Deloach Marine Services, LLC v. Marquette Transportation Company, LLC

Filing 59

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that both captains were negligent in the January 26, 2016 collision. Defendant Marquette shall bear 70% of the total damages sustained by Ingram, and plaintiff Deloach shall bear the remaining 30% of the costs. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/2/2019.(mm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DELOACH MARINE SERVICES, LLC

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 17-2970

MARQUETTE TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, LLC

SECTION “R” (3)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of a collision between the M/V VANPORT, a vessel

owned by plaintiff Deloach Marine Services, and the M/V JUSTIN PAUL
ECKSTEIN

(JUSTIN),

a

Transportation Company. 1

vessel

owned

by

defendant

Marquette

The collision resulted in damages to the

VANPORT’s cargo in the amount of $1,172,739.30. 2 Plaintiff paid the owner
of the cargo the full loss amount in exchange for a release of claims against it
and took an assignment of the owner’s claim to recover the loss from
defendant.3 On April 6, 2017, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in this Court seeking
damages and contribution.4 Plaintiff alleges that the collision was caused by

1
2
3
4

R. Doc. 1 at 2 ¶ 4.
Id. at 4 ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10.
See generally id.

defendant’s negligence through its employee, the captain of the JUSTIN.5
Defendant denies that it was negligent and counterclaims that the plaintiff,
through its employee, the captain of the VANPORT, was contributorily
negligent.6
On February 11 and 12, 2019, the Court held a bench trial. The Court
has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. After hearing live
testimony and reviewing all the evidence presented by the capable and
experienced maritime lawyers on each side, the Court rules as follows.

II.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

Background

At trial, Billy Jackson, captain of the JUSTIN, testified that on January
26, 2016, shortly before 1:00 p.m., the JUSTIN was on the right descending
bank of the Mississippi River, near mile marker 131, with six barges in tow.7
The JUSTIN was directly behind the CGB LaPlace fleeting facility, a barge
storage area. 8 Captain Jackson wanted to “flip off” of the river bank and “top
around” the JUSTIN, which involved turning the ship around to face the

5
6
7
8

Id. at 3 ¶ 7.
R. Doc. 5 at 4-5.
Testimony of Billy Jackson; Joint Exhibit 41.
Joint Exhibit 41; Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
2

opposite direction. 9 As was his practice, Captain Jackson made a security
call to all vessels in the area alerting them of his intention.10 Captain Jackson
stated over the vessel radio at 12:49p.m., “JUSTIN PAUL ECKSTEIN. Going
to be delivering six loads around bottom of the CGB Laplace off the west
bank. Turn around heading south.”11 At the time of Captain Jackson’s call,
Matthew Vidrine, the captain of the VANPORT, was near Bonnet Carré Point
proceeding down river with four barges in tow. 12 Captain Vidrine testified
that he heard Captain Jackson’s radio message, but that he did not feel an
obligation to respond, because Captain Jackson’s message was merely
alerting all boat traffic of his intention. 13
Ten minutes earlier, at 12:39p.m., Captain Vidrine had made a passing
agreement with a large, oceangoing ship the BEATRICE, which was also
travelling downriver. He stated over the radio, “I wouldn’t mind getting you
by me . . . I’ll pull it back and float.”14 The two captains agreed that the
BEATRICE would pass the VANPORT on the VANPORT’s port side.15 The

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Testimony of Billy Jackson.
Id.
Joint Exhibit 7.
Joint Exhibit 4.
Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
Joint Exhibit 7.
Id.
3

BEATRICE therefore asked the VANPORT to “favor the barge fleet.”16
Captain Vidrine understood that he had to stay close to the CGB Laplace fleet
on the right descending bank so that the BEATRICE, a large vessel, could
travel in the deepest part of the river channel.17 The BEATRICE also needed
to travel closer than it usually would to the right side of the channel, because
the BEATRICE had a second passing agreement with a vessel moving
upriver, in which the BEATRICE agreed stay to the right and let the vessel
pass on its port side.18 Finally, a strong river current was pushing the
VANPORT quickly downriver and toward the left descending bank. Thus,
Captain Vidrine had to turn toward the right descending bank to fight the
current.19 For all of these reasons, the VANPORT was required to travel as
close to the right edge of the channel as possible. Captain Vidrine testified
that, after he made the agreement with the BEATRICE, he put the vessel in
idle 20 and turned the VANPORT toward the right descending bank.21 He
then continued down river as the BEATRICE began to overtake him. 22

