Stewart v. Marathon Petroleum Company, LP et al

Filing 103

ORDER AND REASONS granting 14 , 33 , and 49 Motions to Dismiss; Stewart's claims against the Polar defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; Stewart's claims against Marathon are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on 1/29/2018. (blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
EDDIE STEWART, III

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 17-7775

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO. LP, ET AL.

SECTION I

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court are two motions 1 to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)—one filed by defendant
Marathon Petroleum Company LP (“Marathon”) and the other by defendants Polar
Corporation and Polar Tank Trailer, LLC (“Polar Tank Trailer”) (collectively, “the
Polar defendants”). For the following reasons, both motions are granted.
I.
Plaintiff Eddie Stewart, III (“Stewart”), a resident of Louisiana, is a
commercial truck driver. 2 On August 10, 2016, Stewart was assigned a job
transporting a chemical from Michigan to the Gulf Coast using a tanker-trailer (“the
trailer”) manufactured by the Polar defendants. 3 On August 11, pursuant to his
superior’s directions, Stewart arrived at Marathon’s oil refinery in Detroit, where
Marathon employees allegedly loaded the trailer with the incorrect chemical. 4 On
Marathon personnel’s instructions, Stewart left the refinery after the loading was

R. Doc. Nos. 14, 33, 49.
R. Doc. No. 1, at 3.
3 Id. at 5.
4 Id.
1
2

complete and continued on his route. 5 Shortly thereafter, the trailer exploded on the
side of the interstate in Ohio, allegedly causing Stewart to suffer personal injuries. 6
II.
The Court may require a nonresident defendant to appear before it, but its
jurisdictional power is restricted by constitutional and statutory bounds. “A federal
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if (1) the forum
state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) the
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 2009).
Because the limits of Louisiana’s long-arm statute are defined by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the two inquiries become one, and the Court need only consider whether
the constitutional requirements of due process have been met. See Guidry v. U.S.
Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3201.
Those requirements permit a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant when (1) that defendant establishes “minimum contacts” with the forum
state, thereby “purposefully avail[ing]” itself of that state’s benefits and protections;
and (2) exercising jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend “traditional notions
of fairy play and substantial justice.” Latshaw v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir.
1999) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The connection

5
6

Id. at 6.
Id.
2

between the defendant’s conduct and the forum state “must be such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court” there. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court has divided personal jurisdiction into two types—
specific or “conduct-linked” jurisdiction and general or “all-purpose” jurisdiction.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014); Sangha v. Navig8
ShipManagement Private Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th Cir. 2018). The former depends
on a connection between the forum state and the underlying controversy, permitting
courts to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when that defendant has
“purposefully directed” his activities at the forum state “and the litigation results
from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Burger King Corp.,
471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (emphasis added); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
Thus, specific jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry and involves cases in
which the defendant’s forum-related activities give rise to the facts that form the
basis of the lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit has articulated the following analysis for
determining whether specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper:
(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state,
i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum state
or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities
there; (2) whether the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or results
from the defendant’s forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.
Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014). If a plaintiff
establishes the first two prongs, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show
that exercising jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable. Id.
3

General jurisdiction, by contrast, is available “even if the nonresident
defendant’s contacts with the forum state are not directly related to the cause of
action.” Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994). Those contacts must,
however, be “so continuous and systematic as to render [the defendant] essentially at
home in the forum State.” Goodyear, 564 at 919. A corporate defendant is typically
considered “at home” in the state where it is incorporated or has its principal place of
business. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. General jurisdiction is not limited to these
forums, but it is an “exceptional case” when “a corporate defendant’s operations in
another forum may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation
at home in that State.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S.Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (quoting
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19). The inquiry’s focus is not solely the “magnitude of the
defendant’s in-state contacts.” Id. at 1559. A corporation’s activities must be
evaluated “in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates
in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at
139 n.20.
When a nonresident defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
the district court’s jurisdiction over the nonresident.” Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d
1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). If a district court rules on the motion without holding an
evidentiary hearing, as the Court does here, 7 the plaintiff may meet his burden by

None of the parties requested an evidentiary hearing, although the Court did
require the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the personal jurisdiction issue.
7

4

establishing a prima facie case showing that personal jurisdiction is proper. Wilson,
20 F.3d at 648. 8 “The court may determine the jurisdictional issue by receiving
affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the
recognized methods of discovery.” Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162,
1165 (5th Cir. 1985). The Court must accept all of the plaintiff’s uncontroverted
allegations as true and construe all disputed facts in the plaintiff’s favor. Revell v.
Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002). The prima facie burden does not, however,
“require the court to credit conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted.” Panda
Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001).
III.
The Court first addresses whether it has personal jurisdiction over the Polar
defendants. According to Stewart, the Polar defendants are subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction under a stream of commerce theory. 9 Stewart no longer asserts that the

