Jones v. Cannizzaro et al
Filing
187
ORDER AND REASONS denying defendant's 118 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Post-Conviction Brady Violations. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROBERT JONES
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 18-503
LEON CANNIZZARO ET AL.
SECTION “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment
on Post-Conviction Brady Violations (Doc. 118). For the following reasons, the
Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robert Jones brings claims against Orleans Parish District
Attorney Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr. (“OPDA”) in his official capacity under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for damages caused by Jones’s wrongful conviction and 23-year
incarceration on charges connected to a crime spree. Plaintiff’s conviction was
vacated for Brady violations on October 8, 2014 by the Louisiana Fourth
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Circuit Court of Appeal, and the charges against him were ultimately
dismissed.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that from 1992 to 2015 Defendant
suppressed favorable evidence that demonstrated Plaintiff’s innocence in
violation of Brady. Plaintiff intends to argue that in addition to the Brady
violations that took place prior to his conviction, Defendant continued to
violate Brady by falsely representing that no favorable evidence existed
throughout the pendency of his applications for post-conviction relief.
Defendant moves for summary judgment holding that there can be no finding
of an unconstitutional suppression of Brady evidence after Plaintiff’s
conviction in 1996. Plaintiff opposes.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 1 A genuine issue
of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” 2
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in his favor. 3 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
3 Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1997).
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shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” 4 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” 5 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.” 6 “We do not . . . in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
necessary facts.” 7 Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual
dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.” 8
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that due process requires
a prosecutor to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defendant before
trial. 9 Defendant argues that the law is clear that Brady does not apply in the
post-conviction context, and therefore there can be no finding of a Brady
violation after Plaintiff’s 1996 conviction. Defendant seeks a ruling that
regardless of whether Brady was violated prior to his conviction, Plaintiff
Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
6 John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th
Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
7 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
8 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
9 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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cannot, as a matter of law, have suffered any Brady violation after his
conviction.
In so arguing, Defendant relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne. 10 In
Osborne, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action alleging that he had a postconviction constitutional right to obtain access to evidence used against him at
trial in order to perform new DNA testing on that evidence. 11 The Supreme
Court held that the rights established under Brady do not extend postconviction and that the proper framework for analyzing plaintiff’s claim was
whether the state’s post-conviction relief procedures violated his substantive
due process rights. 12 The Court expressly noted that “nothing in our precedents
suggested that [the Brady] disclosure obligation continued after the defendant
was convicted and the case was closed.” 13
In reliance on Osborne, Defendant asks this Court to hold that the duty
to disclose Brady evidence does not extend past a defendant’s conviction.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, asks this Court to find that the Brady obligation
is a continuing one, which requires disclosure of favorable information even
after conviction. This Court declines to do either, and instead, holds that the
question need not be answered in this case.
Favorable evidence is necessarily discovered either prior to or after a
conviction. A defendant has a Brady right to favorable evidence in the
government’s possession prior to conviction. Pursuant to Osborne, a defendant
Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 (2009).
Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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does not have a Brady right to favorable information discovered after his
conviction. 14 It is undisputed that the favorable evidence at issue in this case
was in the government’s possession at the time of trial. 15 Therefore, Brady
applies and that evidence should have been produced before Plaintiff’s
conviction. This Court has already held that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s
Brady rights prior to his conviction by failing to produce favorable evidence
and that this element of his § 1983 claim was satisfied as to that evidence. 16
Accordingly, the issue of whether a Brady duty continued after conviction or
whether Defendant continued to violate such a duty need not be answered.
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated when favorable evidence was not
handed over prior to his conviction. The fact that it took 20 years for Defendant
to right this wrong is not relevant for purposes of its liability for that
constitutional violation. If Plaintiff proves his claim, Defendant is liable for the
damages that resulted from that constitutional violation whether its duty to
disclose under Brady continued beyond Plaintiff’s conviction or not.
Accordingly, this Court declines to enter the summary judgment requested by
Defendant because such is unnecessary here.
The Court further notes that a motion for summary judgment is not the
appropriate vehicle for the resolution of this issue. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 permits summary judgment to be entered on a claim or part of a
claim. Plaintiff brings a single Brady claim. Plaintiff indicates that he will seek
Id.
Id.
16 See Doc. 117 (holding that Plaintiff is “entitled to summary judgment on the element
of his § 1983 claim requiring him to establish that OPDA violated his Brady rights to the
extent of the findings and conclusions reached by the Fourth Circuit in his Post-Conviction
Case.”).
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to introduce evidence of Defendant’s multi-decade suppression of evidence to
argue for an increased damages award and to prove that “OPDA had a
longstanding unconstitutional policy
of withholding Brady and was
deliberately indifferent to his Brady rights.” 17 Accordingly, the events at issue
are merely evidence that Plaintiff might use to prove his single Brady claim;
they are not an independent claim or part of a claim. The issue of the
admissibility of this evidence is a question for another day, and this Court
makes no finding here.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 4th day of November, 2019.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Doc. 155.
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