Naquin v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc. et al

Filing 46

ORDER and REASONS granting 42 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as set forth herein. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 6/27/2022. (cbs)

Case 2:17-cv-03584-SSV-DPC Document 46 Filed 06/27/22 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRYANT A. NAQUIN

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 17-3584

B.P. EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL.

SECTION “R” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP
American Production Company, and BP p.l.c.’s (collectively the “BP parties”)
motion for summary judgment.1 Plaintiff Bryant A. Naquin does not oppose
the motion. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion, and
dismisses plaintiff’s complaint.

I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises from plaintiff Bryant Naquin’s alleged exposure to

toxic chemicals following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico. Plaintiff alleges that he was exposed to crude oil and chemical

1

R. Doc. 42. The remaining defendants, Halliburton Energy Services,
Inc., Transocean Deepwater, Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. join the BP parties’
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1 n.1.

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dispersants while he was “living in close proximity to coastal waters.”2
Naquin asserts that he has been continuously exposed to these chemicals
since April 20, 2010. 3 Plaintiff also represents that this continuous exposure
has resulted in “[h]eadaches, skin irritation, shortness of breath, . . . [the
development of] COPD . . . , insomnia, ringing in ears, some pain in muscles,
sluggishness, staph infections, occasional boils, and other injuries.”4
Naquin’s case was originally part of the multidistrict litigation (“MDL”)
pending before Judge Carl J. Barbier. Naquin’s case was severed from the
MDL as one of the “B3” cases for plaintiffs who either opted out of, or were
excluded from, the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement Agreement.5

Naquin is a plaintiff who opted out of the

settlement.6 After plaintiff’s case was severed, it was reallocated to this
Court.

On July 28, 2021 this Court issued a scheduling order that

established, among other deadlines, that plaintiff’s expert disclosures had to
be “obtained and delivered” to defense counsel by no later than April 22,

2
3
4
5

6

R. Doc. 1-1 at 11.
Id. at 5.
Id.
R. Doc. 1-1 at 6; In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the
Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at
*2, 12 & n.12 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021).
R. Doc. 1-1 at 6.
2

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2022. 7 Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that, because
plaintiff has not identified any expert testimony, he is unable to carry his
burden on causation. 8 Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to defendants’
motion. The Court considers the motion below.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). “When assessing whether a
dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence
in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or
weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness
Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or
affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’
are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

7
8

R. Doc. 24 at 1.
R. Doc. 42-1.
3

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Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting
10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. “No genuine dispute
of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the nonmoving party.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475,
481 (5th Cir. 2014).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence
which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went
uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,
1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948,
951 (D. Colo. 1991)). “[T]he nonmoving party can defeat the motion” by
either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the “existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact,” or by “showing that the moving party’s
evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to
return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by
pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
4

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325.

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by

submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the
pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for
resolution. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 ‘mandates the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).
In the Fifth Circuit, a district court may not grant a “default” summary
judgment on the ground that it is unopposed. Morgan v. Fed. Express Corp.,
114 F. Supp. 3d 434, 437 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (collecting cases). Even in the
context of unopposed motions for summary judgment, the movant must still
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50
F.3d 360, 363 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995). When a motion for summary judgment is
unopposed, a court may accept the movant’s evidence as undisputed.
Morgan, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (quoting UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Long,
227 F. Supp. 2d 609 (N.D. Tex. 2002)). Nevertheless, if the moving party

5

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fails to meet its burden, the Court must deny its motion for summary
judgment. Hetzel, 50 F.3d at 362 n.3.

III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims for general maritime negligence, negligence per
se, and gross negligence against the defendants, as a result of the oil spill and
its cleanup.9 Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot prove that exposure
to oil or dispersants was the legal cause of his alleged injuries, and thus that
he cannot prove a necessary element of his claims against defendants. 10
“Under the general maritime law, a party’s negligence is actionable only if it
is a ‘legal’ cause’ of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992). “Legal cause” is more
than but-for causation; instead, the negligence “must be a ‘substantial factor’
in the injury.” Id.
In a toxic torts case, “[s]cientific knowledge of the harmful level of
exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff was exposed to such
quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiffs’ burden.”
Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996). And in cases, like

9
10

R. Doc. 28 ¶¶ 19-49.
R. Doc. 41-1 at 4-6.
6

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this one, where the plaintiff “cannot expect lay fact-finders to understand
medical causation[,] expert testimony is thus required to establish
causation.” Seaman v. Seacor Marine L.L.C., 326 F. App'x 721, 723 (5th Cir.
2009) (per curiam); see also Troxler v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 17-4207,
2022 WL 1081193, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2022) (noting that “the causal
connection between exposure to oil or dispersants and Plaintiff’s injuries is
not within the common knowledge of a layperson”).
Here, there is no indication that plaintiff has retained an expert to
provide testimony at trial to establish causation.

See Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(B). Nor is there an indication that plaintiff will present expert
testimony from his treating physician. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C).
Plaintiff did not make any expert disclosures by the Court-ordered
deadline, 11 nor did he move for an extension. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)
(“A party must make these disclosures at the times and in the sequence that
the court orders.”). Without expert testimony, plaintiff is unable to carry his
burden on causation. See Banegas v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 17-7429,
2019 WL 424683, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 2019) (“In a toxic torts case, a
plaintiff must rely on expert testimony to prove his medical diagnosis and
causation.” (citing Seaman, 326 F. App’x at 723)). Because he cannot prove

11

R. Doc. 24 at 1.
7

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a necessary element of his claims against defendants, plaintiff’s claims must
be dismissed. See Williams v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 18-9753, 2019 WL
6615504, at *11 (E.D. La. Dec. 5, 2019) (“When a plaintiff has no expert
testimony to prove his medical diagnosis or causation at trial, the plaintiff’s
suit may be dismissed at the summary judgment stage.”).

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

27th day of June, 2022.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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