Williams v. Lowe et al
Filing
25
ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that the 23 objections are OVERRULED and the Magistrate Judge's 22 Report and Recommendation are ADOPTED as the Court's opinion, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 3/13/2019.(jls)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
EDDIE JAMES WILLIAMS
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 18-916
DET. DAVID LOWE, ET AL.
SECTION: “B”(1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the court are Plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation granting Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff’s claims (Rec. Doc. 23),
and Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s objections (Rec. Doc. 24).
For the reasons discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that the objections (Rec. Doc. 23) are OVERRULED
and the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation are ADOPTED
as the Court’s opinion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 11, 2017, Plaintiff was arrested by the Jefferson
Parish Sheriff’s Office. See Rec. Doc. 22 and 24-1. On September
15,
2017,
Plaintiff
was
charged
in
two
separate
bills
of
information. See Rec. Doc. 17-1. On April 9, 2018, Plaintiff pled
guilty to reckless operation of a motor vehicle, resisting arrest,
and battery on a peace officer causing injury. See Rec. Doc. 17-6
at 1. Subsequently, on April 11, 2018, Plaintiff also pled guilty
to illegal possession of prescription narcotics, possession of
1
heroin, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. See id. at
6.
On January 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his constitutional
rights were violated when the defendants used excessive force
during Plaintiff’s arrest. See Rec. Doc. 1. According to Plaintiff,
Defendants Detectives Lowe and Wiebelt approached his car with
their guns drawn, punched him in the right eye, busted a vessel,
and kicked and punched him multiple times while on the ground. See
id.
On
June
14,
2018,
Defendants
filed
a
motion
to
dismiss
Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(c) or alternatively, for summary judgment pursuant to F.R.C.P.
56. Rec. Doc. 17. On August 24, 2018, Magistrate Judge Janis Van
Meerveld reviewed Defendants’ motion for summary judgment1 and
recommended it be granted and Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed with
prejudice. See Rec. Doc. 22 at 4.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
Although Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(c), or,
alternatively, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Magistrate Judge
Meerveld construed it as a motion for summary judgment, because Defendants
presented matters outside the pleadings. See Rec. Doc. 22 at 1 n.2.
1
2
to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A genuine
issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
When
the
movant
bears
the
burden
of
proof,
it
must
“demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” using
competent summary judgment evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. But
“where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the
movant may merely point to an absence of evidence.” Lindsey v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994). When the
movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who
must show by “competent summary judgment evidence” that there is
a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Lindsey, 16
F.3d
at
618.
Conclusory
statements,
speculation,
and
unsubstantiated assertions are not enough for the non-movant party
to
meet
his
or
her
burden.
See
Eaton-Stephens
v.
Grapevine
Colleyville Indep. Sch. Dist., 715 F. App’x 351, 353 (5th Cir.
2017).
To determine whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact, the court must determine if Plaintiff’s claims are barred
under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). If they are, then
summary judgment is appropriate as there are no genuine issues of
3
material fact. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner may
not bring a § 1983 suit if judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
“imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512
U.S. at 487. See also Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 798 (5th
Cir. 2000).
In
order
to
recover
damages
for
allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called into question by
a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
The Heck court found that this policy avoids duplicate litigation
and conflicting results arising out of the same or identical
transaction. See id. at 484. “The Heck doctrine bars the court
from entertaining a suit for damages under § 1983 where such claims
would
necessarily
undermine
the
validity
of
the
state
court
criminal conviction.” Curran v. Aleshire, 67 F. Supp. 3d 741, 747
(E.D. La. 2014) (citing Buckenberger v. Reed, 342 F. App’x 58, 61
(5th Cir. 2009)). However, a claim would not be barred by Heck if
the facts underlying the state criminal court conviction are
“temporally and conceptually distinct from the excessive force
claim.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2008).
In Curran, the court found that the plaintiff’s excessive
force claims were not Heck-barred. See Curran, 67 F. Supp. 3d at
4
750. In that case, the plaintiff battered the defendant outside of
the school’s auditorium, which led the defendant to later push the
plaintiff against a wall and place her in handcuffs. Id. at 749.
