Jackson v. LeBlanc et al

Filing 19

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17 . Signed by Chief Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown.(jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PERRY JACKSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 18-4929

JAMES LEBLANC

SECTION “G”(2)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Petitioner Perry Jackson’s (“Petitioner”) objections to the Report and
Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge assigned to the case.1 Petitioner, a state
prisoner incarcerated in the Elayn Hunt Correctional Center in St. Gabriel, Louisiana, filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2 The Magistrate Judge
recommended that the petition be dismissed with prejudice on the merits.3 Petitioner objects to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.4 After reviewing the petition, the State’s response, the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, Petitioner’s objections, the record, and the
applicable law, the Court will overrule Petitioner’s objections, adopt the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation, and dismiss this action with prejudice.

1

Rec. Doc. 18.

2

Rec. Docs. 1, 8.

3

Rec. Doc. 17.

4

Rec. Doc. 18.

I. Background
A.

Factual Background
On September 24, 2015, Petitioner was charged by Bill of Information in the Orleans Parish

Criminal Court with one count of failure to register as a sex offender.5 On October 28, 2015,
Petitioner pleaded guilty as charged.6 The same day, Petitioner also pleaded guilty to a multiple
offender bill of information charging him as a second felony offender, and the state trial court
sentenced Petitioner to five years imprisonment at hard labor.7 Petitioner did not appeal his
conviction or sentence.
On March 28, 2016, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief with the state
trial court.8 The trial court denied the application on July 6, 2016.9 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit
denied Petitioner’s related writ application on October 14, 2016,10 and the Louisiana Supreme
Court also denied relief on April 27, 2018.11
On May 11, 2018, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition.12 In the petition,
Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance when his counsel: (1) failed to conduct
adequate discovery and investigation into the prior conviction and the validity of any registration
requirement imposed upon him or for which he was being prosecuted; (2) failed to inform him

5

State Rec., Vol. I of II, Bill of Information, Sept. 24, 2015.

6

State Rec., Vol. I of II, Plea Minutes, Oct. 28, 2015.

7

Id.

8

State Rec., Vol. I of II, Application for Post-Conviction Relief, Mar. 28, 2015.

9

State Rec., Vol. I of II, Order Denying Application for Post-Conviction Relief, Jul. 6, 2016.

10

State v. Jackson, 16-K-832 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/14/16); State Rec. Vol. II of II.

11

State ex rel Jackson v. State, 16-KH-2037 (La. 4/27/18); 242 So. 3d 560.

12

Rec. Docs. 1, 8.

2

who was accusing him of being a danger to the community; (3) failed to inform him of the details
of the right to jury trial before advising him to plead guilty; (4) failed to provide him with a copy
of or review with him the multiple bill before advising him to plead guilty; (5) allegedly committed
perjury by signing the waiver of rights forms indicating that she fully advised Petitioner of his
rights before he pleaded guilty to the charge and the multiple bill; and (6) allegedly told Petitioner
that if he complained about her representation she would assure that the plea deal was revoked.13
Petitioner also claims that the state courts failed to recognize that his multiple offender
adjudication was unconstitutional, because the state trial court failed to advise him of the
allegations and evidence against him before accepting the plea of guilty to the multiple offender
bill of information.14 On October 29, 2018, the State filed a response, arguing that Petitioner’s
claims should be dismissed on the merits.15 On November 13, 2018, Petitioner filed a reply to the
State’s response.16
B.

Report and Recommendation Findings
The Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court dismiss the petition with prejudice.17

First, the Magistrate Judge addressed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.18 The
Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his claim that his counsel failed
to conduct adequate discovery and investigation into the prior conviction and the validity of any

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Rec. Doc. 15.

16

Rec. Doc. 16.

17

Rec. Doc. 17.

18

Id. at 11–27.

