Miller v. St. Tammany Parish School Board et al

Filing 40

ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that the 31 motion to dismiss is GRANTED and plaintiffs' federal claims against defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice, and plaintiffs' state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 03/20/2019. (am)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
QUINTRELLE MILLER

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 18-3920

ST. TAMMANY PARISH
SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.

SECTION “B”(3)
ORDER AND REASONS

Defendants St. Tammany Parish School Board and W.L. Trey
Folse, III filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment.
Rec. Doc. 31. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition. Rec. Doc.
34. Defendants then sought, and were granted, leave to file a
reply. Rec. Doc. 39. For the reasons discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and
plaintiffs’ federal claims against defendants are DISMISSED with
prejudice, and plaintiffs’ state law claims are DISMISSED without
prejudice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of the alleged physical assault and
battery

of QM, a 12-year-old minor, by Jonathon Johnson, an

instructor and teacher at the Project Believe School program. Rec.
Doc. 1 at 5. Plaintiffs assert that QM was repeatedly kicked,
slapped, and punched by Jonathon Johnson after arriving at the
Project Believe campus in January 2017, and suffered physical and
mental

damages

as

a

result.

Id

at

6.

Plaintiffs

claim

that

instructors and supervisors at Project Believe were aware of QM’s
1

assault but did not interfere or report it to the school board.
Id. at 7. Plaintiffs allege that Quintrelle Miller made multiple
calls to defendant Trey Folse, head of the St. Tammany Parish
School Board, regarding the attacks on QM in March and April 2017.
Id. at 8. Additionally, plaintiffs state that Quintrelle Miller’s
mother, Carol Miller, witnessed the attacks when picking QM up
from school and was able to record a video, which was delivered to
Folse. Id. at 9. Ultimately, Johnson was fired on April 24, 2017.
Id. In June 2017 Johnson was arrested by the St. Tammany Sheriff’s
Office for, among other things, cruelty to a juvenile. Id. at 9.
Plaintiffs filed this action on April 13, 2018 seeking damages
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 for constitutional violations as well
as under Louisiana law for tort claims. Id. Plaintiffs assert that
defendant Johnson’s actions violated QM’s constitutional rights
under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and that
it was the policy or custom of the St. Tammany Parish School Board
to inadequately supervise and train its personnel, thereby failing
to discourage constitutional violations. Id. at 12. Therefore,
plaintiffs assert that the St. Tammany Parish School board is
liable for the assault and battery of QM and the financial and
emotional damages. Id. at 13. Plaintiffs seek punitive damages
from Johnson and the School Board for Johnson’s conduct, alleging
that the executives had actual knowledge of the attacks and did
not stop them. Id. at 10. Plaintiffs also bring state law claim
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under LSA-RC CC Art 2315 for damages resulting from the tortious
actions of defendant Johnson. Id. at 13-14.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
“A statute of limitations may support dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) where it is evident from the plaintiff's pleadings that
the action is barred and the pleadings fail to raise some basis
for tolling or the like.” Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366
(5th Cir. 2003)1
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint “must contain ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Varela v. Gonzalez, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When
deciding whether a plaintiff has met his burden, a court “accept[s]
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret[s] the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but
‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements’ cannot establish facial
plausibility.” Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d
512, 520 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009)) (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

1Because

the Court is considering only the complaint and resolves this issue
based on the passage of the statute of limitations, it is considered a
12(b)(6) motion rather than a summary judgment motion.

3

A. One-Year Prescriptive Period for § 1983 Claims
Plaintiffs’ federal claims must be dismissed because the
statute of limitations has run. “The statute of limitations for a
suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of
limitations

governing

personal

injuries

in

the

forum

state.”

Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001).
Louisiana Civil Code Article 3492 provides a one-year prescriptive
period for tort actions. See Jones v. Orleans Parish School Board,
688 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.1982). The Fifth Circuit has routinely
applied

this

one-year

prescriptive

period

to

§

1983

claims

brought in federal courts in Louisiana. See Heath v. Bd. of
Supervisors for S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 850 F.3d 731,
739 (5th Cir. 2017); Smith v. Reg'l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412,
421 (5th Cir. 2016) Pittman v. Conerly, 405 Fed.Appx. 916, 918
(5th Cir. 2010).
Although the statute of limitations is determined by state
law, federal law determines when a cause of action accrues. Heath
at 740. Under federal law, an action accrues “the moment the
plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has
sufficient

information

to

know

that

he

has

been

injured.”

Piotrowski at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs state in their complaint that “In March and April,
Quintrelle Miller made multiple calls to Defendant, Trey Folse,
head of the St. Tammany Parish School Board, and relayed to Folse
the continuing attacks and beatings of her minor son by Defendant
4

Johnson.”

Rec.

Doc.

1

at

8-9.

Therefore,

from

the

face

of

plaintiffs’ complaint, they knew of the injury that formed the
basis of this action since at least March 2017. Plaintiffs filed
their complaint on April 13, 2018, more than a year after the cause
of action accrued. Defendants also provide an affidavit from Kevin
Darouse, Senior Supervisor of Administration, that Carolyn Miller
provided a written complaint to the School System Administration
on April 3, 2017 concerning QM’s treatment. Rec. Doc. 31-3 at 1.
Defendants attach a copy of the letter as an exhibit to their
motion, showing that it is dated April 3, 2017. Rec. Doc. 31-3 at
3. Therefore, defendants aver that the action accrued on at least
April 3, 2017 and plaintiffs’ filing on April 13, 2018 was too
late. However, the Court does not need to consider this evidence
in finding that this action is time-barred, because plaintiffs
themselves state in their complaint that they were aware of the
alleged assault in March 2017.
Plaintiffs aver that Louisiana Civil Code Article 3496.1’s
three-year prescriptive period should apply rather than the oneyear statute of limitations governing personal injury actions.
However, the Supreme Court stated that:
In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), we held that
courts entertaining claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 should borrow the statute of limitations for
personal injury actions. This case raises the question
of what limitations period should apply to a § 1983
action where a State has one or more statutes of
limitations for certain enumerated intentional torts,
5

and a residual statute for all other personal injury
actions. We hold that the residual or general personal
injury statute of limitations applies.
Owens

v.

Okure,

488

U.S.

235,

236

(1989)

(emphasis

added).

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Louisiana Civil Code Article 3496.1 is
counter to binding Supreme Court precedent. Plaintiffs were aware
of the potential action by March 2017. Therefore, the statute of
limitations ran by March 2018 due to application of Louisiana’s
residual

or

general

personal

injury

statute

of

limitations,

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3492. Because this action was not
filed until April 13, 2018, more than a year after plaintiffs
became aware that QM had suffered an injury, the statute of
limitations on the federal claims has run.
B. State Law Claims
Because this Court is dismissing plaintiffs’ federal cause of
action2, the Court also dismisses the remaining state law cause of
actions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs assert
in their complaint that this Court has pendant jurisdiction of
their state law claims. Rec. Doc. 1 at 1.

The Court notes that although plaintiffs attempt to alternatively assert
their claims directly under the Constitution, no cause of action exists
against state officials directly under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
amendments. While the Supreme Court has recognized certain causes of action
against federal officials directly under the Constitution, see, e.g., Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), claims against state officials are properly asserted through §1983.
See Burns-Toole v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270, 1273 n.5 (5th Cir.1994); Hearth, Inc.
v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 617 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1980).
2

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When a court has original jurisdiction over a federal claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the court also has supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims when the state law claims are
“so related to the claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a). Section 1367(c) enumerates the circumstances in which a
district court may refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction:
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if—
(1)

the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State
law,

(2)

the claim substantially predominates over the claim
or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction,

(3)

the district court has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction, or

(4)

in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367 (emphasis added). Pursuant to § 1367 (c)(3), we

7

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state claims because the Court is dismissing all claims over which
it

has

original

jurisdiction.

Therefore,

the

remaining

state

claims are dismissed without prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 20th day of March, 2019.

___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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