Crawford et al v. Gusman et al
Filing
48
ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Maynard's 16 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Sheriff Marlin Gusman, Brandon Savage, Jessica Geddies, Kenneth Goodman, Alisha Comeaux, Ronika Stewart, Kanisha Carey, and Alvin White's 28 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 8/8/2018. (jls)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CELLETTE CRAWFORD
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 17-13397
MARLIN N. GUSMAN, ET. AL.
SECTION "B"(4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Gary Maynard’s “Motion to
Dismiss” (Rec. Doc. 16), and Defendants, Sheriff Marlin Gusman,
Brandon Savage, Jessica Geddies, Kenneth Goodman, Alisha Comeaux,
Ronika Stewart, Kanisha Carey, and Alvin White’s “Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim” (Rec. Doc. 28).
Plaintiff has filed its responses in opposition (Rec. Docs. 29 and
37) to the above-referenced motions to dismiss. Also before the
Court is Defendant Maynard’s Reply (Rec. Doc. 46). For the reasons
discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Maynard’s Motion to Dismiss (Rec.
Doc. 16) is GRANTED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Sheriff Marlin Gusman,
Brandon Savage, Jessica Geddies, Kenneth Goodman, Alisha Comeaux,
Ronika Stewart, Kanisha Carey, and Alvin White’s Motion to Dismiss
(Rec. Doc. 28) is DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 3, 2016, Colby Crawford was arrested and taken into
custody by the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office (“OPSO”). Rec. Doc.
1
11 at 5. On February 22, 2017, at approximately 7:42 p.m. and while
still in pre-trial OPSO custody, Colby collapsed and died of a
cocaine drug overdose. Id. at 10. Plaintiff Cellette Crawford
(“Plaintiff”), Colby’s mother, has filed Complaint against various
defendants (Rec. Docs. 1 and 11), alleging violations of Colby’s
constitutional
rights,
42
U.S.C.
§
1983,
the
Americans
with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and relevant Louisiana constitutional
and statutory laws. Rec. Doc. 11 at 19-24.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that at the time her son Colby
was arrested in 2016 he had been diagnosed with and in treatment
for bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and substance abuse. Rec.
Doc. 11 at 5. Allegedly, upon his arrest Colby requested to be
placed on a psychiatric tier at the Orleans Justice Center (“OJC”).
Shortly after entering OPSO custody at the OJC, Colby was
seen by Defendant Dr. Angela Green (“Defendant Green”). Pursuant
to her consultation, Defendant Green prescribed Colby psychiatric
medications and noted that his symptoms included “seeing spirits
and ghosts, insomnia, anxiety, paranoia, and bad dreams.” Rec.
Doc. 11 at 5. Although Defendant Green did not recommend Colby for
transfer to Elayn Hunt Correctional Center’s special psychiatric
unit, he was eventually transferred there on June 1, 2016. Id. at
6. The Complaint alleges that while at Elayn Hunt facility, Colby
was reported to have been participating in therapies and taking
2
his medication on a consistent basis. Id. Colby was transferred
back to OJC on August 1, 2016.
Subsequent to his transfer back to OJC, there was an alleged
decline in Colby’s welfare. It is alleged that Defendant Lena Mason
(“Defendant Mason”) notes, after a medical visit, that Colby’s
symptoms had returned. He was reportedly only taking his medication
half of the time. Colby also reported to Defendant Mason that he
was getting into fights, and requested a transfer to a psychiatric
tier. Rec. Doc. 11 at 7. However, Colby remained in general
population at OJC.
It is uncontested that on February 22, 2017, an inmate
introduced cocaine into Colby’s tier at OJC. Rec, Doc, 11 at 9.
The Complaint alleges that said inmate was either intentionally or
negligently
permitted
to
smuggle
illegal
drugs
into
the
correctional facility. Defendants Brandon Savage, Jessica Geddies,
Kenneth Goodman, Alisha Comeaux, Ronika Stewart, Kanisha Carey,
and
Alvin
White
(collectively,
the
“OPSO
Defendants”)
were
allegedly assigned to perform security checks and tasked with
monitoring Colby’s tier on the day of his death. Plaintiff alleges
that the OJC video surveillance system “plainly showed inmates,
including
Colby,
ingesting
cocaine
and
engaging
in
other
prohibited behavior throughout the day on February 22, 2017.” Id.
As a result, Colby Crawford died of a cocaine overdose.
3
The instant Complaint asserts four causes of action. Rec.
