Port Marigny, LLC et al v. City of Mandeville et al

Filing 150

ORDER AND REASONS: Before the Court are a Motion to Interpret Consent Judgment (Rec. Doc. 133 ) filed by Plaintiffs, Port Marigny, LLC and Pittman Assets, LLC and a Motion to Strike Declaration of Richard L. Muller (Rec. Doc. 143 ) filed by Defe ndant, the City of Mandeville ("the City"). IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Interpret Consent Judgment (Rec. Doc. 133) is GRANTED. The Court has interpreted the consent judgment and finds that the five-year term to obtain a build ing permit closes on April 3, 2024. The Permitted Uses are also effective until April 3, 2024. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Motion to Strike Declaration of Richard L. Muller (Rec. Doc. 143) is GRANTED. For the reasons explained above, the Court need not consider the information contained in the Muller Declaration to interpret the parties' Consent Judgment. Signed by Judge Carl J Barbier on 4/2/24. (cg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PORT MARIGNY, LLC, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 17-4727

CITY OF MANDEVILLE, ET AL.

SECTION: “J” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are a Motion to Interpret Consent Judgment (Rec. Doc. 133)
filed by Plaintiffs, Port Marigny, LLC and Pittman Assets, LLC and a Motion to Strike
Declaration of Richard L. Muller (Rec. Doc. 143) filed by Defendant, the City of
Mandeville (“the City”). The City opposed the motion to interpret consent judgment
(Rec. Doc. 146), and Plaintiffs opposed the motion to strike (Rec. Doc. 147). Plaintiffs
also filed a reply to the City’s opposition. Having considered the motion and
memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that both motions
should be GRANTED for the reasons that follow.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case, which arose from the City’s land use regulations in a neighborhood
of Mandeville, Louisiana, has been administratively closed since April 17, 2019, when
the parties entered into a consent judgment resolving the claims. (Rec. Docs. 129,
132). The underlying litigation began when Plaintiffs tried to develop a 76-acre tract
of land in Mandeville (the “Property”), and the City denied Plaintiffs’ zoning
application.

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The Consent Judgment provides, among other things, various administrative
guidelines governing development and use of the Property moving forward. Relevant
to the instant motions, Paragraph 12 states:
The Parties agree that, in light of the scope of the Port Marigny
Development and the delays associated with the litigation, the Plaintiffs
shall have 5 years from the date of the Court signing this Consent
Judgment to obtain a building permit. The Permitted Uses shall remain
effective during this time period and any additional time period
resulting from any litigation or prolonged approval process invoked by
the City.
(Rec. Doc. 129, at 15).
In their motion to interpret the consent judgment, Plaintiffs contend that there
has been litigation regarding the Ordinance referenced in the Consent Judgment,
delaying their ability to obtain a building permit and interrupting the five-year period
outlined in the clause in Paragraph 12. (Rec. Doc 133-1, at 8). That litigation includes
the following matters:
1. The Goodwin Litigation: a suit filed by B. Charles Goodwin seeking declaratory
judgment as to several issues concerning the Port Marigny development. (Rec.
Doc. 133-1, at 8). Goodwin was dismissed on exceptions and the Louisiana
Supreme Court denied a request for a writ. Id. at 9. Plaintiffs were not parties
in this case. Id.
2. The Sachs Litigation: a suit filed by Mandeville residents challenging
Plaintiffs’ Conditional Use Permit. Id. Sachs is still pending. Id. at 10.
Plaintiffs are not parties in this case. Id.

