Medley v. LeBlanc et al
Filing
21
ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's objections are OVERRULED and the 16 Report and Recommendation are ADOPTED as the Court's opinion, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 03/13/2019.(am)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROGER DALE MEDLEY
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 18-4488
JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL.
SECTION: “B”(3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before
the
Court
are
the
Magistrate
Judge’s
Report
and
Recommendation to dismiss Petitioner Roger Dale Medley’s request
for habeas corpus relief (Rec. Doc. 16) and Petitioner’s objections
to the Report and Recommendation (Rec. Doc. Nos. 19, 20). For the
reasons discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED and
the Report and Recommendation are ADOPTED as the Court’s opinion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2012, Petitioner was charged by an indictment
alleging that he committed aggravated rape of his three-year-old
son. See State v. Medley, No. 2005 KA 0100, 2015 WL 5515980, at *1
(La. App. 1st Cir. Sept. 18, 2015). According to the record,
Petitioner’s son told his mother that the Petitioner sexually
assaulted him when the Petitioner forced the victim to perform
oral sex on him. See id. After an investigation that lasted nearly
one year, Petitioner was arrested. See id. At trial, the jury heard
testimony from the Petitioner, the Petitioner’s two witnesses, the
1
victim,
the
victim’s
mother,
the
forensic
interviewer,
the
detective and the victim’s therapist. See id. at *2-4. While there
was conflicting testimony between the witnesses, 1 the jury found
the victim’s testimony sufficient. On August 7, 2014, the jury
found
Petitioner
guilty,
returning
a
responsive
verdict
of
indecent behavior with a juvenile. See id. at *1; Rec. Doc. 16 at
1 n.1.
On August 15, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 20
years imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence. The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed
on September 18, 2015. See Medley, 2015 WL 5515980, at *9. On
November 18, 2016, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his writ
application. See State v. Medley, 210 So. 3d 282. On May 9, 2017,
Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief. It was
denied on September 11, 2017.
On October 30, 2017, Petitioner filed the instant federal
habeas
corpus
application.
See
Rec.
Doc.
7.
According
to
The first time A.M. (the victim) was interviewed by Jo Rickels (the forensic
interviewer), he did not provide any pertinent information regarding
inappropriate acts by his father. However, at the next interview a year
later, A.M. recounted the facts that he had previously told to his mother.
A.M.’s testimony for trial was consisted with the second interview. On the
other hand, the detective testified that he was suspicious that K.O. (A.M.’s
mother) might be manipulating A.M. Ms. Rickels testified that while A.M. did
show one red flag in the second interview--blurting out allegations without
being prompted to do so--, he nevertheless could have just been made aware of
the reasons concerning his second interview. A.M.’s therapist testified that
A.M. remained consistent in his story. Defendant’s sister testified that K.O.
related the abuse to her in a “nonchalant manner.” Defendant testified that
he did not commit the abuse and that K.O. was using A.M. to manipulate him.
See Rec. Doc. 16 at 7-9.
1
2
Petitioner, there was insufficiency of evidence to convict him of
a crime. See id. On July 31, 2018, the magistrate judge reviewed
the petition and recommended it be denied with prejudice. See Rec.
Doc. 16. On August 16, 2018, Petitioner filed his first objections
to the report and recommendation. See Rec. Doc. 19. Then, on
September 17, 2018, Petitioner filed his second objections. See
Rec. Doc. 20.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) controls this Court’s review of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
corpus petition. See Poree v. Collins, 866 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir.
2017)
(“Federal
habeas
proceedings
are
subject
to
the
rules
prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act .
. .”). Under § 2254, an application for a writ of habeas corpus
may be denied on the merits, even if an applicant has failed to
exhaust state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Jones v.
Jones, 163 F.3d 285, 299 (5th Cir. 1998). Enacted as part of the
AEDPA, the amended subsections 2254(d)(1) and (2) provide the
standards of review for questions of fact, questions of law, and
mixed questions of both.
For pure questions of fact, factual findings are presumed to
be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted
by an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . a determination
of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be
3
correct.”).
The
applicant
has
the
burden
of
rebutting
the
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. However, a
writ of habeas corpus may be granted if the adjudication of the
claim on the merits “resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2);
Hankton v. Boutte, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126899 *1, *10 (E.D. La
June 29, 2018).
For pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact,
a state court’s determination is reviewed under § 2254(d)(1). See
Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). Specifically,
with
mixed
questions,
a
state
court’s
determination
receives
deference unless the decision was either contrary to federal law
or involved an unreasonable application of federal law.
See §
2254(d)(1); Hill, 210 F.3d at 485.
A state court’s decision is contrary to federal law if (1)
the state court applies a rule different from the governing law
set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases or (2) the state court
decides a case differently than the Supreme Court when there are
“materially indistinguishable facts.” See Poree, 866 F.3d at 246;
Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2010). A state
court’s decision involves an unreasonable application of federal
law when it applies a correct legal rule unreasonably to the facts
of the case. See White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014).
4
An inquiry under the unreasonable context involves not whether the
state
court’s
determination
was
incorrect,
but
whether
the
determination was objectively unreasonable. Boyer v. Vannoy, 863
F.3d 428, 454 (5th Cir. 2017).
The court in Boyer stated that the determination must not be
“merely wrong,” and that “clear error” will not be enough to
overturn a state court’s determination. Id; see also Puckett v.
