Coder et al v. M-I, LLC

Filing 56

ORDER AND REASONS DENYING 49 Motion to Recognize William Green as a Party Plaintiff. Signed by Judge Wendy B Vitter on 10/23/2019. (jeg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROBERT CODER, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 17-15074-WBV-JVM

M-I, LLC

SECTION: D (1)
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion to Recognize William Green as a Party Plaintiff,
filed by Robert Coder.1 The Motion is opposed. 2 For the reasons that follow, the
Motion is DENIED.
I.

Background
On December 6, 2017, Robert Coder, individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated, Murray Alford, Craig Dawson, Michael Maloy, Robert Theiss and
Cory Veuleman (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint in this Court, styled as a
collective action, seeking to recover unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (the “FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., from M-I, LLC d/b/a M-I Swaco
(“Defendant”).3 On December 12, 2017, the case was consolidated with Civ. A. No.
17-6124-GGG-JVM, Bocage v. M-I, LLC (the “Bocage matter”).4 After consolidation,
the Bocage matter became the lead consolidated case into which further pleadings
were filed. On January 3, 2018, Jeremy Bocage, the plaintiff in the Bocage matter,

R. Doc. 49.
R. Doc. 52.
3 R. Doc. 1.
4 R. Doc. 6.
1
2

1

filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, seeking to add Kenneth
Abbas, Robert Armstrong, Mike Aucoin, Ernest Badeaux, Jr., David Burford, Brian
Carbo, Maxcillian Danos, III, Kenneth Kidder, Terry Leeper, Ricky Livingston, Harry
Mankle, Bradley McKay, Phillip Palmer, Martin Ranstead, Garret Richard, James
Smith, Steven Sonnier, Mark Stockstill, Elwin Thomas, Dominique Trahan and
Larry Williamson as plaintiffs.5 The Court granted the Motion for Leave on March
7, 2018.6
Thereafter, on July 5, 2018, Robert Coder filed a Notice of Filing Written
Consent to Join as Plaintiffs in the consolidated matter, asserting that William D.
Green, William McBee and James E. Slack “have elected to become plaintiffs in this
lawsuit by filing the attached written consent forms, in accordance with the
provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).”7 On July 6, 2018, the Clerk of Court marked the
pleading as deficient because it is an “Improper form of pleading.”8 The deficiency
notice states that, “A Motion to Amend must be filed to add parties.”9 The deficiency
notice further provides, “Attention: Document must be refiled in its entirety
within seven (7) calendar days; otherwise, it may be stricken by the court
without further notice. Deficiency remedy due by 7/13/2018.”10 Coder failed
to address the deficiency or file any further motion to request that a party be added
until October 8, 2019, well over one year later.11

See R. Docs. 17 & 17-4 in the Bocage matter.
R. Doc. 31 in the Bocage matter.
7 R. Doc. 42 in the Bocage matter.
8 See July 6, 2018 NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY in the Bocage matter.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 R. Doc. 49.
5
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2

On July 10, 2018, the Court issued an Order Deconsolidating Cases.12 In the
instant case, the parties recently filed joint stipulations of dismissal with respect to
Craig Dawson, Murray Alford, Michael Maloy, Robert Theiss and Cory Veuleman,
who have been dismissed without prejudice from this case. 13

Thus, the only

remaining named plaintiff in this action is Robert Coder.
As indicated, on October 8, 2019, Coder filed the instant Motion, requesting an
Order from this Court recognizing that William Green was properly joined as a
collective action plaintiff when he filed his written consent to join this lawsuit on July
5, 2018, despite the notice of deficiency and lapse of time since the notice.14 Coder
asserts that his counsel contacted the Court to clarify the deficiency and “spoke to a
member of the Court’s staff,” during which counsel pointed out that this case was
filed as a putative collective action and that additional plaintiffs could be added by
filing a written consent to join under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).15 Coder asserts that his
counsel was advised that because the collective action claims in the Bocage matter
had been previously dismissed, “the Court did not realize that the Coder matter was
still pending as a putative collective action,” and that, “Plaintiff’s counsel was advised
that the Court would review the docket and take corrective action if necessary.” 16
Coder asserts that, “On July 10, 2018, the Court issued an order deconsolidating the
Bocage and Coder matters, and plaintiff’s counsel mistakenly believed that the docket

R. Doc. 7; See R. Doc. 43 in the Bocage matter.
See R. Docs. 19, 20, 22, 24.
14 R. Doc. 49.
15 R. Doc. 49-1 at p. 2.
16 Id. (citing R. Doc. 14 in the Bocage matter).
12
13

