Dixon v. Toyota of New Orleans et al

Filing 27

ORDER and REASONS granting 22 Motion for Summary Judgment; all claims against TMCC in this matter are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on 8/10/2017. (blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LANDRY DIXON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 17-111

TOYOTA OF NEW ORLEANS ET AL.

SECTION I

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion 1 for summary judgment filed by defendant Toyota
Motor Credit Corporation (“TMCC”) against pro se plaintiff Landry Dixon. Dixon
alleges violations by TMCC of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) arising out of his purchase of a Toyota Corolla. 2 TMCC
argues that it was not involved in financing Dixon’s purchase and has no contractual
relationship with any party in the case. 3 As such, TMCC contends that Dixon has
not, and cannot, offered any evidence to show that TMCC is liable for any alleged
violations of the TILA and the ADA arising out of the purchase. 4
On July 17, 2017, the Court ordered Dixon both to respond to TMCC’s
argument that TMCC was not involved in Dixon’s purchase, and to submit any
evidence in his possession that supports his claims against TMCC. 5 The Court
warned Dixon that his failure to respond to TMCC’s motion may result in the

R. Doc. No. 22.
See R. Doc. No. 1
3 R. Doc. No. 22-1, at 4-5.
4 See id. at 5.
5 R. Doc. No. 24.
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granting of summary judgment in favor of TMCC, or in the dismissal of all claims
against TMCC for failure to prosecute, or both. Dixon did not respond to the Court’s
order.
Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, the court determines
that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “[A] party
seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record]
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment
need not produce evidence negating the existence of material fact, but need only point
out the absence of evidence supporting the other party’s case. Id.; Fontenot v. Upjohn
Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir. 1986).
Once the party seeking summary judgment carries its initial burden, the
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine issue of material fact is
not satisfied by creating “‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by
‘conclusory allegations,’ by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of
evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted). Instead, a genuine issue of material fact exists when the “evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party responding to the motion for
summary judgment may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts
that establish a genuine issue. Id. The nonmoving party’s evidence, however, “is to
be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmoving party’s]
favor.” Id. at 255; see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999).
TMCC has met its initial summary judgment burden by pointing out that the
record is devoid of any evidence supporting Dixon’s claims that TMCC can be held
liable for alleged violations of the TILA and the ADA arising out of Dixon’s purchase
of the Toyota Corolla. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fontenot, 780 F.2d at 1195. Dixon,
on the other hand, has not met his corresponding burden. Dixon has failed to respond
to TMCC’s motion in any respect. Moreover, Dixon has failed to submit any evidence
in his possession supporting his case against TMCC, despite the Court’s order to do
so. 6
Given Dixon’s failure to respond to TMCC’s motion, Dixon has not met his
burden of identifying specific facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 587; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. As no reasonable
jury could return a verdict in favor of Dixon on his claims against TMCC, the Court
concludes that summary judgment in TMCC’s favor is warranted. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248.
Accordingly,

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Id.
3

IT IS ORDERED that TMCC’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED,
and all claims against TMCC in the above-captioned matter are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, August 10, 2017.

_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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