Snyder v. Vannoy et al

Filing 15

ORDER AND REASONS ADOPTING 13 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 04/18/2019.(am)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALLEN SNYDER

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO.

DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN

SECTION: “B”(1)

17-7071

ORDER AND REASONS
Before

the

Court

are

the

Magistrate

Judge’s

Report

and

Recommendation to Dismiss Petitioner Allen Snyder’s Request for
Habeas Corpus Relief (Rec. Doc. 13) and Petitioner’s Objections to
the Report and Recommendation (Rec. Doc. 14). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Objections are OVERRULED and
the Report and Recommendation are ADOPTED as the Court’s
Opinion, dismissing the captioned Section 2254 action for relief.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Allen Snyder is a state prisoner incarcerated
at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. See
Rec. Doc. 13 at 1. In 1996, petitioner was originally convicted
by

a

twelve-member

subsequently

jury

of

first

degree

murder

and

sentenced to death. See State v. Snyder, 128 So.

3d 370, 372 (5th Cir.

2013).

However,

States Supreme Court

1

in

2008,

the

United

reversed the judgment and remanded the matter after finding a
Batson violation.1 See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
On January 29, 2009, a grand jury indicted petitioner

for

second-degree murder. See State v. Snyder, 128 So. 3d 370, 372
(5th Cir. 2013). The State also filed notices of intent to use
evidence of other crimes. See id. On May 4, 2010, a Prieur
hearing2 was held, and on May 27, 2010, the motion was granted.
See id. Petitioner was denied review of that ruling and trial began
in

2012.

See

id.

At

trial,

the

jury

heard

testimony

from

defendant and his ex-wife as well as saw medical records that were
introduced into

evidence.

See

id.

at

373-75.

Testimony

and

evidence showed that petitioner and his ex-wife had a troubled
marriage in which petitioner was jealous and controlling. See
id. at 373. According
On August 29, 1996, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder. On August
22, 1997, petitioner was sentenced to death. On April 14, 1999, the Louisiana
Supreme Court conditionally affirmed the conviction and sentence but remanded
the matter to the lower court for an inquiry into petitioner’s competence
at the time of trial. After determining that Petitioner was in fact
competent at the time of trial, the state Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
and sentence. In June 2005, the United States Supreme Court granted
petitioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the Louisiana State Supreme Court for consideration of
petitioner’s Batson claim. On remand, the state Supreme Court found no merit in
petitioner’s claims and again affirmed his conviction and sentence.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 2008, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
trial
court
judgment and remanded the matter after finding that the
committed error in rejecting Petitioner’s claim that the prosecution
exercised peremptory challenge based on race in violation of Batson. On April
30, 2008, the Louisiana Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence
and remanded the matter. See Rec. Doc. 13 at 1-2.

1

2

A Prieur hearing requires that before evidence of other crimes are introduced,
the trial court must determine that the extraneous acts are probative of a real
issue and that their probative value exceeds their prejudicial effect. The
party seeking to introduce such evidence must show the requisite for it at a
hearing outside the presence of the jury. See State v. Taylor, 217 So. 3d 283,
291 (La. 2016).

2

to the evidence, the jealousy escalated to physical abuse3 causing
the ex-wife to eventually move out. See id. However, in 1995,
Petitioner

wanted

to

reconcile

with

his

ex-wife.

See

id.

Nevertheless, petitioner found his ex-wife with another man, the
victim,

and

eventually

engaged

in

an

altercation

in

which

petitioner stabbed the victim nine times and his ex-wife 19 times.
See id. at 374-75.
On February 2, 2012, the jury found petitioner guilty as
charged. Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. See id. at
373.

The

Court

of

Appeals

affirmed

petitioner’s

conviction

and

sentence. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied his related writ
application. See id. at 383; State v. Snyder, 138 So. 3d 643 (La.
2014). Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in
the state courts. See Rec. Doc. 13.
On July 24, 2017, petitioner filed the instant federal habeas
corpus

application

alleging

that

he

received

ineffective

assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate levels. See
Rec. Doc. Nos. 1, 3. On November 3, 2017, respondents filed a
response in opposition to the habeas petition arguing that the
petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred. See Rec. Doc. 11. On
November 13, 2017, Petitioner filed a reply. See Rec. Doc. 12. On

3 According to the record, petitioner shoved his ex-wife’s head into the car
window, struck her with a baseball bat while she was sleeping, drove her to an
isolated location, opened his trunk, and threatened her, slammed her head into
the wall causing serious injuries, and stabbed her nine times in the neck, head,
and arms. See State v. Snyder, 128 So. 3d 370 (5th Cir. 2013).

