Rose Crewboat Services, Inc. v. Wood Resources, LLC

Filing 60

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: As stated herein, the Court finds that defendant negligently left an unmarked line in the water on 7/23/2016. Plaintiff's damages to its vessel were caused by defendant's negligence, except that the Court finds that the damage to the vessel's tiller arm was not caused by the accident. Accordingly, the Court hereby finds defendant liable to plaintiff for repairs to the M/V SAM B totaling $16,816.00 plus interest. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 11/12/2019.(mm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROSE CREWBOAT SERVICES, INC.
VERSUS
WOOD RESOURCES, LLC

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-7052
SECTION “R” (4)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of an alleged accident in the Mississippi River.1

Plaintiff claims that its vessel, the M/V SAM B, was damaged when it hit an
unmarked and unlit dredge pipeline early on the morning of July 23, 2016.2
On July 24, 2017, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in this Court seeking damages for
repairs to the vessel, as well as interest and costs.3 Plaintiff alleges that
defendant’s negligence caused plaintiff’s damages.4

The Court has

jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. The parties agreed to
try this case on the briefs in lieu of a live trial. 5 After reviewing the parties’
trial briefs and exhibits, the Court rules as follows.

1
2
3
4
5

See R. Doc. 1.
Id. at 2 ¶¶ 5-7.
Id.
See id. at 4 ¶ 16-17.
See R. Doc. 56.

II.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

The Accident

In the early morning hours of July 23, 2016, Captain George Bonck
navigated the M/V SAM B, an aluminum crewboat, down the Mississippi
River.6 Around 4:00 a.m., after dropping off a crew at the vessel GEMINI
for his employer, Rose Crewboat Services, Capt. Bonck steered the crewboat
around a barge line close to the GEMINI.7 Capt. Bonck testified at his
deposition that as he navigated around the barge line, he hit an unmarked
and unlit dredge pipe near the Wood Resources’ dock.8 He stated: “as I came
to about right around the side of this barge to come make my approach to the
landing, and that’s where I hit the dredge pipe. There [were] no lights, there
was nothing marked.” 9 Capt. Bonck described the dredge pipe as “below the
surface of the water . . . where you could barely see it.” 10 Capt. Bonck also
testified that there was a dredge very close by in the middle of the river,
although he could not see where the pipeline was attached. 11

6
7
8
9
10
11

See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 at 12:17-13:4.
See id. at 14:2-14:13.
Id.
Id. at 14:8-13.
Id. at 13:21-25.
Id. at 11:12-16.
2

Capt. Bonck attested that immediately following the accident, the M/V
SAM B was approached by a small boat driven by a Wood Resources
employee. 12 The employee asked what happened, to which Capt. Bonck
responded, “I believe I hit your pipeline,” and inquired why it was not
marked.13 Capt. Bonck put the boat in gear and eased up to the landing.14 At
this point, the vessel was taking on water.15 Once he was on land, Capt.
Bonck confirmed that he had hit a dredge pipe. He testified:
I got off the boat and once I tied it up and walked
around and I was able to see the pipeline from the
landside because I said it went in the high grass, you
couldn’t see it from the boat, because it went down in
the water and it went to the grass, but once I was able
to get on land, they had the pipe way on land. You
[were] able to see the other end of the pipe. 16
Capt. Bonck then contacted Kelly Sauerwin, who was a supervisor at
Wood Resources. Capt. Bonck stated that Sauerwin apologized and stated
that he “was going to look into it about the guys not marking their pipeline.”17

See id. at 21:1-5.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 at 21:1-8; See also Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at 9 (“I
notified a woods dredging employee of the damage . . . .”)
14
See id. at 21:9-20.
15
See id.
16
Id. at 25:5-13.
17
Id. at 22:15-17.
3
12
13

According to Capt. Bonck, Sauerwin added, “Anything we can do to help, we
will be willing to help.” 18
Following the accident, Capt. Bonck called his employer, Charles
Augustine, to report what had taken place.19 Augustine came to the Wood
Resources dock and observed significant activity involving various dredge
pipes in the area. 20 Augustine stated that he saw:
a big batture of mud piled up and they made roads
out of it and they had the thing blockaded with the
pipes they were dragging from one side to the other
and in the water, and you couldn’t even get out of
there to get to the water. 21
He also saw employees moving dredging pipes across the land. 22 When asked
at his deposition about the dredge pipe in the water, Augustine stated that
“George Bonck and the people that went out there to fix the boat, [and] the
crane operator” told him there were dredge pipes in the water. 23
Defendant counters Capt. Bonck’s first-hand account with evidence of
its general practices. Although Wood Resources does not dispute that it was
engaged in a dredging operation in the area where the M/V SAM B struck an

