In re: The Matter of TK Boat Rentals, L.L.C.
Filing
84
ORDER AND REASONS granting 48 , 49 and 51 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment and partial summary judgment are GRANTED. The claims of Justin McCarthy, Michael Harrell, Patrick Beck, and Becks minor son, C.D.B., are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE insofar as they assert a breach of a duty of seaworthiness. Further, the claims of Tracy Edwards and Charles "Nick" Siria are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 3/21/2018. (Reference: all cases)(cg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE: TK BOAT RENTALS, as owner
and operator of the M/V MISS IDA,
for exoneration from or limitation of
liability.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-1545
c/w 17-2446 and 17-3657
SECTION “R” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendants Extreme Fishing, LLC, and Troy Wetzel move for summary
judgment as to the claims of plaintiffs Tracy Edwards 1 and Charles “Nick”
Siria,2 and partial summary judgment as to the claims of plaintiffs Justin
McCarthy, Michael Harrell, Patrick Beck, and Beck’s minor son, C.D.B.3 For
the following reasons, the motions are granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
This consolidated action arises out of a boat collision on February 12,
2017.4 Plaintiffs Edwards, Siria, McCarthy, Harrell, Beck, and Beck’s minor
son, C.D.B., allegedly entered into an agreement with Defendants Troy
1
2
3
4
R. Doc. 51.
R. Doc. 49.
R. Doc. 48.
R. Doc. 1.
Wetzel and Extreme Fishing to charter a vessel for a fishing trip. 5 According
to plaintiffs, Wetzel or someone acting on his behalf then entered into an
agreement with Defendant Chase St. Clair to use one of St. Clair’s vessels for
the fishing trip.6 On February 12, 2017, plaintiffs departed as passengers on
the M/V SUPER STRIKE, a fishing vessel owned by St. Clair and operated by
Defendant Andre Boudreau.7
The M/V SUPER STRIKE, with plaintiffs aboard, was crossing the
Mississippi River when it collided with the M/V MISS IDA, a vessel owned
by TK Boat Rentals.8 As a result of the accident, Beck and C.D.B. each
allegedly suffered severe physical injuries, including facial fractures. 9
Edwards also alleges that he sustained serious physical injuries.10 All six
passengers assert that they suffered mental anguish and emotional distress
because of the collision. 11
The owners of the M/V MISS IDA and of the M/V SUPER STRIKE each
filed limitation of liability actions in this Court relating to the February 12,
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6
7
8
9
10
11
R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 13 (Case No. 17-2446).
Id. at 4 ¶ 14.
Id. at 4 ¶ 15; R. Doc. 18 at 10 ¶ 9.
R. Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 16 (Case No. 17-2446).
Id. at 5 ¶¶ 18-19.
Id. at 6 ¶ 20.
Id. at 5-7.
2
2017 collision.12 The six passengers of the M/V SUPER STRIKE filed claims
in these limitation actions. 13 The passengers also filed a separate suit against
multiple defendants, including Wetzel and Extreme Fishing.14 The two
limitation actions and the passengers’ suit for damages were consolidated in
this action. 15 Wetzel and Extreme Fishing now move for summary judgment
as to all plaintiffs’ claims for unseaworthiness, and as to Siria’s and
Edwards’s negligence claims. 16
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any material
fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s]
from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta &
Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99
12
13
14
15
16
R. Doc. 1; R. Doc. 1 (Case No. 17-3657).
R. Doc. 5; R. Doc. 17.
R. Doc. 1 (Case No. 17-2446).
R. Doc. 6; R. Doc. 16.
R. Doc. 48; R. Doc. 49; R. Doc. 51.
3
(5th Cir. 2008).
All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth
‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either
support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision
Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at
1075. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” EEOC v.
Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence
which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went
uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,
1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted). The nonmoving party can
then defeat the motion by either countering with evidence sufficient to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, or “showing
that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the
reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id.
at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by
4
pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
325.