Epps, 641 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that unreasonable
is not the same as incorrect, and thus an incorrect application of
the law will be affirmed if it is not also unreasonable).
Even if
a state court incorrectly applies Supreme Court precedent, that
mistake alone, does not mean that a petitioner is entitled to
habeas relief. See Puckett, 641 F.3d at 663.
Courts refer to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v.
Virginia
when
reviewing
and
analyzing
claims
challenging
the
sufficiency of the evidence. Courts must determine, “after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
[whether] any rational trier of fact could have found that the
essential elements of the crime [were proven] beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). However, this review
does
not
mean
that
courts
can
reweigh
the
evidence
or
the
credibility of the witnesses. Hankton, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126899
at *14 (quoting United States v. Young, 107 F. App’x 442, 443 (5th
Cir. 2004)).
5
The Court must review Petitioner’s claim under § 2254(d)(1)
as his claim is one of mixed law and fact. In other words, this
Court will defer to the state court’s determination unless the
petitioner shows that the result was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable
application
of
Federal
law.
See
28
U.S.C.
§
2254(d)(1).
First, Petitioner contends that he has never filed a habeas
corpus petition. The Court finds this argument unconvincing. Court
records clearly show that on October 30, 2017, Petitioner filled
out a document entitled “Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, For Writ
of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody.” See Rec. Doc. Nos.
1, 7. Originally, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of
Louisiana
received
the
petition.
Id.
The
case
was
later
transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana. See Rec. Doc. 3.
Subsequently, the Court sent Petitioner a notice of deficient
filing, in which Petitioner was to complete and return to the
court. See Rec. Doc. 5. On May 31, 2018, the Petition for Habeas
Corpus was again filed into the record. See Rec. Doc. 7. On that
same
day,
the
Petitioner’s
Application
to
Proceed
without
Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit was returned to the Court and
filed into the record. See Rec. Doc. 6. This record shows that
Petitioner,
using
the
same
signature
from
the
habeas
corpus
petition, signed this application on May 21, 2018. The authorized
officer signed the Statement of Account on May 23, 2018. See id.
6
at 2. Thus, the record clearly shows that Petitioner did in fact
file a habeas corpus petition.
Second, Petitioner argues that there was a lack of evidence
to convict him of a crime. The Court finds this argument lacks
merit.
Petitioner
convicted
of
the
was
charged
lesser
with
offense
of
aggravated
indecent
rape
behavior
but
was
with
a
juvenile. However, Petitioner’s sufficiency claim will be reviewed
in regards to the elements of the charged offense—aggravated rape. 2
This is so, because at trial, the Petitioner did not object to the
jury charge involving the responsive verdict. When a defendant
fails to object to the responsive verdict charge, the court will
not overturn the conviction if the jury returns with the responsive
verdict as long as the evidence is sufficient to support the
charged offense. State v. Porretto, 468 So. 2d 1142, 1147 (La.
1985). Therefore, the Court must see if the evidence would have
supported a conviction of the greater offense; in this case,
aggravated rape being the greater offense than indecent behavior
with a juvenile.
It is well established that the testimony of the victim alone
is sufficient evidence to support a conviction. See, e.g. State v.
2 Aggravated rape and first degree rape are the same and any reference to
aggravated rape is the same as a reference to first degree rape. See L.R.S. §
14:42(E). In Louisiana, first degree rape is committed “where the anal, oral,
or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the
victim because it is committed . . . [w]hen the victim is under the age of
thirteen years.” L.R.S. § 14:42.
7
Banks, 241 So. 3d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir. 2018); State v. Miller, 84
So. 3d 611, 617 (5th Cir. 2011); State v. Singleton, 922 So. 2d
647, 650 (5th Cir. 2006). In Banks, the court found that even
absent physical, medical, or scientific evidence, a conviction for
aggravated rape may be upheld based on testimony alone. 241 So. 3d
at 1250.
In
the
instant
case,
the
elements
of
the
crime
were
established through A.M.’s testimony, in which A.M. testified that
Petitioner made him perform oral intercourse on Petitioner.
See
Medley, 2015 WL 5515980, at *1 (A.M. stated that “defendant choked
him with his ‘woodie.’”). Petitioner argues that A.M.’s testimony
was not credible. The Court finds that argument unconvincing. While
there
was
some
conflicting
evidence
at
trial
concerning
the
multiple testimonies of the witnesses, the jury still found A.M.
credible and returned a verdict against Petitioner. Therefore, the
Court found A.M. credible. See Hankton, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126899 at *14 (quoting Ramirez v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 691, 695 (5th
Cir. 2005)(“All credibility choices and conflicting inferences are
to be resolved in favor of the verdict.”)). Since it is not the
job of the court to reweigh the credibility of the witnesses, this
Court defers to the trial court’s determination that A.M. was a
credible witness. See Hankton, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126899 at
*14; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to
show that the state court’s decision to reject his sufficiency
8
claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of
federal law.
Third,
Petitioner
argues
that
he
is
being
forced
to
participate in these proceedings without assistance of counsel.
The Court finds that Petitioner is mistaken. Petitioner has not
requested counsel. It is only in his objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation that petitioner brings up the
issue of counsel. Furthermore, Petitioner has no constitutional
right to counsel in habeas proceedings. See In re Goff, 250 F.3d
273, 276 (5th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the record does not show a
need
for
appointed
counsel
and
Petitioner
fails
to
show
an
inability to adequately present his claims.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of March, 2019.
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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