18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 22:18-19.
See id. at 25:14-21.
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 at 32:17-33:14.
Id. at 14:22-15:4.
See id. at 34:2-34:11.
Id. at 34:24-25.
4

object in July 2016, it points to evidence that it completed that project on
July 15, 2016, about a week before the accident.24 The evidence defendant
points to includes a log from July 15, 2016, stating “finished pit, called
Kelly,”25 a notice sent to the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and the
accompanying email, 26 and a partially completed affidavit stating that the
dredging project ended on July 18, 2016. 27 Defendant’s key witness, William
Smith, was an employee who worked on dredging projects for Wood
Resources. He testified in his deposition that when he finishes a dredging
project, he generally takes the pipe out of the water “first thing,” or at least
“within 24 hours.”28 Based on this practice and the log, Mr. Smith concluded
that they had taken the dredge pipe in question out of the water before July
23, 2016. 29 But Mr. Smith was not present at the time of the accident, nor
did he recall specifically removing the dredge pipe.30 Mr. Smith also testified
that the pipe was packed up later to be moved, but similarly did not
specifically recall packing up the pipe. 31

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

R. Doc. 59 at 2-5.
Defendant’s Exhibit 2.
Defendant’s Exhibits 3 and 4.
Defendant’s Exhibit 5.
Defendant’s Exhibit 1 at 36:13-22.
See id. at 36:13-37:1.
See id. at 15:13-18; 31:7-12.
See id. at 31:7-12.
5

Based on the preceding evidence, the Court credits Capt. Bonck’s
testimony and finds that the M/V SAM B hit Wood Resources’ unmarked
dredge pipe during the early morning hours of July 23, 2016. Capt. Bonck is
the only eyewitness to the accident who testified to what happened. He
recorded the incident contemporaneously in Rose Crewboat’s logs.32 Capt.
Bonck also told another witness, Charles Augustine, that he had hit an
unmarked dredge pipe shortly after this occured.33 Augustine’s testimony
supports Capt. Bonck’s. Augustine stated that upon his arrival at the Wood
Resources’ property, he saw numerous dredge pipes being moved across
property near the Wood Resources’ dock, suggesting some dredge pipes were
in use. 34 And he noted that Capt. Bonck and others told him that they saw a
dredge pipe in the water. 35 All of this supports Capt. Bonck’s testimony.
Defendant argues that Capt. Bonck is not a credible witness, pointing
to several asserted inconsistencies in his testimony. 36 The Court finds these
arguments to be without merit. Capt. Bonck’s testimony is supported by

See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at 9. (“While leaving the dock at woods 110 I
ran over a[n] unmarked and unlit pipeline that was below the water and it
has caused one of my wheels to fall off and caused damage to the shaft.”).
33
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 at 26:25-27:12; See also Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 at
32:6-12.
34
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 at 32:23-34:11.
35
Id. at 34:22-25.
36
R. Doc. 59 at 5-6.
6
32

other

witnesses

and

contemporaneous

records.

Moreover,

the

“inconsistencies” Wood Resources relies on are conclusory or are explained
when the record is considered in context. In any event, they are not fatal to
Capt. Bonck’s credibility. For example, Wood Resources alleges that Capt.
Bonck “claims SAM B ran into Wood’s dredge pipe long after it had been
removed from the river.”37 This conclusory assertion assumes that the Court
credits Wood Resources’ evidence of its regular practices over Capt. Bonck’s
testimony.

But the Court finds Capt. Bonck’s first-hand account more

persuasive than defendant’s evidence.
Wood Resources also points to Capt. Bonck’s statement that he spoke
to Sauerwin several times on the day of the accident. 38 Defendant argues
that this contradicts what Capt. Bonck wrote in M/V SAM B’s logs. But the
log from the day of the accident, which Wood Resources points to, states
only: “I notified a Woods dredging employee of the damage and he gave me
his supervisor ‘Mr. Kelly [Sauerwin’s]’ number.”39 The logs from the day of
the accident therefore do not suggest that Capt. Bonck could not reach
Sauerwin. The logs from July 25, 2016—several days later—state: “I called
Mr. Kelly [Sauerwin] several times and he didn’t answer, I texted him and no

