Jenkins v. Robert M. Murphy et al
Filing
58
ORDER AND REASONS: ORDERED that Burmaster's 15 Motion to Dismiss isGRANTED, and Jenkins' claims against him are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;FURTHER ORDERED that Treadaway's 19 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Jenkins' claims a gainst her are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; FURTHER ORDERED that Murphy's 23 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Jenkins' claims against him are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and FURTHER ORDERED that O'Rourke's 24 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Jenkins' claims against him are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Barry W Ashe on 11/27/18. (clc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MARK ANTHONY JENKINS
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 18-3122
ROBERT M. MURPHY, et al.
SECTION: M (1)
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Barron Burmaster
(“Burmaster”),1 to which plaintiff Mark Anthony Jenkins (“Jenkins”) responds in opposition,2
and in support of which Burmaster replies;3 a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Kristyl
Treadaway (“Treadaway”),4 to which Jenkins responds in opposition,5 and in support of which
Treadaway replies;6 a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Robert M. Murphy (“Murphy”),7 to
which Jenkins responds in opposition,8 and in support of which Murphy replies,9 and in further
opposition to which Jenkins has filed a sur-reply;10 and a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant
Timothy O’Rourke (“O’Rourke”),11 to which Jenkins responds in opposition,12 and in support of
which O’Rourke replies.13 Having considered the parties’ memoranda and the applicable law,
the Court issues this Order & Reasons.
1
R. Doc. 15.
R. Doc. 25.
3
R. Doc. 34.
4
R. Doc. 19.
5
R. Doc. 26.
6
R. Doc. 36.
7
R. Doc. 23.
8
R. Doc. 37.
9
R. Doc. 41.
10
R. Doc. 47.
11
R. Doc. 24.
12
R. Doc. 39.
13
R. Doc. 51.
2
I.
BACKGROUND
This action is a collateral attack on a state court judgment. The pertinent facts and
procedural history of this case were recited by the Louisiana court of appeal for the fifth circuit
in an appeal stemming from the underlying state-court litigation:
Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. and Latasha Jackson began their relationship while
Ms. Jackson was in high school. During the time of their sexual involvement, Ms.
Jackson became pregnant. On September 18, 1997, Mark Anthony Jenkins, Jr.
(hereinafter referred to as “Mark, Jr.”) was born to Latasha Jackson. According to
Mr. Jenkins, he signed an acknowledgement of paternity establishing filiation to
Mark, Jr., and the acknowledgement was filed by November 1997.1 The
following year, on May 31, 1998, Mr. Jenkins and Ms. Jackson were married. At
some point, the parties separated, and Ms. Jackson obtained a judgment of child
support against Mr. Jenkins on October 27, 2003. Mr. Jenkins and Ms. Jackson
were divorced on April 13, 2004.
On February 15, 2012, Mr. Jenkins filed a “Petition for Revocation of
Acknowledgement of Paternity, for Damages Due to Fraud under C.C. art. 2315,
and for Restoration of Payments Not Due under C.C. art. 2299” in the 24th
Judicial District Court. In his petition, Mr. Jenkins alleged that Ms. Jackson
fraudulently concealed the truth about the paternity of Mark, Jr. and obtained
child support while knowing that another man, Samuel Scott, was the biological
father. He also alleged that he mistakenly signed the acknowledgement of
paternity for Mark, Jr.
In addition, Mr. Jenkins sought to have his
acknowledgement of paternity revoked, monetary damages from Ms. Jackson, and
a court order for a paternity test for himself and Mark, Jr.
In opposition to the petition for revocation, Ms. Jackson filed an “Exception of
Prescription and/or No Cause/Right of Action.” In her exception, Ms. Jackson
argued that Mr. Jenkins’ right to revoke the formal act of acknowledgement was
perempted because he failed to disavow Mark, Jr. within 180 days of the
marriage; thus, he had neither a right of action nor cause of action to revoke the
acknowledgement. The matter was heard by a domestic commissioner. In a
judgment rendered on July 5, 2012, the domestic commissioner sustained the
exception of prescription but overruled the exceptions of no cause of action and
no right of action. Mr. Jenkins filed a “Motion for New Trial,” which was heard
on September 13, 2012. A new trial was granted, and the matter was set for
arguments.2 On October 15, 2012, the domestic commissioner rendered a
judgment in favor of Mr. Jenkins, which overruled Ms. Jackson[’s] exception of
prescription. Ms. Jackson objected to the domestic commissioner’s ruling.