3

September 7, 2018, the Magistrate Judge reviewed the petition and
recommended it be dismissed with prejudice. See Rec. Doc. 13. On
September 18, 2018, Petitioner filed his objections to the Report
and Recommendation. See Rec. Doc. 14.
A. 28 U.S.C. § 2254- General Principals
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) controls review of this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus
petition. See Poree v. Collins, 866 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 2017)
(“Federal habeas proceedings are subject to the rules prescribed
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act . . .”). Under
§ 2254, an application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied
on the merits, even if an applicant has failed to exhaust state
court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Jones v. Jones, 163
F.3d 285, 299 (5th Cir. 1998). Enacted as part of the AEDPA, the
amended subsections 2254(d)(1) and (2) provide the standards of
review for questions of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions
of both.
For pure questions of fact, factual findings are presumed to
be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted
by an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . a determination
of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be
correct.”).

The

applicant

has

the

burden

of

rebutting

the

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. However, a
writ of habeas corpus may be granted if the adjudication of the
4

claim on the merits “resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2);
Hankton v. Boutte, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126899 *1, *10 (E.D. La
June 29, 2018).
For pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact,
a state court’s determination is reviewed under § 2254(d)(1). See
Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). For mixed
questions, a state court’s determination receives deference unless
the decision was either contrary to federal law or involved an
unreasonable application of federal law. See § 2254(d)(1); Hill,
210 F.3d at 485.
A state court’s decision is contrary to federal law if (1)
the state court applies a rule different from the governing law
set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases or (2) the state court
decides a case differently than the Supreme Court when there are
“materially indistinguishable facts.” See Poree, 866 F.3d at 246;
Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2010). A state
court’s decision involves an unreasonable application of federal
law when it applies a correct legal rule unreasonably to the facts
of the case. See White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014).
An inquiry under the unreasonable context involves not whether the
state

court’s

determination

was

5

incorrect,

but

whether

the

determination was objectively unreasonable. Boyer v. Vannoy, 863
F.3d 428, 454 (5th Cir. 2017).
The court in Boyer stated that the determination must not be
“merely wrong,” and that “clear error” will not be enough to
overturn a state court’s determination. Id; see also Puckett v.
Epps, 641 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that unreasonable
is not the same as incorrect, and thus an incorrect application of
the law will be affirmed if it is not also unreasonable).

Even if

a state court incorrectly applies Supreme Court precedent, that
mistake alone, does not mean that a petitioner is entitled to
habeas relief. See Puckett, 641 F.3d at 663.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A petitioner seeking relief for ineffective counsel must show
that

counsel’s

performance

was

deficient

and

the

deficient

performance prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). Petitioner bears the burden of proof and
must prove by a preponderance of evidence that his counsel was
ineffective. See Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 563 (5th Cir.
1997); Clark v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 273, 284 (5th Cir. 2000). A court
is not required to address both prongs of the test if the court
finds that the petitioner has not sufficiently proven one of the
two prongs. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. In other words, a
court may dispose of the claim without addressing the other prong.

6

To prove deficient performance, the petitioner must show that
defense counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.” See United States v. Bolton, 908 F.3d 75, 99
(5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). The Fifth
Circuit has repeatedly held that courts apply a “strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” Halprin v. Davis, 911 F.3d 247, 258 (5th
Cir. 2018); Lucio v. Davis, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 29213 *12 (5th
Cir. Oct. 17, 2018); Crockett v. McCotter, 796 F.2d 787, 791 (5th
Cir. 1986). The petitioner must overcome this presumption as the
courts take into account the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct
under all of the circumstances. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689;
Lucio, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 29213 at *12-13.
To show prejudice, the petitioner “must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
United States v. Avila-Gonzales, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 35950 *3-4
(5th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Therefore, the petitioner must be able to demonstrate that the
outcome would have been different. See id. “The likelihood of a
different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Mejia
v. Davis, 906 F.3d 307, 320 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)).