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by
submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the
pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for
trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Seaworthiness Claims
Plaintiffs assert that their injuries “were legally and proximately
caused by the fault, including negligence, of Defendants, . . . as well as by the
unseaworthiness of the aforesaid fishing vessel and the M/V MISS IDA.” 17
The parties agree that this dispute is governed by general maritime law. 18
Extreme Fishing and Wetzel first argue that they are entitled summary
17
18
R. Doc. 1 at 7 ¶ 24 (Case No. 17-2446).
R. Doc. 48-1; R. Doc. 51-1; R. Doc. 57; R. Doc. 58; R. Doc. 59.
5
judgment as to plaintiffs’ unseaworthiness claims because passengers are not
owed a duty of seaworthiness under general maritime law. 19 See Dove v.
Belcher Oil Co., 686 F.2d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that the owner of
a vessel “has no duty of seaworthiness to a passenger but is held only to the
standard of reasonable care under the circumstances”).
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they are not owed a duty of
seaworthiness. 20 But plaintiffs argue that the seaworthiness of the vessel is
relevant to whether defendants failed to exercise reasonable care.21 Because
plaintiffs are not owed a duty of seaworthiness under general maritime law,
defendants are entitled summary judgment on this issue.
The Court
dismisses plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they assert a violation of a duty of
seaworthiness. This order shall not prevent plaintiffs from arguing that
defendants failed to exercise reasonable care with regard to the condition of
the vessels.
B. Claims of Charles “Nick” Siria
Extreme Fishing and Wetzel argue that they are entitled summary
judgment with regard to Siria’s negligence claims because he has not suffered
19
20
21
R. Doc. 48-1 at 2; R. Doc. 49-1 at 3; R. Doc. 51-1 at 3.
R. Doc. 57 at 5; R. Doc. 58 at 5; R. Doc. 59 at 4.
R. Doc. 57 at 5; R. Doc. 58 at 5; R. Doc. 59 at 4-5.
6
any actual injuries.22 “To establish maritime negligence, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that there was (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff,
(2) breach of that duty, (3) injury sustained by the plaintiff, and (4) a causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.” GIC
Servs., LLC v. Freightplus USA, Inc., 866 F.3d 649, 659 (5th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation omitted).
Siria argues that he can recover for emotional distress under general
maritime law because he was within the zone of danger of the collision. 23 The
zone of danger rule permits a plaintiff to recover for emotional injuries that
“result from the witnessing of peril or harm to another if the plaintiff is also
threatened with physical harm as a consequence of the defendant’s
negligence.” Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1992); see
also Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC, 744 F.3d 927, 938 (5th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that “the zone of danger test allows a Jones Act plaintiff to
recover for emotional injury caused by fear of physical injury to himself”
(internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original)). Siria testified that, in
the moments before the collision, he “knew that [the] boats were going to
hit” and “chose just to hold on for dear life.”24 Siria further attests that,
22
23
24
R. Doc. 49-1 at 3-4.
R. Doc. 58 at 5-8.
R. Doc. 58-2 at 11.
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immediately before the collision, he was “extremely scared” and feared for
his life.25
The Court assumes without deciding that the zone of danger rule is
applicable to Siria’s claim, and that Siria was within the zone of danger of the
collision. See Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 224 (5th Cir.
2013) (explaining that the Fifth Circuit has “yet to recognize recovery under
the zone of danger rule for general maritime claims” (internal quotation
omitted)). But the zone of danger rule is merely a threshold requirement to
determine whether a plaintiff is eligible to recover for emotional injuries. See
Naquin, 744 F.3d at 938 (describing the zone of danger test as a limiting test
on who can recover damages for emotional harm).
Siria must also
demonstrate that he suffered actual injuries. Cf. Gough v. Nat. Gas Pipeline
Co. of Am., 996 F.2d 763, 764 (5th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff was diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788
F.2d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff developed cancerphobia after he
was accidentally soaked with toxic chemicals); Anselmi v. Penrod Drilling
Corp., 813 F. Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. La. 1993) (noting that the defendant did
not dispute that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress).
