Naz, LLC v. Philips Healthcare
ORDER granting in part & denying in part 11 Motion for More Definite Statement as stated herein. FURTHER ORDERED that, w/in 7 days, consistent with this Order & Reasons, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1653, the plaintiff must file an amended complaint correcting its defective jurisdictional allegations. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 7/26/2017. (caa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PHILIPS HEALTHCARE, A DIVISION OF
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the defendant’s Rule 12(e) motion for
more definite statement and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or,
alternatively, for more definite statement.
For the reasons that
follow, the motion is GRANTED in part (insofar as the plaintiff
must amend its complaint to identify the citizenship of each of
its members) and DENIED in part (insofar as the plaintiff has
satisfied its notice pleading obligation with respect to its
allegations of the sale of the MRI and the defendant is not
entitled to a more definite statement).
This litigation arises from a medical facility’s purchase of
shoddy installation and service of the MRI equipment, as well as
its failure to provide the purchaser with the “complete package”
including the hardware and software components that should have
been delivered when the MRI equipment was installed.
This extensive factual summary is drawn from the allegations
of the complaint.
Philips Healthcare, a Division of Philips
medical and diagnostic equipment, including the Ingenia 3.0T Omega
Philips Medical Capital (PMC) is the financing arm of
Philips, but Philips leads its customers to believe that Philips
controls the financing terms of its equipment sales in order to
The medical facility at 2909 Kingman Street
was constructed to expand the existing medical center (2905 Kingman
St.) with the addition of a state of the art neuroscience center
and ambulatory surgery center.
Critical to this expansion, the
neuroscience center was to house an Ingenia 3.0T Omega MRI.
Morteza Shamsnia, as principal of NAZ, decided that a new, state
MRI, or magnetic resonance imaging, is non-invasive imaging
technology that, using a large magnet and radio waves, produces
and structures inside the body.
of the art 3T MRI would provide better services to patients, would
produce much higher quality MR images, would allow vast expansion
of his research into subjects such as autism, dementia, Alzheimer’s
Shamsnia decided, with the proper computer hardware and software
equipment, it would expand the number and geographical reach of
services, and thereby increase NAZ’s revenue and profits.
After research and discussions with various manufactures, Dr.
Shamsnia, on behalf of NAZ, decided to purchase the Philips Ingenia
3.0T Omega MRI neurological complete package.
package was crafted to serve NAZ’s and Dr. Shamsnia’s particular
purposes for use of the machine.
Philips marketed its product
with promises and representations that the MRI package was the
equipment needed to achieve the particular purposes sought by Dr.
Shamsnia on behalf of NAZ.
including those regarding the high level of skill, expertise, and
knowledge possessed by Philips, its engineers, and installation
specialists, Dr. Shamsnia signed a quote document that set forth
the price and components, package, and services Philips promised
In doing so, Dr. Shamsnia (on behalf of NAZ) made a
counteroffer to Philips’ quote or proposal by adding to the terms
a condition that acceptance was contingent upon Philips providing
financing for the purchase of the MRI at 3.9%.
The effective dates
of this quote document were December 11 and December 30, 2011.
Nevertheless, it is alleged, there was never a meeting of the
minds as to this quote document, which was never fully executed.
Negotiations regarding the sale terms continued.
In May 2012, a Philips financial sales representative sent
another “partial” quote document to Dr. Shamsnia, who countered by
attaching additional conditions of the sale.
Dr. Shamsnia noted
on the quote that any agreement on the sale of the Ingenia 3.1T
was conditioned upon Philips confirming its authority to lock in
the financing terms previously requested by Dr. Shamsnia and made
representative ever signed this partial quote document and the
Philips Standard Terms and Conditions of Sale were never sent or
explained to Dr. Shamsnia.
This partial quote document, which had
the effective dates of May 14, 2012 to June 28, 2012, was never
finalized and never became effective or binding on NAZ.
Negotiations between Philips and Dr. Shamsnia continued in an
attempt to reach an agreement on the sale terms and conditions and
on the services, instructions, and recommendations by Philips.
While the negotiations continued, because of the delays, Philips
and NAZ agreed that Philips would deliver the Ingenia MRI package,
and Dr. Shamsnia on behalf of NAZ agreed to follow Philips’
experts’ instructions and recommendations regarding installation
Before the MRI package could be installed, the facility and
room where it would be housed needed to be constructed and modeled
according to Philips’ experts’ specifications.
