Marriott International, Inc. v. Danna
Filing
34
ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' 32 motion is GRANTED insofar as Plaintiffs seek leave to file an amended complaint and DENIED insofar as Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the dismissal of their original Complaint. The proposed pleading (Rec. Doc. 32-2) attached to the motion shall be filed into the record, subject to the conditions stated infra. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 4/4/2018.(jls)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 17-10590
DEON DANNA
SECTION "B"(3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
and
Reasons
dismissing
Plaintiffs’
complaint
or,
in
the
alternative, for leave to file an amended complaint. Rec. Doc. 32.
Defendant timely filed an opposition. Rec. Doc. 33.
For the reasons discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED insofar as
Plaintiffs seek leave to file an amended complaint and DENIED
insofar as Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the dismissal of
their original Complaint. The proposed pleading (Rec. Doc. 32-2)
attached to the motion shall be filed into the record, subject to
the conditions stated infra.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant worked at the Ritz Carlton in New Orleans from 2000
to 2010, when he was fired. Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 11. In 2011, Defendant
sued Ritz Carlton and its corporate parent, Marriott, in Louisiana
state court. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. Defendant alleges that he was fired in
violation of a Louisiana whistleblower statute and his employment
agreement. Id. ¶ 13. The lawsuit is ongoing. Id. ¶ 12.
1
In 2013, Defendant was hired by the Sheraton in New Orleans.
Id. ¶ 21. When Defendant applied for the Sheraton position, he
signed an arbitration agreement. Id. ¶ 20. In 2016, Marriott
purchased
Sheraton.
Id.
¶¶
21-22.
In
August
2017,
Defendant
resigned from his position at Sheraton. Id. ¶ 39.
On October 12, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint seeking
“entry of a judgment compelling and requiring Defendant to submit
[to arbitration] any and all claims or disputes that now exist or
may hereafter arise in connection with or in any manner relating
to Defendant’s [Sheraton] application, Defendant’s employment at
the [Sheraton], or Defendant’s resignation or separation therefrom
. . . .” Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 64.
Defendant then filed his Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See Rec. Doc.
10. The Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss on ripeness
grounds
because
Plaintiffs’
complaint
failed
to
plead
facts
sufficient to establish a ripe controversy between the parties.
See Rec. Doc. 30. Plaintiffs then filed the instant motion to
reconsider the dismissal of their original Complaint or, in the
alternative, file an amended complaint. See Rec. Doc. 32.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), Plaintiffs
seek
(1)
reconsideration
of
the
2
dismissal
of
their
original
Complaint or (2) leave to file an amended complaint.1 See Rec. Doc.
32 at 1. “Rule 59(e) serves the narrow purpose of allowing a party
to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Templet v. HydroChem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473,
479 (5th Cir. 2004). “A Rule 59(e) motion . . . is not the proper
vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that
could have been offered or raised before” the order was issued.
Id. at 478-79. As a result, the “extraordinary remedy” available
under Rule 59(e) “should be used sparingly.” Id. at 479.
Plaintiffs’ first request is for the Court to reconsider the
dismissal of the original Complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ original Complaint
because it failed to establish a ripe controversy between the
parties. See Rec. Doc. 30. Specifically, the Court concluded that
Plaintiffs’ Complaint did not plead sufficient facts to establish
that Defendant had already brought or would soon bring arbitrable
claims against Plaintiffs. See id. at 4-6. In the instant motion,
Plaintiffs argue that the simple fact that Defendant’s 2011 state
lawsuit seeks damages from Marriott and its affiliated companies
was sufficient to plead a ripe controversy. See Rec. Doc. 32-1 at
12-14.