7

Petitioner alleges five claims regarding alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate levels.
For

the

reasons

discussed

petitioner’s

below,

claims

are

without merit.
First, petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for not
making

a

Batson

Specifically,

challenge

petitioner

due

to

argues

gender

that

the

bias

at

“trial

the

was

trial.

infected

with a severe case of gender bias” because the jury consisted of
nine

females

fundamentally

and

three

unfair.”

males,

Rec.

Doc.

“thus
14

at

rendering
4.

his

However,

trial
as

the

Magistrate Judge found, this argument lacks merit.
A Batson violation occurs when there is the use of peremptory
strikes of prospective jurors to purposefully discriminate against
one due to race or gender. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)
(extending Batson to include gender discrimination). Among the
different steps required of a petitioner to make, the petitioner
must show a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has
been exercised on the basis of gender. See Sparkman v. Vannoy,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222324 *50 (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 2017) (citing
Stevens v. Epps, 618 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 2010)).
Petitioner has not made out a prima facie case of gender
discrimination. The State used only three peremptory challenges,
one striking a male and two striking females. See Rec. Doc. 13 at
8

14. While petitioner urges the number of peremptory challenges
used by the State is “irrelevant,” (See Rec. Doc. 14 at 4), the
fact that the State only used one to strike a male is not inherently
suspect. Petitioner’s claim is conclusory and nothing in the record
supports a finding that a juror was improperly struck under Batson.
Second, petitioner argues that counsel’s cross-examination
of Mary Beth Snyder was deficient. However, courts have stated
that “[t]he decision whether to cross-examine a witness, and if
so, how vigorously
requires

a

judgment.”

Lyons

(E.D.

La.

Supp.

2d

to

challenge

quintessential
v.

the

witness’

exercise

of

May

11,

2018)

(quoting

831,

859

(W.D.

Tex.

in

professional

Vannoy, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99137 *66
Ford

v.

second-guessing

Cockrell,

315

the

decisions

Court
of

has

warned

counsel.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Specifically, the Supreme
has

stated

decisions

that
through

courts

F.

2004), aff’d, 135 F. App’x 769

(5th Cir. 2005)). In addition, the Supreme
courts

testimony,

should

hindsight,

not

second-guess

but

instead

See
Court

counsel’s
look

at

counsel’s perspective at the time. Id. Thus, courts are to give
a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable
and might be “sound trial strategy.” Id.
In Lyons, the court found that the petitioner’s claims were
meritless

as

the

petitioner

failed

to

show

what

necessary

questions went unasked and how he was prejudiced by such. Lyons,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99137 *67. On the contrary, the court
9
found that the

petitioner’s defense counsel “vigorously and exhaustively cross
examined” the witnesses. Lyons, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99137 *6768.
petitioner

Here,
counsel’s

fails

to

establish

that

performance was deficient in the cross examination of

the witness. He asserts that defense counsel cross-examined Mary
Beth Snyder, but that the “cross examination . . . was simply
about her trial
she

had

testimony

that

contradicted

information

that

provided to Snyder and others.” Rec. Doc. 1 at 6. While

Petitioner attempts to assert that counsel did not vigorously
cross examine Mary Beth Snyder, he fails to show or identify any
relevant questions
examination.

In

that

counsel

failed

to

ask

on

cross-

addition, petitioner discusses how Mary Beth

Snyder should have been impeached due to inconsistencies in her
testimonies, and that counsel had a “duty to impeach” her. Id.
However, not only does petitioner concedes that defense counsel
did in fact cross examine the witness on her inconsistencies, but
the

record

also

shows

that

defense counsel attempted to use

transcripts in order to challenge the
See

id.;

found

Rec.

in

vigorously
Supreme
tactical
strong

Lyon,

Doc.

