Bode, et al v. Kenner City, et al
Filing
65
ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' 62 Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of$46,925.00 and costs in the amount of $405.85. Signed by Chief Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 10/1/2018. (mmv)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GEORGE BODE, et al.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
CASE NO. 17-5483
KENNER CITY, et al.
SECTION: “G” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
In this litigation, Plaintiffs, who are twelve “unclassified civil service” public employees
of the City of Kenner, Louisiana,1 sought declaratory relief and an injunction barring the City of
Kenner (“the City”), Mayor Ben Zahn in his official capacity (“Mayor Zahn”), and Chief of Police
Michael Glaser in his official capacity (“Chief Glaser”) from enforcing Kenner City Charter
Article I, Section 1.06 (hereinafter, the “Charter Amendment”).2 On March 20, 2018, the Court
entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.3 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ “Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.”4 Having considered the motion, the memoranda in support and in
opposition, the record, and the applicable law, for the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the
motion in part, deny it in part, and award Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in the amount of $46,925.00
1
Rec. Doc. 1 at 3–4. In particular, Plaintiffs are: (1) George Bode, the City of Kenner’s Assistant Director
of Inspections and Code Enforcement; (2) Adam Campo, the City of Kenner’s Clerk of Court; (3) Gerald Dillenkoffer,
an employee of the City of Kenner’s Public Works Department; (4) Wendi Folse, the City of Kenner’s Director of
Personnel; (5) Mary-Sharon Howland, the Assistant to the Mayor, Defendant Ben Zahn; (6) Kenneth Marroccoli, the
City of Kenner’s Director of Parks and Recreation; (7) Theresa Nevels, the City of Kenner’s Director of Purchasing;
(8) Stephen Petit, Jr., an Assistant City Attorney and Kenner City Prosecutor; (9) Johnie Sullivan, an employee of the
City of Kenner’s Recreation Department; (10) Ronald Vitellaro, the City of Kenner’s Director of Fleet Management;
(11) Richard Walther, the City of Kenner’s Director of Inspections and Code Enforcement; and (12) Mike Wetzel, the
City of Kenner’s Director of Finance. Id.
2
Id. at 1–2.
3
Rec. Doc. 61.
4
Rec. Doc. 62.
1
and costs in the amount of $405.85.
I. Background
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this matter on June 1, 2017, naming the City of Kenner,
Police Chief Glaser, and Mayor Ben Zhan as defendants.5 On June 20, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction.6 On July 5, 2017, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction.7 On July 26, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and
enjoined Defendants and their agents from enforcing Kenner City Charter Article I, Section 1.06
until there is a final judgment in this case.8
On February 20, 2018, the Court granted a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Mayor
Ben Zhan because the Court found that the claims against Mayor Zhan were duplicative of
Plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Kenner.9
On March 19, 2018, the Court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs.10
The Court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact and Plaintiffs were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law declaring that the Charter Amendment violated their First Amendment
rights to engage in political speech, was unconstitutionally vague, and was overbroad.11 The Court
also found that Plaintiffs had carried their burden on all four factors identified by the Fifth Circuit
5
Rec. Doc. 1.
6
Rec. Doc. 4.
7
Rec. Doc. 30.
8
Rec. Doc. 42.
9
Rec. Doc. 59.
10
Rec. Doc. 60.
11
Id. at 38.
2
to prevail on a request for a permanent injunction.12 Therefore, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment and enjoined Defendants and their agents from enforcing Kenner City
Charter Article I, Section 1.06.13 The Court also concluded that Plaintiffs were entitled to nominal
damages in the amount of $100, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.14 The Court ordered
Plaintiffs to file a specific request for attorneys’ fees and costs consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s
precedent on prevailing hourly rates, etc.15 On March 20, 2018, the Court entered a final judgment
in favor of Plaintiffs.16
On April 10, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the instant “Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.”17
On April 17, 2018, Defendants filed an opposition to the motion.18
II. Parties’ Arguments
A.
Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Support of the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
In the motion, Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees in the amount of $51,475.00 and costs in the
amount of $405.85.19 In support of the motion, Plaintiffs provide the following table setting forth
the hours expended, prevailing rate in the community, and associated fees for: lead counsel, Scott
L. Sternberg; a partner at the firm, Keith J. Naccarri; an associate at the firm, Michael S.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 39.
16
Rec. Doc. 61.
17
Rec. Doc. 62.
18
Rec. Doc. 64.
19
Rec. Doc. 62-1.
