Gantt v. Seadrill Americas, Inc. et al

Filing 64

ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 37 ) is GRANTED. Terry Gantt's claims against LLOG Bluewater Holdings, LLC and LLOG Exploration Offshore, LLC are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on 12/21/2018. (sa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TERRY GANTT

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 18-2569

SEADRILL AMERICAS, INC., ET AL.

SECTION I

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is defendants LLOG Bluewater Holdings, LLC (“LLOG
Bluewater”) and LLOG Exploration Offshore, LLC’s (“LLOG Exploration”)
(collectively, the “LLOG defendants”) motion 1 for summary judgment. For the
following reasons, the motion is granted.
I.
This case arises out of injuries plaintiff Terry Gantt (“Gantt”) allegedly
suffered when responding to a fire that broke out in an air handling unit on board the
M/V WEST NEPTUNE (the “vessel”) in March 2015. 2 Because the complaint does not
specify which claims pertain to which defendants, the LLOG defendants’ motion
addresses all of the claims for relief listed in the complaint. In his opposition, Gantt
clarified that he is only pursuing general maritime negligence claims against the
LLOG defendants. 3 Therefore, the Court will not consider the LLOG defendants’
arguments as to Gantt’s Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims. 4
R. Doc. No. 37.
See R. Doc. No. 44, at 1.
3 Id. at 9 n.12.
4 The LLOG defendants assert that LLOG Exploration was not involved in the
operations being performed on the vessel and that it is, therefore, an improper
1
2

On the date of the March 2015 fire, Gantt was working aboard the vessel as an
assistant crane operator employed by defendant Seadrill Americas, Inc. (“Seadrill
Americas”). 5 According to Gantt’s account of the subject incident, the air handling
unit’s filter material came into contact with the unit’s heater elements, resulting in
a fire because there was no physical barrier preventing such contact. 6 Gantt alleges
that he was one of the crew members who responded to the fire. 7
The LLOG defendants state that the vessel was operating on a federal oil and
gas lease block as a result of a contract (the “daywork drilling contract”) between
LLOG Bluewater, the leaseholder, and Seadrill Deepwater Contracting, Ltd.
(“Seadrill Deepwater”), the drilling contractor. 8 Pursuant to the daywork drilling
contract, Seadrill Deepwater—which is not a party to this lawsuit—was to furnish
the vessel, as well as the drilling equipment, insurance, and personnel. 9 It is
uncontested that the LLOG defendants had no ownership interest in the vessel. 10
Rather, the vessel was owned by Seadrill Neptune Hungary Kft. (“Seadrill

defendant. R. Doc. No. 37-2, at 2 n.5. However, apart from this motion for summary
judgment, the LLOG defendants have not moved for LLOG Exploration’s dismissal.
5 Id.; R. Doc. No. 37-2, at 2.
6 R. Doc. No. 44, at 1.
7 Id.
8 R. Doc. No. 37-2, at 2; R. Doc. No. 37-8, at 1. Seadrill Deepwater eventually assigned
the daywork drilling contract to another Seadrill entity, Seadrill Gulf Operations
Neptune, LLC. R. Doc. No. 37-8, at 57; R. Doc. No. 37-3, at 2. However, because other
contracts that are relevant to resolving the present motion refer to Seadrill
Deepwater as the contractor with respect to the daywork drilling contract, the Court
will use “Seadrill Deepwater” herein to refer to the contractor.
9 R. Doc. No. 37-8, at 1.
10 R. Doc. No. 37-1, at 2; R. Doc. No. 44-6, at 1.
2

