Davis v. Hager et al

Filing 54

ORDER AND REASONS granting 34 36 41 and 46 Motions to Dismiss. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss. Plaintiff's claims against NOPD, Judge Lee, Christenberry, Beaulieu, and Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter are DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 8/1/2018. (cg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHEILA DAVIS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 17-10118

JULIE HAGER, ET AL.

SECTION “R” (4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by defendants Judge John
Lee, New Orleans Police Department, Andrew Christenberry, Robin
Beaulieu, and Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter. 1 For the following reasons,
the Court grants the motions.

I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a dispute over ownership of a dog, Ms. Minnie

the Chihuahua. Plaintiff Sheila Davis and her mother, plaintiff Barbara
Davis, allege that they purchased the dog and had Home Again implant a
microchip in the dog in 2008.2 Ms. Minnie was allegedly stolen in October
2012. 3 Defendant Julie Hager later purchased the dog from an unknown

1
2
3

R. Docs. 34, 36, 41, 46.
R. Doc. 28 at 4 ¶¶ 12-13.
Id. ¶ 14.

person.4 Hager allegedly registered and re-microchipped the dog on August
14, 2015, at which point Home Again notified plaintiffs that Ms. Minnie was
found. 5
A dispute between plaintiffs and Hager then arose as to who was the
dog’s rightful owner. Barbara Davis filed a civil action in a Jefferson Parish
Justice of the Peace Court on August 17, 2015, to determine ownership of the
dog. 6 The Justice of the Peace ruled in favor of Barbara Davis, but Hager
refused to surrender the dog and Jefferson Parish Police Department
declined to seize it.7 Hager then appealed the case to the First Parish Court.8
Judge John Lee, who is also a defendant in this case, reversed the Justice of
Peace and ruled in favor of Hager on February 3, 2016. 9 Plaintiffs allege that
Hager and her attorney, defendant Andrew Christenberry, fraudulently
misrepresented facts to Judge Lee.10 Plaintiffs further assert that Hager,
Christenberry, and Judge Lee conspired to deprive Barbara Davis of her

Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
6
Id. ¶ 19; see also R. Doc. 34-2 at 11. The Court takes judicial notice of
the state court records, which Judge Lee attached to his motion to dismiss.
7
R. Doc. 28 at 4-5 ¶¶ 20-21.
8
Id. at 5 ¶ 23; see also R. Doc. 34-2 at 1, 56. Although Judge Lee
apparently announced his judgment from the bench at the February 3, 2016
trial, see R. Doc. 34-2 at 56, a written judgment was not entered until July 6,
2017, id. at 58.
9
R. Doc. 34-2 at 58.
10
R. Doc. 28 at 5 ¶ 24.
2
4
5

property on the basis of race, and that Judge Lee lacked jurisdiction over the
case.11
On August 11, 2016, according to plaintiffs, Ms. Minnie ran away from
Hager, and eventually came into the custody of defendant Jefferson Parish
Animal Shelter.12 Defendant Robin Beaulieu, the director of the animal
shelter, gave the dog to Hager.13 Ms. Minnie then allegedly ran away again. 14
This time, the dog was taken to Home Again, which gave it to plaintiffs on
July 1, 2017. 15

After Hager filed a police report, New Orleans Police

Department (NOPD) officers allegedly entered Barbara Davis’s residence
and seized Ms. Minnie without a warrant.16 The dog is now in Hager’s
possession.17
Sheila Davis filed suit in this Court on October 4, 2017.18 The original
complaint named Hager, Christenberry, Christenberry & Associates, the
Office of Risk Management, NOPD, unknown NOPD officers, Judge Lee,

Id. at 6 ¶ 28, 30. Plaintiff also alleges that Judge Lee “deprived and
denied plaintiff of her property in violation of Louisiana and Federal
constitutional and civil rights.” Id. ¶ 28.
12
Id. at 6 ¶ 32, 7 ¶ 34.
13
Id. at 7 ¶ 38.
14
Id. ¶ 41.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 8 ¶ 43.
17
Id. ¶ 50.
18
R. Doc. 1.
3
11

Beaulieu, and Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter as defendants. NOPD and
Judge Lee both filed motions to dismiss, which the Court granted on March
6, 2018. 19 Sheila Davis filed an amended complaint, with leave of court, on
May 4, 2018. 20 The amended complaint adds Barbara Davis as a plaintiff
and omits the Office of Risk Management and Christenberry & Associates as
defendants.21 The amended complaint also lists plaintiffs’ causes of action. 22
First, plaintiffs allege a Fourth Amendment violation by NOPD officers
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second, plaintiffs allege a due process violation
under Section 1983. Third, plaintiffs allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
Finally, plaintiffs assert various Louisiana tort claims against Judge Lee.
Judge Lee, NOPD, Christenberry, Beaulieu, and Jefferson Parish Animal
Shelter now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint. 23