The matter was heard by the trial court on January 16, 2013. In a judgment
rendered on January 22, 2013, the trial court overruled Ms. Jackson’s exception of
2
prescription. The trial court also ordered genetic testing and assigned costs for the
test. Ms. Jackson sought supervisory review of the trial court’s judgment.
In Jenkins v. Jackson, 13-296 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/14/13) (unpublished writ
disposition), writ not considered, 13-1835 (La. 8/22/13); 122 So.3d 1009, this
Court granted Ms. Jackson’s writ application in part, reversing the trial court’s
ruling on the exception of prescription and rendering a ruling that sustained the
exception. Citing J.P. v. C.E., 12-20 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/2/12); 94 So.3d 107, this
Court found that the two-year prescriptive period in La. R.S. 9:406 should apply
prospectively from its effective date, which was August 15, 2008. Because Mr.
Jenkins did not file his petition to revoke until February 15, 2012, which was well
over the two years from the effective date, Mr. Jenkins’ action to revoke his
acknowledgement of paternity was prescribed. This Court also vacated the order
for genetic testing and remanded the matter to the trial court for determination of
whether Mr. Jenkins was entitled to the genetic testing pursuant to applicable law,
specifically La. R.S. 9:396. Upon remand, Mr. Jenkins filed a “Motion for Court
to Rule on Petitioner’s Previous Motion for Genetic Testing under R.S. 9:396.”
The trial court granted the motion and ordered that Mr. Jenkins, Ms. Jackson and
Mark, Jr. submit to the genetic testing.3
On September 11, 2013, Mr. Jenkins filed a “Motion to Amend Petition to Annul
Judgment of Juvenile Court.”4 In that motion, Mr. Jenkins alleged that he filed a
petition to nullify child support in the juvenile court; however, he was informed
by the court that the nullification had to take place in the district court. Mr.
Jenkins sought to amend his original petition filed, which was filed in the trial
court, to include a request for damages for mental anguish and nullification of the
judgment of child support rendered in the juvenile court. The motion was heard
by the trial court and granted on November 25, 2013.
Mr. Jenkins subsequently filed a “Petition for Nullification of the Judgment of the
Fifth Circuit which Reversed a Judgment of This Court” on June 25, 2014. In that
petition, Mr. Jenkins sought to annul the portion of the May 14, 2013 writ
disposition of this Court that found his right to revoke the acknowledgement
prescribed. He alleged that his acknowledgement of paternity was signed at the
hospital after Mark, Jr. was born, but the only copy of the acknowledgement was
destroyed during Hurricane Katrina, while in the possession of the State.5 Mr.
Jenkins sought to have the judgment of this Court annulled on the basis that it did
not consider whether the form of the acknowledgement was by authentic act.
On October 14, 2014, Mr. Jenkins filed a “Rule to Show Cause Why Plaintiff’s
Name Should Not Be Removed from the Birth Certificate and Why An Expert
Should Not be Appointed to Calculate Probability of Paternity.” In that pleading,
Mr. Jenkins requested that, since the genetic testing ordered by the court showed
that he cannot be Mark, Jr.’s biological father, the testing be admitted into
evidence, the signing of the birth certificate be given no legal effect, and his name
be removed from the birth certificate. Mr. Jenkins also requested that an expert
3
be allowed to use Samuel Scott’s DNA report6 to calculate the probability of
paternity, and Ms. Jackson be cast with the costs of the genetic testing.
In opposition to Mr. Jenkins’ petition to revoke acknowledgement and rule to
show cause, Ms. Jackson filed an “Exception of Prescription,” arguing that Mr.
Jenkins’ cause of action was prescribed under the ten-year liberative prescriptive
period. She also argued that fraud was not a procedural avenue that could be used
to vitiate the birth certificate; specifically, Mr. Jenkins could have ascertained the
truth regarding his paternity of Mark, Jr. prior to signing the birth certificate.