3
Finkelstein; and a law clerk:20
In support of this request, Plaintiffs present a detailed invoice of the hours billed in this
action.21 Plaintiffs also present affidavits of each of the attorneys involved who attest that the rates
billed are consistent with their customary rates.22 Mr. Sternberg also attests to the firms use of
“value-based” billing whereby billing is halted “for client contact, menial or ministerial tasks, and
other billings which do not advance the ultimate cause of action.”23 Mr. Sternberg further attests
that he has personally reviewed a public records request response from the City of Kenner, which
“indicates that not only is the Plaintiffs’ bill eminently reasonable, but that all told, the amounts
Plaintiffs’ attorneys charged their lawyers to investigate, prosecute, and defend an assault on the
Plaintiffs’ fundamental civil rights is substantially similar to what the Defendants paid to defend
this case at state-mandated rates.”24 Finally, Plaintiffs rely on declarations of civil rights attorneys
Alysson Mills, Katie Schwartzmann, and Larry Centola, who attest to the reasonableness of the
attorneys’ fees requested.25 Plaintiffs therefore move for a full award of $51,880.85 in fees and
20
Id. at 11.
21
Id. at 5 (citing Exh. A).
22
Id. at 6 (citing Exh. B, Exh. C, Exh. D).
23
Id. (citing Exh. B).
24
Id. at 7 (citing Exh. B).
25
Id. (citing Exh. E, Exh. F, Exh. G).
4
costs.26
Plaintiffs assert that it cannot reasonably be disputed that they are entitled to attorneys’
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) because they prevailed on every element of their claim.27 Next,
Plaintiffs contend that both the hours expended and the hourly rates billed are reasonable.28
Plaintiffs assert that the full award requested is warranted after consideration of the
Johnson factors because: (1) Plaintiffs were fully successful on their request for a preliminary
injunction and on summary judgment obtained a permanent injunction;29 (2) the case involved
complicated legal and procedural issues;30 (3) the case required skill of counsel to understand the
complex principles of constitutional law at issue;31 (4) “[r]epresentation of the Plaintiffs was
somewhat risky given counsel’s newly-formed law firm and the desirability of seeking other
billable work”;32 (5) the rates charged in this matter are in line with rates customarily charged in
this market for First Amendment and civil rights litigation;33 (6) counsel took on this important
litigation without guarantee they would be paid unless they were successful;34 (7) time limitations
were imposed to ensure that a decision was made before the March 2018 election cycle;35 (8) the
26
Id.
27
Id. at 8.
28
Id. at 9–16.
29
Id. at 17–18.
30
Id. at 18.
31
Id. at 18–19.
32
Id. at 19.
33
Id. at 19–20.
34
Id. at 20.
35
Id.
5
case required considerable time and effort;36 (9) counsel has considerable experience in the areas
of representation;37 (10) “[t]he task of representing City employees taking on the City of Kenner
and seeking to overturn a voter-approved Charter Amendment further made the case
‘undesirable’”;38 (11) counsel had no prior relationship with Plaintiffs;39 and (12) the Eastern
District of Louisiana has approved fee awards “at least somewhat similar to that which is requested
here.”40
Finally, Plaintiffs assert that an award for costs in the amount $400 for the filing fee and
$5.85 for copies is appropriate.41 Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert that the Court should award the full
amount of attorneys’ fees and costs requested.42
B.
Defendants’ Arguments in Opposition to the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Defendants do not contest that Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties.43 In opposition,
Defendants only dispute the number of hours billed and the hourly rates used.44 Specifically,
Defendants argue that the amount of research undertaken in this case is excessive, “[g]iven that
Plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Scott Sternberg, is a recognized First Amendment attorney.”45 Similarly,
Defendants assert that the administrative tasks and inter-office communications billed should be
36
Id.
37
Id. at 21.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 22.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Rec. Doc. 63.
44
Id. at 2–4.
45
Id. at 2.
6
reduced or eliminated from the attorney fee award.46
Next, Defendants assert that the Court should consider the prevailing market rates awarded
to attorneys by other judges in the Eastern District of Louisiana.47 Defendants cite Faulk v.
