Patterson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

Filing 22

ORDER AND REASONS granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS MetLife's summary judgment motion. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/2/2018. (cg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ORIA PATTERSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 17-7188

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY

SECTION “R” (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) moves for
summary judgment. 1 The Court grants the motion because plaintiff does not
qualify as the beneficiary under MetLife’s policy.

I.

BACKGROUND
This case concerns the proper beneficiary of life insurance proceeds.

The decedent is Kelvin Patterson, whose Federal Employees Group Life
Insurance (FEGLI) policy was administered by MetLife.2 Kelvin designated
his mother, plaintiff Oria Lee Patterson, as his beneficiary on December 11,
1979. 3 On May 11, 1987, he changed his designated beneficiary to his then-

1
2
3

R. Doc. 14.
R. Doc. 1-1 at 6; R. Doc. 14-8 at 1-2.
R. Doc. 14-3 at 3.

fiancée, Desta Sue Smith.4 Kelvin allegedly executed a third designation of
beneficiary form on June 11, 2016, naming plaintiff as his beneficiary. 5
Kelvin died on June 14, 2016.6 In August 2016, plaintiff sought death
benefits under the policy.7 MetLife denied plaintiff’s claim on the ground
that the latest designation of beneficiary form on file with the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) at the time of death was the 1987 form
naming Smith as beneficiary.8 Smith submitted a claim in March 2017,
which MetLife approved and paid. 9
Plaintiff sued MetLife in state court on June 16, 2017, seeking damages
for breach of contract. 10 Plaintiff later added a negligence claim. 11 MetLife
removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 12
MetLife now moves for summary judgment. 13

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10
11
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Id. at 5.
Id. at 15.
R. Doc. 1-1 at 6.
R. Doc. 14-8 at 2.
R. Doc. 14-3 at 22; R. Doc. 14-4 at 13.
R. Doc. 14-8 at 3.
R. Doc. 1-1 at 6.
Id. at 14.
R. Doc. 1.
R. Doc. 14.
2

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any material
fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s]
from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta &
Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99
(5th Cir. 2008).

All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the

nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth
‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either
support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision
Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at
1075. A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence
which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went
3

uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,
1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by
either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact, or “showing that the moving party’s
evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to
return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by
merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with
respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex,
477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must,
by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the
pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for
trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).

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III. DISCUSSION
Kelvin Patterson’s life insurance policy is governed by the Federal
Employees Group Life Insurance Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 8701, et seq. The Act
provides that death benefits under a FEGLI policy must be paid first “to the
beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the employee in a signed and
witnessed writing received before death in the employing office or . . . in the
Office of Personnel Management.” Id. § 8705(a). The Act makes clear that
“a designation, change, or cancellation of beneficiary in a will or other
document not so executed and filed has no force or effect.” Id. The Act also
includes an express preemption provision:
The provisions of any contract under this chapter which relate to
the nature or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments
with respect to benefits) shall supersede and preempt any law of
any State or political subdivision thereof, or any regulation
issued thereunder, which relates to group life insurance to the
extent that the law or regulation is inconsistent with the
contractual provisions.
Id. § 8709(d)(1).
As an initial matter, MetLife argues that plaintiff’s state law claims are
preempted. 14 The Act clearly preempts certain state laws, such as those
altering the distribution of life insurance proceeds. See, e.g., Hillman v.
Maretta, 569 U.S. 483 (2013). But many courts have entertained state law

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R. Doc. 14-1 at 7.
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claims related to FEGLI policies. See, e.g., Devlin v. United States, 352 F.3d
525, 544-45 (2d Cir. 2003) (negligence); Keife v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 797 F.
Supp. 2d 1072, 1077 (D. Nev. 2011) (breach of contract). The Fifth Circuit,
however, has repeatedly declined to delineate the scope of the Act’s
preemption provision. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Atkins, 225 F.3d 510, 514
(5th Cir. 2000); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Trevino, 20 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir. 1994).
Because of the lack of legal authority on this issue, and because plaintiff’s
claims fail on the merits, the Court does not address whether plaintiff’s
claims are preempted.
A.

Breach of Contract

MetLife argues that it is entitled summary judgment on plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim because Smith, not plaintiff, was the designated
beneficiary under the policy. Upon Kelvin’s death, MetLife received the 1979
and 1987 designation of beneficiary forms from OPM. 15 MetLife denied
plaintiff’s claim on August 29, 2016, because the more recent form
designated Smith as beneficiary. 16 Plaintiff’s counsel contested this decision
by letter dated October 7, 2016, and attached the 2016 designation of
beneficiary form.17 MetLife then sought confirmation from OPM that the

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R. Doc. 14-8 at 2; R. Doc. 14-2 at 3-6.
R. Doc. 14-3 at 22.
R. Doc. 14-4 at 2-4.
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2016 form was not on file before Kelvin’s death. 18 OPM confirmed that it had
no record of any forms other than those it had previously sent to MetLife. 19
Plaintiff disputes whether OPM actually received the 1987 designation
of beneficiary form, and argues that this dispute of fact precludes summary
judgment. 20 It is true that the 1987 form lacks any stamp or notation
indicating receipt by the employing office.21 But it is also true that OPM
actually possessed the 1987 form and provided it to MetLife shortly after
Kelvin’s death. Such possession suffices to establish receipt. Cf. Atkins, 225
F.3d at 514 (holding that once “a properly filled out and signed designation
of beneficiary form” is turned over to an employing office, the form is
considered received by the office). While it is possible that OPM received the
1987 form only after Kelvin’s death, this inference lacks any support in the
record. Such “unsupported speculation [is] not sufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th
Cir. 2003). Accordingly, MetLife is entitled summary judgment on plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 10-11.
20
Plaintiff does not dispute that OPM did not receive the 2016
designation of beneficiary form before Kelvin’s death.
21
R. Doc. 14-3 at 5-6.
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B.

Negligence

MetLife argues that it is entitled summary judgment on plaintiff’s
negligence claim because the factual allegations supporting the claim are
insufficient.22

Plaintiff’s state court petition asserts that MetLife “was

negligent in its handling of [plaintiff’s] claim for benefits by failing to . . .
properly explain [the] policy to [plaintiff] and the deceased, failing to
provide[] proper notifications and potentially mishandling/misplacing
crucial documentation.” 23 The petition lacks any further factual allegations
regarding MetLife’s alleged negligence, and no evidence of such negligence
appears in the record. Accordingly, MetLife is entitled summary judgment
on plaintiff’s negligence claim.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS MetLife’s summary

judgment motion. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2nd
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of April, 2018.

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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R. Doc. 14-1 at 9.
R. Doc. 1-1 at 14.
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