Rockett v. Belle Chasse Marine Transportation, LLC
Filing
103
ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Associated Marine Anchorage of St. John, L.L.C. and St. John Enterprises, L.L.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 69 ) is GRANTED, and plaintiff's claims against them are DISMISSED. IT IS FU RTHER ORDERED that Belle Chasse Marine Transportation, LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Seeking Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims for Negligence and Unseaworthiness (Doc. 70 ) is GRANTED, and plaintiff's negligence and unseaworthiness claims against Belle Chasse Marine Transportation, LLC are DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rec. Docs. 67 , 68 , and 72 are DISMISSED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon on 9/5/2018. (sa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DARRIN ROCKETT
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 17-229
BELLE CHASSE MARINE
TRANSPORTATION, LLC, ET AL.
SECTION: "S" (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Associated Marine Anchorage of St. John, L.L.C. and St.
John Enterprises, L.L.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #69) is GRANTED, and plaintiff's
claims against them are DISMISSED.1
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Belle Chasse Marine Transportation, LLC's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Seeking Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims for Negligence and
Unseaworthiness (Doc. #70) is GRANTED, and plaintiff's negligence and unseaworthiness claims
against Belle Chasse Marine Transportation, LLC are DISMISSED.2
1
Associated Marine Anchorage of St. John, L.L.C. and St. John Enterprises, L.L.C. also filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claim for Punitive Damages (Doc. #67). Because this
court has found that Associated Marine and St. John are entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintiff's
claims against them, it is unnecessary to address the punitive damages issue separately, and that motion is
DISMISSED as moot. Further, Associate Marine and St. John's Motion In Limine to Exclude or,
alternatively, to Limit the Report and Anticipated Testimony of Plaintiff's Liability Expert, John Pierce (Doc.
#72), is DISMISSED as moot.
2
Belle Chasse also filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Seeking Limitation of Liability
(Doc. #68), which would be applicable only if Belle Chasse were found to be liable for negligence under the
Jones Act or for unseaworthiness under the general maritime law. Because this court has found that Belle
Chasse is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims, the motion
directed at limitation of liability is DISMISSED as moot.
BACKGROUND
This matter is before the court on motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants,
Associated Marine Anchorage of St. John, L.L.C., St. John Enterprises, L.L.C., and Belle Chasse
Marine Transportation, LLC.
Plaintiff, Darrin Rockett, filed this action against defendants, Belle Chasse, Associated
Marine, and St. John,3 seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained in a maritime accident.
Rockett, a Jones Act seaman, alleges he was injured that around midnight on January 29, 2016,
when he was employed as the captain of the M/V MR. FRED, a vessel in navigation owned,
operated and controlled by Belle Chasse. Rockett was the only person aboard the vessel navigating
on the Mississippi River during high water conditions. Rockett claims that he left the navigation
channel to avoid traffic, and that the vessel struck a submerged object and became airborne.
Rockett alleges that the submerged object, that he admittedly never saw, was a buoy and that
Associated Marine and St. John owned, maintained, or were otherwise responsible for the buoy. He
alleges the buoy was improperly marked, maintained, and/or positioned. Rockett alleges that he
sustained injuries to his head and other parts of his body as a result of the accident. Rockett reported
the accident to his supervisors at Belle Chasse. However, neither Associated Marine nor St. John
were notified until a year-and-a-half later and there was no investigation to determine what Rockett
allegedly hit.
3
Rockett originally named St. John Fleeting, LLC as a defendant in this matter. When he was
informed that St. John Fleeting was the wrong entity, Rockett filed an amended complaint adding Associated
Marine and St. John as defendants.
2
Rockett's claims against Belle Chasse include a negligence claim under the Jones Act, and
general maritime law claims for unseaworthiness and failure to pay maintenance and cure, along
with punitive damages related to the failure to pay maintenance and cure. Rockett alleges a general
maritime law negligence claim against Associated Marine and St. John, and seeks punitive damages
associated with that claim. Associated Marine and St. John argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment as to all of Rockett's claims against them because there is no proof of what he hit, much
less that they controlled whatever it was. Belle Chase argues that it is entitled to summary judgment
on plaintiff's Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims because Rockett cannot prove that it was
negligent or that the vessel was unseaworthy.
ANALYSIS
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Granting a motion for summary judgment is proper if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits filed in
support of the motion demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10 (1986). The court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be]
'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party
. . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] 'material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson,
106 S.Ct. at 2510).
3
If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for
trial. Celeotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). The non-movant cannot satisfy the
summary judgment burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla
of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). If the
opposing party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party does not have to submit
evidentiary documents properly to support its motion, but need only point out the absence of
evidence supporting the essential elements of the opposing party’s case. Saunders v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991).
