Henderson v. Vannoy
Filing
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ORDER AND REASONS: Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right; he raises no issues reasonable jurists could debate or which deserve further encouragement. Accordingly, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability For the reasons stated herein. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 12/13/2019.(mm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WILLIAM ANTHONY HENDERSON
VERSUS
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-7788
DARRELL VANNOY
SECTION “R” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is William Anthony Henderson’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court has reviewed de novo
the petition,1 the record, the applicable law, the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation, 2 and petitioner’s objections.3 Because the Magistrate
Judge was correct that the trial court conducted an acceptable Faretta
hearing, the petition is dismissed.
Henderson was charged with second degree murder and cruelty to a
juvenile.4 During his trial, Henderson moved to represent himself. The trial
judge then began a Faretta hearing, to ensure that Henderson was
competent to waive his right to representation and that he understood the
1
2
3
4
R. Doc. 28.
R. Doc. 30.
R. Doc. 35.
St. Rec. Vol. 1 of 8, January 19, 2011, Amended Indictment.
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). The judge engaged in a meaningful Faretta
hearing, in which he advised Henderson of various constitutional rights;
asked Henderson various questions about his age, education, and
employment; and inquired into his understanding of the law and courtroom
procedures.5 At the end of the Faretta hearing, Henderson withdrew his
motion for self-representation.6
Henderson takes issue with only one minor part of the Faretta hearing.
Specifically, he objects to the portion of the hearing in which the trial court
asked Henderson if he understood that by taking the stand, he could not just
“stand and tell [his] story,” but that he would have to ask questions of
himself. 7 Henderson indicated that he had not been aware of that procedural
requirement, but that he understood it once the judge explained it.8
Henderson argues this particular question produced a “chilling effect” and
was “misleading and unnecessary to determine [Henderson’s] competency
to waive his right to counsel.”9
5
6
7
345.
8
9
St. Rec. Vol. 2 of 8, Trial Transcript, Vol. I, at 335-49.
Id. at 349.
R. Doc. 31 at 4; see also St. Rec. Vol. 2 of 8, Trial Transcript, Vol. I, at
St. Rec. Vol. 2 of 8, Trial Transcript, Vol. I, at 345.
R. Doc. 31 at 2, 4.
2
The thrust of Henderson’s argument is that this question from the trial
court did not speak to Henderson’s competency to waive his right to counsel,
but rather his competency to represent himself. Henderson is correct that
“the competence that is required of a defendant to waive his right to counsel
is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent
himself.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993) (emphasis removed).
But Henderson misunderstands that Faretta hearings also serve the purpose
of ensuring that a defendant is “made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
One such “danger and disadvantage” of self-representation is a lack of
familiarity with the procedural and evidentiary rules that govern
proceedings.
Thus, questions regarding understanding of courtroom
proceedings—similar to those asked by the trial court here—are well within
the scope of a proper Faretta hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 269
F.3d 514, 519 n. 11 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the Benchbook for U.S. District
Court Judges includes questions regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence and
3
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the sample questionnaire for Faretta
hearings).
Importantly, the trial court did not find that Henderson could not
waive his right to counsel because of a lack of understanding of procedural
or evidentiary rules. Indeed, the trial court never made any ruling on
Henderson’s competency to waive his right to counsel, because petitioner
withdrew his request. Rather, these questions were designed to ensure that
Henderson would waive his right “with eyes open,” as required by Faretta.
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. And counsel’s failure to object to such questioning
could not possibly be considered so deficient as to be ineffective assistance
of counsel, particularly under the doubly deferential standards set out by
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
Henderson also takes issue with the trial court’s statement that
although the court would appoint standby counsel, said counsel could not
intervene or ask questions. Petitioner states that the Supreme Court has
allowed standby counsel “to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom
protocol” and “aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to
be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the
defendant’s self-representation is necessary.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
4
U.S. 168, 176, 184 (1984) (citation omitted). But the issue in McKaskle was
whether counsel had infringed on a defendant’s Faretta rights to selfrepresentation though some involvement in the courtroom, and there the
Supreme Court noted that there is no constitutional right to the sort of hybrid
representation that Henderson argues that trial court should have allowed
and apprised him of. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183. Since McKaskle, the
Fifth Circuit has explicitly held that “there is no constitutional right to hybrid
representation.” Myers v. Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1335 (5th Cir. 1996); see
also Randolph v. Cain, 412 F. App’x 654, 658 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Of critical
importance here, although defendant possesses the right to counsel as well
as the right to self-representation, there is no constitutional right to have
both through a ‘hybrid representation’ scheme.” (emphasis in original)).
And again, the failure to object to the trial court’s statement does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel here.
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings provides that
“[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it
enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings, Rule 11(a). A court may issue a certificate of appealability only
if the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings,
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Rule 11(a) (noting that an issue must “satisfy the showing required by 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)” for a certificate to issue).
This statutory language codified the judicial standard “for determining
what constitutes the requisite showing” for a certificate of appealability. See
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). “Under the controlling
standard, a petitioner must ‘sho[w] that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Id. (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
For the reasons stated above, petitioner has not made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right; he raises no issues reasonable
jurists could debate or which deserve further encouragement. Accordingly,
the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability.
13th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of December, 2019.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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