A hearing on Mr. Jenkins’ rule to show cause was held on January 21, 2015. In a
judgment rendered on February 4, 2015, the trial court denied the rule and made a
handwritten notation that “no authority [was] provided by mover to show this
court that this is the proper procedure to alter or amend birth certificates. Dept. of
Vital Records is not a party.” In a separate judgment rendered on the same date,
the trial court overruled Ms. Jackson’s exception of prescription, admitted the
genetic testing into evidence, found that Mr. Jenkins is not the father of Mark, Jr.,
and ordered Ms. Jackson to reimburse Mr. Jenkins for the total costs incurred for
the testing, which included attorney’s fees and court costs. The trial court also
ordered a rule to show cause hearing to show why the birth certificate should not
be altered and why DCFS should not authorize the calculation of Mr. Scott’s
probability of paternity for Mark, Jr.
Ms. Jackson filed a “Motion and Order for Appeal” on February 24, 201[5],
seeking appellate review of the trial court’s rulings that overruled her exception of
prescription and ordered her to pay the costs incurred to prove paternity. The
motion was granted by the trial court, and an appeal was lodged. This Court
dismissed Ms. Jackson’s appeal through an order on May 26, 2015, finding that
the trial court’s February 4th judgments were not final judgments. Ms. Jackson
was allowed 30 days to file an appropriate writ application seeking review of the
interlocutory rulings.
After the trial court rendered its February 4th judgments, Mr. Jenkins filed a
“Petition for Alternation of a Birth Certificate to Remove Petitioner’s Name as
Father of the Child, Void His Signature, and Change the Surname of the Child”
on February 9, 201[5]. Subsequently, he filed a “Motion to Amend Petition a
Third Time.” In that motion, Mr. Jenkins sought permission to add allegations
against DCFS, mainly that it failed to establish paternity prior to obtaining a
judgment of child support against him for Mark, Jr. Mr. Jenkins also filed a
“Motion for Order to Calculate the Probability of Paternity.” He claimed that he
obtained permission from the juvenile court to allow the use of the DNA report
for Mr. Scott and requested that the DNA information be used in the instant
matter.
On June 23, 2015, Ms. Jackson filed a supervisory writ with this Court, seeking
review of the trial court’s February 4, 201[5] judgments. Ms. Jackson alleged that
4
the trial court erred when it overruled her exception of prescription and found Mr.
Jenkins not to be the legal father of Mark, Jr. She argued that Mr. Jenkins’ cause
of action was prescribed under La. R.S. 9:392 and 9:406.7 Ms. Jackson further
alleged that the trial court erred in ordering her to reimburse Mr. Jenkins for the
costs incurred in obtaining the genetic testing. In opposition to the writ
application, Mr. Jenkins contended the prior writ disposition did not preclude his
claim to rebut the presumption of legal paternity created by signing Mark, Jr.’s
birth certificate because there was no evidence of an authentic act of
acknowledgement.
In Jenkins v. Jackson, 15-399 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/23/15) (unpublished writ
disposition), writ denied, 15-1622 (La. 9/4/15); 177 So.3d 709,8 Ms. Jackson’s
writ application was granted in part and denied in part. This Court found that Mr.
Jenkins had judicially confessed, in more than one pleading, that he signed both
the birth certificate and an acknowledgement of paternity at the time of Mark,
Jr.’s birth in 1997, and that Mr. Jenkins’ confession constituted full proof against
him. Consequently, this Court found that Mr. Jenkins’ subsequent allegations that
he could not remember signing any acknowledgement or that no authentic act of
acknowledgement existed could not be considered for purposes of pursuing
another attempt to revoke or rebut his acknowledgement of legal paternity in this
matter. Thus, Mr. Jenkins’ cause of action was again found to be prescribed
pursuant to La. R.S. 9:406. The trial court’s ruling concerning prescription was
reversed, and Ms. Jackson’s exception was sustained as to Mr. Jenkins’ claim to
revoke or rebut his acknowledgement of legal paternity. This Court further found
no error in the portions of the trial court’s judgment that found Mr. Jenkins was
not the father of Mark, Jr., based upon the paternity test report, and ordered Ms.
