Young v. LeBlanc et al
ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that the 14 Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED; Petitioner's 16 objections are OVERRULED; and the 9 instant Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 11/29/2017.(jls)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JAMES LEBLANC, ET. AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction. (Rec.
Doc. 9). Magistrate Judge Roby’s Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”)
(Rec. Doc. 14), and Petitioner’s objections to the R&R. (Rec. Doc.
For the reasons enumerated below, IT IS ORDERED that the Report
and Recommendation is ADOPTED; Petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED;
Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Michael Young (“Petitioner”) is a state inmate housed
in B.B. Sixty Rayburn Correctional Center (“Rayburn”). Rec. Doc. 14 at
1; Rec. Doc. 16 at 1. Petitioner filed a civil rights complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Defendants 1 (Rec. Doc. 1), proceeding
The Complaint names as Defendants: The Department of Corrections
Secretary James LeBlanc, Warden Sandy McClain, Warder Robert Tanner,
Assistant Warden Keith Bickham, Assistant Warden Beverly Kelly,
Colonel Craig Kennedy, Major Jeff Williams, Major Tim Crawford, Captain
Ronnie Seal, Social Worker Gina Todd, Specialist Amy Stogner, and
Correctional Officer Jules Hebert. (collectively referred to herein as
pro se and in forma pauperis. Rec. Doc. 7. In the civil right complaint,
Petitioner alleges that after he filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act
complaint (“PREA”) against Defendant Officer Jules Hebert in 2015,
Defendant Hebert labeled Petitioner a “snitch” to the other inmates.
Rec. Doc. 16 at 2; Rec. Doc. 4 at 11. Petitioner asserts that because
Defendant Hebert labeled him a “snitch,” he is more prone to be
physically and sexually abused by the other inmates. Furthermore,
Petitioner asserts that the Defendant correctional officers refuse to
adequately protect him from the other inmates’ assaults. Rec. Doc. 4
Preliminary Injunction, claiming that he made numerous requests to the
Defendants for either a transfer to another facility (Rec. Doc. 9 at
1) or additional protection from the assaults of other inmates’. (Rec.
Doc. 9 at 3). However, Petitioner contends that the Defendants have
denied all his requests (Rec. Doc. 16 at 2; Rec. Doc. 14 at 1); and as
recently as September 28, 2017, he alleges another assault from his
fellow inmates. Rec. Doc. 16 at 6.
a. The Report and Recommendation
First, the R&R found that Petitioner is not entitled to a TRO and
Preliminary Injunction. Rec. Doc. 14 at 3.
The R&R grounded its
finding on the conclusion that Petitioner neither proved an ongoing
substantial threat that he will suffer an irreparable future injury.
Rather, the R&R found that Petitioner merely showed a speculative fear
of danger. Id. The R&R also concluded that Petitioner could not
identify any future harm that could not be adequately compensated by
monetary redress. Rec. Doc. 14 at 3-4. Moreover, the R&R determined
that because the court grants broad discretion to state officials with
regards to decisions of prison security and discipline, Petitioner is
not afforded any constitutionally protected interest that outweighs
the Defendants’ or public’s interest in the maintenance of discipline
at Rayburn. Rec. Doc. 14 at 4. Ultimately, the R&R recommended the
Court deny Petitioner’s Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction. Id.
b. Petitioner’s Objections
arguments. Rec. Doc. 16. First, Petitioner argues that he is entitled
to a TRO and Preliminary Injunction under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 65 requirements. Id. at 4. Petitioner asserts that the
Defendants failed to adequately protect him from inmates’ assaults
more than five times—as recently as September of 2017—thereby violating
his constitutionally vested rights. Id. at 4. Petitioner contends that
Furthermore, Petitioner contends that the cost of his medical bills
and the investigation of his death would be a greater disservice to
the public interest than transferring him to another facility. Id.
Second, Petitioner argues that because of Defendants’ inadequate
protection from on-going assaults by the other inmates, Defendants are
Constitution Eighth Amendment right. Id. at 5-6.