13

this

cross-examined

Court’s

warning

decisions
presumption.

at

16.

witness’s

Furthermore, as the court

Court

finds

the

witness.

against

unless

10

that
We

defense
also

can

counsel

recognize the

second-guessing

petitioner

Therefore,

credibility.

counsel’s

overcome

the

Petitioner has not shown how such attempts to cross-examine Mary
Beth Snyder were deficient nor how Petitioner was prejudiced.
Third, petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to Gwendolyn Williams’s testimony from the first
trial
In

being

read

objections

that

the

the

the

record

report

testimony

petitioner
counsel

to

into

should

and

to

show

or

neglected

to

object

to

Williams’s

his

second

recommendation,

have

fails

at

been

the

he

barred.

establish

how

admission

trial.
argues

However,
his

of

trial

Gwendolyn

testimony from the first trial. On the contrary, the

record shows that counsel objected vigorously to the use of the
evidence at the hearing and renewed those objections at trial.
As

the

Magistrate

Judge

discussed,

challenge to the testimony was
that

counsel
Fourth,

was

performed

continuances.

for

According

mere

fact

is

not

unsuccessful

that

the

evidence

deficiently.” Rec. Doc. 13 at 18.

petitioner

ineffective

“the

contends
requesting
to

that

trial

unnecessary

petitioner,

the

“case

counsel
and
was

oral
not

benefited from the granting of any continuances.” Rec. Doc. 14
at 6.

However, the court in Farrier v. Vannoy stated that the

decision to either seek a continuance or not is one of trial
strategy that should be given great deference, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 214803 *20 (E.D. La. May 25, 2018).

11

In the instant case, petitioner’s indictment was amended to
charge him with second degree murder. Petitioner’s counsel from
the Louisiana Capital Assistance project withdrew counsel when
Petitioner no longer became charged with a capital offense. On the
same day that trial was scheduled, new counsel enrolled for
petitioner and requested a continuance. Thus, as the Magistrate
Judge assumes, a continuance was requested to prepare for trial as
counsel had just enrolled. A second continuance was requested when
Petitioner

was

not

transferred

to

the

Jefferson

Parish

Correctional Center as ordered by the court.
While petitioner asserts that these continuances did not
benefit

his

case,

he

does

not

show

how

the

requests

for

continuance were unreasonable. See United States v. Webb, 796 F.2d
60, 63 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that a continuance to gain time to
complete

necessary

trial

preparation

does

not

equal

an

unreasonable act by counsel). Petitioner fails to show how the
results of his proceeding would have been different if counsel had
not requested the continuances. There is no showing that counsel
was prepared to try the case on the same day that counsel was
appointed for petitioner. See Rec. Doc. 13 at 20. Thus, the
additional time gave counsel the necessary time to adequately
prepare petitioner's defense.
Lastly,
ineffective

petitioner
for

failing

claims
to

that

argue
12

appellate

certain

issues

counsel
on

was

appeal.

According to petitioner, appellate counsel should have asserted
a

claim

that

requesting

trial

was

ineffective

for

continuance of the trial. However, the courts have

previously held that
bring

counsel

forth

appellate

counsel

is

not

required

to

non-frivolous claim that might be raised. See

every

Matthews v. Cain, 337 F.

Supp.

3d

687,

712

(E.D.

La.

2018);

West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1396 (5th Cir. 1996)

The

court

in

Matthews

reiterated

the

viewpoint

that

it

is important for experienced lawyers to not focus so much on
the

weaker arguments on appeal but instead focus on either one

central issue or a few important ones. The court held that such
strategy could be beneficial in that focusing on every issue,
especially those that lack merit, could potentially undermine
or bury good arguments. Matthews, 337 F. Supp. at 712. “Rather,
the applicable test to be applied in assessing such a claim is
instead

whether

the

‘clearly

stronger’

appeal.”

Id.

issue

than

(citing

ignored

the

Diaz

v.

issues

by

appellate
actually

counsel

was

presented

on

Quarterman, 228 Fed. App’x 417,

427 (5th Cir. 2007)).
Petitioner’s

appellate counsel raised three arguments

on

appeal concerning the trial court’s denial of the motion for
mistrial,
the

the

allowance

of

petitioner’s

other

crimes,

and

allowance of the State to view personal letters that were

never offered at trial. While appellate counsel was unsuccessful
in his arguments,
claim that

the

petitioner
13

fails

to

establish

how

the

trial

counsel

was

ineffective

for

requesting

continuances

is

stronger than those actually presented on appeal. As seen earlier,
the continuances had reasonable grounds.
For the reasons stated above, petitioner has not shown that
either trial or appellate counsel was deficient in performance
nor that he was prejudiced by either counsel’s performances.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 18th day of April, 2019.

____________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14