Jackson to reimburse Mr. Jenkins for the costs incurred in obtaining the genetic
testing and court costs; however, the order for Ms. Jackson to pay Mr. Jenkins’
attorney’s fees was vacated.
On October 7, 2015, Mr. Jenkins filed a “Motion to Dismiss the Allegations
against DCFS Contained in the Third Amendment to the Petition and Motion to
Rebut Finding of Judicial Confession to Signing ‘An Acknowledgment’ other
Than the Birth Certificate.” In the motion, Mr. Jenkins alleged that Ms. Jackson
and DCFS judicially confessed in the juvenile court proceeding that there was no
authentic act of acknowledgement, and the June 23rd writ disposition from this
Court was not the law of the case. He sought to dismiss his allegations against
DCFS in his third amendment to his petition and sought admission of the judicial
confessions of DCFS and Ms. Jackson into evidence for the purposes of rebutting
this Court’s legal paternity finding. The motion was heard before the trial court
on October 16, 2015. In a judgment rendered on February 1, 2016, the motion
was denied.
Subsequently, in the same proceeding, Mr. Jenkins filed a “Petition for
Nullification 1) Request Nullification of Fifth Circuit’s Ruling for Lack of
Jurisdiction and for Fraud and Ill-Practice in the Writ Application, 2) Request a
5
Finding that R.S. 9:406(B)(2) is Unconstitutional, and 3) Request an Injunction
against Enforcement of the Rulings” on March 10, 2016. Among his numerous
allegations, Mr. Jenkins alleged that the rulings of this Court in the prior writ
dispositions regarding the existence of an authentic act of acknowledgement and
legal paternity were null because this Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction
to consider the legal paternity of Mark, Jr. He further alleged that Ms. Jackson’s
attorney obtained the rulings in her favor through fraud and ill practices because
she misrepresented the law by claiming that the signing of the birth certificate
made him the legal father of Mark, Jr. and by failing to enter the judicial
confession of Ms. Jackson from the juvenile court that there was no authentic act
of acknowledgement. He maintained that enforcement of the rulings obtained
through fraud and ill practices would be unconscionable and inequitable because
injustice was brought about by depriving him of notice and the right to be heard.
Mr. Jenkins also alleged that La. R.S. 9:406(B)(2) was unconstitutional because it
did not provide for a suspension of the two-year prescriptive period to revoke an
authentic act of acknowledgement obtained by fraud.
On April 5, 2016, Ms. Jackson filed an “Exception of No Cause of Action, Res
Judicata, and for Sanctions.” Ms. Jackson argued that Mr. Jenkins’ petition for
nullification did not state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
She claimed that Mr. Jenkins’ grounds for nullifying the rulings were baseless;
thus, she requested that the action be dismissed. She also argued that Mr.
Jenkins’ action sought to re-litigate issues that were already considered by this
Court and the supreme court. As a result of the repeated litigation of the same
issues and the personal attack upon her attorney, Ms. Jackson requested sanctions
against Mr. Jenkins. The exception was heard before the trial court on May 16,
2016. On May 24, 2016, the trial court sustained the exceptions of no cause of
action and res judicata and denied the request for sanctions.9 The instant appeal
followed.
*
*
*
On appeal, Mr. Jenkins alleges the trial court erred in sustaining the peremptory
exceptions of no cause of action and res judicata, which resulted in the dismissal
of his action. He argues that the litigation has focused entirely on whether the
two-year prescriptive period of La. R.S. 9:406 applied to an act executed in 1997,
not whether there had actually been an authentic act of acknowledgement
executed by him.
*
*
*
Mr. Jenkins alleges the trial court erred in sustaining Ms. Jackson’s exception of
no cause of action. He claims that his petition for nullification is authorized by
La. C.C.P. art. 2006 and is not simply another request for review of this Court’s
previous rulings. Mr. Jenkins avers that the grounds for nullity raised in his
petition are mainly based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of
6
legal paternity and deprivation of the right to be heard through having an
opportunity to present evidence. When taking the allegations of the petition as
true, Mr. Jenkins claims that his petition stated valid causes of action.
1
Mr. Jenkins alleges that he signed an acknowledgement of paternity in his petition for
revocation.