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id.
Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
Id.
Testimony of Samuel Schropp.
Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
Id.
Id.
4

At 12:54p.m. Captain Jackson made a radio call to the VANPORT and
initiated the following exchange:
JUSTIN: I straightened her up there with all the traffic coming.
I think you’re down far enough now that I can go ahead and start
letting her spin.
VANPORT: Yeah, you sure can. I’m just slowed down to get this
ship by me . . . .
JUSTIN: Yeah, seeing as how I’m going to be about abreast here
and I got her crossways, I didn’t want to have my head stuck out
there in nobody’s way.
VANPORT: I appreciate it. I saw that, but I had confidence. 23
Captain Vidrine testified that he understood this conversation to mean that
the JUSTIN would wait for him to pass and top around behind him. 24 He
testified that the JUSTIN had to straighten up to avoid “all this traffic
coming,” i.e., vessels such as the BEATRICE and the VANPORT.25
“Straightened her up” meant that the JUSTIN had pulled back against the
bank behind the fleet, out of the navigational channel of the river.26 Captain
Vidrine therefore understood Captain Jackson to be telling him that the
JUSTIN was out of the navigational channel, and that it would stay

23
24
25
26

Joint Exhibit 7.
Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
Id.
Id.
5

underneath the fleet and out of the navigational channel until the VANPORT
had safely passed. 27 Captain Vidrine testified that he agreed that the JUSTIN
could “start or prepare for his spin,” because he thought he was giving
permission for the JUSTIN to “spin in behind [the VANPORT] and fall in
behind [it].”28 He did not know how long it would take the JUSTIN, with the
cargo it was carrying, to execute the top around maneuver. 29 Indeed, such a
calculation would have been nearly impossible, because Captain Vidrine
could see the JUSTIN only in his Rose Point display.30 This display did not
include an image of the JUSTIN’s tow. 31 Captain Vidrine therefore did not
have access to information required to calculate the speed at which the
JUSTIN would turn when he gave permission for it to begin turning.
Conversely, Captain Jackson interpreted the exchange between the
VANPORT and the JUSTIN as creating an agreement in which the
VANPORT would stay clear of the JUSTIN while the JUSTIN executed the

Id.
Id.
29
Id.
30
Rose Point is a marine navigation software program that allows vessel
captains to see their vessel’s trajectory as well as the position of other vessels
near them. See Marquette Transp. Co., LLC v. M/V Century Dream, No. 16522, 2017 WL 677814, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 21, 2017) (referring to the Rose
Point navigational system as “the industry standard” that “automatically and
objectively record[s] vessel location and movement on a proven industry
standard electronic chart”).
31
Testimony of Samuel Schropp.
6
27

28

top around maneuver ahead of the VANPORT. 32

Captain Jackson

understood Captain Vidrine’s statement, “yeah, you sure can,” as permission
to do the top around maneuver immediately. 33 He therefore proceeded
immediately to begin topping around.34 Captain Jackson testified that he
thought he had room to top around in front of the VANPORT in part due to
Captain Vidrine’s statement that the VANPORT had “cut back” its speed for
the BEATRICE. 35

He expected the VANPORT to continue running at

reduced speed because that was “what we had talked about when we made
the agreement.”36
The Court credits both captains’ testimony and finds that they had two
conflicting interpretations of the radio exchange. It also finds that the
differing understandings of the radio exchange led the captains to proceed
into the same spot in the river at the same time, each thinking that the other
vessel would stay clear.
B.

The Collision

The Rose Point data from the two vessels shows that after the radio
exchange, the VANPORT continued an essentially straight course along the

32
33
34
35
36

Testimony of Billy Jackson.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
7

edge of the navigational channel, hugging the fleet along the right descending
bank.37 The JUSTIN pulled out from the bank and began to top around in
the VANPORT’s path.