Third, Petitioner asserts that his death is a future injury that
monetary redress would not adequately compensate. Id. at 7.
Fourth, Petitioner contends that he asserts more than a mere fear
of harm or that the defendants will not protect him from assault by
other inmates because he has been attacked by other prisoners more
than four times since 2015 and as recently as 2017. Id. at 7-8.
Fifth, Petitioner argues that the court granting this motion will
not require the court to interfere with the prison’s function in an
unwarranted way that would disserve the public interest. Rec. Doc. 16
at 8. Petitioner asserts that this case is different than Young v.
Wainwright, 448 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1971) because Petitioner, in this
segregation. Rec. Doc. 16 at 8.
Sixth, Petitioner contends that his interest in safety and his
rights guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment outweigh the Defendants’
interest, and that he has shown the public interest will be served by
the Defendants’ protection of him. Id. at 9.
Lastly, and maybe duplicative, Petitioner argues that he is
entitled to an injunction because he is experiencing an ongoing assault
from other inmates and the Defendants labeling him a “snitch” is a
appropriate remedy to his injury is an injunction. Id. at 9-10.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Temporary and preliminary injunctions are governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65 (a) and (b), which require a party
seeking injunction to prove “specific facts in an affidavit or a
verified complaint [that] clearly show that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
65. Both temporary and preliminary injunctions are granted where the
applicant can establish four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the party will
suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) the
movant’s substantial injury outweighs any possible damage to the
enjoined party; and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public
interest. Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir.
2013); Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667
F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 2012); Bluefield Water Ass'n, Inc. v. City of
Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 2009). An injunction is
an extraordinary remedy that will be granted only if a movant “clearly
carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.”
Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d at 574; see Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); see also
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972(1997).
“ranging deference to the decisions of prison administrators and
prison operations.” Smith v. Bingham, 914 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir.
a. Element 2: Substantial threat of imminent and irreparable
A party seeking an injunction must show that he or she will suffer
both “imminent and irreparable” harm unless an injunction is granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; Heath v. City of New Orleans, 320 F. Supp. 545,
1970), aff'd, 435
equitable injunctive power of the federal court will not be exercised
[except] in exceptional cases to prevent irreparable injury which is
clear and imminent.”). For purposes of an injunction, “irreparable
harm” is an injury that cannot be adequately redressed by a monetary
award. See Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan, 289 F. App'x 706, 708 (5th Cir.
2008). Mere speculation of an irreparable injury is insufficient to
satisfy this requirement. Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy,
sufficient; there must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of
the applicant.”)(Emphasis added.); Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v.
Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 2013).
In this instance, Petitioner fails to carry his burden to prove
that he will
injury is imminent from unidentified inmates. Petitioner does not
offending inmates, a rape kit, a medical report, incident reports, or
any evidence to support conclusions of being assaulted by other inmates
Petitioner’s possibility of death is purely speculative and does
the above requirements. There are
allegations in support of conclusions that the other inmates are
suffered any life-threatening injuries.
Arguendo, if the inmates
were to kill Petitioner, it is additionally speculative that the
Defendants would have allowed the other prisoners to do so; noting
of the facility.
Therefore, Petitioner fails to establish he will suffer an imminent
and irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted and thus,
his request for an injunction should be denied.
b. Remaining Elements
deference to the Defendants’ prison administrative decisions, his
abuse from the other prisoners is more significant than inference with
the Defendants’ ability to maintain a secure and discipline prison.
Such an action by the Court may also affect the Defendants’ ability
to secure their safety. Therefore, Petitioner fails to prove that
his conclusory claim outweighs the possible damage to the Defendants.
It is highly probable that granting an injunction in this instance
may interfere with the Defendants’ ability to secure the prison and
rehabilitation of the prisoners. Additionally, it does not allow for
the safety of both prisoners and individuals that work in prison, such
as the Defendants.
meet his burden of
showing that granting an injunction would not disserve the public
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 29th day of November, 2017.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?