2
In his ruling, the domestic commissioner found that Mr. Jenkins’ right to revoke the
acknowledgement could not prescribe pursuant to the version of La. R.S. 9:406 in effect at the
time of the signing of the acknowledgement. In 2007, La. R.S. 9:406(B) provided,
At any time, a person who executed an authentic act of acknowledgment may
petition the court to rescind such acknowledgment only upon proof, by clear and
convincing evidence, that such act was induced by fraud, duress, material mistake of
fact or error, or that the person is not the biological parent of the child.
3
The trial judge made a handwritten notation that the parties “dispensed with [the
determination of Mr. Jenkins’ right] in light of [the] hearing held.”
4
This was the second request to amend Mr. Jenkins’ petition. In the first amendment, the
Department of Children and Family Services (hereinafter referred to as “DCFS”) was added
to the action as an indispensable party.
5
Mr. Jenkins’ reference is to the Louisiana Department of Health.
6
Mr. Jenkins obtained Mr. Scott’s DNA report from another, unrelated matter in the juvenile
court.
7
Ms. Jackson also argued that Mr. Jenkins should have actually filed a disavowal action
pursuant to La. C.C. art. 195, not an action to revoke an acknowledgement, because he filiated
himself to Mark, Jr. by marrying her after Mark, Jr. was born. However, she maintained that
action would have also been prescribed.
8
On writ of certiorari to the supreme court, Justice Hughes dissented, stating,
[T]he seemingly untimely review and intervention of the Court of Appeal to decide
an issue not addressed in the trial court’s judgment, based on the concept of a
“judicial confession,” is clearly wrong given the DNA evidence, the multiple
pleadings and amendments thereto, the stipulation of the parties, and the inability of
DCFS to produce an authentic act of acknowledgment. This is not justice but judicial
“gotcha.” These matters are best left to the trial court for trial on the merits and
development of a full record.
The continued efforts of DCFS given the DNA results in the record are also
questionable.
(Emphasis in original).
9
The initial judgment signed by the trial court did not contain the required decretal language
required to render the judgment final because it failed to indicate the specific relief granted.
See Morraz-Blandon v. Voiron, 16-112 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/25/16); 199 So.3d 1220, 1221. As
such, after the appeal was lodged, we issued an order instructing the trial court to amend the
judgment to include the necessary decretal language. The trial court signed an amended
judgment on November 7, 2016 to include decretal language that dismissed Mr. Jenkins’
7
petition with prejudice. (See generally, Rousseau v. Emp’rs Mut. of Wausau, 493 So.2d 121,
124 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986), where this Court held that a judgment sustaining an exception
of no cause of action is a final, appealable judgment, even in cases where only a portion of the
case is dismissed by the exception.) The amended judgment corrected the deficiency in the
judgment. Accordingly, we find that a final judgment has been rendered and is reviewable on
appeal.
Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So. 3d 1082, 1084-89 (La. App.), writ denied, 224 So. 3d 984 (La.
2017).
In its opinion regarding Jenkins’ appeal of the dismissal of his nullity action, the
Louisiana court of appeal for the fifth circuit held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter
the rulings regarding paternity in the July 31, 2015 order pertaining to Jacksons’ writ
application.14 Id. at 1089-90. The court explained:
Mr. Jenkins alleges this Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to determine
his legal paternity of Mark, Jr. when reviewing Ms. Jackson’s supervisory writ
applications. As a result, he contends that the writ dispositions rendered by this
Court are null and void.
The nullity of a final judgment may be demanded for vices of either form or
substance. La. C.C.P. art. 2001. A final judgment shall be annulled if it is
rendered by a court which does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit. La. C.C.P. art. 2002(A)(3). Except as otherwise provided in La. C.C.P. art.
2003, an action to annul a judgment on the grounds for vices of form may be
brought at any time. La. C.C.P. art. 2002(B).
The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action or proceeding
cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. Canal/Claiborne, Ltd. v.
Stonehedge Dev., LLC, 14-664 (La. 12/9/14); 156 So.3d 627, 632, citing La.
C.C.P. art. 3. Thus, a judgment rendered by a court with no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action or proceeding is void. Id.
