Young v. LeBlanc et al
Filing
51
ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that 49 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order is hereby dismissed as frivolous. FURTHER ORDERED that 43 the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation are adopted as the opinion of the court, overruling objections filed by Young, and dismissing with prejudice the federal claims and dismissing the state-based claims without prejudice. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 08/19/2020.(ko)
Case 2:17-cv-06329-ILRL Document 51 Filed 08/19/20 Page 1 of 9
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MICHAEL YOUNG
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 17-6329
JAMES LEBLANC, ET. AL.
SECTION: “B”(4)
ORDER AND REASONS
For reasons assigned herein, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff
Michael Young’s “Memorandum of law in support of plaintiffs (sic)
order
to
show
cause,
preliminary
injunction
and
temporary
restraining order” is hereby DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. (Rec. Doc.
49). IT
IS
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
the
Magistrate’s
Report
and
Recommendation are adopted as the opinion of the court, overruling
objections
filed
by
DISMISSING
Young, and
with prejudice
the
federal claims, and DISMISSING the state-based claims without
prejudice. See Rec. Docs. 43, 46.
Young is a state court prisoner at the Rayburn Correctional
Center (RCC) who is
appearing pro se
and in forma pauperis.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he seeks damages and injunctive
relief,
including
transfer
to
another
facility,
arising
from
alleged failures by RCC prison officials to provide protective
custody. Rec. Doc. 49, p. 1.
He asserts nearly identical claims
and arguments to those set forth in prior motions for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. Rec. Docs. 9, 25,
29. Regarding plaintiff’s first two motions, the Magistrate Judge
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Case 2:17-cv-06329-ILRL Document 51 Filed 08/19/20 Page 2 of 9
submitted a Report and Recommendation to dismiss Young’s claims
for injunctive relief as speculative and failing to otherwise
provide support for preliminary or temporary injunctive relief.
Rec. Docs. 14, 28. Further, this Court has adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s
Report
and
Recommendations
for
each
motion,
without
modification. Rec. Docs. 18, 39.
Young states this Section 1983 action is based on violations
of plaintiff’s Eight Amendment rights to be “free from rape and
assault by other inmates, [and] failure to protect and officer
calling me a rat.” Rec. Doc. 49 at 1. In his complaint and “Spears”
hearing testimony before the Magistrate Judge 1, Young admittedly
was “almost assaulted” or in a fight where ever he was in RCC,
even while housed in a single-man segregation cell on RCC’s high
security Sleet Unit. That unit of RCC houses inmates in need of
protection, mental health and discipline issues.
a
ten-year
sentence
for distribution
of
Young is serving
cocaine. His
medical
history includes treatment for schizophrenia and bipolar disorders
since age eleven (11).
He is regularly prescribed Depakote and
Trazodone for the latter conditions as well as for depression and
anxiety. Following his mother’s death in September 2015, Young was
placed on extreme suicide watch by the prison doctor and ordered
766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). The purpose of the “Spears” hearing is to determine what the prisoner alleges
occurred and the legal basis for the claims. The information received is considered an amendment to the complaint
or a more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Wilson v. Barientos, 926 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1991).
Young participated in that digitally recorded hearing by telephone. Rec. Doc. No. 15 and 17.
1
2
Case 2:17-cv-06329-ILRL Document 51 Filed 08/19/20 Page 3 of 9
strapped
by
soft
restraints
to
his
bed
in
the
Sleet
Unit.
Restraints were ordered following repetitive episodes of Young
violently striking his head on the walls or ceiling of his cell.
Soon thereafter on September 14, 2015 Young alleges defendant
correctional officer Jules Hebert entered his cell fully clothed,
placed his private parts in Young’s face, and made inappropriate
sexual
remarks
while
checking
on
Young’s
restraints.
After
reporting that activity, he alleges Hebert began telling other
prisoners that Young was a “rat.” Rec. Doc. 49 at 1. Young further
claims that Hebert encouraged an inmate to attack him in February
2016. He believes RCC has failed to protect him and has continually
denied him his rights, and that he is in danger from other inmates,
arising from the “rat” designation. Id.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)
require the Court to sua sponte dismiss cases filed by prisoners
proceeding in forma pauperis upon a determination that they are
frivolous or otherwise fail to state a claim for which relief can
be granted. The Court has broad discretion in determining the
frivolous nature of the complaint. Se e Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d
318 (5th Cir.1986), modified on other grounds, Booker v. Koonce,
2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993). However, the Court may not sua sponte
dismiss an action merely because of questionable legal theories or
unlikely factual allegations in the complaint.
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Case 2:17-cv-06329-ILRL Document 51 Filed 08/19/20 Page 4 of 9
Under this statute, a claim is frivolous only when it lacks
an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Talib v.
Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). A claim lacks an
arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a
legal interest which clearly does not exist. Harper v. Showers,
174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999). It lacks an arguable factual
basis only if the facts alleged are “clearly baseless,” a category
encompassing
fanciful,
fantastic,
and
delusional
allegations.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118
L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28. Therefore, the
Court must determine whether the plaintiff's claims are based on
an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual
allegations. Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994);
see Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 176–77 (5th Cir.1995); Moore
v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1992).
After liberally construing Young’s claims in the process of
reviewing the factual record and applicable law, we find that
Young’s
Section
1983
claims
against
defendants,
in
their
individual and official capacities are prescribed, frivolous, fail
to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and/or otherwise
fail to warrant relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(2) and § 1915A(b), and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
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Case 2:17-cv-06329-ILRL Document 51 Filed 08/19/20 Page 5 of 9
That review also confirms the correctness of the Magistrate Judge’s
detailed report.
