Taylor v. Marquette Transportation Company, LLC

Filing 61

ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS ORDERED that the 43 motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC, be and hereby is DENIED. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOSEPH TAYLOR,
Plaintiff

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 17-7934

MARQUETTE TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY GULF-INLAND, LLC,
Defendant

SECTION: “E”(3)

ORDER AND REASONS
This is a maritime personal injury case. Before the Court is a motion for partial
summary judgment filed by Defendant Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland,
LLC (“Marquette”). 1 Discovery having been completed on August 14, 2018, 2 Defendant
timely filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment on August 21, 2018. 3
Defendant argues, because Plaintiff’s fall occurred from a piling owned by United Bulk
Terminal, his injuries were not the result of the unseaworthiness of the M/V AUDREY
PEARSON. 4 Additionally, Defendant argues it did not owe Plaintiff a duty of
seaworthiness for an injury sustained off the vessel. 5 Alternatively, Defendant argues, if
it did owe Plaintiff a duty of seaworthiness for an injury sustained while not onboard the
M/V AUDREY PEARSON, the M/V AUDREY PEARSON was a seaworthy vessel that did
not employ any unsafe work methods. 6 Plaintiff Joseph Taylor opposes the motion. 7

R. Doc. 43.
R. Doc. 14 at 8.
3 R. Doc. 43.
4 R. Doc. 43-1 at 2-4; R. Doc. 43-3 at 1.
5 R. Doc. 43-1 at 2-4.
6 R. Doc. 56 at 1-4
7 R. Doc. 49.
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Defendant has filed a reply. 8 For the reasons that follow, the motion for partial summary
judgment is DENIED.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”9 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” 10
When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the
evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.” 11 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. 12
There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. 13
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of
[the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
To satisfy Rule 56’s burden of production, the moving party must do one of two things:
“the moving party may submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of
the nonmoving party’s claim” or “the moving party may demonstrate to the Court that the
nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
10 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).
11 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008); see
also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).
12 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
13 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Horwell Energy,
Inc., 969 F.2d 146, 147–48 (5th Cir. 1992)).
8
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nonmoving party’s claim.” If the moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must
be denied. If the moving party successfully carries this burden, the burden of production
then shifts to the non-moving party to direct the Court’s attention to something in the
pleadings or other evidence in the record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish
that a genuine issue of material fact does indeed exist. 14
If the dispositive issue is one on which the non-moving party will bear the burden
of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of production by either (1)
submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-movant’s
claim, or (2) affirmatively demonstrating that there is no evidence in the record to
establish an essential element of the non-movant’s claim. 15 If the movant fails to
affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record, its motion for summary
judgment must be denied. 16 Thus, the non-moving party may defeat a motion for
summary judgment by “calling the Court’s attention to supporting evidence already in the
record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party.” 17 “[U]nsubstantiated
assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence. The party opposing summary
judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the
precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. ‘Rule 56 does not impose
upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a
party’s opposition to summary judgment.’” 18
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24.
Id. at 331–32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16 See id. at 332.
17 Id. at 332–33. The burden would then shift back to the movant to demonstrate the inadequacy of the
evidence relied upon by the non-movant. Once attacked, “the burden of production shifts to the nonmoving
party, who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party’s papers, (2) produce
additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit
an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).” Id. at 332–33, 333 n.3.
18 Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Forsyth
v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) and quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915–
14
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FACTS
It is undisputed that (1) at all relevant times, the Plaintiff, Joseph Taylor, was
employed as a deckhand on the M/V AUDREY PEARSON, a vessel owned and operated
by Marquette; 19 (2) the vessel operated out of the United Bulk Terminal (“UBT”), shifting
barges within the facility; 20 (3) “on June 10, 2017, while serving as a deckhand on the
Marquette towing vessel, M/V AUDREY PEARSON, [Plaintiff] injured himself while
attempting to tie off two empty barges;” 21 and (4) “Plaintiff was actually standing on
UBT’s piling when he slipped and fell into the Mississippi River. 22
The parties dispute whether the M/V AUDREY PEARSON conducted safety
meetings and whether the vessel’s captain provided adequate safety training or warnings
to his crew. 23 Plaintiff points to Captain Mulvehill’s deposition testimony, stating he
would “just tell them what we’re about to do, as far as the job that we’re about to do,”
instead of conducting a job safety meeting about the specifics of a job. 24 Additionally
Captain Mulvehill’s deposition testimony reveals he was “written up” for a failure to have
a “pre-safety.” 25 Defendant contends that adequate safety trainings and warnings were in
place, as Plaintiff testified in deposition that he received safety training when hired by
Marquette, 26 along with an observation and shadowing opportunity on a Marquette
boat. 27 Defendant also argues the routineness of the maneuver of shifting barges made

16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
19 R. Doc. 43-1 at 1; R. Doc. 49 at 1.
20 R. Doc. 43-1 at 1; R. Doc. 49 at 10.
21 R. Doc. 43-3 at 1; R. Doc. 49-1 at 1.
22 R. Doc. 43-3 at 1; R. Doc. 49-1 at 1.
23 R. Doc. 49-1 at 1.
24 R. Doc. 43-3 at 2.
25 Id. at 8.
26 R. Doc. 56-1 at 7-10, 13.
27 Id. at 13.

