Henderson v. Haza Foods of Louisiana, LLC
Filing
36
ORDER AND REASONS: finding as moot 32 Motion to Dismiss Case; finding as moot 32 Motion for Sanctions; granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 12/13/2018. (am)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WANDA HENDERSON
VERSUS
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 18-3146
HAZA FOODS OF LOUISIANA, LLC
SECTION “R” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are defendant Haza Foods of Louisiana, LLC’s
(Haza’s) (1) motion for summary judgment, and (2) motion for sanctions
against plaintiff Wanda Henderson.1 Because plaintiff’s previous suit did not
interrupt the prescriptive period for her claims, the Court grants the motion
for summary judgment. It denies defendant’s motion for sanctions as moot.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of plaintiff’s alleged fall in defendant’s restaurant.2
Plaintiff allegedly visited a Wendy’s restaurant owned by Haza on December
24, 2016.3 While she was there, she alleges that she fell on a moist floor and
1
2
3
R. Doc. 18; R. Doc. 32.
R. Doc. 1 at 1 ¶ 3; R. Doc. 18-2 at 1 ¶ 1.
R. Doc. 1 at 1 ¶ 2.
injured herself. 4 She alleges that her injuries required surgical intervention
and admission to the hospital. 5
Plaintiff initially filed a complaint in Louisiana state court on
December 18, 2017, against “Allstate BK Real Estate Holdings, d/b/a Haza
Foods, LLC/Wendy’s” (Allstate).6 Allstate is a company that shares an
address with Haza, but it does not own the Wendy’s in which Henderson
allegedly fell.7 Allstate removed this action to federal court on January 25,
2018.8 On March 21, 2018, this Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against
Allstate for lack of personal jurisdiction, because Allstate does not do
business in Louisiana.9
On March 23, 2018, plaintiff filed a new complaint in federal court,
based on the same underlying facts, against Haza.10 Plaintiff claims that
Haza was negligent in failing to correct a defect on its property, ignoring an
unsafe condition, failing to inspect, and other general acts of negligence.11
Plaintiff seeks damages for physical and mental pain and suffering, loss of
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5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Id. ¶ 3.
R. Doc. 9 at 1 ¶ 8.
R. Doc. 20-1 at 1 ¶ 1.
Id. at 3 ¶ 11; R. Doc. 24 at 1.
R. Doc. 1 (Case No. 18-789).
R. Doc. 6 (Case No. 18-789).
R. Doc. 1.
Id. at 2 ¶ 5.
2
income, medical expenses, travel expenses, and permanent disability.12
Haza has moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff’s
complaint against it is untimely.13 Plaintiff opposes the motion. 14
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any material
fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s]
from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta &
Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99
(5th Cir. 2008).
All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth
‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either
support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision
Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at
12
13
14
R. Doc. 9 at 2 ¶ 10.
R. Doc 18.
R. Doc. 20.
3
1075. A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that
a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence
which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went
uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,
1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by
either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact, or “showing that the moving party’s
evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to
return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by
merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with
respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex,
477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must,
by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the
pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for
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trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).
III. DISCUSSION
Haza moves for summary judgment on the basis that Henderson’s
claims against it are time barred. 15 Henderson’s claims are subject to a
liberative prescription of one year. See La. Civ. Code art. 3492 (“Delictual
actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one year . . . from the day
injury or damage is sustained.”); Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 869 F.2d 879,
880 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that “federal courts apply state statutes of
limitations and related state law governing tolling of the limitation period”
in diversity cases). The one-year period is interrupted “when the obligee
commences action against the obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction
and venue.” La. Civ. Code art. 3462. A court of competent jurisdiction is “a
court which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of, and is the proper
venue for, the action or proceeding.” La. Code Civ. Pro. 5251(4); see also
15
R. Doc. 18-1 at 3.
5
Pickard v. Baugh, 565 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
competent jurisdiction “does not include jurisdiction over the person”). The
prescriptive period is interrupted until judgment in the first suit is final, at
which point the prescriptive period begins anew, and a plaintiff has another
year to file a second lawsuit. La. Civ. Code art. 3466; see also Terrel v.
Perkins, 704 So. 2d 35, 38 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff had
one year from the final judgment of the first suit to bring a second suit).
Plaintiff filed this action on March 23, 2018, more than one year after
the alleged accident, which she claims occurred on December 24, 2016.16 But
plaintiff argues that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the earlier
lawsuit that she filed in Louisiana state court. 17 See La. Civ. Code art. 3462.
Plaintiff timely filed the first action in state court on December 18, 2017. If
that suit interrupted prescription, plaintiff would have one year from a final
judgment in the case against Allstate to commence the instant lawsuit
against Haza. La. Civ. Code art. 3466. This action, filed two days after
dismissal of the action against Allstate, would be timely filed.
See R. Doc. 1.
Although this Court ultimately dismissed plaintiff’s first suit for lack of
personal jurisdiction, it was filed in a court of competent jurisdiction because
subject matter jurisdiction existed, and venue was proper.