Then, while the defendant was bringing the plaintiff to another
room, the defendant again pushed the plaintiff against a wall in
the hallway. Id. The defendant argued that Plaintiff’s excessive
force claims were barred under Heck, because such claims would
undermine the validity of her adjudication for battery of a police
officer. See id. at 747. However, the court disagreed and found
that the incidents underlying Plaintiff’s excessive force claims
took place after the battery of the officer. Id. at 750. There was
no evidence that the plaintiff was attempting to flee, evade
arrest, or resist arrest when she was subjected to excessive force.
Id. Because the charged crime, the battery of a police officer,
was over at the time of Defendant’s use of force, the plaintiff
was permitted to bring her excessive force claims. Id.
On the other hand, in Buckenberger, the court found that
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim was barred not only by Heck, but
also by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d
868 (5th Cir. 1996). See Buckenberger, 342 F. App’x at 64. In
Buckenberger, the plaintiff kicked, spat at, and threatened the
police officer as the officer attempted to place the plaintiff in
handcuffs. Id. at 60. The plaintiff pled guilty to battery;
however, following his conviction, the plaintiff alleged that the
5
officer used excessive force in his arrest. Id. The court found
that because self-defense is a justification defense to battery of
an officer, an excessive force claim against the arresting officer,
if proved, would imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s arrest
and conviction for battery of an officer. Id. (citing Hudson v.
Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996)). Therefore, the court
dismissed the plaintiff’s excessive force claim as barred by the
court’s holding in Hudson.
In the present case, Plaintiff was charged with battery upon
a police officer, specifically, Detectives David Lowe and John
Wiebelt, and entered a plea of guilty. See Rec. Docs. 17-5 at 7
and 17-6 at 1. In Plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate’s Report
and Recommendation, Plaintiff asserts that his guilty plea to
battery of a police officer was in connection with another officer,
and not the named defendants in the present case. See Rec. Doc.
23. However, a review of the state record shows that count 3 of
the bill of information, which charges Plaintiff with battery of
a police officer and to which Plaintiff pled guilty, specifically
names the defendants Detectives Lowe and Wiebelt. See Rec. Docs.
17-5 at 7, 17-6 at 1. Thus, Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit
and contradicted by the state court record.
In
addition,
like
the
plaintiff
in
Buckenberger,
the
plaintiff in the present case pled guilty to battery of a police
officer. Thus, Plaintiff is barred from seeking damages for alleged
6
excessive force by the same officers against whom Plaintiff pled
guilty to committing battery. In Louisiana, self-defense is a
justification defense to the crime of battery. The defendant, who
is charged with battery, must show that his use of force “was both
reasonable and necessary to prevent a forcible offense against
him.” Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversed
on different grounds). Like the court found in Buckenberger, a
self-defense justification to a charge of battery upon a police
officer would potentially undermine the plaintiff’s arrest and
conviction for battery. This is because self-defense raises the
questions of whether the police used reasonable force, the degree
to which the defendant resisted, and whether the defendant was
justified
in
defendant’s
resisting.
convictions
See
for
id.
battery
This
of
would
a
undermine
police
officer
the
and
resisting arrest. However, the plaintiff in the instant case did
not raise the issue of self-defense in the state court proceedings;
he did not argue that Defendants’ use of force was unreasonable
and that his response was justified.
Lastly, unlike the plaintiff in Curran, Plaintiff does not
present summary judgment type evidence that the excessive force
occurred after the completion of the battery of the officer. The
police reports state that officers restrained Plaintiff as he
resisted arrest and battered the officers. See Rec. Doc. 17-4.
Plaintiff was charged based on those facts with battery of a police
7
officer, and then entered a guilty plea. See Rec. Docs. 17-5, 176. In signing a guilty plea, Plaintiff admitted the charges brought
against him were true. Plaintiff’s conclusory and unsubstantiated
allegations, all in contradiction to his state court plea,
to show that a genuine issue exists as
to
whether
the
fail
alleged
excessive force occurred after his battery of the officers.
Thus, because Plaintiff has offered no evidence that the facts
surrounding
his
conviction
are
“temporally
and
conceptually
distinct from the excessive force claim,” and that his conviction
has either been reversed or declared invalid, Plaintiff’s claims
are barred under Heck.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of March, 2019.
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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