II.
Associate Marine and St. John's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #69)
Associated Marine and St. John argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on
Rockett's claims against them because Rockett cannot prove what he hit with the vessel, much less
that they had ownership or custody of the object or that they were responsible for its placement in
navigable waters.
Rockett's raises maritime negligence claims against Associated Marine and St. John. To
prevail on a negligence claim under admiralty law, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant
owed it a duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach was the cause-in-fact and legal
cause of plaintiff's damages; and, (4) actual damages. In re Mid–S. Towing Co., 418 F.3d 526, 531
(5th Cir. 2005); see also 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5–2 (2d ed.
1994). In admiralty cases, the standard of care is established by statutes or regulations, maritime
custom, or by the general principles of negligence law. S.C. Loveland, Inc. v. E.W. Towing, Inc.,
608 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1979).
4
To establish liability when a vessel strikes an object in navigable water, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant owned, placed, maintained or controlled the object. Creppel v. Shell Oil
Co., 738 F.2d 699, 701-2 (5th Cir. 1984). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must offer some
proof linking the object that he hit to the defendant. Guidry v. Apache Corp. of Del., 236 Fed.Appx.
24, 25 (5th Cir. 2007). "It is not enough that the defendants' operations were closest to the allision
site." Id.
In this case, Rockett has offered no proof to link the object he hit to Associated Marine or
St. John. Rockett admitted in his deposition that he never saw the object he hit. Also, because he
did not make allegations against Associated Marine or St. John for over a year-and-a-half after the
accident, there was no investigation done to discover what Rockett hit. Rockett assumed that he hit
a buoy belonging to Associate Marine or St. John because he was in the vicinity of their facility
when the accident occurred, but he has offered absolutely no poof of what the vessel struck, much
less that it was associated with either Associated Marine or St. John. Therefore, Associated Marine
and St. John's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Rockett's claims against them are
DISMISSED.
III.
Belle Chase Marine's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Seeking Dismissal of
Plaintiff's Claims for Negligence and Unseaworthiness (Doc. #70)
Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims are separate causes of action and are
treated as such. See Brunner v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 779 F.2d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1986). In this
case, the basis of the negligence claim is that Belle Chasse failed to properly train Rockett to
navigate in high water conditions. The basis of the unseaworthiness claim is that the M/V MR.
FRED lacked navigational charts, the radar was "in and out" and the vessel lacked a second crew
member to serve as a lookout.
5
A. The Jones Act
Under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101, et. seq., a seaman's employer is liable for damages
if the employer's negligence, including negligence of the employer's officers, agents, or employees,
caused the seaman's injury. See Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir.
1997) (en banc); see also Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 86 S.Ct. 765, 766 (1966). The employer is held
to a standard of ordinary prudence under the circumstances. Id. “An employer ‘has a continuing duty
to provide a reasonably safe place to work and to use ordinary care to maintain the vessel in a
reasonably safe condition.’" Lett v. Omega Protein, Inc., 487 Fed. Appx. 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting 1 Admiralty & Maritime Law § 6–22 (5th ed.)). “Because the amount of care exercised by
a reasonably prudent person varies in proportion to the danger known to be involved in what is being
done, it follows that the amount of caution required, in the use of ordinary care, will vary with the
nature of what is being done . . .'" Id. (quoting 1B–III Benedict on Admiralty § 21). The terms
“slightest” and “featherweight” have been used to describe the reduced standard of causation
between the employer's negligence and the employee's injury, and a seaman must only show that
“his employer's negligence is the cause, in whole or in part, of his injury.” Gautreaux, at 335;
Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir. 1988). However, “[u]nder familiar
principles of negligence, in Jones Act cases, there must be some evidence from which a jury can
infer that the unsafe condition existed and that the owner either knew or, in the exercise of due care,
should have known of it.” Perry v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 528 F.2d 1378, 1379 (5th Cir.
1976).
The Jones Act adopts a comparative negligence standard in which a seaman's recovery is
reduced in proportion to his fault if he contributes to his own injury by not exercising ordinary
6
prudence under the circumstance. Johnson v. Cenac Towing, 544 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 2008).