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16
17
To interrupt the prescriptive period, a suit must be against “a proper
party defendant.”18 See 1983 Revision Comments to La. Civ. Code art. 3462.
Accidentally suing the wrong defendant does not interrupt prescription as to
the correct defendant. Smith v. Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., No. 07-1496,
2007 WL 3245443, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 2, 2007) (“[I]f the plaintiff sues the
wrong defendant this will not interrupt prescription under Louisiana law.”);
Ruffin v. Blue Plate Foods, 29 So. 2d 722, 725 (La. App. 1947). But federal
courts applying Louisiana law and Louisiana state courts have recognized
two limited exceptions to this principle. First, prescription is interrupted
when a plaintiff sues the correct defendant but slightly misstates the name of
the defendant. See, e.g., Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 869 F.2d 879, 884 (5th
Cir. 1989) (holding that prescription was interrupted by a suit naming “John
Deere Corp.” instead of “Deere & Company,” when “John Deere Corp.” did
not exist). Second, prescription is interrupted when a plaintiff names an
entity that is so related to the correct defendant that service of one operates
as service of the other. See Ruffin, 29 So. 2d at 725 (recognizing that
prescription is interrupted when plaintiff names the wrong corporation but
Prescription is also interrupted as to those who are solidarily liable
with the named defendant, and as to joint tortfeasors. La. Civ. Code art.
1799; La. Civ. Code art. 2324(C). Neither of these exceptions applies to this
case.
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18
“the two corporations [are] closely related, that they ha[ve] the same
manager, [and] they operate[] from the same office”); Lukin v. Triangle
Farms, 23 So. 2d 209, 212 (La. 1945) (holding that earlier suit interrupted
prescription because service on the general manager of both corporations
“was sufficient notice to this defendant of the nature of the claim”). Actual
knowledge of the suit is not enough to interrupt prescription under the
second exception. Martin v. Mud Supply Co., 119 So. 2d 484, 493 (La. 1959).
The entities must be so intertwined that service on one apprises the other of
the suit in a legal manner—meaning that they are essentially a single
business operation. Id. at 494.
Here, plaintiff named “Allstate BK Real Estate Holdings, d/b/a Haza
Foods, LLC/Wendy’s,” and she served Allstate BK Real Estate Holdings. 19
Plaintiff’s mistake does not fall into the first exception because she did not
sue the correct defendant under a slightly incorrect name; she sued an
entirely different corporate entity. This situation is distinguishable from the
exception recognized in Hensgens, in which the plaintiff merely
misidentified the defendant slightly but served the proper defendant.
Plaintiff’s mistake also does not fall within the second exception because
plaintiff has not put forth enough facts to show that the two corporations
19
R. Doc. 1-1 (Case No. 18-789).
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were so closely related that service on one would operate as service on the
other. Indeed, Henderson does not identify any overlapping ownership or
any common officers, directors, or managing personnel between the two
entities.
The parties do not dispute that the two companies’ principal places of
business are located at the same address. 20 From this fact the plaintiff makes
the conclusory assertion that, “[i]t is quite obvious that the two business
entities are related in terms of management and business operations.”21 In
addition, the same legal team represents both Allstate and Haza, and defense
counsel in this case communicated with plaintiff’s counsel shortly after the
first suit was filed.22 But a shared address and shared counsel are not enough
for the Court to conclude that the two entities were so related that service of
one operates as service of the other. That Haza’s attorneys knew of the first
suit, and that Haza shared an address with Allstate, does not establish that
the two companies had the same management or were sufficiently entangled
that suit on one company was tantamount to suit on the other. Martin, 119
So. 2d at 494. Indeed, there is evidence of separate existence in that the two
20
21
22
R. Doc. 20-1 at 3 ¶ 11.
Id.
R. Doc. 24 at 4; R. Doc. 24-1.
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companies do not share an agent for service of process.23 Further, they are
separately organized: Allstate is a Texas limited partnership and plaintiff
alleges that Haza is a Delaware limited liability company. 24 And only Haza
does business in Louisiana,25 indicating that the two entities do not have the
same business portfolio. Neither of the exceptions allowing interruption by
a suit against the wrong defendant applies, and thus plaintiff’s first suit did
not interrupt prescription. Her second suit is prescribed.
Because plaintiff’s claims are prescribed and must be dismissed, the
Court denies defendant’s motion to dismiss as moot.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment
is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT.
13th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of December, 2018.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
See R. Doc. 1-1 at 2 (Case No. 18-789) (requesting service on Shoukat
Dbanani, Allstate’s agent for service of process); R. Doc. 3 (summons
addressed to CT Corporation System, Haza’s agent for service of process).
24
R. Doc. 6 at 4 (Case No. 18-789); R. Doc. 20-1 at 2 ¶ 8.
25
See id. at 4-5 (Case No. 18-789) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint
against Allstate because Allstate does not do business in Louisiana).
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