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

19
20
21
22
23

R. Doc. 21.
R. Doc. 28.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 3, 9-10.
R. Docs. 34, 36, 41, 46.
4

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially
plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Lormand v. U.S. Unwired,
Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a “sheer
possibility” that the plaintiff’s claim is true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need
not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must go beyond labels, legal
conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Id.
In other words, the face of the complaint must contain enough factual matter
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence
of each element of the plaintiff’s claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257. The claim
must be dismissed if there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is
apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an insuperable bar to
relief, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).

5

III. DISCUSSION
A.

NOPD

As the Court found in its March 6, 2018 order, NOPD is not a juridical
person capable of being sued. 24 Thus, plaintiffs’ claims against NOPD must
be dismissed.
B.

Judge Lee

In its March 6, 2018 order, the Court found that Sheila Davis lacked
standing to sue Judge Lee because Sheila Davis was not a party to the suit he
adjudicated.25 To cure this jurisdictional defect, Sheila Davis joined her
mother, Barbara Davis, as a plaintiff.
Judge Lee now disputes whether Barbara Davis is truly a plaintiff in
this case.26 Judge Lee points out that the amended complaint does not
include Barbara Davis in the caption. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (requiring that
the caption of a complaint “name all the parties”). The section of the
complaint that lists the parties in the suit also does not mention Barbara
Davis.

Additionally, much of the complaint refers to “plaintiff” in the

singular, just like the original complaint.

Notwithstanding these

irregularities or technical defects, the amended complaint makes clear that

24
25
26

R. Doc. 21 at 6.
Id. at 8.
R. Doc. 34-1 at 8-9.
6

Barbara Davis is now a plaintiff in this suit. See Abecassis v. Wyatt, 902 F.
Supp. 2d 881, 911 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“Although the caption may serve as a
guide, courts look to the body of the complaint to determine the parties.”);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do
justice.”); N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San Juan, 90 F.3d 910,
918 (5th Cir. 1996) (“As a general matter, the caption on a pleading does not
constrain the court’s treatment of a pleading.”). Indeed, the first sentence of
the amended complaint states that Sheila Davis “files her amended and
supplemental complaint to cure any and all defects by adding the name of
Barbara Davis as a plaintiff.” 27 Moreover, several paragraphs in the body of
the amended complaint explicitly mention Barbara Davis and her role in the
state court litigation presided over by Judge Lee. 28 Thus, Barbara Davis is a
plaintiff in this suit, and Judge Lee does not contest her standing to sue. The
Court therefore proceeds to the merits of plaintiffs’ claims against him.
Plaintiffs’ allegations against Judge Lee relate solely to his adjudication
of Hager’s appeal. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Judge Lee knowingly
acted outside his jurisdiction in deciding the dispute between her and
Hager.29 This allegation does not plausibly support a claim for relief. The

27
28
29

R. Doc. 28 at 1.
See, e.g., id. at 5 ¶¶ 22, 24.
Id. at 6 ¶¶ 28-29.
7

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that a decision made by a justice
of the peace court may be appealed to the parish court. La. Code Civ. Proc.
art. 4924. The First Parish Court for Jefferson Parish, on which Judge Lee
sits, has appellate jurisdiction over decisions made by justice of the peace
courts on the east bank of the Mississippi River. La. R.S. § 13:2561.17.
Barbara Davis filed her statement of claim against Hager in the Fifth Justice
of the Peace Court, which covers part of Jefferson Parish’s east bank.30 Thus,
Judge Lee plainly had jurisdiction to hear Hager’s appeal. Plaintiffs’ claims
related to Judge Lee’s alleged lack of jurisdiction must be dismissed.
Plaintiffs further allege that Judge Lee “willfully and wantonly had a
meeting of minds with Julie Hager and attorney Andrew C. Christenberry,
who engaged in a conspiracy to deprive[]and deny plaintiff of her liberty and
property interest in violation of her constitutional and civil rights on the
basis of her race.” 31 This conclusory allegation is not supported by any other
factual matter in the complaint. Without more, this bare allegation of a
conspiracy does not suffice to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Zuniga v. Masse Contracting, Inc., 290 F. Supp.
3d 581, 587 (E.D. La. 2017) (“It is well settled in the Fifth Circuit that ‘mere

30
31

See R. Doc. 34-2 at 11.
R. Doc. 28 at 6 ¶ 30.
8

conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material
facts, state a substantial claim of federal conspiracy.’” (quoting McAfee v. 5th
Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiffs’ claims against
Judge Lee related to this alleged conspiracy must be dismissed. 32
C.