An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary because there is sufficient information in the
record to resolve the pending motions before the Court.
8 If the Court had held an evidentiary hearing, Stewart would have to “demonstrate
that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants is proper by a preponderance of
the evidence.” Irvin v. S. Snow Mfg., Inc., 517 F. App’x 229, 230 (5th Cir. 2013).
9 R. Doc. No. 99, at 7–10. In their supplemental brief, the Polar defendants stress that
they are distinct legal entities. R. Doc. No. 97, at 7. For the reasons discussed herein,
the Court concludes that it does not have personal jurisdiction over Polar Tank
Trailer, which has significantly more contacts with Louisiana than Polar
Corporation. If the Court does not have jurisdiction over Polar Tank Trailer, it
certainly does not have jurisdiction over Polar Corporation. As the Polar defendants
note, there is no evidence to show that Polar Corporation has any independent
connections to Louisiana whatsoever. R. Doc. No. 102. Regardless, because treating
them collectively does not change the jurisdictional outcome, the Court will generally
refer to the two Polar defendants as one entity for the sake of clarity.
5

Court has general jurisdiction over the Polar defendants, 10 and the U.S. Supreme
Court has restricted the stream of commerce theory’s application to specific
jurisdiction. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 926–27 (“Flow of a manufacturer’s products
into the forum, we have explained, may bolster an affiliation germane to specific
jurisdiction.”). 11 The Court will therefore only examine whether it can exercise
specific jurisdiction over the Polar defendants.
The circuits are split on the stream of commerce theory’s reach after the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of
California, Solano County, 12 but the Fifth Circuit has adopted “Justice Brennan’s
more expansive view.” In re DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., 888 F.3d 753, 778 (5th Cir.
2018) (citation omitted).

Under this approach, the first prong of the specific

jurisdiction analysis is satisfied if a court determines that the defendant “delivered
the product . . . ‘into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it would be
purchased by or used by consumers in the forum state.’” Irvin, 517 F. App’x at 779
(citing Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 2013)).
Applying the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, the Court must first determine whether
the Polar defendants established minimum contacts with Louisiana by purposefully
directing their activities toward Louisiana or purposefully availing themselves of the

R. Doc. No. 98. The Court considers this argument waived.
The stream of commerce theory “recognizes that a defendant may purposefully
avail itself of the protection of a state’s laws—and thereby subject itself to personal
jurisdiction—by sending its goods rather than its agents into the forum.” In re DePuy,
888 F.3d at 778 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
12 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
10
11

6

privileges of conducting activities here. Stewart argues that, under a stream of
commerce theory, the Polar defendants have sufficient contacts with Louisiana to
subject them to the Court’s jurisdiction. 13 In response, the Polar defendants contend
that the trailer at issue left the stream of commerce after Quality Carriers, Inc.
(“Quality Carriers”) purchased it—before it was garaged in Louisiana and before the
date of the explosion. 14 They argue that, as a result, the stream of commerce theory
is inapplicable. 15 In support of their argument, the Polar defendants rely on Seiferth
v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., in which the Fifth Circuit observed, “Once a product
has reached the end of the stream and is purchased, a consumer’s unilateral decision
to take the product to a distant state, without more, is insufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction over the manufacturer or distributor.” Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros,
Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2006).
The Court agrees with the Polar defendants. Under Seiferth, the trailer
“reached the end of the stream” when Quality Carriers bought it. Id. The fact that
Quality Carriers later had the trailer transported to Louisiana does not allow the
Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Polar defendants.

R. Doc. No. 99, at 10.
R. Doc. No. 102, at 5–6. As stated herein, Quality Carriers, a defendant in this case,
is a Florida-based company that purchased the trailer from the Polar defendants and
had it shipped to Florida. R. Doc. No. 102, at 1. Quality Carriers later moved the
trailer to Louisiana and provided Stewart with the trailer so he could drive the route
from Louisiana to Michigan and back—the route Stewart was driving when the
explosion occurred. R. Doc. No. 99, at 8.
15 R. Doc. No. 102, at 6.
13
14

