Thomas et al v. Chambers et al

Filing 37

ORDER AND REASONS denying 21 Motion to Alter Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 22 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental and Amending Counterclaim. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 2/7/2019. (cg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KIERRA THOMAS, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 18-4373

RANDALL CHAMBERS, ET AL.

SECTION “R” (4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendants have moved under Federal Rules of Procedure 59 and 60
for the Court to reconsider its Order dismissing their counterclaim with
prejudice.1 Defendants separately seek leave to file a supplemental and
amending counterclaim. 2 Because defendants’ newly uncovered evidence in
support of their counterclaim does not remedy the fact that their claim is not
legally cognizable, their motions are denied.

I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident in Orleans Parish. 3

According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, on April 24, 2017, plaintiff Kierra
Thomas was driving an automobile westbound on Interstate 10 in the right-

1
2
3

R. Doc. 21; R. Doc. 20.
R. Doc. 22.
R. Doc. 1-4.

hand lane with plaintiffs Antoine Clark and Shirley Harris as passengers.4
Defendant Randall Chambers was allegedly driving a tractor-trailer next to
plaintiffs in the middle lane. 5 Chambers was allegedly driving the tractortrailer in the course of his employment with defendant God’s Way Trucking,
LLC.6 Plaintiffs allege that Thomas was driving “straight in a cautious
fashion” when Chambers negligently attempted to move into the right-hand
lane without “keep[ing] a proper lookout.”7 Chambers’ vehicle allegedly
struck plaintiffs’ vehicle, causing all three plaintiffs to be “violently jolted.”8
All three plaintiffs allege that the accident caused serious injuries to their
necks and backs, and that their injuries require continuing medical care and
treatment. 9
On April 6, 2018, plaintiffs filed suit against Chambers, God’s Way
Trucking, and defendant Canal Insurance Company. 10 Canal Insurance
allegedly insured the vehicle Chambers drove on the day of the collision. 11
Plaintiffs allege that Chambers’ negligence caused their injuries, and that

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Id. at 3 ¶¶ 7-8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. at 2 ¶ 3.
Id. at 3 ¶ 10.
Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
Id. at 5 ¶ 16; 6 ¶¶ 19, 22.
Id. at 2 ¶ 3.
Id.

2

God’s Way Trucking is liable for their damages as Chambers’ employer under
the doctrine of respondent superior. 12 Plaintiffs also allege causes of action
for negligent entrustment and negligent hiring against God’s Way
Trucking.13 Defendants removed the action to federal court on April 27,
2018, asserting diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 14
On July 3, 2018, defendants filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs. 15
Defendants alleged, in conclusory fashion, that plaintiffs intentionally
caused the collision and/or that plaintiffs suffered no injuries as a result of
the accident.16 Defendants asserted that plaintiffs’ petition for damages
constitutes a fraudulent misrepresentation under Louisiana law.17
Defendants further asserted that as a result of plaintiffs’ alleged
misrepresentations, they have suffered damages to be shown at trial,
including attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses.18
On July 11, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss defendants’
counterclaim and a motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Id. at 4 ¶¶ 13-14.
Id. ¶ 14.
R. Doc. 1.
R. Doc. 13.
Id. at 2 ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.

3

Procedure 11.19 On October 24, 2018, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to
dismiss, and dismissed defendants’ counterclaim with prejudice.20 The court
held that defendants’ counterclaim for fraud was not legally cognizable
because the claim was incompatible with an assertion that they justifiably
relied on plaintiffs’ alleged misrepresentations. 21 The Court noted that
defendants did not allege that they ever believed plaintiffs’ representations
were truthful, considering defendants were contesting them in litigation.22
The Court also held that defendants failed to allege sufficient facts to state a
claim for fraud under Federal Rule of Procedure 9(b). 23 The Court denied
plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions. 24
On October 26, 2018, two days after the Court issued its order,
defendants filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and
60, requesting that the Court reconsider the dismissal on the grounds that
they uncovered new evidence supporting their fraud claim. 25

They

separately filed a motion seeking leave to file an amended counterclaim.26

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20
21
22
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24
25
26

R. Doc. 14.
R. Doc. 20.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9-11.
R. Doc. 21.
R. Doc. 22.

4

The proposed amended counterclaim explains in greater detail the basis for
defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs’ complaint misrepresents what took
place on the day of the alleged collision. 27

Defendants assert (1) that

Chambers “did not experience any type of impact consistent with a motor
vehicle accident,” (2) that Chambers only merged into the right lane after “an
unknown third vehicle swerved directly in front of him into his lane 2-3
times,” and (3) that shortly after merging, plaintiffs “flagged” Chambers
down and indicated that they had been in a collision. 28 Defendants further
allege that there is circumstantial evidence supporting their allegation that
plaintiffs’ claims are fabricated. 29

Defendants assert that they have

connected plaintiffs to approximately fifteen other lawsuits where the
plaintiffs alleged they were side-swiped by an 18-wheel truck on Interstate
10 under very similar circumstances. 30 Defendants have attached police
reports associated with these other lawsuits to their motions.31 On January
17, 2019, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel-of-record,
which the Court granted.32

See R. Doc. 22-4.
Id. at 2 ¶ 3.
29
Id. at 2-9.
30
Id. Defendants generally assert that the individuals involved in these
other accidents are either the plaintiffs’ relatives or “associates.” Id.
31
See generally R. Doc. 21.
32
R. Doc. 34; R. Doc. 35.
5
27

28

II.