The BEATRICE reached the VANPORT at

approximately 12:56p.m., travelling in the middle of the channel on the
VANPORT’s port side.38 The VANPORT could not turn toward the middle of
the river until the BEATRICE had safely passed. The VANPORT’s black box
CCTV footage shows that the BEATRICE did not clear the front end of the
VANPORT until 12:58, about one minute before the collision. 39
Just as the BEATRICE was clear, the Rose Point data shows that the
VANPORT began to steer hard to port, away from the JUSTIN. 40 Captain
Vidrine testified that he realized the JUSTIN was turning into his path at the
same moment that the BEATRICE finished passing the VANPORT. 41 He
immediately took the vessel out of idle and turned toward the center of the
channel, away from the JUSTIN.42 Captain Vidrine radioed the JUSTIN at
this point, stating, “I hope you’re backing down.”43

37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Joint Exhibit 2; Joint Exhibit 4.
Joint Exhibit 40.
Joint Exhibit 5.
Joint Exhibit 4; Testimony of Samuel Schropp.
Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
Id.
Joint Exhibit 7.
8

Captain Jackson

responded, “Roger, roger, I’m backing away from you.”44 But by the time
Captain Vidrine appreciated the risk of collision and communicated it to the
JUSTIN, the vessels could not move out of each other’s way quickly enough
to avoid a collision.
The vessels collided just before 12:59p.m. 45 The JUSTIN’s tow hit the
side of the lead barge of the VANPORT’s tow.46 After the collision, Captain
Jackson stated over the radio, “that’s why I asked you whether you thought
it would be all right for me to go ahead and start turning . . . I ain’t but six
foot off the bank.”47 Captain Vidrine said nothing further over the radio. 48
C.

Damages

As a result of the collision, Ingram, the owner of the VANPORT’s cargo,
incurred damages in the amount of $1,172,739.30.49 Plaintiff reimbursed
Ingram for the full amount of this loss and took an assignment of Ingram’s
claim to recover the loss from defendant. 50

44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
Joint Exhibit 2, Joint Exhibit 4, Testimony of Samuel Schropp.
Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
Joint Exhibit 7.
Id.
Joint Exhibit 15 at 1.
Id. at 2-3.
9

D.

Maritime Negligence

Plaintiff argues that defendant, through its employee Captain Jackson,
negligently caused its damages by: (1) performing the top around maneuver
before the VANPORT, as the ship with the right of way, had passed; and (2)
violating Rule 2, Rule 5, Rule 7, and Rule 14 of the Inland Navigation Rules.51
Defendant responds that it was not negligent, and that Captain Vidrine was
negligent in: (1) violating Rule 2, Rule 5, Rule 6, Rule 7, Rule 8, and Rule 14
of the Inland Navigation Rules; and (2) violating industry custom or practice
of abiding by top around agreements.52 The Court addresses the parties’
arguments in three parts: (1) negligence under the requirement that seamen
take reasonable care, (2) negligence under the Pennsylvania Rule; and (3)
negligence in violating an industry custom or practice.
1.

Failure to Take Reasonable Care

“To establish maritime negligence, a plaintiff must ‘demonstrate that
there was a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, breach of that duty,
injury sustained by [the] plaintiff, and a causal connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.’” Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil
Co., 220 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Cooper/T. Smith, 929

51
52

R. Doc. 41.
R. Doc. 37; Testimony of Gregory Smith.
10

F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1991)). “Even without a statutory violation, liability
may be imposed simply where there is negligence.” Stolt Achievement, Ltd.
v. Dredge B.E. LINDHOLM, 447 F.3d 360, 364 (5th Cir. 2006); see also
Movible Offshore, Inc. v. M/V Wilken A. Falgout, 471 F.2d 268, 274 (5th Cir.
1973) (“It is enough that the vessel sought to be charged had at its disposal
safe means to avoid the collision and negligently failed to do so.” (emphasis
in original)). “The applicable standards of care in a collision case stem from
the traditional concepts of prudent seamanship and reasonable care . . . .”
Stolt, 447 F.3d at 364; see also Folkstone Mar., Ltd. v. CSX Corp., 64 F.3d
1037, 1046 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that seamen have a duty to take
“reasonable care under the circumstances”).
The Court determines that both captains failed to adhere to a standard
of reasonable care under the circumstances, but that defendant was more at
fault than plaintiff. First, the JUSTIN’s decision to perform the top around
maneuver in front of oncoming traffic created the unsafe circumstances that
led to the collision. Both parties agree that the VANPORT had the right of
way as the downbound vessel.53 Captain Jackson testified that he heard the
VANPORT make its passing agreement with the BEATRICE. 54 Knowing that