Neptune”). 11 Gantt alleges that the LLOG defendants, as the leaseholder party to the
daywork drilling contract, “held all rights and obligations.” 12 He seeks to hold the
LLOG defendants liable under a theory of general maritime negligence. 13
II.
Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, the Court determines
that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “[A] party
seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record]
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment need
not produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact; it need only point out
the absence of evidence supporting the other party’s case. Id.; see also Fontenot v.
Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir. 1986).
Once the party seeking summary judgment carries its burden, the nonmoving
party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute
of material fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
R. Doc. No. 37-2, at 2; see also R. Doc. No. 44, at 8–9. This Seadrill entity is distinct
from the Seadrill Neptune entity discussed in footnote 8. In a November 28, 2018
telephone conference, counsel for all parties explained that Seadrill Neptune, Seadrill
Deepwater, and Seadrill Americas are separate entities. Confusingly, the parties
have yet to explain the relationship between Seadrill Deepwater, which was required
to furnish the vessel under the contract, and Seadrill Neptune, which owned the
vessel.
12 R. Doc. No. 44, at 1.
13 Id. at 9 n.12.
11

3

574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine issue is not satisfied by creating “‘some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory allegations,’ by
‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Instead, a genuine issue of material fact exists when the “evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Although the substance or content of the
evidence submitted to support or dispute a fact on summary judgment must be
admissible . . . , the material may be presented in a form that would not, in itself, be
admissible at trial.” Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., LLC, 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th
Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). The party responding to the motion for summary
judgment may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that
establish a genuine issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party’s
evidence, however, “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
[the nonmoving party’s] favor.” Id. at 255; see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,
552 (1999).
III.
“General principles of negligence guide the analysis of a maritime tort case.”
Casaceli v. Martech Int’l, Inc., 774 F.2d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, “[t]o
establish maritime negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, breach of that duty, injury sustained by [the]
plaintiff, and a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s

4

injury.” Skinner v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 655 F. App’x 188, 192 (5th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co., 220 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2000)). The
LLOG defendants argue that Gantt’s claims fail because Gantt cannot prove that
they owed him a duty—one of the critical elements of such a negligence claim. 14
The Fifth Circuit has “consistently held that a principal who hires independent
contractors over which he exercises no operational control has no duty to discover and
remedy the hazards created by its independent contractors.” 15 Skinner, 655 F. App’x
at 192 (quoting Wilkins v. P.M.B. Sys. Eng’g, Inc., 741 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1984)).
According to the daywork drilling contract, LLOG Bluewater hired Seadrill
Deepwater as an independent contractor. 16 Seadrill Deepwater was obligated to carry
out the offshore drilling operations, which included furnishing the vessel that
included the allegedly defective air handling unit. 17 Critically, Gantt concedes that
the LLOG defendants did not exercise operational control. 18 Instead, Gantt argues
that the LLOG defendants owed him a duty under two different theories, which the
Court will consider in turn.

R. Doc. No. 37-2, at 5.
“An exception to this general rule occurs ‘where the principal [ ], despite the
independent contractor arrangement, actually retained some degree of control over
the manner or methods by which the contractor [ ] does his work.” Skinner, 665 F.
App’x at 192 (quoting Wilkins, 741 F.2d at 800). Gantt has not argued that this
exception applies.
16 R. Doc. No. 37-8, at 3.
17 Id. at 1, 2.
18 R. Doc. No. 37-1, at 2; R. Doc. No. 44-6, at 1.
14
15

5

A.
Gantt first argues that the LLOG defendants owed him a duty to ensure that
the vessel’s equipment and work areas were in a safe condition pursuant to 30 C.F.R.
§ 250.107. 19 Section 250.107 was promulgated pursuant to the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”). The regulation provides that certain leaseholders,
including the LLOG defendants in this case, must “[m]aintain[ ] all equipment and
work areas in a safe condition.” 30 C.F.R. § 250.107(1)(2); see also Voces v. Energy
Res. Tech., G.O.M., L.L.C., 704 F. App’x 345, 348 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting that 30
C.F.R. § 250.107 applies to “a lessee or its designated operator under an offshore
mineral lease”).
Gantt alleges that one of LLOG’s company men, Michael Harris (“Harris”),
inspected the vessel numerous times in 2014 while it was still in its original
construction yard in South Korea. 20 The vessel was constructed at approximately the
same time and in the same place as its sister vessel, the M/V WEST SATURN (the
“WEST SATURN”). 21 Gantt claims that in 2014, during the time that Harris was in
South Korea purportedly inspecting the WEST NEPTUNE, a fire broke out on the