According to La. Const. art. V, § 10, except as otherwise provided by the
constitution, a court of appeal has appellate jurisdiction of all civil matters
appealed, including matters from family and juvenile courts, and supervisory
jurisdiction over cases which arise within its circuit. A district court has original
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters, with the exception of the excluded
cases listed in the constitution. La. Const. art. V, § 16.
14
The Louisiana court of appeal for the fifth circuit mistakenly referred to the order as having been issued
on June 23, 2015, when it was actually entered on July 31, 2015. See R. Doc. 36-1 at 21-24.
8
In the instant matter, this Court reviewed supervisory writ applications arising
from Mr. Jenkins’ petition for revocation of acknowledgement of paternity, which
was properly filed in the 24th Judicial District Court.10 The district court had the
jurisdiction to determine both the legal and biological paternity of Mark, Jr. in its
review of Mr. Jenkins’ petition to revoke. Because the 24th Judicial District Court
is a district court within our circuit, this Court had the supervisory jurisdiction to
render determinations relevant to Mr. Jenkins’ petition, which included the legal
and biological paternity of Mark, Jr. As such, despite his assertion that this Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, Mr. Jenkins’ legal paternity of Mark, Jr. was
properly before this Court for review in the two supervisory writ applications at
issue.11
Mr. Jenkins’ contention that this Court had no subject matter jurisdiction to
determine his legal paternity of Mark, Jr. lacks merit beyond a doubt because no
set of facts could have been proven in support of his claim. Thus, there is no
relief that could be granted to Mr. Jenkins, and the claim should have been
dismissed. See Guidry [v. Hanover Ins. Co., 09-220 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/20/09);
28 So.3d 426, 428]. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly sustained
Ms. Jackson’s exception of no cause of action on the claim of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction raised in Mr. Jenkins’ petition for nullification.
10
The Juvenile Court of Jefferson Parish would not have been the proper venue to file such a
petition. (See State v. James, 99-1670 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/23/00); 757 So.2d 811, 813, where
the court held, “There is no authority in Ch.C. art. 311 or any other article of the Children’s
Code for the filing of a petition to nullify an acknowledgment of paternity in Juvenile
Court....”)
11
We note that both Mr. Jenkins and Ms. Jackson were given the fair opportunity to argue their
positions in their respective briefs, as no oral arguments were heard for Ms. Jackson’s
supervisory writ applications. This Court considered the arguments presented by both parties.
Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So. 3d at 1089-90.
On March 22, 2018, Jenkins filed this action in federal court again arguing that the
Louisiana court of appeal for the fifth circuit lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to determine legal
paternity in its July 31, 2015 order regarding Jackson’s writ application.15 Jenkins names as
defendants: O’Rourke, an assistant district attorney involved in the state-court litigation;16
Murphy, a judge on the Louisiana court of appeal for the fifth circuit;17 Treadaway, Jackson’s
attorney in the state-court litigation;18 and Burmaster, a judge on the 24th Judicial District Court,
15
R. Doc. 1 at 1-3.
Id. at 4.
17
Id. at 3.
18
R. Doc. 4 at 1-2.
16
9
Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana.19
Jenkins alleges that the defendants conspired to
deprive him of his rights secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States of America by procuring the July 31, 2015 order from the Louisiana court of
appeal when that court allegedly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on the issue of
paternity.20
Jenkins asserts that his claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1893, 1985, 1986,
and 1988, and that he seeks a judgment that the July 31, 2015 ruling of the state court is null and
void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and monetary damages.21
II.
PENDING MOTIONS
Burmaster, Treadway and O’Rourke filed motions to dismiss arguing that this Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Jenkins’ action by operation of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.22 The defendants argue that Jenkins is a “state-court loser” who filed this action in
federal court to collaterally attack a state-court judgment. Jenkins argues that his claims are not
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the state-court judgment he attacks, the July 31,
2015 order issued by the Louisiana court of appeal for the fifth circuit, is void for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.
III.
LAW & ANALYSIS
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits “a party to challenge the
subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case.” Ramming v. United States, 281
F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Lack of subject matter
jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint
19
Id. at 1.
R. Docs. 1 & 4.
21
R. Doc. 1 at 3 & 17-19; R. Doc. 4 at 3-5.
22
R. Docs. 15, 19 & 24. Murphy also filed a motion to dismiss but did not raise the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See R. Doc. 23. However, this Court’s finding that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine also applies to Jenkins’ claims against Murphy.