DISCUSSION
Defendants’ motions are all premised on the argument that their newly

discovered evidence entitles them to the relief they seek. Both Rule 59(e)
and Rule 60 allow a party to move for reconsideration of a judgment based
on newly discovered evidence. See Wright’s Well Control Servs., LLC v.
Oceaneering Int’l, Inc., No. 15-1720, 2018 WL 814187, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 9,
2018) (moving party can prevail on Rule 59(e) motion by presenting “newly
discovered or previously unavailable evidence”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) (a
court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order on the basis of
“newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered” at the time the order was issued). But “[a] motion to
reconsider [under Rule 59(e)] based on an alleged discovery of new evidence
should be granted only if . . . the facts discovered are of such a nature that
they would probably change the outcome.” Ferraro v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 796 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 2015). That same standard applies to
motions brought under Rule 60. See Compass Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Labs.,
Inc., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Rule 59 and Rule 60(b)(2) share the
same standard for granting relief on the basis of newly discovered
evidence.”).

Defendants’ motion to amend their counterclaim likewise

cannot be granted if the proposed amendment does not remedy the
6

deficiencies in their previous pleading. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962) (courts consider the “futility of [the] amendment” on a motion to
amend a complaint); Carmouche v. Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, No. 17-11479,
2018 WL 5279121, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2018) (denying motion to file
amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) because amendment would
be futile). Because defendants’ newly discovered facts would not change the
outcome of the Court’s Order dismissing their fraud claim, their motions are
denied.
The Court dismissed defendants’ counterclaim with prejudice
principally because their claim was incompatible with a plausible assertion
that they justifiably relied upon plaintiffs’ alleged misrepresentations. 33
Justifiable reliance is an element of an intentional misrepresentation claim
under Louisiana law. See Kadlec Med’l Ctr. v. Lakeview Anesthesia Assoc.,
527 F.3d 412, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The elements of a claim for intentional
misrepresentation in Louisiana are: (1) a misrepresentation of a material
fact; (2) made with intent to deceive; and (3) causing justifiable reliance with
resultant injury.”); Becnel v. Grodner, 982 So. 2d 891, 894 (La. App. 4 Cir.
2008). None of defendants’ new evidence is relevant to the Court’s analysis.

R. Doc. 20 at 8 (“Any assertion that defendants depended upon or
trusted plaintiffs’ alleged misrepresentations is facially absurd, because
defendants are contesting them in this litigation.”).
7
33

Defendants remain unable to state a cognizable claim for fraud because they
do

not

assert

that

they

ever

relied

upon

plaintiffs’

alleged

misrepresentations.
Defendants argue that Louisiana law does not require a showing of
justifiable reliance when alleging a claim for delictual fraud. 34 Defendants
correctly point out that Louisiana courts have been inconsistent with
explicitly naming justifiable reliance as an element of this claim. Compare
Williamson v. Haynes Best Western of Alexandria, 688 So. 2d 1201, 1239
(La. App. 4 Cir. 1997) (“Two elements are necessary to prove fraud: an intent
to defraud and actual or potential loss or damages.”), with Becnel, 982 So.
2d at 894 (“To recover under a cause of action in delictual fraud, a plaintiff
must prove three elements: (1) a misrepresentation of material fact, (2) made
with the intent to deceive, (3) causing justifiable reliance with resultant
injury.”). Federal courts applying Louisiana law, by contrast, routinely
include justifiable reliance as a distinct element of the claim. See, e.g.,

R. Doc. 32 at 2-3. Defendants’ emphasis on the fact that they state a
claim for delictual, rather than contractual, fraud is irrelevant. Id. at 3.
There has never been any confusion that defendants’ claim is for delictual
fraud. Indeed, in both is order dismissing defendants’ counterclaim and in
this order, the Court has applied the Louisiana standard for alleging delictual
fraud.
8
34

Kadlec, 527 F.3d at 418; Abbott v. Equity Grp., Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir.
1993); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1131 n.33 (5th Cir. 1988).
But defendants wrongly conclude from these slight discrepancies that
they are not required to assert that they at one point believed plaintiffs’
alleged misrepresentations, and acted to their detriment because of that
belief. The court in Sun Drilling Products Corporation v. Rayborn, 798 So.
2d 1141 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2001) explained:
Two elements are necessary to prove fraud: (1) an intent to
defraud and (2) actual or potential loss or damage. Federal
courts applying Louisiana law indicate that reliance is an element
of a claim for fraud. Moreover, for fraud or deceit to have caused
plaintiff’s damage, he must at least be able to say that had he
known the truth, he would not have acted as he did to his
detriment.
Whether this element is labeled reliance,
inducement, or causation, it is an element of a plaintiff’s case for
fraud.
Id. at 1152-53 (internal citations omitted). As this quotation makes clear, it
is immaterial whether Louisiana courts always explicitly list justifiable
reliance as an element. They nonetheless recognize that a party asserting
fraud is required to allege that it was unaware that the opposing party’s
representation was false, and that the misrepresentation caused it to act
differently than it would have had it known the truth. Defendants have not
made this assertion here. They do not allege that they were fooled by
plaintiffs’ alleged misrepresentations, so they therefore cannot allege that
they would have acted differently had they “known the truth.” Id.
9

Defendants assert that they have been damaged by being forced to
spend money on “attorney’s fees and litigation expenses” to defend
themselves from plaintiffs’ alleged lies.35 If defendants can prove their
allegations, there are other avenues by which they can recover the relief they
seek. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), (b)(3), (c)(1), (c)(2). But defendants’ factual
assertions are incompatible with a claim for delictual fraud under Louisiana
law, and their motions must therefore be denied.

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ (1) motion to alter the judgment
and/or motion for relief from judgment, and (2) defendants’ motion to file
an amended counterclaim, are DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of February, 2019.
7th
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

35

R. Doc. 22-4 at 10 ¶ 27.

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