Marriott International, Inc. v. Danna

Filing 30

ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's 10 motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as set forth in document. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' 9 motion to compel arbitration is DISMISSED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 1/18/2018. (jls)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 17-10590

DEON DANNA

SECTION "B"(3)
ORDER AND REASONS

There are two motions before the Court. Plaintiffs filed a
“Motion to Compel Arbitration” (Rec. Doc. 9), which Defendant has
opposed (Rec. Doc. 11). Defendant also filed a “Motion to Dismiss”
(Rec. Doc. 10) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure
to state a claim. Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum. Rec.
Doc. 22. Defendant then sought, and was granted, leave to file a
reply (Rec. Doc. 27).
For the reasons discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc.
10)

is

GRANTED

and

Plaintiffs’

claims

against

Defendant

are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to compel
arbitration (Rec. Doc. 9) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant worked at the Ritz Carlton in New Orleans from 2000
to 2010, when he was fired. Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 11. In 2011, Defendant
sued Ritz Carlton and its corporate parent, Marriott, in Louisiana
state court. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. Defendant alleges that he was fired in

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violation of a Louisiana whistleblower statute and his employment
agreement. Id. ¶ 13. The lawsuit is ongoing. Id. ¶ 12.
In 2013, Defendant was hired by the Sheraton in New Orleans.
Id. ¶ 21. When Defendant applied for the Sheraton position, he
signed an arbitration agreement. Id. ¶ 20. In 2016, Marriott
purchased

Sheraton.

Id.

¶¶

21-22.

In

August

2017,

Defendant

resigned from his position at Sheraton. Id. ¶ 39.
On October 12, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint seeking
“entry of a judgment compelling and requiring Defendant to submit
[to arbitration] any and all claims or disputes that now exist or
may hereafter arise in connection with or in any manner relating
to Defendant’s [Sheraton] application, Defendant’s employment at
the [Sheraton], or Defendant’s resignation or separation therefrom
. . . .” Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 64. Defendant then filed his Motion to
Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim. See Rec. Doc. 10.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the party asserting jurisdiction bears the
burden

of

“alleg[ing]

a

plausible

set

of

facts

establishing

jurisdiction.” Physician Hosps. of America v. Sebelius, 691 F.3d
649, 652 (5th Cir. 2012). When deciding whether this burden has
been met, a court may analyze “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the
complaint

supplemented

by

undisputed
2

facts

evidenced

in

the

record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus
the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Barrera-Montenegro v.
United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996).
“[R]ipeness is a constitutional prerequisite to the exercise
of jurisdiction.” Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II,
LLC, 858 F.3d 916, 922 (5th Cir. 2017). “Under Article III of the
Constitution, federal courts are confined to adjudicating cases
and controversies. And to be a case or controversy for Article III
jurisdictional purposes, the litigation must be ripe for decision,
meaning that it must not be premature or speculative.” Id. When
deciding whether a complaint to compel arbitration is ripe, a court
“must look through the [complaint] . . . to determine whether the
underlying dispute presents a sufficiently ripe controversy to
establish federal jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Vaden v. Discover
Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009)). This procedure is necessary because the
Federal

Arbitration

jurisdiction;

rather,

Act
it

“does

not

confines

enlarge
federal

federal-court

courts

to

the

jurisdiction they would have had save for the arbitration agreement
. . . .” Id. at 923 (quoting Vaden, 556 U.S. at 66).
Here, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendant to submit
claims to arbitration. See Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 64. However, Plaintiffs
do not point to any pending claims and instead base their complaint

3

on the possibility that Defendant will bring claims in the future.1
“In the declaratory judgment context, whether a particular dispute
is ripe for adjudication turns on whether a substantial controversy
of sufficient immediacy and reality exists between parties having
adverse legal interests.” Lower Colo. River Auth., 858 F.3d at
924. While the “threat of litigation can establish a justiciable
controversy if it is specific and concrete[,]” such an inquiry is
fact-specific

and

turns

on

“the

practical

likelihood”

that

litigation will actually begin. Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832,
835 (5th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the inquiry must focus on the
likelihood

that

Defendant

will

actually

assert

the

claims

attributed to him in Plaintiffs’ complaint.
Plaintiffs’

strongest

allegation

is

that

Defendant

unsuccessfully attempted to add to his state lawsuit “claims
relating to his employment at the” Sheraton. Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 27. But
Plaintiffs weaken this allegation by proceeding to acknowledge
that Defendant’s state lawsuit “does not include claims relating
to the termination of his [Sheraton] employment” and that Defendant
“has so far not filed a separate complaint regarding his [Sheraton]
employment

. . . .”

Rec.

Doc.

22

1

at

3;

see

also

id.

at

11

Plaintiffs vaguely argue that Defendant has already brought arbitrable claims
in his state lawsuit by seeking damages for lost future wages through his
expected retirement. See Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 48. But a claim and the relief sought
for a claim are two separate things. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). As discussed
herein, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the claims in Defendant’s state
lawsuit are subject to the arbitration agreement.

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(admitting “[t]he fact that [Defendant] is not—for the moment—
asserting a legal action against Sheraton . . .”); id. at 17 (“The
CDC Judge has clearly refused to allow any claims or disputes
relating to [Defendant’s] employment at the [Sheraton] or his
termination therefrom to become part of the CDC lawsuit . . . .”).
Moreover, Defendant states in an affidavit attached to his motion
to dismiss that he has not brought any claims related to his
employment at Sheraton. See Rec. Doc. 10-9 at 2.
Most

importantly,

given

that

Plaintiffs

seek

an

order

compelling arbitration of future claims, Plaintiffs’ complaint
offers no detail about what types of claims Defendant might assert.
Nor do Plaintiffs explain if, or when, Defendant will assert claims
subject to arbitration. Given the lack of detail about what claims
Defendant might bring and when he might bring them, Plaintiffs’
complaint does not plausibly allege that there is a concrete threat
of litigation. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ complaint does not present
a dispute ripe for adjudication at this time. See Lower Colo. River
Auth., 858 F.3d at 925-26 (explaining that a dispute was not ripe
for adjudication because there was only a possibility that the
contract at issue would be breached); Shields, 289 F.3d at 836-37
(reasoning that there was no concrete threat of litigation because
the prospective plaintiffs had not communicated a specific intent
to begin litigation); Orix Credit All., Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d
891, 897-98 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Future claims could raise any number
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of

issues

. . .

or

they

could

never

be

filed

at

all.

Such

unasserted, unthreatened, and unknown claims do not present an
immediate or real threat” of litigation.).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 18th day of January, 2018.

___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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