Young v. LeBlanc et al

Filing 18

ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that the 14 Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED; Petitioner's 16 objections are OVERRULED; and the 9 instant Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 11/29/2017.(jls)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MICHAEL YOUNG

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 17-6329

JAMES LEBLANC, ET. AL.

SECTION “B”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before

the

Court

is

Petitioner

Michael

Young’s

Motion

for

Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction. (Rec.
Doc. 9). Magistrate Judge Roby’s Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”)
(Rec. Doc. 14), and Petitioner’s objections to the R&R. (Rec. Doc.
16).
For the reasons enumerated below, IT IS ORDERED that the Report
and Recommendation is ADOPTED; Petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED;
and

the

instant

Motion

for

Temporary

Restraining

Order

and

a

Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Michael Young (“Petitioner”) is a state inmate housed
in B.B. Sixty Rayburn Correctional Center (“Rayburn”). Rec. Doc. 14 at
1; Rec. Doc. 16 at 1. Petitioner filed a civil rights complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Defendants 1 (Rec. Doc. 1), proceeding

1

The Complaint names as Defendants: The Department of Corrections
Secretary James LeBlanc, Warden Sandy McClain, Warder Robert Tanner,
Assistant Warden Keith Bickham, Assistant Warden Beverly Kelly,
Colonel Craig Kennedy, Major Jeff Williams, Major Tim Crawford, Captain
Ronnie Seal, Social Worker Gina Todd, Specialist Amy Stogner, and
Correctional Officer Jules Hebert. (collectively referred to herein as
“Defendants”).
1

pro se and in forma pauperis. Rec. Doc. 7. In the civil right complaint,
Petitioner alleges that after he filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act
complaint (“PREA”) against Defendant Officer Jules Hebert in 2015,
Defendant Hebert labeled Petitioner a “snitch” to the other inmates.
Rec. Doc. 16 at 2; Rec. Doc. 4 at 11. Petitioner asserts that because
Defendant Hebert labeled him a “snitch,” he is more prone to be
physically and sexually abused by the other inmates. Furthermore,
Petitioner asserts that the Defendant correctional officers refuse to
adequately protect him from the other inmates’ assaults. Rec. Doc. 4
at 11.
On

August

9,

2017,

Petitioner

filed

a

Motion

for

TRO

and

Preliminary Injunction, claiming that he made numerous requests to the
Defendants for either a transfer to another facility (Rec. Doc. 9 at
1) or additional protection from the assaults of other inmates’. (Rec.
Doc. 9 at 3). However, Petitioner contends that the Defendants have
denied all his requests (Rec. Doc. 16 at 2; Rec. Doc. 14 at 1); and as
recently as September 28, 2017, he alleges another assault from his
fellow inmates. Rec. Doc. 16 at 6.

I.

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
a. The Report and Recommendation
First, the R&R found that Petitioner is not entitled to a TRO and

Preliminary Injunction. Rec. Doc. 14 at 3.

The R&R grounded its

finding on the conclusion that Petitioner neither proved an ongoing
violation

of

his

constitutional

rights

by

the

Defendants

nor

a

substantial threat that he will suffer an irreparable future injury.
2

Rather, the R&R found that Petitioner merely showed a speculative fear
of danger. Id. The R&R also concluded that Petitioner could not
identify any future harm that could not be adequately compensated by
monetary redress. Rec. Doc. 14 at 3-4. Moreover, the R&R determined
that because the court grants broad discretion to state officials with
regards to decisions of prison security and discipline, Petitioner is
not afforded any constitutionally protected interest that outweighs
the Defendants’ or public’s interest in the maintenance of discipline
at Rayburn. Rec. Doc. 14 at 4. Ultimately, the R&R recommended the
Court deny Petitioner’s Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction. Id.
b. Petitioner’s Objections
Petitioner

filed

an

Objection

to

the

R&R,

asserting

seven

arguments. Rec. Doc. 16. First, Petitioner argues that he is entitled
to a TRO and Preliminary Injunction under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 65 requirements. Id. at 4. Petitioner asserts that the
Defendants failed to adequately protect him from inmates’ assaults
more than five times—as recently as September of 2017—thereby violating
his constitutionally vested rights. Id. at 4. Petitioner contends that
his

death

is

a

future

injury

that

is

irreparable.

Id.

at

5.