Doc. 11. Plaintiff’s first cause contends that all defendants,
individually and under color of law, deprived Colby of certain
rights violating the Fourteenth amendment to the constitution, and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that
Defendant Gusman, Defendant Maynard, and Defendant Correct Care
Solutions (“Defendant CCS”) “established, condoned, ratified, and
encouraged
customs,
policies,
patterns,
and
practices
that
directly and proximately caused” the complained of violations of
Colby’s rights. Rec. Doc. 11 at 20. Third, Plaintiff asserts claims
pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 1 and the ADA
against
Defendant
Gusman.
Finally,
Plaintiff’s
fourth
cause
asserts gross negligence and intentional misconduct against all
defendants. Rec. Doc. 11 at 24. Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action
is
asserted
against
Defendants
Gusman
and
CCS
via
vicarious
liability and/or respondeat superior. Id.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a motion is rarely
granted because it is viewed with disfavor. See Lowrey v. Tex. A
& M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser
1
29 U.S.C. § 701.
4
Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d
1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
Upon identifying the well-pleaded factual allegations, courts
“assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 1950. A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows
the
court
to
draw
the
reasonable
inference
that
the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. This
is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw
on
its
plaintiffs
judicial
must
experience
“nudge[]
their
and
claims
common
across
sense.”
the
Id.
line
The
from
conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
A. DEFENDANT MAYNARD’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Rec. Doc. 16)
Defendant contends that the claims alleged against him arise
out of a court-appointed authority, and should therefore, be
dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of judicial immunity. Rec. Doc.
16 at 1. Defendant Maynard further asserts that should this Court
find suit against the office of Compliance Director a proper
remedy, he is no longer the proper defendant as he has resigned
from the position. Rec. Doc. 30-2 at 5.
The Compliance Director is a position that was created by a
Stipulated Order of the Court, in order to bring the OJC into
compliance with a prior Consent Judgment entered in the case. Jones
et al v. Gusman, Civil Action No. 12-859, Ecf. No. 1082 (E.D.La
5
Jun. 2013). The Consent Judgement was the outcome of a class action
suit initiated by prisoners against the Orleans Parish Prison in
April of 2012. The district court judge eventually approved a
Consent
Judgement,
“systemic
and
longstanding
requiring
durable
problems
Defendant
reforms
at
the
to
jail.”
Gusman
address
Id.
In
to
implement
pervasive
April
2016,
and
the
plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Appoint Receiver” requesting the
Court appoint a receiver to carry out the remedies provided for in
the Consent Judgment. Jones et al v. Gusman, Civil Action No. 12859, Ecf. No. 1009. After evidentiary proceedings, a Stipulated
Order was signed by all parties and the Court. See Ecf. No. 1082.
The Stipulated Order provides that the Compliance Director will
have “final authority to operate” the OJC and “all jail facilities,
including authority over the entire prisoner population in the
custody of” the OPSO. Id. The Stipulated Order also provides that
the Complaince Director is “answerable only to the Court.” Id. at
3.
The Supreme Court has clearly expressed that the question of
absolute,
judicial-immunity
entails
a
functional
approach.
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988). This functional
approach should examine the “nature of the functions with which a
particular
official
or
class
of
officials
has
been
lawfully
entrusted." Id. Further, this Court should “evaluate the effect
that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have
6
on the appropriate exercise” of such functions. See id. “Court
appointed receivers act as arms of the court and are entitled to
share the appointing judge's absolute immunity provided that the
challenged actions are taken in good faith and within the scope of
the authority granted to the receiver.” Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d
367, 373 (5th Cir. 1995).
Here, we find the record reflects the Compliance Director to
be a court-appointed receiver, entitled to derivative judicial
immunity from the Plaintiff’s federal and state law claims. The
Compliance Director was a position created and funded by the Court,
tasked with implementing the substantive measures provided for in
the Court’s consent judgment. Defendant unsuccessfully attempts to
distinguish the facts at bar from those in the Plata decision. See
generally, Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL
2932253, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005); see also Rec. Doc. 29.
Holding the Compliance Director liable would essentially find the
Court liable for its attempt to adjudicate the dispute between
prisoners
and
the
OPSO.
This
is
highlighted
by
the
Court’s
acceptance of Defendant Maynard’s resignation, and its subsequent
appointment of the current Compliance Director, Darnley Hodge, Sr.
Jones et al v. Gusman, Civil Action No. 12-859, Ecf. No. 1151.
Accordingly, Defendant Maynard’s Motion to Dismiss (Rec.