“The circumstances of a seaman's employment include not only his reliance on his employer to
provide a safe work environment but also his own experience, training or education. The reasonable
person standard, therefore, [in] a Jones Act negligence action becomes one of the reasonable seaman
in like circumstances.” Id. (quoting Gautreaux, 107 F.3d at 339) (emphasis in original). An injured
seaman is barred from recovery for damages sustained as the result of his own fault. Miles v.
Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 984 (5 th Cir. 1989). "[T]he defendant has the burden of proving that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause in producing
his injury." Id. The plaintiff cannot recover if his accident was causes solely by his own fault. Id.
In this case, Rockett was operating the vessel when he struck a submerged object. Rockett
is a licensed Captain with a 100 ton endorsement, credentials that exceeded those necessary to
operate the vessel. Rockett was an experienced seaman, who worked for 8 years on the section of
the Mississippi River where the accident occurred. He testified that he was familiar with the buoy
system that he supposes he hit. A vessel owner does not have a duty to instruct a seaman on how
to perform a routine task in which he is well-versed. See Glaze v. Higman Barge Lines, Inc., 611
Fed. Appx. 227, 228 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Robinson v. Zapata Corp., 664 F.2d 45, 48 (5th Cir.
1981) (concluding that "[d]efendant could not have been negligent in failing to supervise or train
an employee in off-shore welding when that employee clearly stated that he had had two years'
experience in off-shore welding.")). Avoiding a known buoy system is a matter of common sense
for a licensed captain. Belle Chasse had no duty to specifically train Rockett on how to navigate the
vessel at that precise moment. Rockett made the ultimate choice on how to navigate the vessel
based on his training required to obtain his captain's license and his years of experience working on
7
that stretch of the Mississippi River. Rockett has failed to establish that any negligence on the part
of Belle Chase caused the accident. Therefore, Belle Chasse's motion for summary judgment on
Rockett's Jones Act claim is GRANTED, and that claim is DISMISSED.
B. Unseaworthiness
“[L]iability based upon unseaworthiness is wholly distinct from liability based upon
negligence.” Usner v. Luckenback Overseas Corp., 91 S.Ct. 514, 517 (1971). To establish a claim
for unseaworthiness under the general maritime law, a seaman must prove “that the owner has failed
to provide a vessel, including her equipment and crew, which is reasonably fit and safe for the
purpose for which it is used.” Jackson v. OMI Corp., 245 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir.2001). A vessel can
be unseaworthy if her “gear [is] defective,” “appurtenances [are] in disrepair,” or “crew [is] unfit.”
Usner, 91 S.Ct. at 517. A vessel may be unseaworthy if it lacks essential navigational charts. Union
Oil Co. of Cal. v. M/V POINT DOVER, 756 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 1985).
The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute and completely independent of the duty
under the Jones Act to exercise reasonable care; therefore, a showing of negligence is not required.
See Phillips v. W. Co. of N. Am., 953 F.2d 923, 928 (5th Cir. 1992). “Although the shipowner has
an absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, the vessel need not be ‘accident free.’" Simeon v.
T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1432–33 (5th Cir. 1988). To prevail on an unseaworthiness
claim, the seaman “must prove that the unseaworthy condition played a substantial part in bringing
about or actually causing the injury and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the unseaworthiness.” Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347,
1354 (5th Cir.1988) (citations omitted).
8
Rockett claims that the M/V MR. FRED was unseaworthy because it lacked certain
navigational charts, the radar was "in and out", and the vessel lacked a second crew member to serve
as a lookout. None of these claims rendered the vessel unseaworthy. Rockett admitted at his
deposition that he would not have used navigational charts had they been onboard the vessel and that
the radar would not have shown submerged buoys in the area. Thus, neither the alleged lack of
charts nor issues with the radar were a cause of the accident. Further, Rockett's liability expert
opined that the M/V MR. FRED did not need a separate person to serve as a lookout because it is
a small pilot boat, and Rockett himself was sufficient to serve as a lookout. Therefore, the vessel was
not unseaworthy for having an inadequate crew. Belle Chasse's motion for summary judgment on
Rockett's unseaworthiness claim is GRANTED and that claim is DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Associated Marine Anchorage of St. John, L.L.C. and St.
John Enterprises, L.L.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #69) is GRANTED, and plaintiff's
claims against them are DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Belle Chasse Marine Transportation, LLC's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Seeking Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims for Negligence and
Unseaworthiness (Doc. #70) is GRANTED, and plaintiff's negligence and unseaworthiness claims
against Belle Chasse Marine Transportation, LLC are DISMISSED.
9
5th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of September, 2018.
____________________________________
MARY ANN VIAL LEMMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
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