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In response, the City notes that the lawsuits Plaintiffs reference were not
invoked by the City, so the Court should enter an order that the five-year term closes
on April 3, 2024. (Rec. Doc. 146, at 2).
Attached to their motion, Plaintiffs offer the declaration of Richard L. Muller,
an attorney who formerly represented Plaintiffs in this proceeding, to provide his
opinions regarding why certain provisions were included in the Consent Judgment
and what various provisions were intended to mean. (Rec. Doc. 133-2). In its motion
to strike, the City asks the Court to strike this declaration as parol evidence not
necessary to interpret the consent judgment. (Rec. Doc. 143-1, at 1-2). In response,
Plaintiffs argue that, if the Court finds the consent judgment ambiguous, the Muller
Declaration can and should be considered evidence of the parties’ intent. (Rec. Doc.
147, at 2).
In their reply brief, filed on April 1, 2024, Plaintiffs state that they complied
with their obligations in the Consent Judgment by obtaining a “commercial building
permit” to replace the gate on the property that same day, April 1, 2024. (Rec. Doc.
149, at 2-3). Plaintiffs argue that this type of building permit interrupts the five-year
period. Id. at 3 n.3.
DISCUSSION
The Consent Judgment in this case can be construed using general principles
of contract interpretation, only by reference to what is within the four corners of the
order itself. United States v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 158 F.3d 345, 349-350 (5th Cir.
1998). Only if a consent judgment is ambiguous, meaning it is “reasonably susceptible

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to more than one meaning, in light of the surrounding circumstances and established
rules of construction,” should a court look to extrinsic evidence to interpret it. Dean
v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 460 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting N. Shore Lab. Corp.
v. Cohen, 721 F.2d 514, 519 (5th Cir. 1983)). “[E]ven when the language of the
contract is clear, courts should refrain from construing the contract in such a manner
as to lead to absurd consequences.” Clovelly Oil Co., LLC v. Midstates Petroleum Co.,
LLC, 112 So. 3d 187, 192 (La. 2013); La. C.C. art. 2046.
The Court finds that the Consent Judgment’s five-year time limit for the
Plaintiffs to obtain a building permit is unambiguous. The Consent Judgment states
that Plaintiffs “shall have 5 years from the date of the Court signing this judgment
to obtain a building permit.” (Rec. Doc. 129, at 15). This clause required Plaintiffs to
obtain a permit by April 3, 2024, five years after the undersigned ratified the parties’
consent judgment on April 3, 2019. This sentence does not provide any reason to
extend or interrupt that five-year period.
This same paragraph goes on to state that the “Permitted Uses shall remain
effective during this time period and any additional time period resulting from any
litigation or prolonged approval process invoked by the City.” Id. Applying general
principles of contract construction and grammar, the Court finds that the clause
“invoked by the City” modifies both alternatives: any litigation and prolonged
approval processes. Accordingly, the Court finds that this sentence indicates that the
five-year timeline allowing Permitted Uses as defined in the consent judgment may
be extended for any litigation invoked by the City or for prolonged approval processes

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invoked by the City. Interpreting this sentence as Plaintiffs request, to allow
Plaintiffs or other third parties to invoke any litigation to allow an extension of
Plaintiffs’ five-year deadline, would lead to absurd consequences, effectively
permitting no limit on what type of litigation could extend the five-year time period
outlined clearly in the Consent Judgment. Further, interpreting the clause “invoked
by the city” to only apply to prolonged approval processes (and not to “any litigation”)
would also render the clause unnecessary, because the City is the only entity with
power to prolong the approval of the development.
Plaintiffs also raise an argument for the first time in their reply brief: that they
had acquired a building permit as required by the Consent Judgment by receiving a
permit to replace a gate on the Property. (Rec. Doc. 149, at 3). Thus, Plaintiffs
contend, the Court should find that Plaintiffs complied with their obligation under
Paragraph 12. Of course, “[a]rguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are
generally waived.” Jones v. Cain, 600 F.3d 527, 541 (5th Cir. 2010). Therefore, the
Court declines to determine the effect of the gate permit on Plaintiffs’ compliance
with their obligations under the Consent Judgment. Accordingly,
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Interpret Consent Judgment
(Rec. Doc. 133) is GRANTED. The Court has interpreted the consent judgment
and finds that the five-year term to obtain a building permit closes on April 3, 2024.
The Permitted Uses are also effective until April 3, 2024.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Motion to Strike Declaration of Richard
L. Muller (Rec. Doc. 143) is GRANTED. For the reasons explained above, the
Court need not consider the information contained in the Muller Declaration to
interpret the parties’ Consent Judgment.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 2nd day of April, 2024.

CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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