7

Even assuming, however, that the trailer remained in the stream of commerce
after its initial purchase, the Court would still not have personal jurisdiction over the
Polar defendants. In Irvin v. Southern Snow Manufacturing, Inc., the defendant was
a Louisiana-based manufacturer of shaved-ice machines, one of which injured the
plaintiff, a Mississippi resident, in Mississippi. Irvin v. S. Snow Mfg., Inc., 517 F.
App’x at 230. Like the Polar defendants, the defendant in Irvin had no direct
connection with the plaintiff; rather, the defendant had sold the machine to a third
party in Louisiana, who then sold it to the plaintiff in Mississippi. Id. The plaintiff
relied on the defendant’s business contacts with a number of other Mississippi
residents to establish the defendant’s “minimum contacts” there under a stream of
commerce theory. Id. at 231.
While the Court did not address whether the machine that had caused the
plaintiff’s injuries exited the stream of commerce after the initial sale, it “assumed
without deciding that . . . [the defendant] purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of doing business in Mississippi by making a substantial percentage of its overall
sales to customers in that state.” Id. at 232. The Court then concluded that—despite
this assumption—jurisdiction was improper because the plaintiff could not show a
sufficient “nexus” between the defendant’s contacts with Mississippi and the machine
that injured her. Id. Without that nexus, she could not satisfy the second prong of the
specific jurisdiction inquiry.
Stewart’s stream of commerce argument is similar to the one the plaintiff made
in Irvin. He contends that the Polar defendants’ contacts with Louisiana—which are

8

unrelated to the accident forming the basis of his complaint— suffice to subject them
to the Court’s jurisdiction. Polar Tank Trailer was certified to do business in
Louisiana until early 2017 and, thus, at the time of the accident. 16 Additionally, the
Polar defendants employ a registered sales agent whose territory includes Louisiana,
and they knew some of the trailers they manufactured and sold were registered in
Louisiana. 17 Nonetheless, like the plaintiff in Irvin, Stewart is unable to satisfy the
second prong of the test for specific jurisdiction, which requires that the controversy
“arise out of or relate to” the Polar defendants’ activity in Louisiana. See Monkton,
768 F.3d at 432; see also Luv N’ care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 472 (5th
Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is not enough to satisfy due process that [a defendant] has some
‘minimum contacts’ with Louisiana.”). For jurisdiction to be proper, “the defendant’s
suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum state.”
Monkton, 768 F.3d at 433 (emphasis added).
None of the Polar defendants’ connections to Louisiana gave rise to the facts
underlying this dispute. Stewart alleges the Polar defendants were negligent in their
design and manufacture of the trailer. 18 However, the trailer was manufactured in
Minnesota, so any alleged negligence relating to the manufacture or design of the
trailer would have occurred there. 19 The Polar defendants sold the trailer to Quality
Carriers, a Florida company. 20 Quality Carriers subsequently shipped the trailer to

R. Doc No. 71-6.
R. Doc. No. 71-7, at 1; R. Doc. No. 102, at 4.
18 R. Doc. No. 1, at 12.
19 R. Doc. No. 33-1, at 5.
20 Id. at 1.
16
17

9

Florida—not Louisiana. 21 The point of sale was documented as Minnesota. 22 It was
Quality Carriers that directed the trailer’s route, which originated in Louisiana. 23
Finally, the eventual explosion that allegedly caused Stewart’s injuries occurred in
Ohio. 24
Any of the Polar defendants’ other contacts with Louisiana are too removed
from the cause of action. Stewart indicates that Polar Corporation owns 100% of Polar
Service Centers—a non-defendant that owns service facilities in Louisiana—but
there is no record that any of the company’s service centers worked on the trailer that
exploded. 25 Neither the Polar defendants’ prior certification to conduct business in

R. Doc. No. 80, at 2.
R. Doc. No. 33-1, at 2.
23 R. Doc. No. 80, at 4. Stewart argues that the Polar defendants should not be allowed
to avoid liability when their trailers cause injury somewhere other than where they
are manufactured simply because the trailers are sold “free on board” (“FOB”). Selling
a trailer FOB means that, once the trailer passes from the seller to the buyer, title to
and liability for the goods transfers to the buyer.
First, an FOB contract term covers liability for the merchandise being
transported, and Stewart is not seeking damages for lost or damaged goods.
Furthermore, the issue currently before the Court is not whether the Polar
defendants are liable for the explosion, but whether the Court may properly exercise
jurisdiction over them. Even if the contract for sale of the trailer had not included an
FOB term, the Polar defendants still would not have made direct contact with
Louisiana because the buyer was not a Louisiana company, and the accident did not
occur in Louisiana. Hence, the Court considers the FOB discussion irrelevant to the
jurisdictional inquiry.
24 R. Doc. No. 33-1, at 5; R. Doc. No. 80, at 2.
25 R. Doc. No. 80, at 2. Even if one of the service centers had serviced the trailer
involved in this case, the Polar defendants correctly note that Polar Service Centers,
LLC’s contacts with Louisiana cannot be imputed to Polar Corporation. Dickson
Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Courts have long
presumed the institutional independence of related corporations, such as parent and
subsidiary, when determining if one corporation’s contacts with a forum can be the
basis of a related corporation’s contacts.”).
21
22

