Horton v. Hilton Retirement Plan

Filing 11

ORDER AND REASONS granting 6 Motion for Summary Judgment; all claims asserted by Horton against Hilton are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on 12/4/2017. (blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BABOM HORTON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 17-9015

HILTON RETIREMENT PLAN ET AL.

SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Hilton Hotels Retirement Plan (“Hilton”), incorrectly identified by
plaintiff Babom Horton (“Horton”) as Hilton Retirement Plan, filed a motion to
dismiss the above-captioned matter. 1 Because Hilton attached documents to its
motion that are not referenced in Horton’s complaint, the Court converted the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Horton then responded to the motion. 3 In his response, Horton explains why
he is suing Hilton, but he does not address the basis for Hilton’s motion—namely,
that Horton’s case is untimely. 4
I.
Hilton is an ERISA-regulated employee pension benefit plan. 5 The plan’s
governing document outlines, among other things, a detailed claims review process
that claimants must exhaust prior to initiating a legal action for benefits under the
plan. 6 Importantly for present purposes, the governing document provides that,

R. Doc. No. 6.
R. Doc. No. 9.
3 R. Doc. No. 10.
4 See R. Doc. No. 6, at 4-6.
5 See R. Doc. No. 6-5 (plan governing document).
6 See id. at 70.
1
2

1

“[e]ffective for claims initially filled [sic] . . . on or after January 1, 2011, any suit or
legal action initiated by a claimant under the Plan must be brought by the claimant
no later than one hundred eighty (180) days following a final decision on the claim
for benefits.” 7
Horton filed a claim for benefits with Hilton on October 9, 2012. 8 On his
claim form, Horton listed his address as an apartment on South Liberty Street in
New Orleans. 9 During the course of the claims review process, Hilton used that
address to correspond with Horton. 10
That process came to an end during the summer of 2015. In a letter dated
July 31, 2015, the Hilton U.S. Appeals Committee denied Horton’s appeal of the
denial of his claim for benefits. 11

The letter informed Horton, in bold:

“The

administrative process is complete. You now have the right to bring a civil action
under Section 502(a) of ERISA in federal court if you choose to further pursue this
claim. Please be aware that the Plan requires that any such suit be filed within 180
days of the date of this letter.” 12 The letter listed Horton’s address as his South
Liberty Street apartment. 13

Id. at 71.
See R. Doc. No. 6-6 (Union Service Claim Form).
9 Id. at 2.
10 See R. Doc. No. 6-7 (notice from Hilton to Horton).
11 See R. Doc. No. 6-4 (denial letter).
12 Id. at 3 (emphasis removed).
13 Id. at 2.
7
8

2

According to Hilton’s outside counsel for employee benefit matters, the letter
was sent to that address via regular mail on the date listed on the letter. 14 Further,
Horton’s counsel at the time received a disc containing a digital copy of the letter on
August 7, 2015. 15
Horton filed this lawsuit on September 14, 2017.
II.
Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, the court determines
that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “[A] party
seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record]
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

The moving party need not

produce evidence negating the existence of material fact, but need only point out the
absence of evidence supporting the other party’s case. Id.; Fontenot v. Upjohn Co.,
780 F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir. 1986).
Once the party seeking summary judgment carries its initial burden, the
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine issue of material
fact is not satisfied by creating “‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’
14
15

R. Doc. No. 6-3, ¶ 3.
See R. Doc. No. 6-11 (cover letter); R. Doc. No. 6-12 (delivery confirmation).
3

by ‘conclusory allegations,’ by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of
evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted). Instead, a genuine issue of material fact exists when the “evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The party responding to the motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue. Id.
However, the nonmoving party’s evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmoving party’s] favor.” Id. at 255; see also
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999).
Moreover, “[a]lthough the substance or content of the evidence submitted to
support or dispute a fact on summary judgment must be admissible . . . , the
material may be presented in a form that would not, in itself, be admissible at
trial.” Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., LLC, 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2017)
(quoting 11 Moore’s Federal Practice–Civil ¶ 56.91 (2017)). “This flexibility allows
the court to consider the evidence that would likely be admitted at trial . . . without
imposing on parties the time and expense it takes to authenticate everything in the
record.” Maurer v. Independence Town, No. 16-30673, 2017 WL 3866561, at *3 (5th
Cir. Sept. 5, 2017).
III.
“Absent a controlling statute to the contrary, a participant [in an ERISAregulated plan] and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period,

4

. . . as long as the period is reasonable.” Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,
134 S. Ct. 604, 610 (2013); see also Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Sales Support
Servs. Inc. Employee Health Care Plan, 426 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Because
ERISA provides no specific limitations period, we apply state law principles of
limitation. Where a plan designates a reasonable, shorter time period, however,
that lesser limitations schedule governs.” (internal citation omitted)). Even where
an ERISA-regulated plan establishes a limitations period, however, courts retain
the authority “to apply traditional doctrines that may nevertheless allow
participants to proceed” in a judicial forum outside that period in exceptional
circumstances.

Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 615.

Those doctrines include waiver,

estoppel, and equitable tolling. Id.
With respect to the question or reasonableness in this context, the Fifth
Circuit has held that a 120-day limitations period designated by an ERISA plan is
reasonable where the plan gave notice of the period and “required prompt
notification to the employee of the decision on appeal,” and where the period did not
commence “until after the disposition of the internal appeal process.”

Dye v.

Associates First Capital Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan 504, 243 Fed. App’x 808,
810 (5th Cir. 2007). 16

Given this holding, the proper resolution of this motion

becomes clear as crystal.

Although Dye preceded the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heimeshoff, the latter did
nothing to call into question the validity of the former. To the contrary, Heimeshoff
simply endorsed the approach taken in Dye: reasonable limitation periods
established by ERISA-regulated plans are enforceable.
16

5

Hilton’s governing document establishes a limitations period of 180 days—
two months longer than the 120-day period previously endorsed and enforced by the
Fifth Circuit. 17 Moreover, Hilton requires prompt notification to a claimant of the
decision on appeal. 18

Finally, the period did not begin to run until after the

exhaustion of Hilton’s internal claims review process. 19

Therefore, the Court

concludes that Hilton’s 180-day limitations period is reasonable.
There is no genuine dispute that Horton filed suit outside this 180-day period
and that his case was untimely filed.

Further, Horton has not articulated a

compelling reason—or any reason—why the Court should apply one of several
traditional doctrines to allow him to proceed with his case anyway.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Hilton’s motion is GRANTED and that all claims
asserted by Horton against Hilton in the above-captioned are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, December 4, 2017.

_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

See R. Doc. No. 6-5, at 71.
See id. at 70 (“The Administrative Committee shall give prompt, written notice of
its decision to the claimant and to the Company.”).
19 See id. at 71.
17
18

6