NAZ had expended
significant costs to construct and model the second floor of its
movement below in the medical facility’s parking lot, the MRI
package needed to be located on the third floor.
NAZ then incurred
additional costs to reconstruct the third floor of the facility to
house the MRI package.
NAZ relied upon Philips’ engineers and
installation specialists, who installed the MRI package and its
components on the facility’s third floor.
engineers participated in weekly meetings, discussing in detail
the issue of vibration and sound isolation.
NAZ articulated its
concerns regarding vibration and the support system for the MRI
Philips’ experts showed photographs and told NAZ that the
redesigned, special pads for 3T MRI units solved those concerns:
the experts reassured NAZ that the weight of the unit and the
special modified pads were adequate and safe to operate the MRI
package and prevent its movement during operation.
mentioned the existence of anti-seismic brackets.
On December 22, 2014, the Philips’ team released the MRI
package to NAZ and represented that it was safe for patient use.
At that time, Philips began to request monthly payments on the MRI
Dr. Shamsnia, on behalf of NAZ, began making payments to
Philips’ financing arm, PMC.
NAZ hired a board certified MRI
technician, who was sent to Philips’ headquarters in Cleveland,
Ohio to receive training on the 3T Philips MRI before January 5,
The MRI use on patients and volunteers began on January 5,
2015 and continued for only four days.
When the technician
returned on January 12, 2015, the technician noted improper signals
during calibration as well as gaps and separation of the covers on
the MRI unit.
Immediately, she notified Philips engineers.
afternoon, a Philips engineer made a site visit and noticed these
When the engineer opened the bottom cover of the MRI
unit, it revealed a significant, clear shift and sliding of the
vibration pads from their originally installed location.
unit was inoperable and service was required to render it safe for
Philips agreed to service the MRI unit, which was tendered to
Philips’ engineering team for modifications and repairs to allow
Philips the opportunity to correct the faulty condition.
January 13, 2015, Philips’ senior engineers arrived at the facility
and discovered that the MRI had moved inches from where Philips’
engineers had originally installed it.
The engineers inquired
about the possibility of an earthquake as the explanation for the
After inspecting the unit, the engineers evacuated the
facility based on their concern that the unit might explode.
then “quenched” the MRI, which involved de-energizing the MRI and
discharging it of all of the helium gas in the MRI system; the
helium was released through a vent pipe on the roof.
The MRI was
Two days later, NAZ employee discovered water from heavy
rainfall the night before had entered through the roof and flooded
the floors, walls, and ceiling of the MRI room, as well as the
floors of the surrounding rooms.
It was later determined that
Philips’ engineers had caused an opening in the roof through which
the water entered the facility.
NAZ had to pay $850,000 to repair
Even after months of communication, Philips’ experts could
not determine the cause of the MRI’s malfunction.
its own experts at its own expense.
NAZ had to hire
NAZ’s experts determined that
the cause of the malfunction was the movement of the MRI in normal
operation; the support system for the MRI equipment was inadequate,
which caused the approximately 4,600 kilogram (10,000+ pound)
magnet to move while the MRI was being used.
When Philips was
notified of this discovery, it admitted that the support system it
had recommended and installed was neither suitable nor safe.
NAZ then had to spend additional time and money to obtain
additional equipment to repair the problem caused by Philips.
oversight, direction, control, and approval of Philips’ engineers
and done according to Philips’ specifications and modifications.
These included additional modifications to the door and the room
in which the MRI was housed.
Given the continuing inspections,
troubleshooting, repairs, reinstallation, and testing, the MRI
equipment was not re-activated until after April 2016.
Because the continuing repair, modification, reinstallation,
and redelivery of the MRI equipment took so long, it was not until
sometime after April 2016 that NAZ discovered that the computer
software and hardware package component that should have been
installed with the MRI equipment had not been installed.
the software and hardware component of the MRI package was central
to NAZ’s agreement to purchase the MRI equipment from Philips at
component has not been delivered to this date, NAZ claims that
Philips has failed to deliver the MRI package it purchased.
claims that Philips’ failure to properly install and configure the
MRI equipment and because of the structural alterations of the
appropriate governmental agency for approval of the ambulatory
surgery center cannot be initiated by NAZ, which has resulted in
loss of use and profits.
required NAZ to complete advance training, which did not occur
until after May 2016.
Certification for clinical use of the MRI
equipment by the American College of Radiology was not obtained
until August 2016.