Duplantis, a First Amendment retaliation lawsuit that went to trial on two separate occasions,
where another judge in this district determined that an hourly rate of $225.00 was appropriate for
attorneys with 29 and 17 years’ experience, rather than the requested hourly rate of $350.00.48
Additionally, Defendants cite Gros v. New Orleans City, where another judge in this district
determined an hourly rate of $210.00 was appropriate for an attorney with 10 years’ experience,
and an hourly rate of $185.00 was appropriate for an attorney with 7 years’ experience who was
“an expert in free speech law.”49 Therefore, Defendants assert that Mr. Sternberg should be
awarded a similar hourly rate of $185.00 to $225.00 per hour, and the hourly rates of Mr. Naccari,
Mr. Finkelstein, and the law clerk should likewise be reduced “given their limited experience in
comparison to Mr. Sternberg.”50
Further, because this matter involved a dispute between a public body and public
employees, who were seeking relief based on the nature of their public employment, Defendants
assert that the Court should consider the Louisiana Attorney General’s Maximum Hourly Fee
Schedule for professional services provided to attorneys representing the State of Louisiana, which
provides for hourly rates of $225.00 per hour for attorneys with more than 10 years of experience,
$175.00 per hour for attorneys with five to ten years of experience, and $40.00 per hour for law
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 3 (citing 2015 WL 3539637 (E.D. La. June 4, 2015)).
49
Id. (citing 2014 WL 2506464 (E.D. La. June 3, 2014)).
50
Id.
7
clerks.51 Finally, Defendants assert that this case did not present a novel issue given the large
amount of case law from the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit on identical or similar issues.52
Therefore, Defendants “respectfully request this Court fully evaluate the bills put forth by
Plaintiffs’ counsel to determine whether such are reasonable in light of the foregoing case law and
documentation from the Louisiana Attorney General.”53
III. Legal Standard for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), the Court, in its discretion, may allow a prevailing party
in any action brought under Section 1983 “a reasonable attorney’s fee as party of the costs.” In the
March 19, 2018 Order, the Court found that Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs because Plaintiffs prevailed on their Section 1983 claims regarding the unconstitutionality of
the Charter Amendment.
“Determining a ‘reasonable attorney’s fee’ is a matter that is committed to the sound
discretion of a trial judge, . . . but the judge’s discretion is not unlimited.”54 “The burden is on the
plaintiff to demonstrate the amount of attorney’s fees, including any adjustment or
enhancement.”55 A court abuses its discretion when it awards attorney’s fees without “a reasonably
specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination, including any award of an
enhancement.”56
51
Id. at 3–4.
52
Id. at 4.
53
Id.
54
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex. rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 558 (2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
55
Jackson v. Host Int’l, Inc., 426 F. App’x 215, 225 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
901–02 (1984)).
56
Perdue, 559 U.S. at 558.
8
Courts in the Fifth Circuit engage in a two-step process to assess attorney’s fees arising
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.57 First, a lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours
reasonably expended by an appropriate hourly rate in the community for such work.58 “[T]here is
a strong presumption that the lodestar figure is reasonable.”59 However, after calculating the
lodestar, a district court may decrease or enhance the amount of attorney’s fees based on the
relative weights of the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.60 The
Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required to represent the client or clients; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the issues in the case; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly;
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee charged for those services in the relevant community; (6) whether the fee is fixed
or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10)
the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client; and (12) awards in similar cases.61
57
Traditionally, courts have considered the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia. Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974) when calculating attorney’s fees. In Perdue, the Supreme Court noted that the
Johnson factors were “[o]ne possible method” for determining reasonable attorney’s fees, but that the factors “gave
very little actual guidance to district courts. Setting attorney’s fees by reference to a series of sometimes subjective
factors placed unlimited discretion in trial judges and produced disparate results.” 559 U.S. at 550-51 (citing
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Since Perdue, however, the Fifth Circuit has continued to weigh the Johnson factors when considering
whether to decrease or enhance the lodestar. See Combs v. City of Huntington, 829 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2016)
(internal citations omitted).
58
Id. at 392.
59
Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553–54.
60
Combs, 829 F.3d at 392 (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19).
61
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19.
9
IV. Analysis
A.
Lodestar Calculation
Plaintiffs submit that the lodestar is $51,475.00.62 They arrives at this figure based on: (1)
a $300.00 hourly rate for Mr. Sternberg multiplied by 134 hours of work; (2) a $250.00 hourly rate
for Mr. Naccari multiplied by 10 hours of work; (3) a $225.00 hourly rate for Mr. Finkelstein
multiplied by 38 hours work; and (4) a $75.00 hourly rate for a law clerk multiplied by 3 hours of
work.63 Defendant objects to both the hours expended and the hourly rates billed.64 “[T]he court
calculates a ‘lodestar’ fee by multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended on the case by
the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers.”65 Accordingly, the Court addresses each
of these issues in turn.