See R. Doc. No. 44, at 8. Gantt incorrectly cites 28 U.S.C. § 250.107, which does not
exist. Id. Moreover, as the LLOG defendants note, the version of 30 C.F.R. § 250.107
that Gantt quotes was not in effect in March 2015. See Oil and Gas and Sulfur
Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf-Blowout Preventer Systems and Well
Control, 81 Fed. Reg. 25,888, 26,014 (Apr. 29, 2016). However, the text of the
pertinent subsections was part of the version in effect at the time, so the Court’s
analysis is the same.
20 R. Doc. No. 44, at 4, 6.
21 Id. at 4; see also R. Doc. No. 44-6, at 2; R. Doc. No. 53-1, at 1.
19

6

WEST SATURN. 22 Gantt alleges that the WEST SATURN fire was similar to the fire
that eventually broke out on the WEST NEPTUNE in March 2015. 23
According to Gantt, Harris knew about the WEST SATURN fire, but he did not
seek information about it—despite the fact that he “must have known” that the
WEST SATURN and the WEST NEPTUNE were sister vessels. 24 Gantt argues that
Harris, and hence the LLOG defendants, violated a duty they owed him pursuant to
30 C.F.R. § 250.107 by failing to “rectify” what he characterizes as a “known fire
hazard” in one of the WEST NEPTUNE’s air handling units. 25
The LLOG defendants argue in response that, even if they violated § 250.107,
the Fifth Circuit has rejected the argument that OCSLA regulations give rise to a
private cause of action or create a legal duty. 26 They rely primarily on Fruge v. Parker
Drilling Co., 337 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 2003), in which the Fifth Circuit held that a
violation of OCSLA regulations does not create a private cause of action. Id. at 563.
The Fruge court also concluded that the regulations do not create an independent
duty under Louisiana law. See Fruge, 337 F.3d at 563–64. However, Louisiana law
does not govern this case.
Because all of the cases that the LLOG defendants cited in their motion for
summary judgment to demonstrate that they did not owe Gantt a duty under 30
C.F.R. § 250.107 are Louisiana negligence cases, while the motion was pending the

R. Doc. No. 44, at 4.
Id. at 4–5.
24 Id. at 6.
25 Id. at 8.
26 R. Doc. No. 53, at 3.
22
23

7

Court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing with respect to the issue of
whether OCSLA regulations may nevertheless serve as a basis for a duty under
general maritime negligence law. 27
In its supplemental brief, the LLOG defendants argue that Fruge’s holding is
not limited to Louisiana negligence claims. 28 They rely exclusively on Creppel v. Shell
Oil Co., 738 F.2d 699, 702 (5th Cir. 1984). In Creppel, the plaintiff’s boat struck a pipe
in navigable waters that had been leased to the defendant. Id. at 700. Alleging
negligence, the plaintiff predicated the defendant’s duty “on its status as mineral
lessee with notice that the potentially hazardous object was in the water covering a
portion of [the defendant’s] lease.” Id. at 700, 701. The Fifth Circuit held that a
defendant may only be liable for damages resulting from a collision between a boat
and an object in the defendant’s waters if the defendant owned, placed, maintained,
or controlled the object. See id. at 701–02.
Although Creppel is most often cited for the foregoing principle, the Fifth
Circuit also held that an OCSLA regulation similar to the regulation at issue in this
case “does not make lessees insurors of their work areas. . . . A breach of the
regulation provides no federal civil cause of action.” 29 Id. at 702; see also Tolar v.