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was corrected to recognize that the opt-in plaintiffs were added to the suit by filing
the written consent forms.” 17 The Court notes that all counsel, including Coder’s
counsel, subsequently participated in a Scheduling Conference to formulate a
Scheduling Order in this matter.18 This issue was not brought up by Coder’s counsel
in the Scheduling Conference.
Relying upon an Eleventh Circuit case, Coder argues that the only requirement
for Green to become a plaintiff in this case was to file a written consent with the Court
and be similarly situated to the named plaintiff.19 Coder contends that Green filed a
written consent on July 5, 2018, and that the Declarations of Coder and Green,
submitted in support of the instant Motion, clearly demonstrate that they are
similarly situated. 20 Coder asserts that under the three-factor test set forth in
Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., Coder and Green are similarly situated. 21 Finally, Coder
asserts that “general fairness and procedural considerations dictate that Green
should be recognized as an opt-in plaintiff and allowed to proceed to trial along with
Coder” because there is no element of surprise, since “The plaintiff has been aware of
the claim since Mr. Green filed his written consent to join the lawsuit.” 22 Coder
claims that Green has participated in discovery by answering written discovery

R. Doc. 49-1 at p. 2.
R. Doc. 11.
19 R. Doc. 49-1 at pp. 5-6 (citing Mickles on behalf of herself v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 127778 (11th Cir. 2018)).
20 R. Doc. 49-1 at p. 6; See R. Docs. 49-2 & 49-3.
21 R. Doc. 49-1 at pp. 6-9 (citing Lusardi, 118 F.R.D. 351, 359 (D.N.J. 1987)).
22 R. Doc. 49-1 at p. 9. Although Coder asserts that there is no element of surprise because he has
been aware of Green’s claim since the filing of Green’s written consent to join the lawsuit, this appears
to be a typographical error. It is more likely that Coder meant to assert that Defendant has been
aware of Green’s claim since the filing of his written consent.
17
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requests and appearing for a deposition noticed by Defendant, and that trying their
claims together will promote judicial efficiency. 23 Alternatively, Coder urges the
Court to “issue an order tolling the statute of limitations on Green’s claim” from July
5, 2018 until 30 days after ruling on the instant Motion so that he can refile his
claims.24
Defendant opposes the Motion, arguing that Green was never properly added
as plaintiff in this case.25 Defendant asserts that Green attempted to file his written
consent, but that it was rejected by the Court as deficient, and that Green took no
action to correct the deficiency.26 Defendant claims that this Court routinely rejects
litigants’ efforts to resurrect deficient documents that were not refiled.27 Defendant
asserts that the instant Motion is premised upon an ex parte communication between
Coder’s counsel and an unnamed member of “the Court’s staff,” and that it was
incumbent upon Coder’s counsel to refile the appropriate pleading in response to the
Court’s deficiency notice.28 Even if Green’s consent had been timely or correctly filed,
Defendant argues that he still cannot proceed in this action as an opt-in plaintiff
because Coder has never moved for certification of the class.29 Defendant asserts that
if a case does not proceed as a collective action, the opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed

Id.
Id. (citing England v. New Century Fin. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 504, 511-12 (M.D. La. 2005)).
25 R. Doc. 52.
26 R. Doc. 52 at pp. 2-3.
27 Id. at p. 3 (citing Brown v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Civ. A. No. 16-1069, 2016 WL 1161306,
at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 2016)).
28 R. Doc. 52 at p. 4.
29 Id. at p. 5.
23
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without prejudice.30 Defendant further asserts that Green is not similarly situated
to Coder because it has separate, dispositive affirmative defenses for Green, including
release and res judicata.31 Defendant asserts that Green was involved in a settlement
agreement in a California putative class action entitled Syed v. M-I, LLC, Civ. A. No.
12-01718, and that Green has admitted that he did not opt-out of the lawsuit and that
he received a cashed a check in connection with the settlement.32
Defendant further asserts that the instant Motion is untimely and highly
prejudicial to Defendant because it was filed over a month after the Court determined
that Green was not a proper party on September 11, 2019.33 Defendant claims that
since that dismissal, the discovery deadline has passed, the deadline to file witness
and exhibit lists has passed, and the dispositive motion deadline has passed. 34
Defendant asserts that it did not list witnesses or exhibits pertaining to Green in its
witness or exhibit lists, and that it would be prejudiced if Green became a plaintiff
after the witness and exhibit list deadline. Alternatively, if Green is recognized as
plaintiff, Defendant argues that it should be allowed to re-urge its motion to sever,
which would no longer be moot.35 Finally, Defendant argues that Coder’s alternative
request for the Court to toll the statute of limitations on Green’s claims is

