Jones v. Cannizzaro et al
Filing
51
ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Leon Cannizzaro's Motion for Leave to Appeal (Rec. Doc. 31 ) and Motion for Reconsideration (Rec. Doc. 32 ) are DENIED, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 8/28/2018. (sa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROBERT JONES
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 18-503
LEON CANNIZZARO ET AL.
SECTION “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Defendant Leon Cannizzaro’s Motion for Leave to
Appeal (Doc. 31) and Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 32). For the following
reasons, the Motions are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robert Jones brings claims against the Orleans Parish District
Attorney Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr. in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for damages caused by his wrongful conviction and 23-year incarceration on
charges connected to a crime spree. Plaintiff’s conviction was vacated for
Brady violations on October 8, 2014. Thereafter, the District Attorney
continued to pursue conviction and re-trial of the charges against him. The
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charges were ultimately dismissed on January 26, 2017. Plaintiff brought this
action on January 16, 2018.
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing, among other things, that
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by prescription. Specifically, Defendant alleged
that the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim began to run when
his conviction was vacated, and it was therefore untimely when it was filed. At
oral argument on that motion, this Court gave reasons on the record denying
Defendant’s motion and holding that Plaintiff’s claim had not prescribed.
Defendant now files a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Leave to
Appeal that decision.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion for Reconsideration
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) states that, “[A]ny order or other
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to
any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of
a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and
liabilities.” “Under Rule 54(b), ‘the trial court is free to reconsider and reverse
its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new
evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law.’” 1
“‘[T]he power to reconsider or modify interlocutory rulings is committed to the
Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., No. 16-10502, 2017 WL 1379453, at *9 (5th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990)).
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discretion of the district court, and that discretion is not cabined by the
heightened standards for reconsideration’ governing final orders.’” 2
B. Motion for Leave to Appeal
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, a court can allow for interlocutory appeal
of orders without directing entry of a final judgment on the order.
For an
interlocutory order to be appealable pursuant § 1292(b), three conditions must
be satisfied. The trial judge must certify in writing that the order: (1) involves
a controlling question of law, (2) substantial ground for difference of opinion
on that question of law exists, and (3) immediate appeal from the order may
“materially advance the ultimate termination of [the] litigation.” 3 The moving
party carries the burden of showing the necessity of interlocutory appeal. 4
Interlocutory appeals are “exceptional” and should not be granted “simply to
determine the correctness of a judgment.” 5
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motions for Reconsideration
The question before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was
whether prescription began to run on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for Brady
violations when his conviction was vacated or when prosecutors dismissed the
charges against him. In a consolidated oral argument in this case and a matter
raising identical issues, the Court gave the following reasons on the record:
2
2011)).
Id. (quoting Saint Annes Dev. Co. v. Trabich, 443 Fed. Appx. 829, 831–32 (4th Cir.
28 U.S.C. § 1292.
Chauvin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Nos. 06-7145, 06-8769, 2007 WL
4365387, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2007).
5 Id. (quoting Clark-Dietz & Assocs.-Eng’rs, Inc. v. Basic Constr. Co., 702 F.2d 67, 68–
69 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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As the parties know, the 1983 statute provides no federal
statute of limitations, and so the courts have directed the courts to
look to the statute of limitations provided in state law. However,
the accrual date for determination of the commencement of that
statute is governed by federal law conforming to common law
principles. And this is Wallace v. Kato, which provides that accrual
occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of
action.
Clearly Louisiana has a one year statute of limitation; the
only question before this Court, in both of the cases, is the date in
which the statute accrued. This Court believes that we are directed
to look to the question as to what is the most analogous common
law tort. In this case, and in virtually all of the cases that this
Court has read, is that that is the malicious prosecution. The
courts look to malicious prosecution.
In Louisiana, in order to show a valid malicious prosecution
claim, there are six factors that must be presented: First, a
commencement or continuance of an original criminal judicial
proceeding; two, its legal causation by the present defendant in the
original proceeding; third, a bona fide termination; four, the
absence of probable cause for the proceeding; five, the presence of
malice therein; and six, damages.
The Supreme Court, Louisiana Supreme Court just in 2015
in Lemoine v. Wolfe said: A cause of action does not accrue until a
bona fide termination and a nolle prossed [prosequi] constitutes a
bona fide termination. The Court also looks to the Fifth Circuit
case of Brandley v. Keeshan for that. Accordingly, in both of the
cases, that is in Morgan v. Cannizzaro, Action No. 17-05319 and
Jones v. Cannizzaro, 18-503, the Court finds that the cases have
not prescribed and may proceed.
Defendant argues that this Court committed manifest error in looking to state
law to determine when Plaintiff’s claim accrued. Defendant correctly points out
that “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law
that is not resolved by reference to state law” and that “[a]spects of § 1983
which are not governed by reference to state law are governed by federal rules
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conforming in general to common-law tort principles.” 6 Defendant has not,
however, shown how the common law principles of the accrual of a malicious
prosecution claim differ from the state law accrual principles cited by this
Court. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has stated that, “[A] malicious prosecution
claim only accrues once the criminal charges are dismissed.” 7 Defendant
instead rehashes arguments already considered and rejected by this Court.
Accordingly, this Court declines Defendant’s invitation to reconsider its
holding.
B. Motion for Leave to Appeal
Defendant next asks this Court to certify its denial of their Motions to
Dismiss on prescription grounds for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292. In order to do so, the Court must certify that the appeal (1) involves a
controlling question of law, (2) substantial ground for difference of opinion on
that question of law exists, and (3) immediate appeal from the order may
“materially advance the ultimate termination of [the] litigation.” 8
Defendant’s request for certification fails the second prong of this test.
In support of his argument that there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion, Defendant cites to a decision by the Eighth Circuit rejecting the
finding reached by this Court, as well as a Fifth Circuit decision that has been
vacated. This Court and the Fifth Circuit are bound by the decisions of the
Supreme Court and earlier panels of the Fifth Circuit. Even if other circuits
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).
Aly v. City of Lake Jackson, 453 F. App’x 538, 539 (5th Cir. 2011).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
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may come to a different conclusion, there is no substantial ground for
difference of opinion here.
The Supreme Court has expressly held that the accrual date of a § 1983
claim are governed by federal rules conforming to common-law tort principles
and occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action. 9 “It
is necessary, then, to first determine the common law ‘tort [that] provides the
proper analogy to the cause of action asserted.’” 10 The Supreme Court has held
that “[t]he common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution provides the
closest analogy to claims” arising out of the failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence. 11 It has further held that “a cause of action for malicious prosecution
does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in the
plaintiff’s favor.” 12 Accordingly, this Court’s decision was governed by Supreme
Court precedent, and there is no substantial ground for disagreement such that
an interlocutory appeal is warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motions are DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 28th day of August, 2018.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (2007).
Aly, 453 F. App’x at 539 (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388).
11 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994).
12 Id.
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