R. Doc. No. 58, at 2.
See R. Doc. No. 59, at 2.
29 The regulation discussed in Creppel provided, in relevant part, “The lessee shall
perform all operations in a safe and workmanlike manner and shall maintain all
equipment in a safe condition for the protection of the lease and associated facilities,
for the health and safety of all persons, and for the preservation and conservation of
property and the environment.” Creppel, 738 F.2d at 702 (quoting what was, at that
time, 30 C.F.R. § 250.46).
27
28

8

McMoran Offshore Prod. Co., 706 F. Supp. 472, 476 (W.D. La. 1987) (applying Creppel
to a Texas strict liability lawsuit and holding that a breach of OCSLA regulations
does not “create[ ] a private right of action for lessee violations”).
What the LLOG defendants fail to mention is that, like Fruge and the other
cases cited in the motion for summary judgment, Creppel involved a negligence action
under Louisiana law. See Creppel, 738 F.2d at 700 (explaining that the plaintiff sued
the defendant “alleging admiralty as well as diversity jurisdiction over a Louisiana
strict liability cause of action”). However, the Court nonetheless finds support for the
LLOG defendants’ position in Creppel because, in addition to finding that OCSLA
regulations do not create a private cause of action, the Fifth Circuit explained that
“the[ ] regulations are in no way ‘analogous to safety regulations which require a
specific standard of conduct in particular situations,’ and establish no special
standard of care in a negligence action.” Id. at 702 (quoting Bourg v. Texaco Oil Co.,
Inc., 578 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir. 1978)).
The Creppel Court reiterated its holding, finding “no basis in federal
regulations or applicable federal maritime law to impose upon a mineral lessee a duty
to police the waters covered by its lease or to take steps to remove obstructions which
it does not own, has not placed there, or does not maintain or control.” Id. (emphasis
added). Creppel’s reasoning is not unique to Louisiana negligence law. Gantt has not
offered any reason why Fruge and Creppel should not apply by analogy to this case.
The reasoning in Creppel comports with Bourg, in which the Fifth Circuit
explained that interpreting the relevant OCSLA regulations to impose a duty under

9

Louisiana law would be erroneous, “absent a clear indication from Congress that this
was their intent.” Bourg, 578 F.2d at 1121. A review of OCSLA’s legislative history
“uncover[ed] no such intent.” Id. at 1121–22. Extrapolating from Bourg, the Court
notes that neither has Congress provided a clear indication that OCSLA regulations
are intended to create a duty under general maritime law. Nor is there any case
suggesting that 30 C.F.R. § 250.107 establishes a “special standard of care” in general
maritime negligence cases. See Creppel, 738 F.2d at 702. 30
Although the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue of whether
OCSLA regulations impose a duty on offshore drilling leaseholders in general
maritime negligence cases, the Court concludes that Creppel, Fruge, and their
progeny are applicable. Accordingly, the directives set forth in 30 C.F.R. § 250.107
cannot serve as the basis for establishing that the LLOG defendants owed Gantt a
legal duty. Cf. Tajonera, 2015 WL 6758258, at *17 (“Without guidance from the Fifth
Circuit . . . finding that the federal regulations create[ ] a private cause of action, the
Court declines to find that they imposed a statutory duty . . . that may be enforced in
this Court by the . . . Plaintiffs.”).

In his supplemental brief, Gantt admits that there are no cases holding that
OCSLA regulations provide a cause of action under general maritime law. R. Doc. No.
60, at 1. Rather, he relies on Bourg to argue that evidence of a breach of federal safety
regulations may be admissible at trial to prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff
a duty. Id. However, as the Fifth Circuit has explained since Bourg, this evidentiary
rule is specific to Louisiana law and may help demonstrate a defendant’s negligence,
not establish a duty: “While there is no implied cause of action from the mere breach
of . . . regulations, Louisiana law does recognize that applicable federal regulations
may be relevant evidence in weighing a defendant’s culpability.” Romero v. Mobil
Expl. & Producing N. Am., Inc., 939 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1991)
30

10

B.
Gantt next argues that a certain agreement between LLOG Bluewater and
Seadrill Deepwater demonstrates that the LLOG defendants owed him a duty. 30
C.F.R. § 250.1900 provides that leaseholders “must develop, implement, and
maintain a safety and environmental management system (SEMS) program.”
Pursuant to § 250.1900, LLOG Bluewater and Seadrill Deepwater signed a contract
(the “bridging agreement”) that “specifies the expectations regarding safety and
environmental management between the Operator’s SEMs and the Contractor’s
safety and environmental policies and practices.” 31 The operator is listed in the
bridging agreement as “LLOG,” and the contractor is Seadrill Deepwater. 32
The bridging agreement contains a table “indicat[ing] whether the LLOG or
[Seadrill Deepwater] manuals, policies, responsibilities, and procedures prevail
during the term of [the] agreement.” 33 In the table, an “X” is placed under LLOG’s
name for the description “LLOG and 3rd party owned equipment is fit for purpose
and meets regulatory standards.” 34 The accompanying comment provides in relevant
part, “LLOG will confirm fit for purpose through shore base [sic] screening and 3rd
party contractor communications.” 35