1
Plaintiffs’ motion is properly analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) because it was filed within twenty-eight days after Plaintiffs’ complaint
was dismissed. See Texas A&M Research Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d
394, 400 (5th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
3
This argument stands in stark contrast to Plaintiffs’ earlier
statements in memoranda previously filed in this case. As discussed
in
the
previous
Order
and
Reasons,
Plaintiffs
repeatedly
“acknowledge[d] that Defendant’s state lawsuit ‘does not include
claims relating to the termination of his [Sheraton] employment’
and that Defendant ‘has so far not filed a separate complaint
regarding his [Sheraton] employment . . . .’” Rec. Doc. 30 at 4
(citing Rec. Doc. 22 at 3); see also Rec. Doc. at 11 (admitting
“[t]he fact that [Defendant] is not—for the moment—asserting a
legal action against Sheraton . . .”); id. at 17 (“The CDC Judge
has clearly refused to allow any claims or disputes relating to
[Defendant’s] employment at the [Sheraton] or his termination
therefrom to become part of the CDC lawsuit . . . .”). The previous
Order and Reasons also noted that “Defendant state[d] in an
affidavit attached to his motion to dismiss that he has not brought
any claims related to his employment at Sheraton.” Rec. Doc. 30 at
5 (citing Rec. Doc. 10-9 at 2). Given the parties’ agreement that
Defendant’s claims in his state lawsuit do not arise out of his
employment at the Sheraton, the Court reasoned that there was no
ripe controversy between the parties about whether these claims
were subject to arbitration. See Rec. Doc. 30 at 4-5. Plaintiffs
offer no explanation for their apparent change of heart about the
nature of Defendant’s state lawsuit. There is no indication that
the nature of Defendant’s state lawsuit has recently changed. Thus,
4
there
is
no
basis
for
the
Court
to
reconsider
its
previous
conclusion that the allegations in Plaintiffs’ original Complaint
are not ripe for adjudication. See Templet, 367 F.3d at 478-79.
Alternatively,
Plaintiffs
argue
that
it
was
improper
to
dismiss their original Complaint because it adequately pled claims
by Plaintiffs against Defendant. See Rec. Doc. 32-1 at 3-5, 9-14.
While the Court does not dispute that the arbitration agreement
allows either party to initiate arbitration, see Rec. Doc. 1-2,
that is not the end of the inquiry because Plaintiffs must then
actually plead a ripe claim against Defendant. As explained in the
Order
and
Reasons
dismissing
Plaintiffs’
original
Compliant,
ripeness is a prerequisite for a court to exercise jurisdiction
over a complaint to compel arbitration. See Rec. Doc. 30 at 2-4.
Therefore, a court “must look through the [complaint] . . . to
determine whether the underlying dispute presents a sufficiently
ripe controversy to establish federal jurisdiction.” Lower Colo.
River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II, LLC, 858 F.3d 916, 922 (5th Cir.
2017) (citing Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009)).
Plaintiffs direct the Court to five paragraphs from the
Complaint that allegedly plead a ripe claim by Plaintiffs against
Defendant. See Rec. Doc. 32-1 at 4. But none of the paragraphs
include facts that suggest a ripe controversy exists. The first
asserts the legal conclusion that disputes related to Defendant’s
5
employment at the Sheraton are subject to arbitration.2 The second
offers a similar legal conclusion.3 The third offers yet another
legal conclusion, namely that the arbitration agreement is valid.4
The fourth again offers a conclusory statement that claims related
to
Defendant’s
employment
at
Sheraton
are
subject
to
the
arbitration agreement.5 The fifth asks the Court to order Defendant
to submit his “claims or disputes” to arbitration.”6 While a court
must accept as true well-pleaded factual allegations at the motion
to dismiss stage, the same is not true of legal conclusions. See
Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 681 F.3d 614, 622 (5th Cir. 2012). These
five
conclusory
paragraphs
do
not
2
suggest
that
Plaintiffs’
“44. The adjudication and resolution of any claims or disputes in connection
with or relating to Defendant’s employment at the SNOH, including his
application for employment, his resignation therefrom and/or any claims or
rights to alleged damages, earnings or losses during or after his employment at
the SNOH, are subject to and governed by the Arbitration Agreement signed by
Defendant and Sheraton.” Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 44.
3 “60. As the language of the Arbitration Agreement makes clear, any claims and
disputes involving Defendant and Plaintiffs, and/or Defendant and the CDC
Defendants, that now exist or may hereafter arise in connection with or in any
manner relating to Defendant’s SNOH application, Defendant’s employment at the
SNOH, or his resignation or separation therefrom, are subject to and governed
by the Arbitration Agreement.” Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 60.
4 “61. The Arbitration Agreement is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the
Defendant on one hand and Sheraton and Marriott on the other hand.” Rec. Doc.
1 ¶ 61.