37
38
39

Id.
Id.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at 9.
7

reply.”40

But it is entirely consistent that Capt. Bonck could speak to

Sauerwin several times on the day of the accident and be unable to reach him
two days later.
Wood Resources also points out that M/V SAM B’s log shows that a
crane was used to lift the M/V SAM B on July 25, 2016, but the invoice is
dated July 26, 2016. Defendant suggests that this means that the vessel’s
logs were prepared after-the-fact or doctored. The invoice could have been
issued after the service was rendered.41 In any event, the Court does not find
a small discrepancy between the log and the invoice to be fatal to Capt.
Bonck’s credibility as a witness about what happened a few days earlier.
Wood Resources’ other contentions that Capt. Bonck’s first-hand account
cannot be trusted similarly do not materially undermine Capt. Bonck’s
credibility. The Court therefore rejects Wood Resources’ argument and
credits Capt. Bonck’s testimony.
Defendant provides no conflicting eyewitness accounts to contradict
Capt. Bonck. It is particularly notable that defendant did not offer testimony
from Kelly Sauerwin, who was the supervisor on duty at time of the
accident.42 Defendant also did not provide the testimony of the employee

40
41
42

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at 11.
R. Doc. 59 at 6.
See R. Doc. 57 at 10.
8

who initially went out to the M/V SAM B, or any other employee from Wood
Resources who was present at the time of the accident. Defendant’s primary
witness, William Smith, has no personal knowledge of the events of July 23. 43
He did not work the shift when the accident took place, but rather started
work at 7:00 a.m. 44 Although Smith testified that he would have been
involved in the removal of the dredge pipe from the river, he has no specific
recollection of removing it. 45
Wood Resources’ reliance on records indicating that the dredging
project was completed eight days before the accident and Smith’s testimony
that Wood Resources usually pulled pipes from the water as soon as a job
was completed, is weaker and less persuasive evidence than Capt. Bonck’s
first-hand account. And defendant offered no records documenting that it
had removed the pipe or who did the removal. In sum, the Court finds Capt.
Bonck’s testimony more credible than the general practices testimony
presented by defendant, and therefore finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the M/V SAM B did hit an unlit and unmarked dredge pipe
early in the morning of July 23, 2016.

43
44
45

See Defendant’s Exhibit 1 at 15:6-18.
See id. at 14:6-14.
See id. at 31:7-12.
9

Nor can it be argued that the pipe did not belong Wood Resources. It
is undisputed that Wood Resources was engaging in dredging activities in
the area around the time of the allision. Wood Resources’ primary witness,
William Smith, testifies as much.46 Capt. Bonck’s testimony indicates that
when he notified Wood Resources employees of the accident, none of them,
including Sauerwin, denied it was a Wood Resources pipe. 47 And Augustine
testified to extensive activity involving pipes near the Wood Resources dock,
stating “they had the thing blockaded with pipes they were dragging from
one side to the other and in the water.”48 The Court therefore finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the pipe into which the M/V SAM B
allided belonged to Wood Resources.
B.

The Aftermath

Once Capt. Bonck successfully tied up the boat, it required repairs.
Rose Crewboat hired Archer Daniels Midland to use a crane to move the
vessel onto its barge for temporary repairs, as indicated in Rose Crewboat’s
logs and the Archer Daniel Midland invoices. 49 After these repairs, Capt.
Bonck testified that he tried to make a run to the GEMINI, but when he put

46
47
48
49

See Defendant’s Exhibit 1 at 14:15-18.
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 at 24:20-23.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 at 14:23-25.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at 11-12, 15, 17-18.
10

the engine in reverse, it came loose, again making the boat unusable. 50 The
Archer Daniels Midland crane was then used again for more temporary
repairs. 51 Archie Coulon, the owner and president of the company which did
the repairs, Bayou Machine & Fabrication, testified that these repairs were
temporary repairs designed to get the boat to the shipyard. 52 The vessel was
eventually brought to the Bayou Machine & Fabrication shipyard for
permanent repairs.53 Because of the accident, Rose Crewboat alleges it
incurred damages of $17,216. 54 These damages consisted of $1,800 in
temporary repairs made to the vessel, $11,720 in permanent repairs made to
the vessel, and $3,696 in crane expenses incurred because of the damages to
the vessel.55
C.

Maritime Negligence

This Court has jurisdiction over this case via 28 U.S.C. § 1333, and
plaintiff’s claims in this matter are admiralty claims pursuant to Rule 9(h) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court therefore applies general
maritime law in analyzing plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff makes two arguments.

