Champagne v. Martin et al

Filing 47

ORDER DENYING 30 Motion to Dismiss Case or, alternatively, MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Wendy B Vitter on 7/29/2019. (jeg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

AMBER CHAMPAGNE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO:

WILEY MARTIN

SECTION: “D”(5)

18-1785

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Wiley Martin’s Motion to Dismiss, or
alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 30) and Plaintiff Amber
Champagne’s Response in Opposition (R. Doc. 37). After careful consideration of the
parties’ memoranda and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion
(R. Doc. 30).
Background
This is an excessive force case. Plaintiff Amber Champagne (“Champagne”)
alleges claims against Defendant Wiley Martin (“Martin”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 “as
it relates to actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and by 28 U.S.C. § 1331” and
“state claims.”1 Champagne originally filed suit against the Lutcher Police
Department, the Town of Lutcher, the St. James Sheriff Department, and Martin in
his capacity as Sheriff.2 Champagne

voluntarily

dismissed

against all defendants, with the sole exception of Martin.

1 R.

Doc. 1, p. 2.
Docs. 1-8.
3 R. Doc. 30-1, p. 3
2 R.

her

claims

Defendant alleges that Officer Robinson approached Champagne outside of a
residence on the basis of outstanding warrants pending against her.3 Champagne’s
boyfriend, Jason Malbrough, allegedly interjected and asked Officer Robinson
to leave.4 At some point, the plaintiff entered the residence.5 Officer Robinson then
called for back-up.6 Sergeant Dustin Tomlinson and Deputy Raymond Marzilli of
the St. James Parish Sheriff’s Office arrived to assist Officer Robinson. 7
Champagne contends that the officers entered her home without warrant or
warning and tackled her, throwing her against the floor.8 She recounts that an
officer placed a knee to her back, fracturing

her

right

shoulder. 9 Defendant

alleges that Sergeant Tomlinson earlier advised Champagne that she had active
warrants and that she was being placed under arrest.10 The defense contends that
Champagne then fled to the rear of the residence and was taken to the ground
by Sergeant Tomlinson.11 The officers claim that Champagne resisted arrest.12
In addition to the active warrants, Champagne was charged with resisting an
officer in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:108.13 Champagne states that
she complained of pain to her right shoulder while she was in jail. 14 She claims she
was taken to St. James Parish Hospital where x-rays were taken and a comminuted
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 R.

Doc. 1, p. 3.

9 Id.
10 R.

Doc. 30-1, p. 3.

11 Id.
12 Id.
13 R.
14 R.

Doc. 30-1, pp. 3-4.
Doc. 1, p. 3.
2

nondisplaced fracture of the greater tuberosity was confirmed.15 She sues for pain
and suffering related to her arrest.16
Analysis
Martin, in his official capacity as Sheriff of St. James Parish, moves for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).18 He argues that any
claims arising out of Champagne’s arrest, including excessive force, are barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).19 Martin also contends that no alleged
constitutional deprivation was motivated by official policy so as to subject him to
liability under federal law.20
A. Procedure
Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are
closed:21 “[T]he central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
the complaint states a valid claim for relief.”22 Pleadings should be construed
liberally, and judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if material facts are not

15 Id.
16 R.

Doc. 1, pp. 3-4.
Doc. 30.
19 R. Doc. 30-1, p. 1.
20 Id.
21 Hughes v. Tobacco Institute, Inc. 278 F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
22 Id., citing St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 440 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2000).
18 R.

3

in dispute and questions of law are all that remain.23 In ruling, courts are confined to
the pleadings and must accept all allegations contained therein as true.24
Courts have articulated different tests for deciding Rule 12(c) motions,
depending on the motion’s purpose. When the motion seeks a merits disposition of
the dispute, courts apply the Rule 56 summary judgment inquiry, asking whether the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because no genuine dispute exists
as to any material fact.25 Alternatively, when the motion seeks only to press a Rule
12 defense, courts apply the Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry, asking whether the contested
pleading succeeded in alleging a “plausible” claim for relief or in stating a legal
defense.26 In the case at hand, Martin states that he moves to dismiss Champagne’s
claims against him pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) under both inquiries.27 The Court
applies the summary judgment inquiry to determine whether material facts are in
dispute.
Martin attaches as exhibits to his motion (R. Doc. 30) the Lutcher Police
Department Report (R. Doc. 30-4), the Notice of Court Appearance (R. Doc. 30-5),
Minutes of Champagne’s Arraignment (R. Doc. 30-6), and the Final Disposition
Report (R. Doc. 30-7). Champagne rejoins that Martin has presented evidence