Christenberry

Plaintiffs’ claims against Christenberry relate to his alleged conspiracy
with Hager and Judge Lee to deprive plaintiffs of their property.

As

explained earlier, plaintiffs’ allegations regarding this conspiracy are
conclusory. Such conclusory allegations cannot support plaintiffs’ claims
against Christenberry under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 33
See Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting
that a plaintiff states a claim against a private citizen under Section 1983 only
if the plaintiffs alleges “(1) an agreement between the private and public
defendants to commit an illegal act and (2) a deprivation of constitutional

Judge Lee also seeks dismissal based on judicial immunity and
prescription. Because plaintiffs’ claims against Judge Lee fail on the merits,
the Court need not address these alternative arguments.
33
The elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) are:
(1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons; (2) for the
purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws; and (3) an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person
or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen
of the United States.
Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1994).
9
32

rights”); see also id. (noting that “[a]llegations that are merely conclusory,
without reference to specific facts, will not suffice” to allege a conspiracy);
Zuniga, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 587.

Thus, plaintiffs’ claims against

Christenberry must be dismissed.
D.

Beaulieu and Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter

Plaintiffs’ claims against Beaulieu and Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter
stem from Beaulieu’s decision to return Ms. Minnie to Hager rather than
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that Beaulieu knew Ms. Minnie belonged to
plaintiffs yet nonetheless returned the dog to Hager. 34

According to

plaintiffs, this conduct violated due process. 35
Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter argues that it is not an entity capable
of being sued. 36 Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the capacity to sue or be sued is determined by “the law of the state
where the court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). Under Louisiana law,
“an entity must qualify as a juridical person” to be sued. Dugas v. City of
Breaux Bridge Police Dep’t, 757 So. 2d 741, 743 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2000). A
juridical person, in turn, “is an entity to which the law attributes personality,
such as a corporation or a partnership.” La. Civ. Code art. 24. Jefferson

34
35
36

R. Doc. 28 at 7 ¶ 38.
R. Doc. 52 at 6.
R. Doc. 46-1 at 6.
10

Parish Animal Shelter is merely a department of Jefferson Parish. See
Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances § 2-406. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter is not a juridical person capable of being
sued, and must be dismissed.
Beaulieu argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’
constitutional claim. 37 A state official sued in her individual capacity, like
Beaulieu, may be held liable under Section 1983 only if (1) she violated
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and (2) her actions were objectively
unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the alleged
violation. See Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011). “A
Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the
time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear
that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (internal
quotation marks and modifications omitted). “When a defendant invokes
qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the

Id. at 12-15. Plaintiffs do not make a Section 1985(3) argument in their
opposition to Beaulieu’s and Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter’s motion to
dismiss. Nor do plaintiffs allege—other than conclusorily—that Beaulieu
participated in a conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their civil rights. Thus, to
the extent plaintiffs assert a Section 1985(3) claim against Beaulieu, this
claim must be dismissed.
11
37

inapplicability of the defense.” Cantrell v. City of Murphy, 666 F.3d 911, 918
(5th Cir. 2012).
Ms. Minnie entered the custody of Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter in
August 2016, after the Parish Court found that Hager was the rightful owner
of Ms. Minnie.

Plaintiffs point to no law—whether or not clearly

established—that would have required Beaulieu to ignore the state court
judgment and give Ms. Minnie to plaintiffs. Even if, as plaintiffs allege,
Beaulieu knew that Ms. Minnie actually belonged to plaintiffs, a reasonable
person in her position could have believed that the state court judgment
justified returning the dog to Hager. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. In light of
that judgment, Beaulieu’s conduct was objectively reasonable. Beaulieu is
therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim
against her must be dismissed.
Although the Court need not address the alternative grounds for
dismissal in Beaulieu and Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter’s motion, the
Court notes that plaintiffs’ claims against these parties are also barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine precludes district court review of
final state court judgments. See Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir.
1986) (“[L]itigants may not obtain review of state court actions by filing
complaints about those actions in lower federal courts cast in the form of civil
12

rights suits.”). The doctrine covers claims that are “‘inextricably intertwined
with the state court’s’ grant or denial of relief.” Id. (quoting D.C. Ct. of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983)). Plaintiffs’ Section 1983
claims against Beaulieu and Jefferson Animal Shelter necessarily call into
question the validity of Judge Lee’s decision, review of which is not available
in this Court.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss.

Plaintiff’s claims against NOPD, Judge Lee, Christenberry, Beaulieu, and
Jefferson Parish Animal Shelter are DISMISSED.

1st
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of August, 2018.

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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