Id. (citing Kaluom v. Stolt Offshore, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Green v. Harbor
Freight Tools USA, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1094 (D. Kan. 2012) (citing Mooney v. Aramco Servs.
Co., 54 F.3d 1208, 1214 (5th Cir. 1995)).
31 R. Doc. 52 at p. 6.
32 Id. (citing R. Docs. 52-2 & 52-3).
33 R. Doc. 52 at p. 7 (citing R. Doc. 30).
34 R. Doc. 52 at p. 7 (citing R. Doc. 11).
35 R. Doc. 52 at p. 7.
30

6

inappropriate because Coder has not and cannot allege that an extraordinary
circumstance prevented Green’s timely filing of his written consent.36
II.

Law and Analysis
A. FLSA Class Actions.
The FLSA generally requires employers to pay employees who work more than

forty hours in a workweek at least one and one-half times the employees’ regular rate
for each hour in excess of forty.37 The FLSA, however, “excludes from its overtime
requirement those employees working ‘in a bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional capacity.’”38 The FLSA provides employees who are improperly denied
overtime wages a cause of action to recoup unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and
attorney’s fees from their employers. 39

An action seeking such relief may be

maintained against the employer “by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.”40 Such an action is
referred to as a collective action. The FLSA further provides that, “No employee shall
be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become
such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”41

Id. at pp. 7-8 (citing Nadesan v. Texas Oncology PA, Civ. A. No. 10-239, 2011 WL 147570, at *6 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 18, 2011)).
37 Rychorcewicz v. Welltec, Inc., 768 Fed.Appx. 252, 255 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
38 Dewan v. M-I, LLC, 858 F.3d 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)).
39 Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (E.D. La. 2008) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
216(b)).
40 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
41 Id.
36

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B. William Green’s Status as a Plaintiff.
The sole issue before the Court is whether William Green was properly joined
as a collective action plaintiff in this matter. Green attempted to become a plaintiff
in this lawsuit during the brief period in which this matter was consolidated with the
Bocage matter, when Robert Coder filed a Notice of Filing Written Consent to Join as
Plaintiffs in that case.42 However, that pleading was deficient and rejected by the
Clerk of Court.43 In the deficiency notice, the Clerk of Court advised that, “A Motion
to Amend must be filed to add parties.” 44 The deadline for Coder to correct the
deficiency was July 13, 2018. However, Coder failed to address the deficiency or file
any further motion to request that a party be added until October 8, 2019, well over
one year later.45 While the Court is mindful that procedural filing deficiencies should
not normally bar a party’s otherwise timely filing,46 the Court finds that Coder has
evidenced a lack of intent to move for conditional certification or amend his pleadings.
Accordingly, the Notice of Filing Written Consent to Join as Plaintiffs is not properly
before the Court.47

See R. Doc. 42 in the Bocage matter.
Id.
44 Id.
45 R. Doc. 49.
46 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(2) (“A local rule imposing a requirement of form must not be enforced in a
way that causes a party to lose any right because of a nonwillful failure to comply.”); Darouiche v.
Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 415 Fed.Appx. 548, 552 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Under these circumstances, a conclusion
that the minor formatting error in Darouiche’s February 10 motion rendered that motion too
insufficient to be considered would unjustifiably elevate form over substance.”).
47 See Daboval v. Miller Transporters, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-1266, 2015 WL 1538810, at * (E.D. La. Apr.
7, 2015) (holding that two pleadings marked as deficient by the Clerk of Court were not properly before
the Court); Whitehead v. FedEx Office Inc., Civ. A. No. 10-1120, 2010 WL 4103707, at *1 (W.D. La.
Oct. 18, 2010) (“Plaintiff’s counsel failed to timely correct these deficiencies; therefore, Plaintiff’s
motions are not properly before this Court.”).
42
43