10

Louisiana nor Polar Tank Trailer, LLC’s employment of a “South Central Regional
Sales Manager” (whose territory covers Louisiana, along with six other states) 26
relate to the incident that forms the basis of Stewart’s complaint. There is no evidence
to suggest that any business the Polar defendants conducted in Louisiana, including
any business coordinated by a Louisiana sales representative, resulted in Quality
Carriers purchasing the trailer from the Polar defendants. These connections are
simply “too attenuated to support personal jurisdiction.” Irvin, 517 F. App’x at 232
(holding that the defendant, which sold its product to a consumer who later
unilaterally transported it to the forum state, was not subject to the court’s
jurisdiction “based on an ‘arose-out-of’ theory”).
The Court ultimately concludes that it cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
Polar defendants. In addition to Stewart’s failure to demonstrate that the Polar
defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Louisiana, Stewart has not
demonstrated that “the litigation result[s] from alleged injuries that arise out of or
relate to” the defendants’ forum-related contacts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; see
also ITL Int’l, Inc. v. Constenla, S.A., 669 F.3d 493, 499–500 (5th Cir. 2012)
(concluding that the defendants had “availed themselves” of the forum state’s laws
but nonetheless finding jurisdiction improper because “there is little nexus between
the defendants’ contacts . . . and the plaintiff’s . . . claims”).
Because Stewart is unable to show that his alleged injuries arise out of or
relate to the Polar defendants’ forum-related activity, Stewart has failed to establish

26

R. Doc. No. 71-7.
11

a prima facie case supporting the Court’s jurisdiction, and the Court need not
determine whether exercising jurisdiction over the Polar defendants would be unfair
or unreasonable. See Eddy v. Printers House (P) Ltd., 627 F. App’x 323, 328 (5th Cir.
2015) (“[W]e do not . . . address whether the ‘fair play and substantial justice’
requirement has been satisfied, as the determination that the [defendant] lacked
‘minimum contacts’ with [the forum state] alone is sufficient to conclude that the
district court could not exercise personal jurisdiction.”).
IV.
The Court now addresses whether it has personal jurisdiction over Marathon.
“[O]nly a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to
all-purpose jurisdiction there.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. When the defendant is a
corporation, the “paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction” is the forum
“in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home”—typically in the state where
it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. Id. at 137. It is the “exceptional
case” in which a corporation’s operations in another forum “‘may be so substantial
and of such a nature as to render the corporation’ subject to general jurisdiction ‘in
that State.’” Whitener v. Pliva, Inc., 606 F. App’x 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19). The standard is high: “It is . . . incredibly difficult to
establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or
principle place of business.” Monkton, 768 F.3d at 432.
To be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, Marathon must be “at home” in
Louisiana or “its continuous and substantial contacts with [Louisiana] must be akin

12

to those of a local enterprise that actually is ‘at home’” here. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 152.
It is undisputed that Marathon is not “at home” in Louisiana in the traditional
paradigm because it is incorporated in Delaware and its principal place of business
is in Ohio. 27 The question is therefore whether Marathon’s Louisiana operations are
“so substantial and of such a nature” that Marathon may nonetheless be considered
“essentially at home” in Louisiana. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 153.
On one end of the legal spectrum are cases in which the defendants’ contacts
with the forum are sparse and shallow and, thus, inadequate. For example, in Ezell
v. Medtronic plc, the defendant—an Irish company called Medtronic plc
(“Medtronic”)—was sued in Louisiana over a products liability dispute. Ezell v.
Medtronic plc, No. 3:17-CV-00796, 2018 WL 1100901, at *1, 5 (W.D. La. Feb. 6, 2018).
Medtronic was not headquartered in Louisiana, had never been licensed to do
business in Louisiana, had no registered agent for service of process in Louisiana,
and had no property or mailing addresses in Louisiana. Id. at *5. As a result, the
court concluded that it had no general jurisdiction over Medtronic. Id.
Perhaps less obvious was the Court’s decision in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrell.
In BNSF, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant railroad company was not
“essentially at home” in Montana despite its 2,000 miles of railroad track and over
2,000 workers there. BNSF, 137 S.Ct. at 1559. Put into perspective, these numbers
represented about 6% of the defendant’s total track mileage and less than 5% of its
workforce, respectively. The Court found these contacts with Montana inadequate to