53
54

Testimony of Matthew Vidrine; Testimony of Billy Jackson.
Testimony of Billy Jackson.
11

the VANPORT would soon pass by very close to where he intended to
perform the top around maneuver, the JUSTIN should have waited until the
channel was clear before topping around. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has
recognized that a party is negligent if it fails to yield to boat traffic with the
right of way, especially when that party sets in motion a course of events
resulting in a collision. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Tug Mary Malloy, 414 F.2d
669, 673 (5th Cir. 1969) (upholding trial court’s assignment of full liability to
defendant because its “failure to yield the right-of-way can properly be
described as that cause which necessarily sets the other cause or causes in
operation in a natural and continuous sequence” (quotation marks
omitted)).

The JUSTIN bears primary responsibility for creating a

dangerous situation in which the VANPORT, already pushed to the side of
the channel by the BEATRICE, was forced to thread a needle between two
other vessels.
Second, the JUSTIN was negligent in failing to clearly communicate its
intent to turn in front of, rather than behind or to the side of, the VANPORT.
When Captain Jackson made his security call alerting other traffic of his
intention to top around, he stated only that he was “[g]oing to be delivering
six loads around bottom of the CGB Laplace off the west bank” and that he

12

would “turn around heading south.”55 When he spoke to the VANPORT
directly, he stated, “I think you’re down far enough now that I can go ahead
and start letting her spin.”56 Neither communication gave any indication of
where, in relation to other vessels, the JUSTIN intended to top around. If
anything, the phrase “I think you’re down far enough now” indicated that the
JUSTIN intended to top around behind the VANPORT, rather than in front
of it. The JUSTIN had an obligation, as the vessel moving out into the
channel in front of downbound boat traffic, to clearly communicate its
intentions. The VANPORT reasonably assumed, given that the JUSTIN had
a duty to yield, that the JUSTIN planned to turn behind it. It was therefore
the JUSTIN’s duty to communicate that it intended to turn in front. The
security call and exchange with the VANPORT did not adequately convey this
intent to reverse the typical right-of-way pattern. The JUSTIN was therefore
negligent in failing to clearly articulate its intention.
But the VANPORT was negligent in agreeing over the radio that the
JUSTIN could begin the top around maneuver before the VANPORT had
safely passed the JUSTIN. The VANPORT was favoring the right descending
bank, and Captain Vidrine could see on the vessel’s Rose Point display that

55
56

Joint Exhibit 7.
Id.
13

the JUSTIN was also along the right descending bank. Even if he reasonably
assumed, based on Captain Jackson’s use of the phrase, “I think you’re down
far enough,” that the JUSTIN sought to top around behind the VANPORT,
Captain Vidrine should have known that it was too early for the JUSTIN to
begin its turn. The VANPORT was a mile upriver of the JUSTIN during their
radio exchange. 57 While Captain Jackson was best positioned to know the
speed at which the JUSTIN would turn, Captain Vidrine could still determine
that the JUSTIN’s tow likely would be pulled into the channel before the
VANPORT passed the JUSTIN, based on the swift current. Even taking the
VANPORT’s assumption that the JUSTIN would top around behind it as
reasonable, the VANPORT was negligent in agreeing that the JUSTIN could
start turning before the VANPORT was clear. At a minimum, the VANPORT
should have added a qualifier along the lines of, ‘as long as you stay clear
until I am past you,’ to its assent.
Defendant’s expert testified that the JUSTIN’s decision to top around
was not negligent because there was room for all three vessels to safely pass
in that stretch of river.58 The Court does not credit this testimony because
Captain Vidrine testified that passing closer to the BEATRICE would have

