Henderson v. Vannoy

Filing 23

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 , DENYING 21 MOTION to Stay Case filed by William Anthony Henderson. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Henderson has 30 days from the entry of this order to amend his petition to allege only the claim that the Magistrate Judge has determined is exhausted and thus properly before the Court. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 11/09/2018.(am)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WILLIAM ANTHONY HENDERSON
VERSUS

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-7788

DARREL VANNOY

SECTION “R” (4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is William Henderson’s petition for federal habeas corpus
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 1

The Magistrate Judge recommends that

Henderson’s petition be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state
court remedies. 2 In response, Henderson does not dispute the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that several of the claims presented in his petition are unexhausted. 3
Instead, Henderson moves the Court to stay these proceedings to allow petitioner
to litigate his unexhausted claims in state court. 4 The Court has reviewed de novo
the petition, the record, the applicable law, and the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, and it finds that the Magistrate Judge’s recommended ruling is
correct and that a stay is inappropriate.
A federal habeas petition should typically be dismissed if the petitioner has
failed to exhaust all available state remedies. Piller v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 227

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2
3
4

R. Doc. 1.
R. Doc. 18.
See R. Doc. 19.
Id.; see also R. Doc. 21.

(2004) (“[F]ederal district courts must dismiss ‘mixed’ habeas corpus petitions—
those containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.”) (citing Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509 (1982)). The dismissal without prejudice of a “mixed” petition,
however, may result in a subsequent petition being barred by the one-year statute
of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.
167, 181-82 (2001) (holding that section 2244(d)’s one-year limitation period is not
tolled during the pendency of federal habeas proceedings).

In light of this

dilemma, federal courts are authorized to stay a habeas petition and hold it in
abeyance while a petitioner exhausts his claims in state court. Rhines v. Weber,
544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). Such stays, however, are available only in limited
circumstances. Id. A district court should stay federal habeas proceedings to allow
a petitioner to exhaust state remedies only when the district court finds that (1) the
petitioner has good cause for failure to exhaust his claim, (2) the claim is not
plainly meritless, and (3) the petitioner has not engaged in intentional delay.
Schillereff v. Quarterman, 304 F. App’x 310, 314 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Rhines,
544 U.S. at 277-78).
Here, Henderson does not dispute that he has failed to exhaust his state
court remedies as to all but one of the claims raised in his federal habeas petition. 5
The only explanation that he provides for his failure to exhaust is that he filed his
application for post-conviction relief in state court pro se. 6 A petitioner’s pro se

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6

R. Doc. 19 at 4; R. Doc. 21 at 2 ¶¶ 2-3.
R. Doc. 21 at 3 ¶¶ 8-10; R. Doc. 21-1 at 5-6.

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status, however, does not constitute good cause to excuse a failure to exhaust.
Thompson v. Tanner, No. 14-924, 2014 WL 5325027, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2014)
(citing Bonilla v. Hurley, 370 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, the
Court finds that Henderson has failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse his
failure to exhaust, and that a stay and abeyance is unwarranted. See Byrd v.
Thaler, No. 10-21, 2010 WL 2228548, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2010) (finding it
unnecessary to address remaining Rhines factors when petitioner fails to
demonstrate good cause).
Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that dismissing Henderson’s petition
without prejudice would effectively preclude federal review of his exhausted claim
because any subsequent petition would be barred by Section 2244(d)’s one-year
limitations period. 7 Under these circumstances, district courts are instructed to
allow a petitioner to withdraw the unexhausted claims and litigate the exhausted
claim properly before the court. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278 (“[I]f a petitioner
presents a district court with a mixed petition and the court determines that a stay
and abeyance is inappropriate, the court should allow the petitioner to delete the
unexhausted claims and to proceed with the exhausted claims if dismissal of the

After his conviction became final on June 19, 2014, Henderson first pursued
post-conviction relief in state court on February 18, 2015. The Louisiana Supreme
Court ultimately denied his writ application on April 13, 2017. Henderson then
filed his federal habeas petition on August 12, 2017. Thus, the one-year limitations
period for filing a subsequent petition has already expired. See Duncan, 533 U.S.
at 181–82 (holding that Section 2244(d)’s one-year limitation period continues to
run during the pendency of federal habeas proceedings).
7

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entire petition would unreasonably impair the petitioner’s right to obtain habeas
relief.”). Accordingly, the Court will allow Henderson 30 days from the entry of
this order to amend his federal habeas petition to state only the claim that he has
already exhausted, as identified by the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, and to withdraw those unexhausted claims that he wishes to
pursue in state court.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation as its opinion herein. It DENIES Henderson’s motion to
stay the proceedings. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Henderson has 30 days from
the entry of this order to amend his petition to allege only the claim that the
Magistrate Judge has determined is exhausted and thus properly before the Court.

9th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of November, 2018.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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