McManus v. Norwood et al
Filing
43
ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal (Rec. Doc. 41 ), Motion for Reconsideration (Rec. Doc. 38 ), and Motion to Remove an Order of Protective Custody ("OPC") (Rec. Doc. 42 ) are DENIED, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 9/25/2018. (Reference: All Cases)(sa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOSEPH MCMANUS
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 18-328
C/W: 18-329, 18-330,
18-366
RE: ALL
ELLA NORWOOD ET AL.
SECTION: “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal (Doc. 41), Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 38), and Motion to Remove an Order of Protective
Custody (“OPC”) (Doc. 42). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motions are
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This Court’s previous Order and Reasons granting Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss details the background of this consolidated action. 1 The details need
not be repeated here. Nevertheless, some developments have occurred since
then. On August 10, 2018—the same day it issued the Order and Reasons
granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss—this Court issued a judgment
1
See Doc. 36.
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dismissing all claims in the consolidated action. 2 On September 10, 2018,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking this Court to review its
previous Order and Reasons granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all
Plaintiff’s claims. 3 In general, Plaintiff argues that this Court failed to give
sufficient weight to certain evidence and misapplied the applicable law.
Defendants oppose, arguing that Plaintiff untimely filed his Motion for
Reconsideration and failed to allege sufficient grounds to warrant this Court’s
reversal of its own previous decision. 4 Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion to
Recuse this Court from the case and a Motion “to remove the order of protective
custody.” This Court will address Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal first before
analyzing his Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Remove the Order of
Protective Custody.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge
of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Nevertheless, “[a] motion for
recusal is within the discretion of the district judge.” 5 “A party seeking such
disqualification must show that, if a reasonable man knew of all the
circumstances, he would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” 6
“[S]peculative allegations of potential bias are not sufficient to warrant
recusal.” 7
Doc. 37.
See Doc. 38.
4 See Doc. 40.
5 United States v. Anderson, 160 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1998).
6 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted).
7 United States v. Mix, No. 12-171, 2014 WL 580758, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2014).
2
3
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Plaintiff argues that this Court should recuse itself because “this judge
do[es] not understand the law or the [U.S.] [C]onstitution.” 8 Plaintiff’s
disagreement with this Court’s interpretation of the law is not sufficient
grounds for recusal. As such, Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal is denied.
II.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
“There is no motion for ‘reconsideration’ in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” 9 Thus, depending on the time of filing, a motion to reconsider “is
evaluated either as a motion to ‘alter or amend a judgment’ under Rule 59(e)
or as a motion for ‘relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding’ under Rule
60(b).” 10 Because the instant Motion was filed more than 28 days after the
entry of judgment, it is analyzed as a motion for relief under Rule 60. 11
“Rule 60(b)(1) provides that a party may be relieved from a final
judgment for ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.’” 12 Among
the other enumerated reasons to grant relief are when new evidence emerges
that could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b), when fraud occurs, or when there exists “any other reason that justifies
relief.” 13 The decision of whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion is within
the trial court’s sound discretion. 14 Such a motion must be filed “within a
reasonable time” of judgment. 15
Because this Court construes Plaintiff’s Motion as a Rule 60 motion for
relief, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s Motion is untimely under Rule 59
Doc. 41.
Bass v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 211 F.3d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hamilton
Plaintiffs v. Williams Plaintiffs, 147 F.3d 367, 371 n.10 (5th Cir. 1998)).
10 Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
11 See id.
12 Jenkens & Gilchrist v. Groia & Co., 542 F.3d 114, 117 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 60(b)(1)).
13 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
14 Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 997 (5th Cir. 2002).
15 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1).
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is moot. And because Plaintiff filed his Motion approximately one month after
judgment, the filing is timely under Rule 60’s reasonableness standard. Since
Plaintiff’s Motion is timely, the Court will now address Plaintiff’s arguments
that this Court improperly dismissed his claims against all Defendants.
This Court dismissed the claims against Defendants Dennis Thomas,
Charles McManus Jr., and Ellamae Norwood for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 16 In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff does not challenge
the merits of this ruling but instead argues that this Court failed to consider
factual allegations he made to support his claims against the defendants. 17
These allegations have no bearing on this Court’s dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. As such, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient grounds to
warrant reversal of the dismissal of claims against these defendants.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Brumfield and Bonnett were
dismissed on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to state an actionable claim
against them. 18 One dismissed claim was an allegation that Defendants
violated the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). 19 The Court dismissed the
claim because FOIA applies only to federal agencies and their employees, but
Plaintiff sought to apply it to members of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s
Office, a subdivision of the state. 20 Plaintiff argues in his Motion for
Reconsideration that this Court misapplied the law in this regard. 21 Plaintiff
provides no support for this argument. As such, Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient grounds to warrant reversal of the dismissal of the claims against
Defendants Brumfield and Bonnet.
See Doc. 36.
See Doc. 38 at 1.
18 See Doc. 36.
19 See Doc. 36.
20 See Doc. 36. at 5–6.
21 See Doc. 38.
16
17
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As for the allegations against Defendants Rice, Roberts, and Ford, this
Court dismissed those on the grounds that some claims had prescribed and
others failed to state an actionable claim. 22 Plaintiff in his Motion for
Reconsideration expands upon previously alleged facts but fails to explain how
this Court erred under Rule 60 by dismissing the claims against these
Defendants on the facts before it. He also fails to show why these new facts
could not have been discovered before dismissal. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed
to allege sufficient grounds to warrant reversal of this Court’s dismissal of the
claims against Defendants Rice, Roberts, and Ford.
Finally, this Court dismissed sua sponte Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Polk because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 23 Plaintiff essentially claims that the Court
misapplied the doctrine, supporting his argument with the erroneous
proposition that federal court is the proper venue for an appeal of a state court
judgment. 24 Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient grounds to warrant reversal of
the Court’s dismissal of the claims against Defendant Polk. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
III.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remove the Order of Protective Custody
In his Motion “to remove the order of protective custody,” Plaintiff for the
first time asks this Court to “remove [the OPC] from [his] medical records.” 25
Construing Plaintiff’s Motion liberally, he seeks this ambiguous relief on
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process grounds. Considering this Court
rendered judgment dismissing all Plaintiff’s claims more than a month before
See Doc. 36.
See Doc. 38. See also Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 381–83 (5th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine bars federal courts from modifying or
reversing certain state court judgments).
24 See Doc. 38 at 2.
25 See Doc. 42.
22
23
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Plaintiff filed this Motion, the time has long since passed for Plaintiff to assert
new claims. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal, Motion for
Reconsideration, and Motion to Remove the Order of Protective Custody are
DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 25th day of September, 2018.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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