57
58

Testimony of Billy Jackson.
Testimony of Gregory Smith.
14

been “risky,” and that he would not have felt comfortable with it, even though
it would have been physically possible.59 In addition, plaintiff’s expert gave
a conflicting calculation of the distance between the VANPORT and the
BEATRICE in the minutes before the collision, 60 indicating that there would
not have been room for all three vessels to pass. At the very least, the risk of
collision increased with the addition of a third vessel simultaneously passing
through the same stretch of river as the VANPORT, its tow, and the
BEATRICE. A prudent seaman under these circumstances would therefore
have waited until the ships passed, and there was no longer such a risk.
Defendant’s witnesses also testified that the JUSTIN was not negligent
because the JUSTIN was behind the fleet and outside of the navigational
channel before and during the collision. 61 Captain Jackson and defendant’s
expert testified that the VANPORT caused the collision by travelling outside
of the navigational channel.62 The Court does not credit this testimony,
because neither party presented sufficient, reliable evidence on the location
of the channel’s border. Indeed, multiple witnesses agreed that they were
not able to identify the exact edges of the navigational channel.63 Captain

59
60
61
62
63

Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
Testimony of Samuel Schropp.
Testimony of Gregory Smith.
Id.
Testimony of Matthew Vidrine; Testimony of Billy Jackson.
15

Vidrine testified that he was in the channel at the time of the collision. 64 The
Court therefore cannot determine whether the VANPORT was slightly inside
or slightly outside of the navigational channel leading up to the accident or
at the time of the accident. Accordingly, the Court finds that the VANPORT
did not negligently travel outside of the channel.
Defendant also argued that the VANPORT negligently turned toward
the JUSTIN and negligently increased its speed after telling the JUSTIN that
it was traveling slowly. 65 The Court does not credit the testimony that the
VANPORT negligently turned toward the JUSTIN or negligently increased
its speed, because Captain Vidrine and plaintiff’s expert credibly testified
that the current was very strong on the day of the collision. 66 Captain Vidrine
testified that the VANPORT was in idle until only a minute before the
collision. 67 The Court therefore finds that the VANPORT’s increased speed
was due to an increased river current, rather than intervention by Captain
Vidrine. Similarly, the VANPORT turned toward the JUSTIN only because
the current was pushing the VANPORT toward the opposite bank. 68 Captain
Vidrine had to angle the vessel toward the right descending bank in order to

64
65
66
67
68

Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
Testimony of Billy Jackson, Testimony of Gregory Smith.
Testimony of Matthew Vidrine; Testimony of Samuel Schropp.
Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
Testimony of Matthew Vidrine; Testimony of Samuel Schropp.
16

maintain a straight path. 69 Finally, even if the VANPORT had sped up,
Captain Vidrine made no representations to the JUSTIN that he would
continue to idle or slow down. He stated only that, he was “just slowed down
to get this ship by me.” 70 The word “just” implies that Captain Vidrine had
slowed only temporarily. Therefore, it was unreasonable for Captain Jackson
to interpret Captain Vidrine’s statements as a pronouncement that he would
continue to travel slowly.

Accordingly, the VANPORT did not behave

negligently by turning toward the JUSTIN, nor did it negligently increase its
speed.
2.

Negligence under the Pennsylvania Rule

In The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873), the Supreme Court held that,
when . . . a ship at the time of a collision is in actual violation of
a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, it is no more than
a reasonable presumption that the fault, if not the sole cause, was
at least a contributory cause of the disaster. In such a case the
burden rests upon the ship of showing not merely that her fault
might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was
not, but that it could not have been.
Id. at 136. Thus, when a court determines that a party has violated a statute
or rule, the burden then rests on the violator to prove that it was not at fault.
See Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Express, 943 F.2d 1465, 1472 (5th

69
70

Id.
Joint Exhibit 7.
17

Cir. 1991). But the Pennsylvania Rule is not “a hard and fast rule that every
vessel guilty of a statutory fault has the burden of establishing that its fault
could not by any stretch of the imagination have had any causal relation to
the collision, no matter how speculative, improbable, or remote.” In re MidS. Towing Co., 418 F.3d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Compania De
Maderas De Caibarien v. The Queenston Heights, 220 F .2d 120, 122-23 (5th
Cir. 1955)). If a violation was not “a contributory and proximate cause of the
damages sustained,” the Court need not find a party at fault even when they
violated a statute or rule. Id.
The Court finds that both captains violated Rule 2, and that these
violations caused the collision. Rule 2 provides, “[n]othing in these Rules
shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master, or crew thereof, from the
consequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or of the neglect of
any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen,
or by the special circumstances of the case.” 33 C.F.R. § 83.02. As already
discussed, the JUSTIN violated the ordinary practice of seamen when it
failed to yield to oncoming vessel traffic and attempted to execute a
maneuver that was risky under the circumstances, as well as when it failed
to clearly express its intention to travel in front of the VANPORT. The
VANPORT violated the ordinary practice of seamen when it gave permission
18