23 See

Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998).
278 F.3d at 420.
25 See Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Ota Corp., 875 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2017); Hindel v. Husted, 875
F.3d 344, 347 (6th Cir. 20147).
26 See In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 893 F.3d 1047, 1056 (8th Cir. 2018).
27 R. Doc. 30.
4
24 Hughes,

outside the pleadings, specifically court records and police report.28 She argues that
the Court should treat Martin’s motion as a motion for summary judgment under
Rule 56, arguing that the Court cannot consider matters outside the pleadings
without such a conversion.29 Rule 12(d) provides that
If, on a motion under 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given
a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to
the motion. [Emphasis added.]
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). However, courts may consider publicly available documents at
the Rule 12 stage.30 The police and court documents Martin attached as exhibits
to his motion are public records.31 Therefore, the motion does not convert to a Rule
56 Motion.32
B. Heck v. Humphrey and Section 1983 Claims
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for plaintiffs who have suffered abuses at the
hand of an official acting under the color of law.33 It is an alternative method of
protection in federal court when an administrator of state law fails to provide the
protections granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.34

28 R.

Doc. 37, p. 3.

29 Id.
30 Van

Duzer v. United States Bank Nat. Ass’n, 582 Fed. App’x 279, 283 (5th Cir. 2014).
v. Jackson, 608 So.2d 949, 957 (La. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. § 44:3(A)(1), (A)(4).
32 See Van Duzer, 582 Fed. App’x at 283-84.
33 Singleton v. Champagne, 2019 WL 917728, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2019)(internal citation omitted).
34 Id.
31 State

5

Martin contends that Heck bars Champagne’s claims.35 In Heck, an inmate
brought a § 1983 action against county prosecutors and a state police investigator,
alleging that his conviction violated his constitutional rights.36 In Heck, the Supreme
Court held that to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.37
Martin also cites Hudson as support for the contention that Champagne’s
excessive force claim is barred.38 In Hudson v. Hughes, the Fifth Circuit found that
Heck precluded the plaintiff’s excessive force claim.39 In Hudson, the plaintiff was
arrested and convicted of battery of an officer.40 The Fifth Circuit determined that
Hudson was barred from bringing a § 1983 claim of excessive force because in
Louisiana, self-defense is a justification defense to the crime of battery of an officer:41
“To make out a justification defense, the criminal defendant charged with battery of
an officer must show that his use of force against an officer was both reasonable and

35 R.

Doc. 30-1, p. 1.
U.S. 477 (1994).
37 Id. at 486-87.
38 R. Doc. 30-1, p. 9.
39 98 F. 3d 868 (5th Cir. 1996).
40 Hudson, 98 F.3d at 873.
41 Id., citing LA. REV. STAT. § 14:19 and La. v. Blancaneaux, 535 So. 2d 1341 (La. Ct. App.
1988)(discussing justification defense to battery of officer conviction)).
6
36 512

necessary to prevent a forcible offense against himself.”42 Therefore, the court found
that if the plaintiff’s claim of excessive force was proved, it would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his arrest and conviction for battery of an officer.43
However, in Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, the Fifth Circuit noted that Heck
does not act as a bar to all excessive force claims.44
By proving an excessive force claim, a plaintiff will not invariably
invalidate his conviction. See Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th
Cir.1996). Other circuits have emphasized the conceptual difference
between an excessive force claim and a challenge to a conviction. Both
the Ninth and Third Circuits have indicated that an excessive force
claim would not necessarily challenge a plaintiff's conviction for assault
during a stop. Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir.1997);
Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir.1996).
Id. The court went on to discuss how certain convictions prevent a plaintiff
from bringing an excessive force claim, offering the charge of aggravated assault on
a police officer as an example.45 Whether Heck bars a § 1983 plaintiff from bringing
a claim “depends on the nature of the offense and of the claim.”46
In Arnold, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s excessive force claim
violated Heck.47 Like Champagne, the plaintiff was convicted of resisting an officer.48

42 Hudson,

98 F.3d at 873 (internal citation omitted).
(“This is true because the question whether the police applied reasonable force in arresting him
depends in part on the degree of his resistance, which in turn will place in issue whether his resistance
(the basis of his conviction for assaulting a police officer) was justified, which, if it were, necessarily
undermines that conviction.”). Id.
44 100 Fed. App’x. 321, 323 (5th Cir. 2004).
45 Id., citing Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000); Sapping v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234,
237 (5th Cir. 1999).
46 Arnold, 100 Fed. App’x. at 323.
47 Id. at 325.
48 Id. at 324.
7
43 Id.