R. Doc. No. 53, at 5.; R. Doc. No. 44-8, at 1.
R. Doc. No. 44-8, at 1.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 4. The bridging agreement states that an “X” placed under either “LLOG” or
Seadrill Deepwater’s name “indicates responsibility for the particular item and/or
Safe Work Practice.” Id. at 2.
35 Id. at 4.
31
32

11

Gantt argues that this item in the table establishes that the LLOG defendants
were required to confirm that all third-party owned equipment was fit for its
purpose. 36 Gantt contends that the air handling unit must constitute third-party
owned equipment as it was owned by Seadrill Neptune, which is not a party to the
bridging agreement. 37 Thus, according to Gantt, the LLOG defendants had a duty to
screen the air handling unit on the vessel to ensure that it was fit for its purpose, and
they failed to do so. 38
The LLOG defendants reurge their argument that SEMS-related regulations
do not create a private cause of action or a legal duty under Fifth Circuit
jurisprudence. 39 However, there is a distinction between the regulations themselves
and contracts created as a result of obligations arising out of such regulations. The
critical question is whether the language that Gantt cites from the bridging
agreement (noting that “LLOG will confirm” that third-party owned equipment is “fit
for [its] purpose”) is evidence of a separate, relevant duty that the LLOG defendants
owed to Gantt.
The LLOG defendants argue that there is nothing in the record to support
Gantt’s argument that they violated the terms of the bridging agreement or that the
air handling unit was third-party owned equipment as contemplated by the
agreement. 40 In support of this argument, the LLOG defendants submitted two

R. Doc. No. 44, at 8.
Id.
38 Id.
39 R. Doc. No. 53, at 5.
40 Id. at 5 n.18.
36
37

12

declarations—one from each party to the bridging agreement. The first declaration is
from LLOG Exploration Company, L.L.C.’s general counsel, George Gilly (“Gilly”). 41
Gilly attests that “[t]his provision pertains, not to appurtenances of the drill ship or
equipment owned by Seadrill [Neptune] or any of its affiliated entities, but to
equipment owned and brought on board the WEST NEPTUNE by vendors with which
LLOG contracts directly to provide exploration and production services, such as
wireline, completion and cementing, for its wells.” 42
Gilly states that Gantt’s interpretation of the bridging agreement is not only
incorrect, but that it is “inconsistent with the [agreement’s] plain intent.” 43 According
to Gilly, “Gantt’s proposed interpretation would mean that LLOG agreed to be
responsible for insuring that the WEST NEPTUNE and all of its appurtenances were
fit for their intended purposes and met all regulatory requirements.” 44 However, Gilly
and the LLOG defendants are adamant that “LLOG . . . made no such undertaking.” 45
The second declaration is from Jon Olav Osthus (“Osthus”), director of Seadrill
Deepwater. Osthus states that he “concur[s] with [Gilly’s] interpretation” of the
bridging agreement. 46 “The WEST NEPTUNE’s No. 2 air handling unit and its

R. Doc. No. 59-1. Gilly states that, as vice president and general counsel of LLOG
Exploration Company, L.L.C., he is “personally familiar with contracts entered into
by [the company’s] affiliates,” including the LLOG defendants. Id. at 1.
42 Id. at 2; R. Doc. No. 59, at 4.
43 R. Doc. No. 59-1, at 2.
44 Id. at 2–3.
45 Id. at 3.
46 R. Doc. No. 63, at 2. The LLOG defendants initially submitted only Gilly’s
declaration. On December 20, 2018, the Court held a status conference to discuss the
arguments surrounding the parties’ interpretation of the bridging agreement. See R.
Doc. No. 62. Counsel for the LLOG defendants explained that both parties to the
41