Young’s
official
capacity
claims
against
the
defendants,
Secretary LeBlanc, Warden McCain, Warden Tanner, Deputy Warden
Bickham, Assistant Warden Kelly, Colonel Kennedy, Major Williams,
Major Crawford, Captain Seal, Ms. Todd, Ms. Stogner, and Officer
Herbert must be dismissed as frivolous for lack of jurisdiction,
for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and
for seeking monetary relief against immune defendants.
K.P. v.
LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir.2010); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), §
1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
While prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from
violence,
not
every
liability
for
prison
injury
translates
officials
into
responsible
for
constitutional
the
victim's
safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970,
1977, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). To succeed on his individual
capacity claims for a failure to protect, “‘the inmate [Young]
must
show
that
he
is
incarcerated
under
conditions
posing
a
substantial risk of serious harm’ and that the prison officials
acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to the inmate's safety.”
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 524 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). “An official is deliberately indifferent
when he/she ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
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Case 2:17-cv-06329-ILRL Document 51 Filed 08/19/20 Page 6 of 9
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Id.
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “The official's knowledge of
the risk can be proven through circumstantial evidence, such as by
showing that the risk was so obvious that the official must have
known about it.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). Finally,
“there is no liability if the official ‘responded reasonably to
the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.’” Id.
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844); Accord Johnson v. Thaler, No.
09-313, 2010 WL 3543266, at *13 (SDTX 2010).
The record supports adoption of the following findings by the
Magistrate Judge:
As Young concedes in his pleadings and statements, he repeatedly
requested protective custody even when he was already housed in a
secured, single man cell on Sleet Unit, deemed by officials to be
the safest area of the prison. He also concedes that, when he had
an actual fight with another inmate, whether it was his cellmates
or an inmate in the hall, he was separated and promptly moved away
from that inmate. Young has done no more than speculate that his
requests for protection, when actually needed, were not taken
seriously because he did not get the relief he wanted every time
he asked to be moved. As shown from his own pleadings and
testimony, his location in the prison had no deterring effect on
his ability to engage and fight with other inmates. Young’s
allegations are inadequate to state a claim of intentional
indifference to his safety and need for protection by these
defendants.
Rec. Doc. 43, p. 21.
As reported by the Magistrate Judge, our own further review
of
the
factual
record
and
applicable
law
shows
that
Young’s
complaint was not filed under the mailbox rule until June 28,
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Case 2:17-cv-06329-ILRL Document 51 Filed 08/19/20 Page 7 of 9
2017. 2 That filing date was well over a year after defendant Hebert
allegedly encouraged an inmate to attack Young in February 2016
and well over a year after Hebert allegedly placed his private
body parts in Young’s face in September 2015. If true, those
offensive acts would constitute proper claims for relief under
Section 1983 as violations of the Eighth Amendment. However, the
one-year prescriptive period for filing those claims bars them as
untimely filed.
For purposes of this § 1983 action, the court must look to
the forum state's personal-injury limitations period. E.g., Moore
v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir.1994). In Louisiana, that
period is one year. Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794 (5th
Cir.1989).
However, federal law determines when this § 1983 claim
accrues. Moore, 30 F.3d at 620. In the context of instant claims,
Young himself knew of and provided the dates for his claimed
injuries and causes. The record does not reflect any material
obstacles that prevented Young from accessing this court with a
timely filed complaint. 3 For the foregoing reasons, claims against
Hebert and other defendants that arose between September 14, 2015
Rec. Doc. No. 1, p. 13; see also, Rec. Doc. No. 4-1, p. 13. Cf. Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir.2006)
(citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270–71, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988)). The prison mailbox rule
applies to the filing of § 1983 complaints. Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 378–81 (5th Cir.1995).
3
Young’s access to this court during relevant times here was shown when he filed a § 1983 complaint in 2016
challenging disciplinary violations received while on extreme suicide watch in September of 2015. See Young v.
McCain, et al, CA 16-03404 T(5).
2
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Case 2:17-cv-06329-ILRL Document 51 Filed 08/19/20 Page 8 of 9
and June 2, 2016, the relevant time period within the complaint,
are dismissed because they have prescribed.
For claims accruing after June 28, 2016 and timely asserted,
Young fails to present a non-frivolous claim or one that rises to
the level of a constitutional violation. Those remaining claims as
correctly described in the Magistrate Judge’s report involve vague
allegations
of
verbal
name-calling.
Verbal
abuse,
threatening
language and gestures by prison officials are insufficient to serve
as the legal basis of a civil rights action. McFadden v. Lucas,713
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983); Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 734
(5th Cir. 2002); Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 274 n. 4 (5th Cir.
1993). Young’s dissatisfaction with the prison’s administrative
grievance
and
frivolous.
He
disciplinary
does
not
review
have
a
procedures
also
constitutional
fail
right
to
as
have
complaints investigated and resolved to his satisfaction. Geiger
v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir.2005).
For the foregoing reasons, Young’s ongoing interest in a
transfer to another prison has not been shown warranted and,
moreover, he has no constitutional right to demand placement in a
particular cell or facility. Yates v. Stalder, 217 F.3d 332, 335
(5th Cir. 2000).
Finally,
jurisdiction
the
over
court
Young’s
declines
to
remaining
exercise
state
laws
supplemental
claims
of
negligence and breach of duty to protect. The federal-based claims
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Case 2:17-cv-06329-ILRL Document 51 Filed 08/19/20 Page 9 of 9
have been dismissed and a balancing of applicable statutory factors
favor that declination. Accordingly, the state-based claims are
dismissed without prejudice.
Enochs v. Lampasas Cty., 641 F.3d
155, 159 (5th Cir. 2011). Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234,
246 (5th Cir. 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
New Orleans, Louisiana this 19th day of August 2020
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9
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