McQuirter et al vs. Nina Lehman et al

Filing 15

ORDER AND REASONS re 13 MOTION to Stay Proceedings and Enforce Settlement Agreement; the Court construes defendants' motion to dismiss Campbell's claim as a motion for summary judgment, and GRANTS the motion unless any party objects within 14 days. The Court DENIES defendants' motion to stay the proceedings or, in the alternative, dismiss McQuirter's claim. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 12/28/2017.(blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DEVONA McQUIRTER, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 17-1370

NINA LEHMANN, ET AL.

SECTION “R” (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendants move to stay proceedings or, in the alternative, to dismiss
plaintiffs’ claims.1

The Court denies defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff

Devona McQuirter’s claim. Construing the motion as to Plaintiff Joseph
Campbell’s claim as a motion for summary judgment, the Court will grant
the motion unless any party files an objection within 14 days.

I.

BACKGROUND
This diversity case arises out of a motor vehicle accident between

plaintiffs and Defendant Nina Lehmann on January 3, 2016. Plaintiffs were
allegedly injured when Lehmann rear-ended Campbell’s vehicle, in which
McQuirter was a passenger. 2 Plaintiffs sued Lehmann, EAN Holdings, LLC,
which owned Lehmann’s rental car, and ACE American Insurance Company

1
2

R. Doc. 13.
R. Doc. 1 at 2-3; R. Doc. 1-6 at 5.

in state court on January 3, 2017.3 Defendants removed the case to this
Court on February 15, 2017, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 4 Plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed Lehmann on April 19, 2017. 5
According to defendants, plaintiffs each agreed to settle their claims
for $15,000 in August 2017. 6 Defendants contend that McQuirter agreed to
voluntarily dismiss her claim as barred by Louisiana’s no pay, no play statute
after it was discovered that McQuirter lacked automobile insurance at the
time of the accident. 7 See La. R.S. § 32:866. Plaintiffs’ counsel has not yet
filed a motion to dismiss. Defendants now move to stay proceedings or, in
the alternative, to enforce its settlement agreement with Campbell and
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims.8 Plaintiffs did not respond to defendants’ motion.

II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Converting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Campbell’s
Claim to a Motion for Summary Judgment

The Court construes defendants’ request to enforce the settlement
agreement and dismiss Campbell’s claim as a motion for summary judgment.

3
4
5
6
7
8

R. Doc. 1-6 at 5.
R. Doc. 1.
R. Doc. 9.
R. Doc. 13-1 at 1.
Id.
R. Doc. 13.
2

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court typically must limit itself to the
pleadings and their attachments. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or
12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). But uncontested documents referred to in the
pleadings may be considered by the court without converting the motion to
one for summary judgment, even when the documents are not physically
attached to the complaint. See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the district
court properly considered documents not attached to the complaint in ruling
on a Rule 12(c) motion). A court may also consider documents attached to a
motion to dismiss without converting it to a summary judgment motion if
the documents are referred to in the complaint and are central to the
plaintiff’s claim. Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285,
288 (5th Cir. 2004).
In their motion to enforce the settlement agreement and dismiss
Campbell’s claim, defendants ask the Court to consider the signed settlement
agreement itself. This document is not referred to in plaintiffs’ complaint.
When a party bases a motion to dismiss on matters outside the pleadings,
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the court has discretion either to reject the extraneous material, or accept it
and convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See
Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 194 n.3 (5th Cir.
1988); 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 (3d ed.
2017). The Court finds that conversion to summary judgment will “facilitate
the disposition of the action” by allowing the Court to resolve the question of
whether a binding settlement agreement was reached. 5C Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 (recognizing that a district court is
likely to accept extra-pleading material and convert a motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment when the material is comprehensive and
will enable a rational determination of a Rule 56 motion). Therefore, the
Court will consider the settlement agreement attached to defendants’ motion
as material outside the pleadings and convert defendants’ motion to dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment.
If a motion to dismiss is converted into a motion for summary
judgment, the nonmovant is entitled certain procedural safeguards. See
Isquith, 847 F.2d at 195. Specifically, “[u]nder Rule 12(d), a district court
may convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment so long
as it gives the parties a ‘reasonable opportunity to present all the material
that is pertinent to the motion.’” Trinity Marine Prod., Inc. v. United States,
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812 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). To ensure
that all parties have proper notice, the Court will permit any party to file an
opposition to summary judgment within 14 days of the entry of this order. If
no party files an opposition, this order will become final.
B.

Summary Judgment

Based on the parties’ settlement agreement, defendants are entitled
summary judgment on Campbell’s claim. Summary judgment is warranted
when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing
whether a dispute as to any material fact exists, the Court considers “all of
the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.”

Delta & Pine Land Co. v.

Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but
“unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory
facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a
motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d
1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. A dispute about a
5

material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence
which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went
uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,
1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by
either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact, or “showing that the moving party’s
evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to
return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by
merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with
respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex,
477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must,
by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the
pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for
6

trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).
A district court has “inherent power to recognize, encourage, and when
necessary enforce settlement agreements reached by the parties.” Bell v.
Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1994). Compromise agreements
under Louisiana law require the parties’ “mutual intention of putting an end
to the litigation,” and “reciprocal concessions of the parties in adjustment of
their differences,” i.e., consideration. Rivett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
508 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (La. 1987). Such agreements must also be in writing
or recited in open court. See La. Civ. Code art. 3072.
Under the terms of the settlement agreement in this case, Campbell
agreed to release defendants from all claims related to the accident in
exchange for a payment of $15,000. 9 These terms clearly indicate both the
parties’ mutual intention to end litigation and consideration. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 630 So. 2d 741, 747 n.5 (La. 1994) (noting that the
“release of a claim executed in exchange for consideration received is, in

9

R. Doc. 13-4 at 1.
7

effect, a compromise”). Additionally, defendants delivered the settlement
check on August 14, 2017. 10 Together, the release signed by Campbell and
defendants’ delivery of the settlement check satisfy the writing requirement
under Louisiana law. See Felder v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 405 So. 2d 521, 523 (La.
1981) (holding that “the release, signed by plaintiff, and defendant’s $700.00
draft identified with the release, together constitute a compromise
agreement in writing and signed by both parties”). Because defendants and
Campbell entered into a binding settlement agreement, defendants are
entitled summary judgment on Campbell’s claim.
B.

McQuirter’s Claim

Defendants also argue for a stay or, in the alternative, dismissal of
McQuirter’s claim. While there is no binding settlement agreement between
defendants and McQuirter, defendants contend that her recovery is barred
by Louisiana’s no pay, no play statute. Under that statute, an individual who
lacks compulsory car insurance may not recover the first $15,000 in injuries
she sustains from a motor vehicle accident. La. R.S. § 32:866(A)(1). But this
provision does not apply to a passenger like McQuirter. Id. § 32:866(E)
(“Nothing in this Section shall preclude a passenger in a vehicle from
asserting a claim to recover damages for injury, death, or loss which he

10

R. Doc. 13-1 at 2; R. Doc. 13-3 at 1.
8

occasioned, in whole or in part, by the negligence of another person arising
out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle.”). Thus, McQuirter’s claim
should not be dismissed because of the no pay, no play statute. Defendants
offer no other reason to stay the proceedings as to McQuirter’s claim. The
Court will therefore deny defendants’ motion as to this claim.

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court construes defendants’ motion to
dismiss Campbell’s claim as a motion for summary judgment, and GRANTS
the motion unless any party objects within 14 days. The Court DENIES
defendants’ motion to stay the proceedings or, in the alternative, dismiss
McQuirter’s claim.

28th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of December, 2017.

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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