However, the plaintiff in Arnold contended that he did nothing wrong to provoke
the officer’s actions.49 The plaintiff’s complaint did not state that he made any
threats or initiated any physical confrontation.50 During his deposition, he testified
that he never attempted to strike any of the officers, never threatened any of them
and, in fact, never resisted their attempts to arrest him:51
Thus, Arnold's claims are not that the police used excessive force after
he stopped resisting arrest or even that the officers used excessive and
unreasonable force to stop his resistance. Instead, Arnold claims that he
did nothing wrong, but was viciously attacked for no reason. He provides
no alternative pleading or theory of recovery.
Id. If a finding of liability would necessarily entail the invalidity of Champagne’s
criminal conviction for resisting arrest, her § 1983 claim is barred by Heck.
Champagne confirms in her Response in Opposition that the “difference between
the present case and Heck [sic] is that the unlawfulness of the actions alleged by
plaintiff would not render her conviction or sentence of [resisting] arrest invalid.”52
Like the plaintiff in Arnold, Champagne was convicted of resisting an officer,
in violation of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:108, which provides that
A. Resisting an officer is the intentional interference with, opposition
or resistance to, or obstruction of an individual acting in his official
capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest, lawful
detention, or seizure of property or to serve any lawful process or court
order when the offender knows or has reason to know that the person
arresting, detaining, seizing property, or serving process is acting in his
official capacity.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 R.

Doc. 37.
8

B. (1) The phrase “obstruction of” as used herein shall, in addition to its
common meaning, signification, and connotation mean the following:
(a) Flight by one sought to be arrested before the arresting officer can
restrain him and after notice is given that he is under arrest.
(b) Any violence toward or any resistance or opposition to the
arresting officer after the arrested party is actually placed under arrest
and before he is incarcerated in jail.
Id. Champagne’s complaint does not allege that her conviction violates her
constitutional rights. In fact, she neither discusses her conviction, nor alleges in her
Complaint whether she did or did not resist arrest.53 Instead, she alleges only that
the force used to subdue her was excessive.54 Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts,
attached to her Response in Opposition, states that she did not attempt to evade the
officers or run from them and that she did not fight with the “sheriff officers” in the
home.55 To the extent that Champagne alleges she did not resist arrest, her excessive
force claim is barred by Heck. Her claim is not barred if she does not allege facts
that contradict or undermine her conviction. Therefore, in the interest of fairness,
the Court permits Champagne to proceed on her claim only if she does not
contradict her conviction by alleging that she did not resist or that her resistance
was justified.56
As to the issue of lawful arrest, Martin notes that Champagne does not
expressly allege a claim for warrantless search of, or entry into, the residence,

53 See

R. Doc. 1.
Doc. 1, p. 4.
55 See R. Doc. 37-1.
56 See Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 146 (3rd Cir. 1997); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952-53
(9th Cir. 1996)(finding that Heck did not bar the plaintiff’s excessive force claim because the plaintiff
maintained that defendants used force far greater than that required for his arrest and out of
proportion to the threat which he posed to the defendants).
9
54 R.

“however, she does loosely contend that ‘three St. James Sheriff’s Deputies entered
the home without a warrant or warning and tackled Ms. Champagne in the kitchen
throwing her against the floor.’”57 To the extent that Champagne alleges unlawful
entry into her home such that her conviction is unlawful, her claim is barred by
Heck.58
Without citing support, Martin states that under Louisiana law, a person is
justified in resisting an unlawful arrest.59 Therefore, he reasons, “there is no question
that a finding of liability for use of excessive force would necessarily imply the
invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction. That is, by finding that the simple act of tackling
Plaintiff to end her flight from and resistance to arrest was excessive, the Court would
necessarily imply that Plaintiff was not resisting a lawful arrest.”60 Martin states,
“It is uncontested that the Officers were authorized to utilize whatever force was
necessary to overcome Plaintiff’s resistance. La. C. Cr. P. art 220.” [Emphasis added.]
However, LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. 220 specifically states that the “person making a
lawful arrest may use reasonable force to effect the arrest and detention, . . . .”
[Emphasis added.]
The crux of the case at hand is whether the force used to overcome
Champagne’s resistance was reasonable. The Court therefore finds that a finding of
excessive force in this case is distinct from Champagne’s conviction for resisting
57 R.

Doc. 30-1, p. 8.
Cougle v. Cnty of DeSoto, Miss., 303 Fed. App’x. 164, 165 (5th Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Bradford,
72 Fed. App’x. 98, 99 (5th Cir. 2003).
59 R. Doc. 30-1, p. 10.
60 Id.
10
58 See

arrest.61 In other words, if plaintiff is successful in this claim in proving excessive
force, that

finding

does

not

necessarily

negate

plaintiff's

conviction for

resisting arrest. The Court does not believe that Plaintiff’s guilty plea to resisting
arrest automatically bars a § 1983 challenge for use of excessive force.
Viewing facts, resolving doubts, and drawing reasonable inferences in the
non-movant’s favor, the Court finds that Champagne has raised genuine issues
of material fact.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Wiley Martin’s Motion (R. Doc.
30) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this

29th day of July, 2019.

WENDY B. VITTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

61 See

Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 100 Fed. App’x. 321, 322 (5th Cir. 2004); Smithart v. Towery, 79
F.3d 951, 952-53 (9th Cir. 1996)(reasoning that the plaintiff’s claim that officers used force far greater
than that required for his arrest is conceptually distinct from his conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon, and that a successful suit on the former would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the
11

latter).

11