Doc. 16) is GRANTED with Prejudice.
7
B. DEFENDANT GUSMAN AND OPSO’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Rec. Doc. 28)
Plaintiff alleges individual and official capacity claims
against Defendant Gusman and the OPSO Defendants. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gusman is liable the following
violations: 1) under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
2) vicarious liability for the OPSO Defendant’s violations of
Plaintiff’s rights, 3) violations of the ADA and Section 504 of
the
Rehabilitation
Act,
and
4)
violations
of
Louisiana
constitutional and statutory law. Plaintiff alleges the following
violations of Plaintiff’s rights against the OPSO Defendants: 1)
under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 2)
Louisiana constitutional and statutory law.
1. DEFENDANT GUSMAN
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges four causes of action against
Defendant Gusman, individually and in his official capacity as
Sheriff of Orleans Parish. “Local government is liable under §
1983 for its policies that cause constitutional torts.” McMillian
v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 784 (1997). Such a claim
requires
proof
of
an
official
policy
as
the
cause
of
the
constitutional deprivation. Turner v. Houma Municipal Fire &
Police Civil Service Board, 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell liability "requires proof of
three elements: (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; (3)
and a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is
8
the policy or custom." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d
567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). The policymaker must have actual or
constructive knowledge of the official policy or custom. Pineda
v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth
Circuit has held that “actual knowledge may be shown by such means
as
discussions
at
council
meetings
or
receipt
of
written
information.” Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 860 F.3d 803,
808-09 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728
F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1984)). “Constructive knowledge” may be
found “where the violations were so persistent and widespread that
they were the subject of prolonged public discussion or of a high
degree of publicity.” Id.
Defendant Gusman contends that “there can be no liability
unless those [Colby’s] injuries resulted from some official policy
which the Sheriff had adopted or . . . was required to adopt.”
Rec. Doc. 28-1 at 7 (quoting Campbell v. Bergeron, 654 F.2d 719
(5th Cir. 1981)). However, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges just the
sort of patterns and practices that resulted in an official
policy. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant Gusman was
personally aware of various unconstitutional practices at the
OPSO,
yet
failed
to
remedy
said
practices.
Rec.
Doc.
37.
Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Gusman was
aware
of
continuous
violations
of
OPSO
policy
by
Defendant
Gusman’s deputies, severe understaffing, failure to train and
9
supervise deputies, and that this failure to remedy the continuous
violations
amounted
to
gross
negligence
and
deliberate
indifference. Rec. Doc. 37; Rec. Doc. 11.
The Complaint alleges that in 2009, a “findings letter” was
issued
by
the
Department
of
Justice
(“DOJ”),
noting
several
employment and mental healthcare deficiencies, which amounted to
serious constitutional violations. The letter from the DOJ is
alleged to have put Defendant Gusman on notice of the complained
of violations. The Complaint further alleges that Defendant Gusman
was made aware of these same and allegedly continuing violations,
on multiple subsequent occasions, including via a consent decree
issued in prior litigation 2, and subsequent Monitor’s Reports
issued in compliance with the Jones case reporting the abovementioned
Colby’s
deficiencies,
death.
Plaintiff’s
as
Taking
Complaint
recent
Plaintiff’s
sufficiently
as
May
2017—shortly
allegations
states
to
be
individual
after
true,
claims
against Defendant Gusman.
For the same reasons above, Plaintiff’s Complaint also states
a claim against Defendant Gusman in his official capacity as well.
Defendant Gusman contends that the Court “must find that the
offender committed the same specific violation in the specific
scenario related to the violation in the instant matter.” Yet the
2
See Jones et al. v. Gusman, Civil Action No. 12-859 (E.D.La Jun.
2013) (the “Jones case”).
10
DOJ letter, as well as language in the Consent Judgment issued in
the Jones case amount to notice of the exact same constitutional
violations alleged herein. Specifically, Defendant Gusman has been
made aware on multiple occasion of the egregious constitutional
violations occurring at OJC. Defense counsel’s argument that the
allegations citing the Jones consent judgment are “generic,” are
quite alarming. Rec. Doc. 28-1 at 10. Complete lack of supervision
and
deliberate
indifference
to
the
mental
health
needs
of
incarcerated individuals at OJC are the specific violations that
Plaintiff alleges and they are the specific violations that the
Government and this Court have already found to pervasively exist
at OJC. Defendant’s attempt to irrationally narrow the scenario
required to place Defendant Gusman on notice is unavailing. It is
that exact lack of supervision and failure to train deputies that
resulted in the allegations here that inmate Samuel Fuller was
successfully able to smuggle cocaine into a housing unit at OJC,
which allowed Colby and other inmates to use cocaine throughout
the day in the tier Colby was being housed.