27

R. Doc. No. 14-1, at 1.
13

warrant exercising general jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to claims
unrelated to the defendant’s business in Montana. Id. at 1554, 1559.
On the other end of the spectrum is Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co., the “textbook case of general jurisdiction.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 129. The Perkins
defendant was a Philippine mining company, although the lawsuit was filed in Ohio.
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438–39 (1952). The company’s
mining operations had come to a complete halt during the Japanese occupation of the
Philippines during World War II, at which time the corporation’s president moved his
office to Ohio. Id. at 447–48. The Court held that the business the president conducted
while in Ohio was so “continuous and systematic” that Ohio did not violate due
process by exercising jurisdiction over the defendant-corporation. Id. at 448. The
Court explained in a later opinion that general jurisdiction was present in Perkins
because “Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business.” Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 n.11 (1984).
Marathon’s ties to Louisiana fall somewhere in between these two ends of the
spectrum. Unlike the railroad company in BNSF—which the Court concluded
operated somewhere between 6–10% of its business in the forum state—Marathon
conducts significantly more of its operations in Louisiana. Between 2015 and 2017,
Marathon reported that 30% of its crude oil refining capacity and 30% of its refineryrelated tank storage capacity was located in Louisiana. 28 On the other hand,

R. Doc. No. 93, at 2. The Court did not request and Marathon did not provide its
figures for years before 2015. Additionally, all percentages discussed herein are
approximations.
28

14

Marathon’s contacts with Louisiana are not analogous to the defendant’s ties to the
forum state in Perkins. The Perkins defendant had moved its office into the forum
state temporarily; it was conducting 100% of its business there. Marathon, by
contrast, cannot be said to conduct 100% of its business in Louisiana because it
conducts a significant percentage of its operations outside of Louisiana. For example,
compared to its operations in the rest of the United States, in 2016—the year the
trailer exploded—Marathon had 3% of its offices in Louisiana; 9% of its employees
were based in Louisiana; and less than 3% of its terminals were located in
Louisiana. 29
Ultimately, while Marathon maintains significant business operations in
Louisiana, Stewart has not established a prime facie case for jurisdiction. “[I]n-state
business . . . does not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims
. . . unrelated to any activity occurring in [the forum state].” BNSF, 137 S.Ct. at 1559.
For the Court to assert general jurisdiction over Marathon, it must be “essentially at
home” in Louisiana. Id. at 1558 (citation omitted). Based on Stewart’s uncontroverted
allegations and construing all disputed facts in his favor, the Court cannot plausibly
conclude that Marathon is essentially at home here. Stewart relies heavily on
Marathon’s refining capacity and total refinery-related tank storage capacity: the
Louisiana percentages for both metrics are 30% and—with the exception of

29

Id. at 3, 7.
15

Marathon’s storage capacity in Texas—greater than the percentages for refining and
refinery-related storage capacities outside of Louisiana. 30
However, an analysis of Marathon’s other business activities reveals that
Marathon is not “essentially at home” here. Only 12% of Marathon’s total refinery
tanks are located in Louisiana. 31 In 2016, Marathon generated 5% of its revenue from
sales in Louisiana. 32 Additionally, 9% of Marathon’s workforce was located in
Louisiana, less than 1% of Marathon-branded retail outlets were located in
Louisiana, and Marathon did not directly advertise in Louisiana in 2016. 33 Finally,
Marathon conducts 100% of its biofuel and ethanol production outside Louisiana. 34
A comparison of Marathon’s contacts with Louisiana with its business
operations that occur elsewhere leads the Court to conclude that Marathon is not
“essentially at home” here. Furthermore, as stated herein, Marathon is not
incorporated in Louisiana, and its principal place of business is not in Louisiana.
Therefore, the Court does not have general jurisdiction over Marathon in this case.
V.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Polar defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED,
and Stewart’s claims against the Polar defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT

Id. at 8; R. Doc. No. 78, at 8.
R. Doc. No. 93, at 8.
32 Id. at 8.
33 Id. at 6–7; R. Doc. No. 78, at 11. There was media spillover into Louisiana, but
Marathon estimates such spillover to account for less than 1% of its nationwide media
purchases. Id.
34 R. Doc. No. 93, at 4–5.
30
31

16

PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Marathon’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED, and Stewart’s claims against Marathon are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, June 29, 2018.

_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17