On April 4, 2017, NAZ, LLC sued Philips Healthcare, alleging
gross fault (because, as a manufacturer of highly complex medical
diagnostic equipment, Philips should be held to a heightened
standard of care from which Philips grossly deviated) and several
breach of contract causes of action: breach of obligation to
provide a complete system that would fit NAZ’s particular purposes
of which Philips was aware, in violation of Louisiana Civil Code
Louisiana Civil Code article 1997; bad faith seller in redhibition,
in violation of Louisiana Civil Code article 2520; failure to make
timely deliver, in violation of Louisiana Civil Code article 2485;
and breach of installation and service agreements.
NAZ seeks to
occasioned by the sale; loss of business with respect to use of
the MRI package; loss of business with respect to use of NAZ’s
surgery center; loss of profits with respect to use of the MRI
package; loss of profits with respect to use of plaintiff’s surgery
center; loss of goodwill; costs and expenses incurred in relation
to damages to the facility caused by the quenching of the MRI;
loss of intellectual gratification and physical enjoyment of the
MRI and ambulatory surgery center; inconvenience; financing costs
associated with repairs and testing of the MRI and MRI room; costs
incurred to mitigate damages or costs associated with repairs to
and testing of the MRI and MRI room; costs incurred to preserve
the MRI and related equipment; depreciation; overhead costs and
expenses; in the event of rescission, return of the purchase price
with interest from the time of the sale and all expenses incurred
as a result of the sale; attorney’s fees and litigation costs; and
any and all penalties, punitive or exemplary damages, fines, fees,
defendant now moves for a more definite statement as to the
plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations and moves to dismiss, or
plaintiff’s claims arising from the alleged contract of sale.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Such a motion is rarely
granted because it is viewed with disfavor.
See Lowrey v. Tex. A
& M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d
1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. at
678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s]
all well-pleaded facts as true and view[s] all facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.”
See Thompson v. City of Waco,
Texas, 764 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Doe ex rel. Magee
v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th
Cir. 2012)(en banc)).
But, in deciding whether dismissal is
warranted, the Court will not accept conclusory allegations in the
complaint as true.
Id. at 502-03 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
To survive dismissal, “‘a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603
(5th Cir. 2009)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)(internal quotation
marks omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and
“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
This is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
Id. at 679.
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are
merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).
“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’”, thus, “requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Finally, “[w]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district
court ‘must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as
other sources ordinarily examined when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th
Cir. 2011)(quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).
statement of a complaint when it is “so vague or ambiguous that
the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”
Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(e)(the moving party must “point out the defects complained of
and the details desired.”). Like other Rule 12 motions, Rule 12(e)
motions are generally disfavored because of the liberal pleading
standard articulated by Rule 8.
See Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers,
Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959).
Rule 12(e) motions should
not be used as a substitute for discovery.
motions should be used sparingly to remedy “a pleading that states
a claim so vaguely or ambiguously that it cannot be answered.”
See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1376, at
315, 328 (3d ed. 2004)(“The narrow range of application of Rule
12(e) and the recognition that many motions for a more definite
statement are interposed largely for the purposes of delay, raises
the question of its contemporary value.
Some commentators and
judges have advocated that the motion be abolished entirely,
thereby remitting parties who desire the clarification of a claim
asserted against them to the discovery process.”).
First, Philips seeks “a more definite statement” concerning
the plaintiff’s allegations supporting this Court’s exercise of
The defendant submits that the plaintiff
has failed to identify the citizenship of each member of its LLC
and, therefore, has failed to sufficiently allege that this Court
has diversity jurisdiction.
The plaintiff counters that it pled
sufficient facts to allow the Court to infer that the parties are
diverse, and that the identity and citizenship of its members is
readily ascertainable by performing a search on the internet.
Court finds that the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations are
defective, but will permit amendment.
determined by the citizenship of all of its members.
Grey Wolf Drilling, 542 F.3d 1077, 1080-81 (5th Cir. 2008). 2
The Fifth Circuit observed:
Supreme Court precedent, case law from other circuits,
and the statutory language of both Section 1332 and
overwhelmingly support the position that a LLC should
not be treated as a corporation for the purposes of
jurisdiction must identify members of an LLC and allege each
member’s citizenship in order to sufficiently allege that the Court
Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff made only conclusory
allegations concerning diversity jurisdiction. 3
Simply put, the
citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of all of
its members; the burden is on the party invoking this Court’s
jurisdiction to sufficiently allege jurisdictional facts on the
face of the complaint -- it is not for the Court to assume that
all unnamed members of the plaintiff LLC are diverse from the
defendant, nor is it for the respondent to consult resources
outside of the complaint to search for jurisdictional facts.
a party has the affirmative burden to allege particular facts
within its knowledge, its burden is discharged when it explicitly
pleads those facts.
