’s
concerns

about

subject

matter

jurisdiction,

res

judicata,

or

collateral estoppel.
While the Court sincerely sympathizes with the loss suffered
by Stanley, Leonard, and Darryl Price, this case was not dismissed
because Ora Price passed away. The case was dismissed because it
is duplicative, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and
the Price family failed to show otherwise. The addition of Leonard
and Darryl Price as Plaintiffs, even with counsel, would not have
altered the outcome.
Finally, this Court did not depend upon the motions filed by
Defendants when it dismissed this case. Therefore, the assertion
that

the

Court

made

improper

credibility

determinations

is

meritless.
This Court has the power under Rule 41(b) to dismiss an action
sua sponte if a plaintiff fails to comply with court orders.
16

Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th
Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). While “lesser sanctions such as
fines

or

dismissal

without

prejudice

are

usually

appropriate

before dismissing with prejudice . . . a Rule 41(b) dismissal is
appropriate where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious
conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not serve
the best interests of justice.” Id. (citations, alterations, and
quotation marks omitted).
This is the fourth action brought by the Price family against
these and related defendants. In each action, the Price family
failed to show federal subject matter jurisdiction over their
claims and each action was consequently dismissed. Even in filing
the instant motion for reconsideration, the Price family has failed
to address this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction concerns. See
Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 443.
Furthermore, Plaintiff Ora Price was proceeding in forma
pauperis. Rec. Doc. 3. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court
shall dismiss a case that is proceeding in forma pauperis at any
time if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
This Court’s review of the record and past cases suggests that the
Price family’s claims are frivolous, malicious, and fail to state
a claim on which relief may be granted because they are barred by
17

res judicata, collateral estoppel, and/or for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction (among other possible reasons not relied upon
by the Court but raised by Defendants in their respective motions
to dismiss). See, e.g. Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th
Cir. 1988) (affirming the dismissal of claims under § 1915 as
duplicative where the plaintiff’s “complaint repeat[ed] the same
factual allegations that he asserted in his earlier case, although
he successively sued different defendants”); Mason v. City of
Dallas, Tex., No. 07-1757, 2008 WL 4137981, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 27, 2008) (discussing the rules of res judicata).
III. CONCLUSION
Stanley, Leonard, and Darryl Price failed to establish a
mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, a void judgment, a
satisfied judgment, or any other reason that could justify relief
under Rule 60. Parties cannot repeatedly file frivolous actions
with impunity. It is a waste of judicial resources and time.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration (Rec. Doc.
35) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of June, 2017.

___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18