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certain safety meetings unnecessary. 28
The parties also dispute whether the vessel was outfitted with proper equipment
for the job. 29 Plaintiff contends a pike pole would not have allowed him to unfoul this
particular line. 30 Instead, he claims he needed to board the piling to unfoul the line.31
Defendant points to Captain Mulvehill's testimony that had he known Plaintiff was unable
to reach the line, he would have told him to get the pike pole. 32 Additionally, it is disputed
whether the captain failed to check the tie-off lines utilized by the crew. 33 Plaintiff’s expert
submits that Captain Mulvehill should have observed the lines and that it is the
responsibility of both captain and crew to notice when the lines need replacing. 34
LAW AND ANALYSIS
To prevail on an unseaworthiness claim, a plaintiff must first show the vessel was
unseaworthy and the unseaworthiness caused or substantially contributed to his injury. 35
A vessel’s unseaworthiness may arise from several circumstances, including when its crew
is ill-trained, inadequate, or engaged in an unsafe method of work.36 When crewmembers
“engage in a congeries of negligent acts that are of such a character or that continue for
such a length of time that they become related to the status of the vessel . . . that congeries
of acts might create a ‘condition’ of unseaworthiness.” 37 To determine whether a vessel is

R. Doc. 56-1 at 18-19, 31.
R. Doc. 49 at 2; R. Doc. 56 at 3.
30 R. Doc. 49-4 at 10.
31 Id.
32 R. Doc. 65-1 at 30.
33 R. Doc. 49-1 at 1.
34 R. Doc. 49-5 at 2.
35 Crane v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 743 So. 2d 780, 790 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Johnson v. Offshore
Express Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1354 (5th Cir. 1988)).
36 Crane, 743 So. 2d at 790; see also Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971).
37 Robinson v. Showa Kaiun K.K., 451 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1971); Daughdrill v. Ocean Drilling and
Exploration Co. (ODECO), 709 F.Supp. 710, 712 (E.D.La. 1989) (finding the negligent acts were not
pervasive enough to render the vessel unseaworthy).
28
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unseaworthy because its crew is engaged in an unsafe method of work, courts will look to
a number of factors, including: whether proper equipment is available, whether the crew
is properly trained to do the work, whether the crew uses a proper method and/or
equipment for the work, whether enough crew are available to perform the work, and
whether any prior injuries occurred while performing the work. 38
For example, in Nichols v. Weeks Marine, Inc., this Court found an unsafe method
of work rendered a vessel unseaworthy, when “the crew was ill-trained[,] . . . the captain
ordered the crew to use an improper procedure,” and the crew did not have the proper
equipment to accomplish the task. 39 Conversely, in Rogers v. Eagle Offshore Drilling
Services, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found a vessel was not unseaworthy and had not used an
unsafe method of work when there was “no evidence to indicate” the method employed
was unsafe and “no one had previously been injured.” 40
Defendant has failed to meet its burden of establishing that there is no disputed
issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To determine
whether an unsafe method of work was used on the M/V AUDREY PEARSON, there must
be no facts in dispute regarding the proper equipment, training, number of crew, and
method for performing the job. 41 The only two undisputed facts submitted by Defendant
are (1) on June 10, 2017, Plaintiff injured himself while attempting to tie off two empty
barges and (2) Plaintiff was standing on a piling owned by UBT when he slipped and fell

Crane, 743 So. 2d at 790 (lack of training, undermanned); Rogers v. Eagle Offshore Drilling Servs. Inc.,
764 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1985) (prior injuries, proper eqiupment); Nichols v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 513 F.
Supp. 2d 627, 636 (E.D. La. 2017) (improper method); see Lett v. Omega Protein, 487 Fed. App’x 839, 846
(5th Cir. 2012) (unsafe method of using tool).
39 513 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
40 764 F.2d at 303.
41 Crane, 743 So. 2d at 790; Rogers, 764 F.2d at 303; Nichols, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
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into the Mississippi River. 42 These do not encompass all the facts material to a
determination of whether an unsafe method of work was used. The material facts not
addressed by the Defendant are in dispute.
The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the M/V
AUDREY PEARSON allowed its crew to engage in an unsafe work method, thus rendering
the vessel unseaworthy. As a result, summary judgment is not appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for summary
judgment filed by Defendant Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, LLC, be
and hereby is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of September, 2018.

________________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

42

R. Doc. 43-3 at 1; R. Doc. 49 at 2; R. Doc. 56 at 3.

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