13

component parts . . . are not ‘3rd party equipment’ as contemplated by the [bridging
agreement], and it was not the intent of the parties to the [daywork drilling contract]
to make LLOG responsible for insuring that the WEST NEPTUNE, including her No.
2 air handling unit and its component parts, were fit for their intended purposes and
met regulatory requirements.” 47
The LLOG defendants further argue that nothing in the bridging agreement
indicates that it was intended to supersede any other agreements between the
contracting parties. 48 The bridging agreement says as much: “This Agreement does
not supersede the requirements of any applicable regulations or any other Service
Agreements between the Operator and the Contractor.” 49 It also provides that the
agreement was “entered into by the parties for clarification purpose only and it [was]
not intended to modify any of LLOG’s or Seadrill [Deepwater’s] rights, obligations,
and liabilities under the original contract.” 50 Considering that the contract provides
that Seadrill Deepwater is “obliged to assume the defense and indemnity of LLOG for
claims of the type asserted by [Gantt],” the LLOG defendants argue that Gantt’s
interpretation of the bridging agreement “flies in the [face] of the parties’ obvious
intent.” 51

bridging agreement agree on how “third party equipment” should be interpreted.
Consequently, the Court requested an affidavit from an appropriate representative
of Seadrill Deepwater.
47 Id. at 2–3.
48 R. Doc. No. 53, at 5 n.18.
49 R. Doc. No. 44-8, at 1.
50 Id. at 9.
51 R. Doc. No. 59, at 3; see also R. Doc. No. 37-8, at 24–28 (Article 9 of the daywork
drilling contract).
14

The Court need not interpret the indemnity provision of the daywork drilling
contract. The bridging agreement was entered into between two sophisticated parties,
both of whom attest that “third party equipment” as it is used in the agreement did
not include the vessel’s air handling unit. Although Gantt says otherwise, he was not
a party to the bridging agreement, and he has not pointed to any evidence in the
record that directly contradicts the declarations provided as evidence by the LLOG
defendants.
Gilly and Osthus’s interpretation of third-party owned equipment is supported
by additional provisions of the daywork drilling contract and the bridging agreement.
Describing what is required of Seadrill Deepwater, the daywork drilling contract
states that “all materials, equipment, goods, supplies or manufactured articles
furnished by Contractor in the performance of the work or services shall be suitable
quality and workmanship for their intended purposes.” 52 The daywork drilling
contract explicitly states that Seadrill Deepwater was obligated to furnish the
vessel. 53 In fact, the bridging agreement indicates that Seadrill Deepwater was the
entity responsible for a “rig hazards analysis,” and an “X” is placed under Seadrill
Deepwater’s name alongside the item “OIM responsible for vessel safety.” 54 According
to the contract, “OIM” refers to the offshore installation manager, who the contract
includes in a list of personnel to be provided by Seadrill Deepwater. 55

Id. at 8.
Id. at 1.
54 See R. Doc. No. 44-8, at 2, 4.
55 R. Doc. No. 37-8, at 10; R. Doc. No. 37-8, at 39.
52
53

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The evidence demonstrates that the LLOG defendants did not take on an
additional duty to ensure the safety of the vessel or its appurtenances through the
bridging agreement. 56 The Court concludes that Gantt’s unsupported assertion that
the air handling unit constitutes third-party owned equipment, as contemplated by
bridging agreement, does not create a genuine dispute as to the existence of a duty
that the LLOG defendants owed to Gantt. Accordingly, the LLOG defendants are
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that LLOG Bluewater Holdings, LLC and LLOG
Exploration Offshore, LLC’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and that
Terry Gantt’s claims against LLOG Bluewater Holdings, LLC and LLOG Exploration
Offshore, LLC are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, December 21, 2018.

_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

By entering into the bridging agreement, the LLOG defendants owed certain duties
to Seadrill Deepwater, the other party to the contract. Gantt has not explained how
those duties would extend to him.

56

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