1. Reasonable Number of Hours Expended
The Court first considers whether the number of hours expended on the case was
reasonable. Plaintiffs submit the billing records for Mr. Sternberg totaling 134 hours, Mr. Narccari
totaling 10 hours, Mr. Finkelstein totaling 38 hours, and a law clerk totaling 3 hours.66 Plaintiffs
also submit the affidavit of Mr. Sternberg, who attests to the firms use of “value-based” billing
whereby the firm does not charge for “ministerial or Client-relations tasks.”67 In opposition,
Defendants argue that the hours billed should be reduced because the amount of research
undertaken in this case is excessive considering Mr. Sternberg’s experience as a First Amendment
62
Rec. Doc. 62-1 at 11.
63
Id.
64
Rec. Doc. 64.
65
Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998).
66
Rec. Doc. 62-1 at 11.
67
Rec. Doc. 62-4 at 4.
10
attorney.68 Defendants also contend inter-office communications and administrative tasks billed
should be reduced or eliminated from the attorney fee award.69
A review of the billing records shows that Mr. Sternberg spent approximately 20 hours
conducting legal research, Mr. Finkelstein spent approximately 5 hours conducting legal research,
and the law clerk spent 3 hours conducting legal research.70 Considering the complex
constitutional law issues raised in this case, the Court finds that the amount of time spent
conducting legal research across all phases of this litigation, which included litigation of a motion
for a preliminary injunction, a motion to intervene, two motions to dismiss, and a motion for
summary judgment, to be reasonable. Accordingly, the Court will not reduce the hours billed for
this reason.
Defendants also contend inter-office communications and administrative tasks billed
should be reduced or eliminated. However, a review of the billing records reveals that less than 10
hours were spent on such tasks by all of the attorneys involved over the course of this litigation,
which spanned almost two years.71 Accordingly, the Court will not reduce the hours billed for this
reason.
“The fee-seeking party must . . . show it exercised ‘billing judgment’ by excluding time
that is unproductive, excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented.”72 The billing records
68
Rec. Doc. 64 at 2.
69
Id.
70
See Rec. Doc. 62-3.
71
Id.
72
Pickney v. Strategic Restaurants Acquisition Company LLC, No. 16-0211, 2017 WL 1821125, at *2 (W.D.
La. May 4, 2017) (citing Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 896 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1990)). See also Saizan v. Delta Concrete
Products Co., Inc., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2006). “Billing judgment requires documentation of the hours charged
and of the hours written off as unproductive, excessive, or redundant. The proper remedy for omitting evidence of
billing judgment does not include a denial of fees but, rather, a reduction of the award by a percentage intended to
substitute for the exercise of billing judgement.” Id.
11
submitted by Plaintiffs show that billing judgment was used in this case. Accordingly, considering
the billing records provided by Plaintiffs and the length and complexity of this litigation, the Court
finds the hours expended on the case to be reasonable.
2.
Reasonable Hourly Rates
Next, the Court considers the reasonableness of the hourly rates submitted. Plaintiffs seek
an hourly rate of $300.00 for Mr. Sternberg, a founding partner of the law firm of Sternberg,
Naccari & White, LLC, who has eight years of experience as an attorney, including significant
experience in First Amendment law.73 Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate of $250.00 for Mr. Naccari, a
founding partner of the law firm of Sternberg, Naccari & White, LLC, who has three years of
experience as an attorney and significant experience in the area of taxation.74 Plaintiffs seek an
hourly rate of $225.00 for Mr. Finkelstein, an associate with four years of experience including
experience representing clients in First Amendment cases.75
Plaintiffs rely on declarations of civil rights attorneys Alysson Mills, Katie Schwartzmann,
and Larry Centola, who attest to the reasonableness of the hourly rates requested in this case.76 In
opposition, Defendants contend that the requested hourly rates should be reduced based upon the
experience of the attorneys, the rates awarded by other judges in this district in similar cases, and
the Louisiana Attorney General’s Maximum Hourly Fee Schedule for professional services
provided to attorneys representing the State of Louisiana.77
The Court has reviewed cases decided by other district judges in the Eastern District of
73
Rec. Doc. 62-4.
74
Rec. Doc. 62-5.
75
Rec. Doc. 62-6.
76
Rec. Docs. 62-7, 62-8, 62-9.
77
Rec. Doc. 64 at 3–4.