for the VANPORT to begin to top around in an unsafe location. But because
the JUSTIN created the unsafe situation, its Captain gave an ambiguous
statement of what he intended, and because the JUSTIN was in a better
position to evaluate how quickly it would execute the top around maneuver,
the JUSTIN bears more fault.
The Court also finds that the JUSTIN, but not the VANPORT, violated
Rule 14(d). A head on situation, in which one vessel is travelling upstream
and the other downstream, is governed by Rule 14(d). The Rule provides, “a
power-driven vessel . . . proceeding downbound with a following current
shall have the right-of-way over an upbound vessel, [and] shall propose the
manner of passage.” 33 C.F.R. § 83.14. The VANPORT had the right of way
as the vessel moving downriver. The JUSTIN violated Rule 14(d) when it
performed the top around maneuver in front of the VANPORT, the vessel
with the right of way. Captain Jackson acknowledged that the VANPORT
and other vessels were going to be “about abreast here and I got her
crossways.” 71 If the downbound vessels had the right of way, the JUSTIN
should have waited until they passed and the river was clear to perform the
top around.

71

Joint Exhibit 7.
19

Defendant argues that the VANPORT also had an obligation under
Rule 14(d) to propose a manner of safe passage after it received the JUSTIN’s
radio call. 72 But the VANPORT had no obligation to propose a safe manner
of passage, because the JUSTIN never indicated its intention to turn in front
of the VANPORT. As discussed, it was reasonable for the VANPORT to
understand that the JUSTIN would turn behind it, based on Captain
Jackson’s language and the JUSTIN’s obligation to yield under the Rule 14.
The VANPORT had no obligation to propose a safe manner of passage until
it had notice that the JUSTIN was planning to move in front of it. 73 Captain
Jackson’s security call and exchange with the VANPORT do not constitute
notice, because neither communication included any indication that the
JUSTIN would proceed in front of the VANPORT. The Court found that it
was reasonable for Captain Vidrine to understand that the JUSTIN would
turn behind the VANPORT, even after his discussion with Captain Jackson.
Thus, the VANPORT did not have appropriate notice that the JUSTIN would
turn in front of it, and it therefore had no obligation to propose a safe manner
of passage under Rule 14.

72
73

Testimony of Gregory Smith.
Testimony of Billy Jackson.
20

Finally, the parties’ arguments under Rules 5, 6, 7, and 8 are predicated
on which captain had the proper understanding of how to proceed, based on
his interpretation of the captains’ radio exchange. Accordingly, the parties’
violations of these rules do not change the Court’s analysis. The Court has
already determined that Captain Jackson was negligent in starting to
perform the top around maneuver, and that Captain Vidrine should not have
allowed the JUSTIN to start its turn before the VANPORT had passed.
Rule 5 provides that captains have an obligation to, “at all times
maintain a proper look-out . . . so as to make a full appraisal of . . . the risk of
collision.” 33 C.F.R. § 83.05. Rule 6 provides that vessels must “at all times
proceed at a safe speed.” 33 C.F.R. § 83.06. Rule 7 provides that captains
must use “all available means . . . to determine if risk of collision exists.” 33
C.F.R. § 83.07. Rule 8 provides that captains must take appropriate action
to avoid collision.

33 C.F.R. § 83.08. Plaintiff’s expert argued that the

JUSTIN violated Rule 5 when it failed to hold up under the fleet until the
VANPORT had passed.74 Defendant’s expert argued that the VANPORT
violated Rule 5 when it failed to steer away from the JUSTIN in the minutes
after the radio exchange.75