25
R. Doc. 58-6 at 2.
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Siria fails to show a genuine issue of disputed fact as to his injuries. In
his deposition, Siria acknowledged that he did not suffer any personal
injuries as a result of the collision, that he has not and does not plan to seek
medical or psychological treatment, and that he cannot identify anything
that he could do before the accident that he can no longer do.26 He further
testified that he has been back on the water since the accident.27 Siria was
asked whether being back on the water “was a little tense?” 28 He responded
that “it was,” but provided no further explanation. 29 Siria also testified that,
a few weeks after the accident, he was traveling on a narrow highway on a
foggy morning, and he experienced a reaction to a car pulling out in front of
him that “was probably very overdramatic.” 30 But Siria does not describe his
emotional response to the car pulling out, and he offers no additional details
about this incident. The statements in Siria’s deposition are too vague and
conclusory to demonstrate an emotional injury. Siria’s conclusory statement
in an affidavit that he has “suffered emotionally as a result of this casualty”
is unsupported by the record.31 See Galindo, 754 F.2d at 1216.
26
27
28
29
30
31
R. Doc. 49-2 at 2-4.
R. Doc. 58-2 at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15-16.
R. Doc. 58-6 at 2.
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Siria has identified no legal authority recognizing a negligence claim
based on such a slight showing of injury. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (explaining that “[t]he mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient”
to defeat summary judgment). Even drawing all inferences in favor of Siria,
“the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find” that
he experienced compensable emotional injuries. Simbaki, 767 F.3d at 481;
see also Gough, 996 F.2d at 767 (explaining that a jury’s award of damages
must be proportional to “the circumstances of the accident and the evidence
of mental anguish and disability”).
Siria’s negligence claims must be
dismissed.
C. Claims of Tracy Edwards
Extreme Fishing and Wetzel argue that Edwards’ negligence claims
must also be dismissed because Edwards was not injured as a result of the
accident.32 Like Siria, Edwards argues that he was in the zone of danger of
the collision.33 But Edwards similarly fails to demonstrate that he suffered
any actual injuries.
In his memorandum in opposition to summary
judgment, Edwards conclusorily states that he suffered physical injury and
32
33
R. Doc. 51-1 at 2.
R. Doc. 57 at 5-8.
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emotional damages. 34 But Edwards does not describe these injuries, and he
points to no specific facts in the record to support his assertions.
As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “Rule 56 does not impose upon the
district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support
a party’s opposition to summary judgment.” Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline
Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). The Court
has nevertheless attempted to identify evidence of Edwards’ alleged injuries
in the record. In his deposition, Edwards testified that he jumped into the
river at the time of the collision, and that the water was very cold.35 But
Edwards did not feel like he needed to go to the hospital, and he did not seek
medical or psychological treatment as a result of the accident.36 Edwards
testified that the only psychological effect he felt from the accident is that, on
a snorkeling trip, he jumped off the back of the boat into the water and then
turned around and got back on the boat. 37 Edwards explained that he had
“never had any fear of the water before,” and did not “know if it was fear of
the water or just that the accident was, you know, fresh.”38 Edwards did not
suggest that he has experienced a fear of water since the snorkeling trip, and
34
35
36
37
38
Id. at 8-9; R. Doc. 57-1 at 2.
R. Doc. 51-2 at 2; R. Doc. 57-4 at 7-8.
R. Doc. 51-2 at 2-3, 5.
R. Doc. 57-4 at 12.
Id.
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he testified that he has gone fishing again and has been back on boats without
problems.39 The Court cannot discern from the record what injury Edwards
has suffered. Without more evidence of a specific physical or emotional
injury, no reasonable fact-finder could find that Edwards is entitled to relief.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252; Gough, 996 F.2d at 767. Accordingly,
his claims must be dismissed.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment and
partial summary judgment are GRANTED. The claims of Justin McCarthy,
Michael Harrell, Patrick Beck, and Beck’s minor son, C.D.B., are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE insofar as they assert a breach of a duty of
seaworthiness. Further, the claims of Tracy Edwards and Charles “Nick”
Siria are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
21st
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of March, 2018.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
39
R. Doc. 51-2 at 5-6.
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