Andrews v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
Filing
46
ORDER AND REASONS denying 23 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 5/16/19. (sbs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
VICTOR ANDREWS,
Plaintiff
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 18-587
ILLINOIS CENTRAL
RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendant
SECTION: “E” (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability
for his on-the-job injuries, filed by Plaintiff Victor Andrews.1 Defendant Illinois Central
Railroad Company, doing business as CN Railroad, (“CN Railroad”) opposes.2 For the
reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.
BACKGROUND
On April 9, 2016, Plaintiff was working as a conductor for Defendant CN Railroad
on a train traveling from Jackson, Mississippi to New Orleans, Louisiana.3 His duties
included applying handbrakes on railcars.4 While Plaintiff was attempting to secure a
handbrake, the brake stopped turning.5 Plaintiff alleges this jolted his body and caused
pain in his arm and shoulder.6 He alleges the handbrake malfunction caused him to
“sustain injuries to his neck, shoulder, spine, and about his body.”7
R. Doc. 23.
R. Doc. 32, amending R. Doc. 27.
3 R. Doc. 23-7 at 1, ¶ 1; R. Doc. 32-1 at 1, ¶ 1.
4 R. Doc. 23-7 at 1, ¶ 4; R. Doc. 32-1 at 2, ¶ 4.
5 R. Doc. 23-7 at 1–2, ¶¶ 5–6; R. Doc. 32-1 at 2, ¶¶ 5–6.
6 R. Doc. 23-7 at 2, ¶¶ 6–9.
7 R. Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ 6.
1
2
1
On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Complaint8 pursuant to the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA).9 He alleges Defendant CN Railroad was negligent and
that it violated the Safety Appliance Act (SAA).10
On January 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant motion.11 He moves for summary
judgment “on the issue of liability, leaving only the issue of damages for jury
determination.”12 Plaintiff states Defendant violated a provision of the SAA that provides,
“a railroad carrier may use or allow to be used on any of its railroad lines . . . a vehicle only
if it is equipped with . . . efficient hand brakes.”13 Plaintiff argues he is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on liability for his injuries because he was an employee of Defendant,
Defendant violated the SAA, and the violation caused his injury. 14 In its opposition,
Defendant admits Plaintiff was its employee and that it committed a “technical violation
of the [SAA] regarding the handbrake.”15 However, Defendant argues there are genuine
issues of material fact with respect to the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.16
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”17 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” 18
When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the
R. Doc. 1.
45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
10 49 U.S.C. § 20302.
11 R. Doc. 23.
12 Id. at 1.
13 49 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(1)(B).
14 R. Doc. 23-6 at 8–9.
15 R. Doc. 32 at 5; R. Doc. 32-1 at 3, ¶ 15.
16 R. Doc. 32 at 4–6.
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
18 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).
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evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”19 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.20
There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.21
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of
[the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
To satisfy Rule 56’s burden of production, the moving party must do one of two things:
“the moving party may submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of
the nonmoving party’s claim” or “the moving party may demonstrate to the Court that the
nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s claim.” If the moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must
be denied. If the moving party successfully carries this burden, the burden of production
then shifts to the non-moving party to direct the Court’s attention to something in the
pleadings or other evidence in the record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish
that a genuine issue of material fact does indeed exist. 22
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008); see
also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).
20 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
21 Hibernia Nat’l. Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Horwell
Energy, Inc., 969 F.2d 146, 147–48 (5th Cir. 1992)).
22 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24.
19
3
ANALYSIS
“Under FELA, an injured railroad employee may recover damages for ‘injury or
death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence’ of the railroad.”23 The Fifth Circuit
has explained:
FELA provides the exclusive remedy for a railroad employee
engaged in interstate commerce whose injury resulted from
the negligence of the railroad. . . . A railroad is charged with
providing a reasonably safe work environment for its
employees. Negligence within the meaning of FELA exists if
the defendant railroad knew, or by the exercise of due care
should have known that its conduct was inadequate to protect
the plaintiff and similarly situated employees. . . . The cause
of action is one for negligence, which requires proof of breach
of a standard of care, causation, and damages. If an injury has
multiple causes, it is sufficient if the railroad's negligence
played a part—no matter how small—in bringing about the
injury.24
The SAA “did not create a federal cause of action for either employees or
nonemployees seeking damages for injuries resulting from a railroad's violation of the
Act,” but railroad employees may bring suit under FELA.25 In FELA actions brought by
railroad employees alleging SAA violations, “the injured employee is required to prove
only the statutory violation and thus is relieved of the burden of proving negligence. He
is not required to prove common-law proximate causation but only that his injury resulted
in whole or in part from the railroad's violation of the Act.”26
In his Complaint, Plaintiff makes factual allegations about only one incident
occurring on April 9, 2016—the incident involving the handbrake malfunction.27 Plaintiff
Huffman v. Union Pac. R.R., 675 F.3d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51).
Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
25 Crane v. Cedar Rapids & I. C. Ry. Co., 395 U.S. 164, 166 (1969); see also Nivens v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co.,
425 F.2d 114, 121 n.3 (5th Cir. 1970).
26 Id.
27 R. Doc. 1.
23
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alleges the handbrake malfunction caused him to “sustain injuries to his neck, shoulder,
spine, and about his body.”28 In the instant motion, Plaintiff states the handbrake incident
caused him “pain in his arm and shoulder area,” but he kept working.29 He states that,
“just a few minutes later[,] he bent over to align a railroad switch. As he did so, he felt a
jolting pain that was not only in his arm and shoulder, but extended down his neck into
his back.”30 Plaintiff asserts it is an undisputed fact that Plaintiff’s “doctors have testified
that [his] injuries and resulting restrictions were caused, at least in part, by his attempt
to apply the defective handbrake.”31 Plaintiff argues that, because the defective handbrake
was in violation of the SAA, he has shown all of his injuries resulted in whole or in part
from Defendant’s SAA violation.32 He argues he is entitled to partial summary judgment
on the issue of liability.33
In response, Defendant admits it violated the SAA in connection with the
handbrake, but argues summary judgment is not warranted because some of Plaintiff’s
injuries resulted not from the incident with the handbrake, but from a separate incident
with a track switch occurring the same night.34 Defendant asserts there are genuine issues
of material fact about which of Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by each incident.35
Defendant points to the deposition testimony of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Rahul
Vohra,36 that Plaintiff has two different medical conditions: a right elbow strain and a
degenerative condition in his lumbar spine.37 Defendant asserts, based on Dr. Vohra’s
Id. at 2, ¶ 6.
R. Doc. 23-6 at 3.
30 Id.
31 R. Doc. 23-7 at 3, ¶ 13.
32 R. Doc. 23-6 at 9.
33 Id.
34 R. Doc. 32 at 4–6.
35 R. Doc. 32-1 at 3–4, ¶¶ 16–22.
36 R. Doc. 32-3.
37 R. Doc. 32-1 at 4, ¶ 18.
28
29
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testimony, the conditions may have had two separate causative events, and the spine
condition more likely than not resulted entirely from the track switch incident.38
Defendant also cites the testimony of Dr. William McCraney,39 the treating physician for
Plaintiff’s right elbow strain, who testified that he would have expected Plaintiff to return
to work from the elbow strain within one and a half months of the injury.40 “[I]t is for the
jury to decide whether any, and if any what, weight is to be given to the testimony” of
expert witnesses.41
The parties agree the SAA does not apply to track switches.42 Defendant has cited
evidence in the record to show there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether all
of Plaintiff’s injuries resulted, in whole or in part, from the handbrake incident or whether
some of his injuries resulted solely from the track switch incident. As a result, the Court
finds Plaintiff has not shown he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of
liability as to all of his injuries. The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of liability.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of liability, filed by Plaintiff Victor Andrews, be and hereby is
DENIED.43
Id. at ¶¶ 19–20.
R. Doc. 32-4.
40 R. Doc. 32-1 at 4–5, ¶ 22.
41 Sartor v. Ark. Nat. Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944).
42 R. Doc. 45 at 8, ¶ 7(j).
43 R. Doc. 23.
38
39
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the request for oral argument on Plaintiff’s
motion, filed by Defendant Illinois Central Railroad Company, be and hereby is DENIED
AS MOOT.44
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 16th day of May, 2019.
_____________________ __________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
44
R. Doc. 28.
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