20
10
supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Id. The party
asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Id.
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “federal district courts, as courts of original
jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts.”
Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18
F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist.
of Colum. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284 (2005). The four elements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are: (1) a state-court loser; (2)
alleging harm caused by a state-court judgment; (3) that was rendered before the district court
proceeding began; and (4) the federal suit requests review and reversal of the state court
judgment. Id.
Further, “[a] state court judgment is attacked for purposes of Rooker-Feldman ‘when the
[federal] claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a challenged state court judgment,’ or where
the losing party in a state court action seeks ‘what in substance would be appellate review of the
state judgment.’” Weaver v. Tex. Capital Bank, N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
“does not preclude federal jurisdiction over an ‘independent claim,’ even ‘one that denies a legal
conclusion that a state court has reached.’” Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293). The
doctrine “generally applies only where a plaintiff seeks relief that directly attacks the validity of
an existing state court judgment.” Id. “Nonetheless, a party cannot escape Rooker-Feldman by
‘casting ... a complaint in the form of a civil rights action.’” Houston v. Queen, 606 F. App'x
11
725, 730 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 317). When constitutional questions arise
in state-court proceedings, federal appellate review is available only in the United States
Supreme Court. Moore v. Whitman, 2018 WL 3602774, at *2 (5th Cir. July 26, 2018) (citing
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284).
All four elements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are satisfied in this case. Jenkins lost
in the state court. He alleges injuries caused by that judgment, which was rendered before he
filed this action, and he specifically asks this Court to reverse that judgment.
In an attempt to escape the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Jenkins argues
that the “void ab initio exception” to the doctrine applies, contending that the July 31, 2015 order
that he attacks is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Whether the Fifth Circuit
recognizes the “void ab initio exception” to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is debatable. In
Matter of Cleveland Imaging & Surgical Hosp., L.L.C., 690 Fed. App’x 283 (5th Cir. 2017), the
court stated that it “has neither endorsed nor rejected the ab initio exception” and noted that its
“sister circuits are split on the issue.” Id. at 286 (citations omitted). The court declined to “reach
this issue” because it was clear that the state court had jurisdiction to enter the order at issue. Id.
Three months later, in Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust, 871 F.3d 380, 385-86 (5th Cir.
2017), the court cited the void ab initio exception as an alternate reason that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine was inapplicable, without discussing whether the Fifth Circuit now accepts the
exception.
In this case, because it is clear that the July 31, 2015 order Jenkins questions is not void
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, it is not necessary now for this Court to deduce the Fifth
Circuit’s current position on the void ab initio exception. Indeed, Jenkins filed a motion in the
24th Judicial District Court pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2002 seeking
an order declaring the July 31, 2015 order null and void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
12
Jenkins, 216 So. 3d at 1087-88. The trial court sustained Jackson’s exception of no cause of
action, and Jenkins appealed. Id. at 1088. On appeal, the Louisiana court of appeal held that it
did have subject-matter jurisdiction to render the July 31, 2015 order. Id. at 1090. Jenkins filed
a writ of certiorari with the Louisiana Supreme Court challenging that ruling, and that court
denied writs. Jenkins v. Jackson, 224 So. 3d 984 (La. 2017). Thus, Jenkins has fully litigated in
the state courts the issue of whether the judgment he now seeks to overturn was void ab initio.
The Louisiana state courts have held that it was not. In the lawsuit pending before this Court,
Jenkins asks this Court to function as a super-appellate court and reverse the decisions of the
Louisiana state courts. This is precisely the type of action that is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. As such, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Jenkins’ suit.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Burmaster’s motion to dismiss (R. Doc. 15) is
GRANTED, and Jenkins’ claims against him are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Treadaway’s motion to dismiss (R. Doc. 19) is
GRANTED, and Jenkins’ claims against her are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Murphy’s motion to dismiss (R. Doc. 23) is
GRANTED, and Jenkins’ claims against him are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that O’Rourke’s motion to dismiss (R. Doc. 24) is
GRANTED, and Jenkins’ claims against him are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of November 2018.
________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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