See Getty Oil Corp., a Div. of Texaco Inc. v.
diversity jurisdiction. Rather, the citizenship of [an]
LLC is determined by the citizenship of all of its
pursuant to 28
“This Court has original jurisdiction
U.S.C. § 1332(a) because Plaintiff and Defendant
of different states, and the jurisdictional
in that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.”
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988)(Where
“[d]effective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended” pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1653, the plaintiff will be permitted to amend its
The defendant moves to dismiss, or seeks a more definite
statement regarding, the plaintiff’s allegations relative to any
alleged “sale” of the MRI equipment.
The defendant identifies
what it perceives as several deficiencies in the plaintiff’s
First, the defendant contends that the plaintiff
fails to plead facts sufficient to identify the parties to the
sale; the defendant submits evidence to support its belief that
the true purchaser of the 3T MRI was Advanced Neurodiagnostics
Center, not NAZ. Second, the defendant contends that the plaintiff
fails to adequately plead the requisite elements concerning a valid
sale under Louisiana law, in particular, that the plaintiff fails
to properly plead “the parties’ concurrence on the thing sold” and
fails to plead the price it paid for the thing sold.
disagrees; the plaintiff’s detailed allegations amply satisfy the
liberal pleading standard and policy of Rule 8, Twombly, and Iqbal.
Although the plaintiff alleges several different claims for
relief, the defendant focuses its challenge on the allegations
Louisiana Civil Code article 2439 defines a “sale” as “a contract
whereby a person transfers ownership of a thing to another for a
price in money.
A valid sale in Louisiana requires concurrence on
(1) the thing sold, (2) the price, and (3) the
consent of the parties.”
Viewing all well pleaded facts in the light most favorable to
NAZ, the plaintiff alleges that Dr. Shamsnia, on behalf of NAZ,
decided to and ultimately did buy from Philips the Philips Ingenia
transaction was financed through PMC.
Negotiations among Dr.
Shamsnia and Philips were extensive and prolonged; there were many
discussions and disputes regarding the terms of the sale, the
financing of the sale, and the specifications of Philips’ services,
instructions, and recommendations.
Despite an impasse among NAZ
and Philips on some terms and conditions of the sale, the parties
governing the transaction.
Philips delivered and installed the
MRI machine in NAZ’s medical facility in Metairie, and in exchange
for delivery and other obligations performed by Philips, NAZ began
making its payments based on the financing arrangement it had with
NAZ then alleges that Philips’ careless installation of the
MRI equipment (among other failings) and the way its experts
handled the consequences of that faulty installation, it has
suffered very specific and wide ranging damages.
Suffice it to
say, this is a simplistic summary of the plaintiff’s very detailed
sufficient to identify the parties to the alleged sale. But simply
consulting the face of the complaint -- as the Court must at the
pleadings stage -- reveals the identities of the parties to the
the complaint clearly alleges that NAZ, Inc. purchased from
Philips the MRI equipment, and that the sale was financed through
PMC. Although the complaint specifies that Dr. Shamsnia negotiated
the sale, it is alleged that he did so “on behalf of NAZ, Inc.”
Philips concedes that the face of the complaint identifies
these particular parties as the parties to the alleged sale (which
should end the Court’s inquiry at this stage), but Philips urges
the Court to consider an extraneous exhibit it submits in support
of its “belief” that the true purchaser of the 3T MRI was, in fact,
Advanced Neurodiagnostics Center, not NAZ, Inc. 4
At this, the
pleadings stage, the Court’s task is not to resolve disputed fact
issues by resort to matters outside the pleadings.
Court’s task is to view the alleged facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether a claim upon which
“Quotation” was an exhibit ordinarily considered in assessing the
inappropriate to consider it for the purpose advanced by the
Submitting an exhibit that it says calls into question whether
NAZ was the purchaser of the MRI equipment, Philips draws the
Court’s attention to a “Quotation” document that indicates:
ADVANCED NEURODIAGNOSTIC CENTER
2905 Kingman St.
Metairie, LA 7006
The second page of this “Quotation” document describes as the
product subject to the “lease” or “purchase order” the Ingenia
3.0T Omega product. The purchase price is redacted, and there are
other portions of the document that are scratched through, in
addition to handwritten note at the end of the document indicating
that the [redacted] purchase price is agreed upon subject to
financing; the handwritten note also references “our previous
plaintiff alleges that it, NAZ, Inc., purchased from Philips the
3T MRI, which was financed through PMC.