50
51
52
53
54
55

See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 at 30:3-7.
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at 17-18; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 at 31:2-6.
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 at 12:5-16.
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at 22; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 at 7:1-9.
R. Doc. 57 at 1.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at 17-18, 21-22.
11

First, it argues that Wood Resources negligently caused its damages by
failing to comply with the Inland Navigation Rules concerning the duty to
mark obstructions in the river, and is therefore per se negligent. Second,
plaintiff argues that Wood Resources failed to adhere to a standard of
reasonable care in marking its pipeline, and thus negligently caused Rose
Crewboat’s damages. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
1.

Per Se Negligence

“The law is well established that violation of a statute which is intended
to protect the class of persons to which a plaintiff belongs against the risk of
the type of harm which has in fact occurred is negligence in itself.” Manning
v. M/V ‘Sea Road’, 417 F.2d 603, 608 (5th Cir. 1969). “When a statute or
regulation ‘establishes a clear minimum standard of care,’ ‘the doctrine of
negligence per se applies, [and] the general standard of care . . . is replaced
by [the] specific rule of conduct established in the statute or regulation.’”
Targa Midstream Servs. Ltd. P’ship v. K-Sea Transp. Partners, L.P., 527 F.
Supp. 2d 598, 602 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (citing Dougherty v. Santa Fe Marine,
Inc., 698 F.2d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1983)). And “failure to follow any Coast
Guard regulation which is the cause of an injury establishes negligence per
se.” Dougherty, 698 F. 2d at 234 (citations omitted).

12

Rose Crewboat has identified 33 C.F.R. § 83.27(d) as a regulation that
it argues imposed a duty upon Wood Resources to mark its submerged
dredge pipe for passing vessels. That regulation states: “A vessel engaged in
dredging or underwater operations, when restricted in her ability to
maneuver, shall exhibit the lights and shapes prescribed in paragraphs (b)(i),
(ii), and (iii) of this Rule.” 33 C.F.R. § 83.27(d). Notably, this regulation
applies only to vessels “engaged in dredging or underwater operations.” Id.
And while Capt. Bonck’s testimony does establish that there was a
submerged pipeline in the water, it does not establish that the pipeline was
necessarily engaged in dredging or underwater operations. Capt. Bonck
stated there was a dredging vessel in the middle of the river,56 but he also
stated that he observed a portion of it on land, 57 could not see where it was
attached,58 and never stated that it was engaged in dredging operations. 59
The Court therefore finds this regulation inapplicable here.

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 at 21:1-5.
See id. at 25:5-13.
58
See id. at 11:16-17.
59
Moreover, Wood Resources certified to the Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries that the dredging was complete, although the certification to the
government did not speak to the removal of the dredge pipe. See Defendant’s
Exhibit 3 (“Work was completed on 07/15/16.”).
13
56
57

Plaintiff also identifies an alternative, catchall regulation that applies
to the “Other obstructions existing on or in the navigable waters . . . .”60 See
33 C.F.R. § 64.03(a)(3). 61 Other courts have held that this regulation applies
to dredge pipelines. See Higman Towing Co. v. Dredge Tom James, 637 F.
Supp. 925, 929 (E.D. Tex. 1986). This regulation requires the owner of an
obstruction to “mark it immediately with a buoy or beacon during the day or
a light at night.” 33 C.F.R. § 64.11(a). Here, the pipeline undoubtably acted
as an obstruction on navigable waters, as it prohibited vessels, such as the
M/V SAM B from navigating through the Mississippi. And as the Court has
found, it was unmarked at the time of the allision. The Court therefore finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that Wood Resources violated 33 C.F.R.
§ 64.11(a), and is therefore negligent per se. 62

R. Doc. 57 at 14.
Although the regulation exempts “Dredging pipelines subject to
Subchapter E of this Chapter,” 33 C.F.R. § 64.03(b)(1), the Court has already
found the relevant regulations in Subchapter E are not applicable to this
pipeline as testimony does not establish that it was engaged in dredging
operations.
62
Although neither party raises the issue, an argument can be made that
the “Pennsylvania Rule” applies in this case. The Pennsylvania Rule states
that when a ship is in violation of a statutory rule that is designed to prevent
collisions and such a collision occurs, the burden rests upon defendant to
show that it could not have been at fault. See The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19
Wall.) 125, 136 (1873). The Fifth Circuit has applied the rule in cases
involving allisions. See Trico Marine Assets Inc. v. Diamond B. Marine
Servs. Inc., 332 F.3d 779, 786 (5th Cir. 2003). Because the Court finds that
plaintiff has proved that defendant violated a regulation designed to prevent
14
60
61

2.

