Rivet v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. et al

Filing 20

ORDER AND REASONS granting 10 Motion to Remand to State Court. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion. This matter is REMANDED to the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson. Plaintiff's request for attorneys fees is DENIED. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 2/20/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Remand Letter) (cg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GRACELEN RIVET

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 17-11151

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA, INC.
AND LAKESIDE IMPORTS, INC.

SECTION “R” (1)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff’s motion to remand. 1 For the following
reasons, the Court grants the motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff Gracelen

Rivet when she was struck by a vehicle.2 Plaintiff alleges that, on or about
July 28, 2016, she was standing next to the passenger door of a 2000 Toyota
Sienna when the car suddenly began rolling backwards, crushing her arm
and ankle. 3 On July 26, 2017, plaintiff filed a petition for damages in state
court against defendants Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., and Lakeside
Imports, Inc.4

1
2
3
4

R. Doc. 10.
R. Doc. 1-2 at 3.
Id.
Id.

The petition alleges that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the
unreasonably dangerous condition of the vehicle, and that Toyota Motor
Sales is the manufacturer of the vehicle under the Louisiana Products
Liability Act.5 The petition further asserts that plaintiff’s injuries were
caused by the negligence of Lakeside Imports, which allegedly sold and
repaired the vehicle. 6 The petition also alleges that Toyota Motor Sales and
Lakeside Imports negligently sold a vehicle with a known defect, failed to
make adequate repairs, failed to inspect and replace parts damaged during
repairs, performed inadequate inspections of the vehicle, and committed
other acts of negligence. 7
On October 24, 2017, Toyota Motor Sales removed the matter to this
Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 8 Although Lakeside Imports is
a Louisiana corporation, Toyota Motor Sales asserts that it was improperly
joined because plaintiff has no reasonable possibility of recovery against
Lakeside Imports.9 Plaintiff now moves to remand. 10

5
6
7
8
9
10

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
R. Doc. 1.
Id. at 4-11.
R. Doc. 10.
2

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may generally remove a civil action filed in state court if

the federal court has original jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). The “removing party bears the burden of establishing the facts
necessary to show that federal jurisdiction exists.” See Allen v. R & H Oil &
Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995). For diversity jurisdiction to exist,
the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, and there must be
complete diversity of citizenship between plaintiffs and defendants. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373
(1978). A defendant may nevertheless remove a case to federal court if a nondiverse party was improperly joined. Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 385 F.3d
568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004).
The removing party bears a “heavy burden of proving that the joinder
was improper.” Id. at 576. A defendant may establish improper joinder by
showing either “(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2)
inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non diverse
party in state court.” Davidson v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC, 819 F.3d 758, 765
(5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). If removal is based on the
second theory, the defendant must demonstrate “that there is no possibility
of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant, which stated
3

differently means that there is no reasonable basis for the district court to
predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state
defendant.” Id. (quoting Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573).
In analyzing whether a plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable
possibility of recovery, the district court may “conduct a Rule 12(b)(6)-type
analysis, looking initially at the allegations of the complaint to determine
whether the complaint states a claim under state law against the in-state
defendant.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. The Court may also “pierce the
pleadings” and consider summary judgment-type evidence as to “discrete
facts that would determine the propriety of joinder.” Id.; see also Davidson,
819 F.3d at 766. In conducting this inquiry, the Court must “take into
account all unchallenged factual allegations, including those alleged in the
complaint, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Travis v. Irby, 326
F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2003). The Court must resolve all ambiguities in
favor of the non-removing party. Id.
Further, the Court must take care not to move “beyond jurisdiction and
into a resolution on the merits.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 574. When “a
showing that compels a holding that there is no reasonable basis for
predicting that state law would allow the plaintiff to recover against the instate defendant necessarily compels the same result for the nonresident
4

defendant, there is no improper joinder; there is only a lawsuit lacking in
merit.” Id. No federal jurisdiction exists over such a case, and it must be
remanded to state court. Id. at 576.