74
75

Defendant’s expert also argued that the

Testimony of Samuel Schropp.
Testimony of Gregory Smith.
21

VANPORT violated Rule 6 by increasing its speed after the radio exchange.76
Finally, he argued that the VANPORT did not take appropriate action to
determine whether a risk of collision existed and to avoid the collision under
Rules 7 and 8, because the VANPORT continued to travel along the fleet edge
of the channel.77
The Court has already determined what could have been done by each
captain to avoid the collision. In accordance with these findings, neither
captain violated Rule 5. Both captains kept a lookout and were aware of the
other vessel’s position before and during their radio exchange, as evidenced
by their communication. The Court also finds that the captains kept a proper
lookout after the radio exchange. But even if the captains had failed to keep
a lookout after their exchange, their mistake would not have affected the
outcome. The VANPORT was unable to turn away from the JUSTIN until
the BEATRICE had fully passed it. And the river current prevented the
JUSTIN from halting the top around maneuver once it was underway. Thus,
once each captain committed to proceed in a manner consistent with his
understanding of what the other captain was going to do, a proper lookout
could not have averted the collision that the misunderstanding set in motion.

76
77

Id.
Id.
22

In addition, as already discussed, the VANPORT was not traveling at
an unsafe speed. Captain Vidrine put the VANPORT in idle as soon as he
reached an agreement with the BEATRICE, and he did not remove the vessel
from idle until a minute before the collision. His increased speed was due to
a fast river current. Finally, both captains violated Rules 7 and 8 for the
reasons that the Court has already enumerated. The JUSTIN should have
assessed the risk of collision and waited to perform the top around
maneuver, or communicated his intent to turn in front of the VANPORT
more clearly. The VANPORT should have told the JUSTIN not to top around
before it had passed the JUSTIN. The Court therefore finds that these rules
do not change the Court’s conclusions about the nature of the parties’
negligence.
3.

Negligence in Violating an Industry Custom or Practice

Defendant’s expert testified that Captain Jackson’s exchange with the
VANPORT established a top around agreement, and that the VANPORT’s
violation of the agreement’s terms caused the collision. 78

A passing

agreement of this kind must be established by facts in the record. See 2
Admiralty & Mar. Law § 14:3 (6th ed.) (“In order to rely on custom, a party
should plead and prove it as a fact applicable in the particular instance.”).

78

Id.
23

The Court finds that defendant has not met its burden of establishing (1) that
top around agreements are a recognized type of navigational agreement; (2)
the requirements to form and execute a top around agreement; and (3) that
a top around agreement of the kind defendant describes existed between the
VANPORT and the JUSTIN.
First, defendants did not establish that “top around agreements,” as a
species of navigational agreement, exist as a matter of custom or practice in
the maritime industry. The existence of such a maritime custom or practice
was disputed at trial.

While ship captains may make various types of

agreements when a vessel plans to top around, defendant did not
convincingly show that a “top around agreement” is universally recognized
as a category of navigational agreement. Plaintiff’s expert Samuel Schropp
testified that, while top around maneuvers are common, and he was familiar
with hold up agreements, he had never heard of a top around agreement
before this case.79 In addition, defendant’s expert testified that an agreement
was formed between the VANPORT and the JUSTIN in this instance, but he
did not testify to the common characteristics of top around agreements in
the industry. Nor did Captain Vidrine acknowledge his awareness of top
around agreements as a category of navigational agreements. “As a general

79

Testimony of Samuel Schropp.
24

matter, ‘[c]ourts do not favor giving effect to local customs involving
deviations’ from the rules of navigation, and they make an exception only
when the customs ‘are firmly established, and well understood.’”

Hal

Antillen N.V. v. Mount Ymitos MS, 147 F.3d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting
The Giove, 27 F.2d 331, 332 (5th Cir. 1928)).

The Fifth Circuit has

overturned a district court’s finding that a custom existed when “[t]here
[was] highly contradictory testimony concerning the existence or
nonexistence of th[e] alleged custom in [the] waterway.” Id. The Court
therefore finds that defendant did not present sufficient proof of top around
agreements as a practice known generally to seamen.
Even if top around agreements are a regular custom or practice of
mariners on the Mississippi River, defendant did not establish that a top
around agreement allowed it to top around in front of the VANPORT.
Captain Jackson testified that the top around agreement allowed him to
immediately move into the navigational channel and that the VANPORT was
obligated to “stay clear” of the JUSTIN regardless of the JUSTIN’s position.80
Defendant’s expert similarly testified that the agreement between the
VANPORT and the JUSTIN mandated that the VANPORT “stay clear.” 81 But

80
81

Testimony of Billy Jackson.
Testimony of Gregory Smith.
25

Captain Jackson never told Captain Vidrine that he was to stay clear while
Captain Jackson topped around.