8

Despite the deficiency, Coder argues that Green was properly joined as a
collective action plaintiff when he filed his written consent to join this lawsuit on July
5, 2018. The Court disagrees. Coder does not cite to, and the Court could not find,
any authority supporting his position. Further, even if Green’s written consent was
properly before the Court, there is no dispute in this case that Coder never filed a
motion for conditional class certification. 48 Thus, there is no purported collective
action that Green could have opted into in this matter. The question of the status of
an opt-in plaintiff when there is no conditionally certified collective action under the
FLSA has resulted in a conflict among courts, including the courts within this
Circuit.49 “Some courts have held that an opt-in plaintiff in a FLSA case where no
class has been certified or where the conditionally certified class has been decertified
must be dismissed without prejudice, as he has opted into a nonexistent class, not
into the original lawsuit, and therefore only the original named plaintiff in the suit

48
49

See R. Doc. 30 at p. 1, n.5.
Dewan v. M-I, LLC, Civ. A. No. H-15-1746, 2016 WL 695717, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2016).

9

proceeds.”50 Other courts, however, have concluded that opt-in plaintiffs who filed a
written consent under the FLSA have the same status as the named plaintiff.51
Finding the first line of cases more persuasive, the Court agrees with
Defendant that if a case does not proceed as a collective action, any opt-in plaintiffs
must be dismissed without prejudice. Thus, even if Green’s written consent to join

Id.; See Mooney v. Aramco Services Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1214 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If the claimants are not
similarly situated, the district court decertifies the class, and the opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed
without prejudice.”), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 90-91,
123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003); Quijano v. Tuffy Associates Corp., Civ. A. No. 2:13-cv-573-FtM38CM, 2014 WL 4182691, at * (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014) (where plaintiff failed to move for conditional
certification, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss opt-in plaintiff without prejudice and
struck collective action allegations from plaintiffs’ complaint); McGlathery v. Lincare, Civ. A. No. 8:13cv-1255-T-23TBM, 2014 WL 1338610, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2014) (after plaintiffs failed to move for
certification of a collective action and requested the court to convert the opt-in plaintiffs to named
plaintiffs, the court dismissed claims of opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice, stating “once the possibility
of class certification passes . . . opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice”); Clay v. Huntington
Ingalls, Inc., Civ. A. No. 09-7265, 2012 WL 860375, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 2012) (after denying class
certification, the Court held that, “[T]o now allow the Opt-in Plaintiffs to be converted to named
plaintiffs would violate the policies and practical considerations underlying the decision not to certify
the collective action in the first place.”); Odem v. Centex Homes, Civ. A. No. 3:08-CV-1196 L, 2010 WL
424216, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2010) (denying motion for conditional certification of an FLSA
collective action and dismissing opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice); Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc.,
561 F. Supp. 2d 567, 588 (E.D. La. 2008) (decertifying collective action and dismissing without
prejudice “the claims of all opt-in plaintiffs, leaving before the Court the named plaintiffs who
originated these actions.”).
51 Dewan, Civ. A. No. H-15-1746, 2016 WL 695717, at *15; See Prickett v. Dekalb County, 349 F.3d
1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Congress indicated that opt-in plaintiffs should have the same status in
relation to the claims of the lawsuit as do the named plaintiffs.”); Alvarado v. Wang Ma LLC, Civ. A.
No. SA:13-CV-944-DAE, 2015 WL 919818, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2015) (finding that conditional
certification is not required for an opt-in plaintiff to be considered a party plaintiff and that “an
amendment is not absolutely necessary,” but granting plaintiff’s unopposed motion for leave to amend
to add named plaintiffs); Palmer v. Priority Healthcare, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:13CV480TSL-JMR, 2013
WL 5771662, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 24, 2013) (“Once opt-in plaintiffs consent to join, they have the
same status in relation to the claims of the lawsuit as do the named plaintiffs.”) (internal quotation
and quotation marks omitted); Alfonso v. Straight Line Installations, LLC, Civ. A. NO. 6:08-cv-1842Orl-35DAB, 2010 WL 519851 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2010) (although plaintiff did not file a motion seeking
to proceed as a collective action, the court found that two individuals became opt-in plaintiffs upon the
filing of their consents to join and granted plaintiff’s nunc pro tunc motion to amend complaint to add
them as plaintiffs); Coan v. Nightengale Home Healthcare, Inc., Civ. A. No. 1:05-CV-0101-DFH-TAB,
2006 WL 1994772, at *2 (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2006) (“Under the opt-in procedures of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
all 66 of the plaintiffs have affirmatively opted in as plaintiffs in this case, and they are full parties
for all purposes. The original plaintiffs are no longer representing the additional plaintiffs; they are
all plaintiffs.”) (internal citation omitted).
50