The Federal Rules require
If discovery exposes otherwise, Philips will enjoy
summary judgment efforts. 5
Even if the complaint alleges facts sufficient to identify
the parties to the alleged sale, as the Court finds that it does,
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations, arguing that: the
plaintiff fails to properly plead the parties’ concurrence on “the
thing sold” (in that the plaintiff itself alleges that there was
no meeting of the minds on the terms and conditions of the sale);
the plaintiff fails to plead facts regarding the price of the thing
sold; and the plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to show a
concurrence on the consent of the parties element of a sale under
Although this Quotation document is referenced in NAZ’s
complaint, along with other quote documents and other terms and
conditions of sale, considering this exhibit to make a factual or
merits determination on the issue of whether NAZ was the true
purchaser of the MRI equipment is procedurally improper. The only
issue for this Court to determine on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
whether the plaintiff’s allegations plausibly state a claim for
relief. And the Court does so by taking the allegations as true.
By attempting to call into question the truth of the plaintiff’s
allegations, the defendant perverts the limited inquiry the Court
makes on a motion challenging the sufficiency of pleadings.
The plaintiff counters that it has alleged facts
sufficient to show or allow the inference that Philips sold NAZ
the MRI machine. The plaintiff contends that it adequately alleges
that, while there was a meeting of the minds and consent on the
thing, price, and delivery, there was no meeting of the minds nor
consent regarding Philips’ Standard Conditions of Sale, and there
was only partial delivery of the MRI package because the software
component was never delivered; the complaint alleges that after
much negotiation, the defendant delivered and installed complex
and expensive MRI equipment and that a financing arrangement was
made for doing so.
The plaintiff’s allegations withstand the
defendant’s three remaining challenges.
To be sure, a plaintiff alleging breach of contract arising
from a sale under Louisiana law must plead facts sufficient to
notify the defendant of the thing sold, that a price was paid for
the thing sold, and that the parties consented to the sale.
La. C.C. art. 2439.
The plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to
satisfy the federal pleading standard on these substantive state
NAZ alleges that it purchased a 3T MRI complete
package (which at various places in the 22-page complaint is
alleged to include a variety of equipment, software, hardware,
installation, service, among other components) 6 from Philips for
a price agreed to by the parties and financed by PMC, 7 and that
both parties performed some or part of their obligations pursuant
to their agreement; the facts alleged by NAZ, including that
Philips delivered and installed and serviced an MRI machine it
sold to NAZ, compels the Court to infer that the parties consented
to the sale.
That performance began while negotiations regarding
the terms of the sale were ongoing, or that the some terms of the
sale may not be finalized or contained in any one document, does
not detract from the sufficiency of the factual allegations or
plausibly suggest that Philips sold its MRI equipment to NAZ.
Finally, insofar as the defendant seeks a more definite statement
from the plaintiff to “properly identify the parties to the alleged
Philips takes issue with what it regards as “inconsistencies” and
the plaintiff’s failure to “clearly identify” what it means by
But the plaintiff alleges many facts in
support of what was included in the sale and one may infer from
these facts that the thing sold included not just the MRI machine
and equipment needed to properly physically install it, but also
hardware, software,, installation, and service.
7 Like its other arguments, Philips’ argument that the plaintiff
failed to sufficiently plead a “sale” under Louisiana law because
the plaintiff did not specify the exact price paid for the
equipment and service elevates form over substance. Moreover, it
appears that Philips itself redacted the purchase price listed on
the two-page quote it asks this Court to consider; that same
exhibit warns that the quote contains confidential information
that may not be disclosed without Philips’ consent.
contract of sale, the item(s) sold and the price paid for that
item(s)” the defendant seeks to expand Rule 12(e) beyond its
confined (if not obsolete) scope and appears to misunderstand the
liberal pleading policy of Rule 8.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED: that
plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations are defective as stated
herein) and the motion is otherwise DENIED in part (insofar as the
plaintiff’s allegations concerning the sale of the MRI complete
package satisfy Rule 8). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that, within seven
days, consistent with this Order and Reasons, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1653, the plaintiff must file an amended complaint correcting
its defective jurisdictional allegations.
New Orleans, Louisiana, July 26, 2017
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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