Failure to Take Reasonable Care

As an alternative to negligence per se, Rose Crewboat argues the
defendant could be held liable under maritime negligence for failing to
adhere to a reasonable standard of care. “To establish maritime negligence,
a plaintiff must ‘demonstrate that there was a duty owed by defendant to the
plaintiff, breach of that duty, injury sustained by [the] plaintiff, and a causal
connection between defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.’” Canal
Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co., 220 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting In re
Cooper/T. Smith, 929 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1991)). “Even without a
statutory violation, liability may be imposed simply where there is
negligence.” Stolt Achievement, Ltd. v. Dredge B.E. LINDHOLM, 447 F.3d
360, 364 (5th Cir. 2006).
The analysis of duty and breach are interrelated, as they turn on the
question of foreseeability. “Under maritime law, a plaintiff is owed a duty of
ordinary care under the circumstances.” In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 2010). “The determination of the
existence and scope of a duty involves a number of factors, including most

just such an allision as took place here, the burden shifts to defendant to
prove “not merely that [its] fault might not have been one of the causes, or
that it probably was not, but that it could not have been.” The Pennsylvania,
86 U.S. (19 Wall) at 136. This is a burden that defendant cannot meet with
the general practices evidence it has put forth.
15

notably the foreseeability of the harm suffered by the complaining party.” Id.
(quoting Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. C.F. Bean Corp., 833 F.2d 65, 67 (5th
Cir. 1987)) (internal quotations omitted). A breach of the duty of ordinary
care can be found when defendant acts negligently, or without such care.
See, e.g., Movible Offshore, Inc. v. M/V Wilken A. Falgout, 471 F.2d 268, 274
(5th Cir. 1973) (“It is enough that the vessel sought to be charged had at its
disposal safe means to avoid the collision and negligently failed to do so.”
(emphasis in original)).
Here, the Court finds the defendant breached the duty of ordinary care
it owed to plaintiff, and is therefore also liable under a theory of maritime
negligence. The Court has found that defendant left an unmarked dredge
pipeline in the Mississippi River as a consequence of its dredging operations.
The pipeline was an obstruction to the boats navigating the river, including
the M/V SAM B. This is particularly true because the pipeline, although
submerged, still hovered near the water’s surface, which increased the
chance of an allision. 63 Moreover, the Court has found that the pipeline was
unmarked. Failing to mark the pipeline significantly increases the risk that
a passing vessel will hit it. Wood Resources was clearly aware of this risk,
because Smith’s testimony establishes that its ordinary practice was to mark

63

See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 at 13:17-14:1.
16

a submerged pipeline to avoid an allision. 64

Other courts have similarly

found that failure to properly mark a submerged obstruction is negligent.
See, e.g., Tidewater Marine, Inc. v. Sanco Int’l., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 987,
1001 (E.D. La. 2000).
D.

Defendant Caused the Plaintiff’s Damages

For Rose Crewboat to recover its alleged damages, it also must prove
that Wood Resources’ negligence was the cause of those damages. “Under
general maritime law, a party’s negligence is actionable only if it is a ‘legal
cause’ of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Expl. Co.,
974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992). A legal cause must be more than “but for”
causation; defendant’s negligence must be a “substantial factor” in plaintiff’s
injury. See id. In the case of a collision or other marine casualty, when the
damaged vessel is not a total loss, the owner is entitled to recover the
reasonable cost of repairs necessary to restore it to its pre-casualty condition.
Gaines Towing & Transp. Inc. v. Atlantia Tanker Corp., 191 F.3d 633, 636
(5th Cir. 1999). Thus, if the allision with the dredge pipe was a substantial
factor in the damage done to the vessel, plaintiff is entitled to damages for
the repairs to the M/V SAM B.

64

See Defendant’s Exhibit 1 at 43:21-25.
17

As an initial matter, defendant does not seem to contest causation for
the temporary repair costs and the cost of using ADM’s crane immediately
following the accident, beyond its argument that Wood Resources was not
negligent. Rather, Wood Resources argues that plaintiff did not pay the
invoices associated with these damages, and therefore cannot recover. 65 But
plaintiff has provided the affidavit of Charles Augustine, which states that it
paid all the relevant invoices in full. 66 Defendant offers no evidence that the
invoices have not been paid. Therefore, the Court includes the $1,800 for
temporary repairs and the $3,696 in crane-use costs in plaintiff’s damages.
Wood Resources more vigorously contests the $11,720 in permanent
repairs that Rose Crewboat claims.