12
Louisiana awarding attorney’s fees in comparable cases. In Faulk v. Duplantis, a First Amendment
retaliation lawsuit, another judge in this district determined that an hourly rate of $225.00 was
appropriate for attorneys with 29 and 17 years’ experience, rather than the requested hourly rate
of $350.00.78 Additionally, in Gros v. New Orleans City, another First Amendment case, a judge
in this district determined an hourly rate of $270.00 was reasonable for a partner with 16 years of
experience, $210.00 was reasonable for an attorney with 10 years of experience, and an hourly rate
of $185.00 was appropriate for an attorney with 6 years of experience.79 In Gros, the district court
also noted that two years earlier it “found that in the Eastern District of Louisiana a reasonable
hourly rate for an attorney who had been practicing law for over eight (8) years and specialized in
the field of law at issue was $300.00 per hour, and that a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney
who had been practicing law for approximately two (2) years and specialized in the field of law at
issue was $180.00 per hour.”80
In this case, Mr. Sternberg, a partner, has eight years of experience as an attorney, including
significant experience in First Amendment law.81 Mr. Sternberg attests that his current hourly rate
ranges from $200.00 to $300.00 an hour based on the nature of the representation.82 Considering
these factors and the hourly rates awarded to attorneys in this district in similar cases, the Court
will reduce Mr. Sternberg’s hourly rate to $275.00.
78
2015 WL 3539637, at *2 (E.D. La. June 4, 2015) (Zainey, J.).
79
2014 WL 2506464, at *8 (E.D. La. June 3, 2014) (Barbier, J).
80
Id. (citing Hernandez v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. Agency, 2012 WL 398328, at *14–16 (E.D.La. Feb.
7, 2012)).
81
Rec. Doc. 62-4.
82
Id.
13
Mr. Naccari, a partner, has three years of experience as an attorney.83 However, Plaintiffs
acknowledge that he has little litigation experience, as his expertise is in the area of taxation.
Considering these factors, the Court will reduce Mr. Naccari’s hourly rate to $225.00. Mr.
Finkelstein, an associate, has four years of experience including experience representing clients in
First Amendment cases.84 Accordingly, the Court will reduce Mr. Finkelstein’s hourly rate to
$200.00 per hour. The Court finds the $75.00 hourly rate requested for work performed by a law
clerk to be appropriate. The Court finds that further reduction of the hourly rates is not warranted
in light of the Louisiana Attorney General’s Maximum Hourly Fee Schedule as counsel was not
representing the State of Louisiana in this matter.
Accordingly, the Court arrives at lodestar calculation of $46,925.00, which encompasses
the following: (1) a $275.00 hourly rate for Mr. Sternberg multiplied by 134 hours; (2) a $225.00
hourly rate for Mr. Naccari multiplied by 10 hours; (3) a $200.00 hourly rate for Mr. Finkelstein
multiplied by 38 hours; and (4) a $75.00 hourly rate for a law clerk multiplied by 3 hours.
B.
Johnson Factors
Plaintiffs assert that the full loadstar award is warranted after considering the Johnson
factors.85 Defendants do not respond to this argument, except to assert that the legal issues
presented in this case were not complex.86
Plaintiffs were fully successful on their request for a preliminary injunction and on
summary judgment obtained a permanent injunction. The case involved somewhat complicated
83
Rec. Doc. 62-5.
84
Rec. Doc. 62-6.
85
Rec. Doc. 62-1 at 16–23.
86
Rec. Doc. 64 at 4.
14
constitutional law issues, which required skill of counsel to understand. Defendants do not dispute
Plaintiffs’ assertion that representation of Plaintiffs was somewhat risky given counsel’s newlyformed law firm and the desirability of seeking other billable work. Counsel took on this litigation
without guarantee they would be paid, and the case required considerable time and effort.
Furthermore, Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs’ assertion that the task of representing City
employees taking on the City of Kenner and seeking to overturn a voter-approved Charter
Amendment made this case somewhat “undesirable.” Accordingly, the Court finds that reduction
of the loadstar amount is not warranted after consideration of the Johnson factors.
V. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court arrives at a lodestar calculation of $46,925.00, which
encompasses the following: (1) a $275.00 hourly rate for Mr. Sternberg multiplied by 134 hours;
(2) a $225.00 hourly rate for Mr. Naccari multiplied by 10 hours; (3) a $200.00 hourly rate for Mr.
Finkelstein multiplied by 38 hours; and (4) a $75.00 hourly rate for a law clerk multiplied by 3
hours. Furthermore, the Court finds that reduction of the loadstar amount is not warranted after
consideration of the Johnson factors. Finally, Defendants do not object to an award for costs in the
amount of $405.85. Accordingly,
15
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs”87 is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$46,925.00 and costs in the amount of $405.85.
1st
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _____ day of October, 2018.
____________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
87
Rec. Doc. 62.
16
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