5 “62. The claims and disputes involving Defendant and Marriott or Sheraton,
and/or any of Plaintiffs’ affiliates or associates, that now exist or may
hereafter arise in connection with or in any manner relating to Defendant’s
SNOH application, Defendant’s employment at the SNOH, or Defendant’s resignation
or separation therefrom, fall within the scope of and are subject to the
Arbitration Agreement.” Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 62.
6 “64. Marriott and Sheraton are entitled to and request the entry of a judgment
compelling and requiring Defendant to submit any and all claims or disputes
that now exist or may hereafter arise in connection with or in any manner
relating to Defendant’s SNOH application, Defendant’s employment at the SNOH,
or Defendant’s resignation or separation therefrom, for binding arbitration
before the American Arbitration Association as described in the Arbitration
Agreement, including any claims or disputes involving Defendant and Marriott or
Sheraton, and/or any of Plaintiffs’ affiliates or associates.” Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 64.
6
original Complaint adequately pled claims by Plaintiffs against
Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiffs have again demonstrated no basis
to reconsider the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ original Complaint.
Moreover,
Defendants’
attempt
to
relitigate
the
same
issues
borders on sanctionable conduct that could be deemed frivolous,
harassing, and lacking in good faith.
Having addressed Plaintiffs’ arguments for reconsideration of
the dismissal of their original Complaint, the Court now turns to
their request for leave to file an amended complaint. Defendant’s
only argument against granting leave to file an amended complaint
is that Plaintiffs should have properly alleged their claims in
the first instance, see Rec. Doc. 33 at 3-4, but that is not the
proper standard. When a plaintiff seeks leave to file an amended
complaint via a motion under Rule 59(e), the standard under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15 is applicable. See Rosenzweig v. Azurix
Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 864-64 (5th Cir. 2003); Dussouy v. Gulf Coast.
Inv. Grp., 660 F.2d 594, 597 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981). Under Rule 15,
a “court should feely give leave [to file an amended complaint]
when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The factors to
consider when deciding whether to grant leave include: “undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the
allowance
of
the
amendment,
and
7
futility
of
the
amendment.”
Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 864 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962)).
Only the futility factor is potentially applicable here. This
is
Plaintiffs’
first
request
for
leave
to
file
an
amended
complaint, which was filed after their original Complaint was
dismissed. See Rec. Docs. 31, 32. Therefore, Plaintiffs seem to
offer, albeit later than usually expected, an amended complaint in
an effort to cure their original deficiencies. However, to grant
leave to amend, the Court must examine whether “the amended
complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.” SGK Props., LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc., 881 F.3d 933,
944-45 (5th Cir. 2018). If that is the case, the amendment would
be futile. See id.
The
proposed
Amended
and
Supplemental
Complaint
seeks
a
declaratory judgment that Defendant’s alleged violations of his
Sheraton employment contract preclude him from seeking damages
from Plaintiffs for periods of time from 2013 to 2032. See Rec.
Doc. 32-2 at 7. The proposed Amended and Supplemental Complaint
also alleges that Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief is
governed by a valid arbitration agreement. See id. As a result,
the proposed Amended and Supplemental Complaint seeks an order
that Defendant participate in arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claim for
declaratory relief. See id. Because Defendant is currently seeking
damages
from
Plaintiffs
for
those
8
periods,
which
indicates
Defendant’s belief that he can obtain such damages, there may be
a ripe controversy between the parties. See Lower Colo. River, 858
F.3d at 92.
The allegations made in the proposed Amended and Supplemental
Complaint are therefore distinct from those advanced in the initial
Complaint,
which
sought
an
order
compelling
Defendant
to
submit his claims to arbitration. See Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 64. The
proposed Amended and Supplemental Complaint instead envisions a
situation in which Plaintiffs initiate an arbitration proceeding
to assert the rights they understand themselves to possess under
Defendant’s
employment
Plaintiffs’
proposed
includes
controversy
facts
contract
Amended
that
between
and
just
with
Sheraton.
Supplemental
minimally
Plaintiffs
and
appropriate,
provided
it
causes
Complaint
describe
a
ripe
Defendant, as well as a
valid arbitration agreement, leave to file an
is
Because
no
amended
complaint
interference with the
ongoing 2011 filed action in state court against Ritz Carlton
and its corporate parent, Marriott.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th day of April, 2018.
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9
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