Defendant argues that, even if it

negligently left an unmarked line in the water, the need for the repairs to the
M/V SAM B arose due to wear and tear on the vessel rather than the
allision. 67 This argument is not supported by the weight of the evidence.
Bayou Machine and Fabrication, Inc., performed the M/V SAM B’s repairs.
Although its president, Archie Coulon, testified that he could not determine
with certainty whether the vessel required certain of the repairs because of

65
66
67

R. Doc. 59 at 10.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at 2.
R. Doc. 59 at 8-10.
18

the accident or because of wear and tear, 68 Coulon’s testimony does not
establish that the vessel required immediate repair before the accident,
except for $400 in damage to its tiller arm.

Indeed, the vessel was

functioning normally and traveling on the river regularly up until the day of
the accident.69
Coulon testified that the vessel “definitely hit something” that caused
substantial damage. 70 He emphasized that the vessel hit something “without
a doubt, you know. Something went wrong for sure.” 71 He further noted
numerous items of damage to the M/V SAM B that were the result of the
vessel hitting an object, and not simply wear and tear. For example, when
asked about the damage to the vessel’s stern tubes, which cost $3,400 to
repair, 72 Coulon stated “I’m pretty sure that had something to do with . . . the
accident, because you know, they . . . had a crack in the strut leg and what
have you.” 73 Similarly, with respect to the rudders, which cost $800 to
repair, and the propellers, which cost $600 to repair, 74 Coulon stated: “I
know he definitely hit something for the damage that it had with the rudders

68
69
70
71
72
73
74

See Defendant’s Exhibit 10 at 8:1-4.
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at 4-7.
Defendant’s Exhibit 10 at 13:16-18.
Id. at 20:16-17.
Defendant’s Exhibit 10 at 25.
Id. at 20:7-14.
Defendant’s Exhibit 10 at 25.
19

and what have you, the propellers.”75 Thus, the substantial damage to the
boat from the accident was readily apparent regardless of prior wear and
tear.
Coulin’s testimony, when taken in conjunction with the testimony of
Capt. Bonck, shows that the allision was a substantial factor in the need for
the repairs.

Capt. Bonck testified that after the accident he had “no

propulsion” in one engine, the vessel was “taking on water and . . . lost a
wheel,” the shaft came off, and the clutch came off.76

The sudden severe

damage that Capt. Bonck describes is not consistent with the damage from
wear and tear.
The totality of the evidence indicates that the damages are from the
allision, not simply from wear and tear. The Court therefore finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that Wood Resources caused Rose Crewboat’s
damages. Because the allision constituted a substantial factor in plaintiff’s
need for the permanent repairs, plaintiff may recover the “reasonable cost of
repairs” of the M/V SAM B. Gains Towing & Transp. Inc., 191 F.3d at 635.
This amount is the full repair costs less the $400 cost of repairing the tiller
arm, the need for which Coulin stated was due to wear and tear.

75
76

Id. at 13:16-18.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 at 21:9-25.
20

E.

Interest and Attorney’s Fees

In addition to the damages discussed above, plaintiff also requests
interest and the costs of litigation. 77 Interest is regularly allowed in maritime
collision cases. Gulf Oil Co. v. Panama Canal Co., 481 F.2d 561, 570 (5th Cir.
1973). No special circumstances exist which would cause the Court to deviate
from this general rule. Therefore, the Court will include interest in plaintiff’s
award. However, under the so-called American Rule, litigants are generally
responsible for their own fees. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 257 (1975). The Court may, however, “assess fees
as sanctions when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatious,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Moench v. Marquette Transp. Comp.
Gulf-Inland, L.L.C., 838 F.3d 586, 595 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Gate Guard
Servs., L.P. v. Perez, 792 F.3d 554, 561 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotations omitted)). Here, while defendant was ultimately unsuccessful in
convincing the Court of its position, defendant did not act in “bad faith,
vexatious, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id. Therefore, the Court will
not award the costs of litigation.

77

See R. Doc. 57.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that defendant negligently
left an unmarked line in the water on July 23, 2016. Plaintiff’s damages to
its vessel were caused by defendant’s negligence, except that the Court finds
that the damage to the vessel’s tiller arm was not caused by the accident.
Accordingly, the Court hereby finds defendant liable to plaintiff for repairs
to the M/V SAM B totaling $16,816.00 plus interest.

12th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of November, 2019.

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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