Martin vs. BP Exploration & Production, Inc., et al
Filing
46
ORDER AND REASONS: Defendants' 44 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 2/24/2023. (pp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LIZZIE MARTIN
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 17-4424
B.P. EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL.
SECTION “R” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP
America Production Company, and BP p.l.c.’s (collectively, the “BP parties”)
unopposed motion for summary judgment.1 For the following reasons, the
Court grants the motion, and dismisses plaintiff’s complaint.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from plaintiff’s alleged exposure to toxic chemicals
following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico by virtue of
her presence in the environment in Gulfport, Mississippi beginning in April
of 2010. 2
1
2
Plaintiff contends that since the alleged exposure, she has
R. Doc. 44. The remaining defendants, Halliburton Energy Services,
Inc., Transocean Deepwater, Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. join the BP parties’
motion for summary judgment. R. Doc. 44-1 at 1 n.1.
R. Doc. 1-1 at 5.
experienced, among other things, nausea; headaches; watery, burning, dry,
and red eyes; dizziness; breathing problems; ear aches; sinus pain, allergic
rhinitis, sinusitis, and maxillary sinusitis; sore throat; productive cough;
pitting edema; abdominal cramps and pain; diarrhea; rashes; skin irritation;
conjunctivitis; blurred vision; hypertension; severe otalgia; PTSD;
depression; bronchitis; and chronic paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnea.3
Plaintiff’s case was originally part of the multidistrict litigation
(“MDL”) pending before Judge Carl J. Barbier. Her case was severed from
the MDL as one of the “B3” cases for plaintiffs who either opted out of, or
were excluded from, the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement Agreement.4
Plaintiff opted out of the settlement.5
After
plaintiff’s case was severed, it was reallocated to this Court.
On March 14, 2022, this Court issued a scheduling order that
established, among other deadlines, that plaintiff’s expert disclosures had to
be “obtained and delivered” to defense counsel by no later than January 13,
2023.6 Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that because
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R. Doc. 1-1 at 5; R. Doc. 44-2 at 1-2.
Id. at 6; R. Doc. 1-2 at 6; In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”
in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL
6053613, at *2, 12 & n.12 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021).
R. Doc. 1-1 at 2.
R. Doc. 42 at 1.
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plaintiff has not identified any expert testimony, she is unable to carry her
burden on causation. 7 Plaintiff does not oppose defendants’ motion. The
Court considers the motion below.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). “When assessing whether a
dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence
in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or
weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness
Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or
affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’
are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”
Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting
10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
7
R. Doc. 44-1 at 1.
3
§ 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. “No genuine dispute
of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the nonmoving party.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475,
481 (5th Cir. 2014).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence
which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went
uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,
1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948,
951 (D. Colo. 1991)). “[T]he nonmoving party can defeat the motion” by
either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the “existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact,” or by “showing that the moving party’s
evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to
return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by
pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
325.
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by
submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
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genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the
pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for
resolution. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 ‘mandates the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).
In the Fifth Circuit, a district court may not grant a “default” summary
judgment on the ground that it is unopposed. Morgan v. Fed. Express Corp.,
114 F. Supp. 3d 434, 437 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (collecting cases). Even in the
context of unopposed motions for summary judgment, the movant must still
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50
F.3d 360, 363 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995). When a motion for summary judgment is
unopposed, a court may accept the movant’s evidence as undisputed.
Morgan, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (quoting UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Long,
227 F. Supp. 2d 609 (N.D. Tex. 2002)). Nevertheless, if the moving party
fails to meet its burden, the Court must deny its motion for summary
judgment. Hetzel, 50 F.3d at 362 n.3.
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III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims for general maritime negligence, negligence per
se, and gross negligence against the defendants as a result of the oil spill. 8
Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot prove that exposure to oil or
dispersants was the legal cause of her alleged injuries, and thus that she
cannot prove a necessary element of her claims against defendants. 9
“Under the general maritime law, a party’s negligence is actionable
only if it is a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Donaghey v. Ocean
Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992). “Legal cause”
is more than but-for causation; rather, the negligence “must be a ‘substantial
factor’ in the injury.” Id. To prevail in a toxic tort case, a plaintiff must show
both general causation and specific causation. See Knight v. Kirby Inland
Marine, Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351-52 (5th Cir. 2007) (in toxic tort cases, “the
district court must determine whether there is general causation,” and if so,
“the district court must determine whether there is admissible specificcausation evidence”). “General causation is whether a substance is capable
of causing a particular injury or condition in the general population, while
specific causation is whether a substance caused a particular individual’s
8
9
R. Doc. 25 ¶¶ 19-49.
R. Doc. 44-1 at 4-6.
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injury.” Seaman v. Seacor Marine LLC, 326 F. App’x 721, 724 (5th Cir.
2009) (citing Knight, 482 F.3d at 351).
Expert testimony is required to establish general causation in toxic-tort
cases like this one. See McGill v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 830 F. App’x 430,
433-34 (5th Cir. 2020) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff lacked
admissible expert testimony on general causation); see also Macon v. BP
Expl. & Prod. Inc., No. 17-3548, 2022 WL 1811135, at *7 (E.D. La. June 2,
2022) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims “[b]ecause expert testimony is required
on [general causation]”). “Scientific knowledge of the harmful level of
exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff was exposed to such
quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiffs’ burden.”
Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996).
Courts have also required expert testimony as to specific causation
“when the symptoms are not within the common knowledge of laypersons
and not classified as transient or temporary.” See Street v. BP Expl. & Prod.
Inc., No. CV 17-3619, 2022 WL 1811144, at *3 (E.D. La. June 2, 2022); see
also Troxler v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 17-4207, 2022 WL 1081193, at *2
(E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2022) (holding that “the causal connection between
exposure to oil or dispersants and [chemical pneumonitis, gastrointestinal
problems, breathing difficulties, and memory loss] is not within the common
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knowledge of a layperson” and thus requires expert testimony); Stephens v.
BP Expl. & Prod. Inc., No. 17-4294, 2022 WL 1642136, at *4 (E.D. La. May
24, 2022) (“[W]ithout an expert opinion on specific causation, Plaintiff
cannot meet her burden of proof on her claims of sinusitis, upper respiratory
infection, abdominal cramps and pain, mood disorder, and insomnia.”).
Plaintiff has not disclosed any experts on either general or specific
causation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). As she is unable to create an issue of
material fact on causation, the Court grants summary judgment.
See
Williams v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 18-9753, 2019 WL 6615504, at *11
(E.D. La. Dec. 5, 2019) (“When a plaintiff has no expert testimony to prove
his medical diagnosis or causation at trial, the plaintiff’s suit may be
dismissed at the summary judgment stage.”).
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment
is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
24th day of February, 2023.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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