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this action as a plaintiff was properly before the Court, his claims would be dismissed
without prejudice.
C. Coder’s Alternative Request for an Order Tolling the Statute of
Limitations on Green’s Claim.
The doctrine of equitable tolling “preserves a plaintiff’s claims when strict
application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable.”52 “A district court may
refuse to toll limitations because it interprets a statute or regulation to prohibit
tolling or because it refuses to exercise its equitable discretion to toll.”53 Principles of
equitable tolling apply in FLSA actions.54 The decision of whether to toll rests within
the discretion of the district court, and where the district court “declines to exercise
its equitable powers,” the appellate court will review only for abuse of discretion.55
The burden to prove that equitable tolling is warranted rests squarely on the
party seeking to invoke tolling. 56 Further, equitable tolling applies in “rare and
exceptional circumstances,” 57 principally where a plaintiff “is prevented in some
extraordinary way from asserting his rights.”58 The remedy is available only where
a plaintiff “diligently pursues his or her rights.”59

United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).
Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
54 Morales v. Bimbo’s Best Produce, Inc., Civ. A. No. 08-5105, 2009 WL 1591172, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr.
20, 2009); Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 1063 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
55 Teemac, 298 F.3d at 456.
56 Id. at 457 (citing Wilson v. Secretary, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 65 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 1995);
Conaway v. Control Data Corp., 955 F.2d 358, 362 (5th Cir. 1992)).
57 Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998).
58 Rashidi v. Am. President Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1996).
59 Montelong v. Housing Auth. Of El Paso, Civ. A. No. 09-0388, 2010 WL 3239235 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13,
2010) (citing Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521, 530 n.23 (5th Cir. 2005); Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904,
906-07 (5th Cir. 1992).
52
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Here, Coder has failed to make any showing whatsoever that Green is entitled
to equitable tolling in this case. Coder’s entire argument with respect to his request
for equitable tolling is set forth in the following sentence: “In the alternative, the
Court should issue an order tolling the statute of limitations on Green’s claim from
July 5, 2018, the day he filed his consent, until thirty days after the order so that he
may refile his claims. England v. New Century Fin. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 504, 51112 (M.D. La. 2005).”60 As such, the Court is forced to ascertain Coder’s argument
from a single pincite. Although the England court makes no mention of equitable
tolling, after denying conditional certification of a collective action, the court held
that, “Because of the unusual procedural aspects of these cases in that the two suits
were originally filed in separate courts and had different pretrial orders issued, the
plaintiffs are concerned that many of the plaintiffs’ claims will now be time barred.”61
The England court further held that, “The Court believes that it should take
appropriate steps to protect the rights of individual plaintiffs who have relied on the
orders that have been issued earlier in these proceedings so each will not be
prejudiced. This equitable relief, however, must also ensure that the defendant’s
rights are also protected . . . .”62
Unlike in England, which involved two actions – one filed in Louisiana state
court and removed to federal court and one filed in Minnesota federal court – which
were consolidated into one action in Louisiana federal court,63 the instant case was

R. Doc. 49-1 at p. 9.
England, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 506-07.
60
61

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originally filed in this Court and was consolidated with the Bocage matter for only
seven months shortly after the Complaint was filed.64 It was during this brief period
of consolidation that Coder attempted to add Green as a plaintiff by filing Green’s
written consent to join as a plaintiff on July 5, 2018.65 As previously discussed, the
Clerk of Court deemed the written consent deficient and Coder failed to cure the
deficiency by re-filing the written consent or by filing a motion for leave to amend the
Complaint. Thus, Coder and Green cannot be said to have “diligently pursue[d their]
rights,”66 in light of the fact that their request to equitably toll Green’s claims was
asserted approximately 15 months after they received the Clerk of Court’s Notice of
Deficient Document on July 6, 2018.

Further, Coder has not alleged that an

extraordinary circumstance prevented Green from timely filing his written consent,
nor has Coder alleged that Defendant did anything to induce Green to delay re-filing
his written consent. Accordingly, Coder has failed to satisfy his burden of proving
that equitable tolling is warranted in this case.
Based on the foregoing, Coder’s Motion must be denied.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Robert Coder’s

See R. Docs. 1, 6 & 7.
R. Doc. 42 in the Bocage matter.
66 Larry v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 890, 897 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927,
930 (5th Cir. 2000)).
64
65

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Motion to Recognize William Green as a Party Plaintiff67 is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, October 23, 2019.

______________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge

67

R. Doc. 49.

14