Furthermore, Petitioner contends that the cost of his medical bills
and the investigation of his death would be a greater disservice to
the public interest than transferring him to another facility. Id.
Second, Petitioner argues that because of Defendants’ inadequate
protection from on-going assaults by the other inmates, Defendants are

3

committing

a

continuing

violation

of

Petitioner’s

United

States

Constitution Eighth Amendment right. Id. at 5-6.
Third, Petitioner asserts that his death is a future injury that
monetary redress would not adequately compensate. Id. at 7.
Fourth, Petitioner contends that he asserts more than a mere fear
of harm or that the defendants will not protect him from assault by
other inmates because he has been attacked by other prisoners more
than four times since 2015 and as recently as 2017. Id. at 7-8.
Fifth, Petitioner argues that the court granting this motion will
not require the court to interfere with the prison’s function in an
unwarranted way that would disserve the public interest. Rec. Doc. 16
at 8. Petitioner asserts that this case is different than Young v.
Wainwright, 448 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1971) because Petitioner, in this
case,

is

only

requesting

an

injunction

and

not

a

release

from

segregation. Rec. Doc. 16 at 8.
Sixth, Petitioner contends that his interest in safety and his
rights guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment outweigh the Defendants’
interest, and that he has shown the public interest will be served by
the Defendants’ protection of him. Id. at 9.
Lastly, and maybe duplicative, Petitioner argues that he is
entitled to an injunction because he is experiencing an ongoing assault
from other inmates and the Defendants labeling him a “snitch” is a
violation

of

his

constitutional

rights;

and

therefore,

the

appropriate remedy to his injury is an injunction. Id. at 9-10.

4

only

II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Temporary and preliminary injunctions are governed by Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65 (a) and (b), which require a party
seeking injunction to prove “specific facts in an affidavit or a
verified complaint [that] clearly show that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
65. Both temporary and preliminary injunctions are granted where the
applicant can establish four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the party will
suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) the
movant’s substantial injury outweighs any possible damage to the
enjoined party; and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public
interest. Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir.
2013); Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667
F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 2012); Bluefield Water Ass'n, Inc. v. City of
Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 2009). An injunction is
an extraordinary remedy that will be granted only if a movant “clearly
carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.”

Texas

Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d at 574; see Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); see also
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972(1997).
Injunctions

concerning

the

prison

context

are

viewed

giving

“ranging deference to the decisions of prison administrators and
permit[ting]

them

to

make

difficult

5

judgments

concerning

prison operations.” Smith v. Bingham, 914 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir.
1990).
a. Element 2: Substantial threat of imminent and irreparable
harm
A party seeking an injunction must show that he or she will suffer
both “imminent and irreparable” harm unless an injunction is granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; Heath v. City of New Orleans, 320 F. Supp. 545,
546

(E.D.

La.

1970), aff'd, 435

F.2d

1307

(5th

Cir.

1971)

(“The

equitable injunctive power of the federal court will not be exercised
[except] in exceptional cases to prevent irreparable injury which is
clear and imminent.”). For purposes of an injunction, “irreparable
harm” is an injury that cannot be adequately redressed by a monetary
award. See Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan, 289 F. App'x 706, 708 (5th Cir.
2008). Mere speculation of an irreparable injury is insufficient to
satisfy this requirement. Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy,
777

F.2d

992,

997

(5th

Cir.

1985)

(“Speculative

injury

is

not

sufficient; there must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of
the applicant.”)(Emphasis added.); Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v.
Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 2013).
In this instance, Petitioner fails to carry his burden to prove
that he will

suffer

an irreparable

injury

or

that

an irreparable

injury is imminent from unidentified inmates. Petitioner does not
provide

any

information

to

help

identify

or

locate

alleged

offending inmates, a rape kit, a medical report, incident reports, or
any evidence to support conclusions of being assaulted by other inmates
6

or

that

the

Defendants

are

allowing

it

to

happen.

Further,

Petitioner’s possibility of death is purely speculative and does
satisfy

insufficient

the above requirements. There are

not

factual

allegations in support of conclusions that the other inmates are
attempting

to

kill

him

nor

is

there

suffered any life-threatening injuries.

proof

that

Petitioner

has

Arguendo, if the inmates

were to kill Petitioner, it is additionally speculative that the
Defendants would have allowed the other prisoners to do so; noting
that

the

Defendants

must

protect

the

prisoners

of the facility.

Therefore, Petitioner fails to establish he will suffer an imminent
and irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted and thus,
his request for an injunction should be denied.

b. Remaining Elements
Next,

Petitioner

fails

to

establish

that

after

according

deference to the Defendants’ prison administrative decisions, his
abuse from the other prisoners is more significant than inference with
the Defendants’ ability to maintain a secure and discipline prison.
Such an action by the Court may also affect the Defendants’ ability
to secure their safety. Therefore, Petitioner fails to prove that
his conclusory claim outweighs the possible damage to the Defendants.
It is highly probable that granting an injunction in this instance
may interfere with the Defendants’ ability to secure the prison and
maintain discipline.
because

prisons

that

Public
are

interest

unsecured
7

would

do not

be
aid

severly disserved
in

the

rehabilitation of the prisoners. Additionally, it does not allow for
the safety of both prisoners and individuals that work in prison, such
as the Defendants.

Thus,

Petitioner

fails to

meet his burden of

showing that granting an injunction would not disserve the public
interest.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 29th day of November, 2017.

___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8