Indeed, Captain Jackson made no

indication of where, in relation to the VANPORT, he would top around. 82
Nor did the defendant establish that a duty to “stay clear” is an implied
aspect of all top around agreements, if top around agreements exist.
Defendant’s expert testified that when topping around, “[i]t is common . . .
to [place] a radio security call to get any interested or concerned vessels in
the area to respond,” and to “make sure the traffic is clear [and] you have the
room to . . . top around.”83 Defendant’s expert also testified that the ordinary
practice of seamen is to “give [a vessel topping around] plenty of room to
accomplish that maneuver safely.”84 General practices of (1) placing security
calls alerting traffic of an intent to top around, and (2) staying clear of vessels
topping around, do not indicate that top around agreements always
implicitly convey to an upstream vessel that it must stay clear while a
downstream vessel performs a top around maneuver in front of it. Further,
the defense expert’s account of these duties was not confirmed by any other
evidence in the record, nor has the Court been able to find any reference to a
“top around agreement” in the case law. The Court therefore does not credit

82
83
84

Joint Exhibit 7.
Testimony of Gregory Smith.
Id.
26

Captain Jackson’s testimony that he was entitled to assume that the
VANPORT would stay clear of him based on the alleged top around
agreement.
Finally, even if defendant proved that top around agreements with the
features it suggests exist in industry practice, defendant did not establish that
such a top around agreement was formed between the VANPORT and the
JUSTIN. Defendant provided no evidence of the words required to form a
top around agreement. Captain Vidrine reasonably did not understand the
exchange between the two vessels as an agreement that required him to
yield.85

Captain Vidrine had the right of way, and Captain Jackson’s

language indicated that he intended to turn behind the VANPORT. Captain
Jackson’s ambiguous language is not enough to constitute an offer for an
agreement to be allowed to proceed first, especially given that he was in an
unsafe position in front of oncoming traffic where other captains would not
expect him to be topping around. Thus, the Court does not find that an
agreement was formed because there was no mutual understanding between
the two captains as to what had been agreed upon. An inexact exchange such
as this one does not override the JUSTIN’s obligation to yield to the
VANPORT as the downbound vessel with the right of way under Rule 14(d).

85

Testimony of Matthew Vidrine.
27

See In re Settoon Towing, LLC, No. 14-499, 2016 WL 9447753, at *4-5 (E.D.
La. Mar. 21,2016) (holding that release from a passing agreement did not
allow a vessel to top around in violation of the Inland Rules); 33 C.F.R. §
83.14.
E.

Allocation of Fault

When both parties have acted negligently, “[l]iability . . . must be
apportioned according to the comparative fault of the parties.” Pennzoil, 943
F.2d at 1472. “Apportionment is not a mechanical exercise that depends
upon counting up the errors committed by both parties.” Stolt Achievement,
447 F.3d at 370. Instead, a court must consider “the number and quality of
faults by each party” as well as “the role each fault had in causing the
collision.” Id.
Here, while both parties are at fault, the JUSTIN played a larger role in
causing the collision. The JUSTIN moved into the channel in front of
downstream traffic without taking due care and in violation in Rule 14(d) and
Rule 2, and Captain Jackson did not communicate his intent to move in front
of the VANPORT. While the VANPORT shares fault in giving the JUSTIN
permission to begin topping around, the JUSTIN was best positioned to
know how long it would take for it to complete the maneuver, and how much
space it would need. It therefore is primarily responsible for determining
28

whether it was safe to begin the top around while the VANPORT was
upstream. Finally, the Court does not find that an agreement was established
to permit the JUSTIN and its six barges to reverse directions in front of
oncoming traffic.
The Court ultimately concludes that the JUSTIN initiated an unsafe
maneuver in high current and congested waters, and it expected the other
vessels in the river to make the situation work. The Court therefore finds
Marquette, as the owner of the JUSTIN, 70% at fault, and it finds Deloach,
the owner of the VANPORT, 30% at fault.

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that both captains were
negligent in the January 26, 2016 collision. Defendant Marquette shall bear
70% of the total damages sustained by Ingram, and plaintiff Deloach shall
bear the remaining 30% of the costs.

2nd
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of April, 2019.

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
29