III. DISCUSSION
Toyota Motor Sales argues that Lakeside Imports was improperly
joined because plaintiff has no reasonable possibility of recovery against it. 11
Toyota Motor Sales relies on an affidavit from Linda Reed, comptroller at
Lakeside Imports.12 Reed attests that she searched Lakeside’s sales and
service records and was unable to locate any records for the 2000 Toyota
Sienna involved in plaintiff’s accident.13 Reed further states that Lakeside
maintains its sales records for three years and its service records for seven
years, and any repair would thus have occurred before August 15, 2010.14 In
its motion to remand, plaintiff presents a Carfax vehicle history report for
the Toyota Sienna. 15 This report includes two service records for Lakeside

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12
13
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15

R. Doc. 1 at 10.
Id. at 9; R. Doc. 1-4 at 18.
R. Doc. 1-4 at 18.
Id. at 18-19.
R. Doc. 10-2 at 1.
5

Toyota: a maintenance inspection on March 10, 2006, and a vehicle servicing
on March 21, 2006.16 Lakeside Imports does business as Lakeside Toyota.17
Toyota Motor Sales argues that the Carfax report is not competent
summary judgment evidence because it is unauthenticated and unsworn.18
But evidence need not be fully authenticated and admissible to constitute
competent summary judgment evidence so long as it is capable of being
presented in admissible form at trial. See Lee v. Offshore Logistical &
Transp., LLC, 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2017); LSR Consulting, LLC v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d 530, 533-34 (5th Cir. 2016). Toyota Motor
Sales offers no reason why the information in the Carfax report cannot be
reduced to admissible form, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B), and other courts have
considered Carfax reports on summary judgment. See Gable v. Nikou Group
Inv., Inc., 16-2927, 2017 WL 3671082, at *1-2 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Krouch v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2014 WL 5463333, at *2 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 2014). The
Court therefore declines to exclude the report.
Toyota Motor Sales further argues that, even if the Carfax report is
considered, plaintiff’s allegations are too conclusory to state a claim against
Lakeside Imports, and too much time has elapsed to plausibly allege a causal

16
17
18

Id. at 2-3.
R. Doc. 1-4 at 18.
R. Doc. 15 at 9-10.
6

connection between Lakeside’s repairs and plaintiff’s injuries. 19 But the
same argument is equally applicable to plaintiff’s allegations against Toyota
Motor Sales. Toyota Motor Sales has filed a motion to dismiss asking the
Court to dismiss plaintiff’s petition with prejudice because plaintiff’s
allegations against it are entirely conclusory, and fail to allege any facts to
raise plaintiff’s claim for relief beyond a speculative level. 20 Toyota Motor
Sales notes that the vehicle is a 2000 model, and that plaintiff provides no
information on when the car was allegedly sold or repaired by Toyota Motor
Sales, the nature of those repairs, or the care and custody of the vehicle in
the intervening years. 21
Plaintiff’s petition asserts equally conclusory allegations against
Toyota Motor Sales and Lakeside Imports, and her claims against Toyota
Motor Sales appear no more plausible than her claims against Lakeside
Imports. In this circumstance, “it makes little sense to single out the in-state
defendants as ‘sham’ defendants and call their joinder improper” because the
“case is ill founded as to all the defendants.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 574.
Toyota Motor Sales has not demonstrated improper joinder, and the Court
lacks jurisdiction.

19
20
21

Id. at 8-9.
R. Doc. 14-1 at 6-12; R. Doc. 19.
Id. at 8 n. 34.
7

Plaintiff requests an award of attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c).22 “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s
fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively
reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,
546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). The Court finds that the Reed affidavit provided
Toyota Motor Sales with an objectively reasonable basis for removal.
Accordingly, the request for attorneys’ fees is denied.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion. This matter

is REMANDED to the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson.
Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is DENIED.

20th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of February, 2018.

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22

R. Doc. 10-1 at 6-7.
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