ADA and Section 504 Liability
Plaintiff’s
amended
complaint
asserts
a
claims
against
Defendant Gusman for violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Rec. Doc. 11 at
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 provides that:
11
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason
of
such
disability,
be
excluded
from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12132. “The language of Title II generally tracks the
language of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and
Congress' intent was that Title II . . . work in the same manner
as Section 504.” Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir.
2000). Thus, in order to state a claim Plaintiff must allege facts
to support “(1) that Colby was a qualified individual within the
meaning
of
the
ADA;
(2)
that
he
was
being
excluded
from
participation in, or being denied benefits of, services, programs,
or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is
otherwise being discriminated against by the public entity; and
(3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was
by reason of his disability.” Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit,
391 F.3d 669, 671–72 (5th Cir. 2004).
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has “not stated any major
life activity which was substantially limited with respect to Colby
Crawford” fails. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Colby Crawford
suffered
from
schizophrenia,
bipolar,
and
substance
disorders. “Major life activities” are defined as:
Caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting,
reaching,
lifting,
bending,
speaking,
breathing,
learning,
reading,
concentrating,
thinking,
communicating, interacting with others, and working; and
12
abuse
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. Additionally, the term “major” “shall not be
interpreted
strictly
to
create
a
demanding
standard
for
disability.” Id. “Whether an activity is a ‘major life activity’
is not determined by reference to whether it is of ‘central
importance to daily life.’” Id.
Colby Crawford had been hospitalized in the past due to such
disorders; and as described above, the employees at OJC had been
well aware of Colby’s mental disabilities, including his original
transfer to Elayn Hunt and subsequent medical follow-ups. Surely
the complained of experiences by Colby—including seeing spirits
and hearing voices—interfered with his ability to safely engage in
major life activities. Accordingly, Plaintiff sufficiently states
ADA and § 504 claims against Defendant Gusman.
2. OPSO Defendants
Under Fifth Circuit precedent, “a plaintiff must establish
that an official acted with deliberate indifference.” Sibley v.
Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 1999). This standard applies
to pre-trial detainees like the decedent in this case. Id.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss also seeks dismissal of the
individual capacity claims against the OPSO Defendants. Defendants
assert that Plaintiff fails to plead actual facts “which indicate
that the OPSO Defendants failed to act when they were either aware
or should have been aware of an unjustified risk of harm to
13
plaintiff.” Rec. Doc. 28-1 at 4-6. In support of their contentions
the OPSO Defendants assert that at no time were any of the deputies
aware that illegal narcotic had been smuggled into the facility.
Rec. Doc. 28-1 at 7. OPSO Defendants maintain that Plaintiff fails
to allege facts that support a claim that the OPSO Defendants had
“subjective knowledge of a risk of harm to Colby Crawford.” Id.
Defendants’
Plaintiff
has
arguments
sufficiently
are
unavailing.
plead
individual
Taken
as
liability
true,
claims
against the OPSO Defendants. Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth a
myriad of facts that highlight the OPSO Defendants’ deliberate
indifference
to
Colby
Crawford’s
rights.
Plaintiff’s
amended
complaint (Rec. Doc. 11) alleges that the OPSO Defendants either
were, or should have been aware, of the drug consumption that was
occurring on the day of Colby’s death. See Rec. Doc. 37 at 11.
The amended complaint alleges that these activities were clearly
shown
on
the
facility’s
surveillance
system,
that
the
OPSO
Defendants were tasked with monitoring said system and the inmate,
at thirty-minute intervals. Id. The amended complaint further
alleges that the OPSO Defendants went so far as to assist the
inmates, allowing them to intermingle in each other’s tiers and
“opening and closing cell doors at inmates’ requests.” Rec. Doc.
37 at 11. Accepting only for now factual allegations as true,
as we
must
supports
a
in
a
claim
Rule
that
12(b)(6)
the
motion
OPSO
14
review,
Defendants
the
had
complaint
“subjective
knowledge of a risk of harm to Colby Crawford” where cocaine was
being ingested throughout the day and the OPSO Defendants failed
to monitor the inmates; especially an inmate alleged to have
repeatedly requested transfer out of general population, based on
well-documented mental and substance abuse challenges.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of August, 2018.
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15
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