3

registration requirement imposed.19 The Magistrate Judge noted that Petitioner was convicted of
forcible rape in 1994, and Louisiana’s sex offender registration and notice requirements applied to
his conviction.20 Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge determined that Petitioner had not established
that his counsel would have discovered by further investigation any reason to have challenged the
bill of information on the grounds that he was not required to register or that his time period for
registering had elapsed before 2015.21 Additionally, the Magistrate Judge noted that the Fifth
Circuit has held that amendments to these laws do not violate due process, equal protection, or
raise ex post facto considerations.22 Similarly, the Magistrate Judge noted that sex offender
registration laws are not “bills of attainer” as argued by Petitioner.23 Therefore, the Magistrate
Judge found that Petitioner had not established that any further investigation was necessary or
would have resulted in a basis to quash the charges.24
The Magistrate Judge found no merit to Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to enquire as to who accused him of being a danger to the community such
that he was required to register as a sex offender.25 The Magistrate Judge noted that Louisiana sex
offender registration laws do not require a specific finding that a sex offender is a danger to the
community.26 Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge noted that Petitioner’s counsel did file a motion

19

Id. at 15–20.

20

Id. at 16.

21

Id. at 18.

22

Id. at 18–19 (citing Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Center, 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 2001)).

23

Id. at 19.

24

Id. at 20.

25

Id. at 20–23.

26

Id. at 21.

4

for discovery, and the State provided counsel with police reports, meaning that the defense was
aware of the names of the officers who would have been potential witnesses.27 Additionally, the
Magistrate Judge found Petitioner’s self-serving and conclusory argument that he would not have
pleaded guilty if he knew who the officers were “fall[s] far short of satisfying Strickland’s
prejudice element.”28
Next, the Magistrate Judge addressed Petitioner’s argument that his counsel was ineffective
because she failed to inform Petitioner of the details included in his right to a jury trial.29 The
Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner had not identified a legal requirement that his attorney
explain the details of the rights he was waiving, as long as he was on general notice of those
rights.30 Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge noted that Petitioner did not question or seek
explanation of any of the rights he was waiving during the plea colloquy, despite being given the
opportunity to do so.31
The Magistrate Judge found no merit to Petitioner’s claims that his counsel was ineffective
because she failed to provide him with a copy of the multiple offender bill of information or review
it with him before advising him to plead guilty; committed perjury when she signed the plea forms
indicating that she fully explained Petitioner’s rights to him; and threatened to have the plea deal
revoked when Petitioner insisted on receiving more information about the charges.32 The

27

Id. at 22.

28

Id. at 23 (citing Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2001)).

29

Id. at 23–25.

30

Id. at 24.

31

Id. at 25 (citing State Rec., Vol. II of II, Plea Transcript (Oct. 28, 2015)).

32

Id. at 25–27.

5

Magistrate Judge found that these claims were contradicted by the record.33 Specifically, Petitioner
signed a waiver of rights form stating that the multiple offender bill of information was provided
to him, and he confirmed under oath that he had personally signed the form.34 Furthermore, the
Magistrate Judge noted that Petitioner confirmed in court that he was satisfied with the advice he
received from counsel.35 For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge determined that Petitioner had
not established that the state courts’ denial of relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims
was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.36
The Magistrate Judge also found that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his claim that
his guilty plea was unconstitutional because the state trial court failed to advise him of the evidence
and facts against him before accepting the guilty plea to the multiple offender bill of information.37
To the extent Petitioner argued that the trial court failed to comply with state law, the Magistrate
Judge found such a claim was not cognizable on federal habeas review.38 Furthermore, the
Magistrate Judge noted that “[t]he Fifth Circuit has recognized that a state court has no federal
constitutional duty to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea to a multiple offender bill because
the state judge is not determining guilt or innocence, and instead is enhancing a sentence based on
a prior conviction which the defendant deems true by admitting to the bill.”39 Additionally, the
Magistrate Judge noted that the transcript of the multiple offender plea proceedings establish that

33

Id. at 26.

34

Id. at 26 (citing State Rec., Vol. I of II, Waiver of Plea Rights (Oct. 28, 2015)).

35

Id. at 27 (citing State Rec., Vol. II of II, Plea Transcript (Oct. 28, 2015)).

36

Id.

37

Id. at 28–31.

38

Id. at 28.

39

Id. at 29 (citing Payne v. Whitley, 48 F.3d 529, 1995 WL 84049, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 1995)).

6

the state court outlined each of the rights and consequences of Petitioner’s plea, and Petitioner
expressed his clear understanding of the proceedings and consequences. 40 For these reasons, the
Magistrate Judge determined that Petitioner had not established that the state courts’ denial of
relief on this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.41
II. Objections
A.

Petitioner’s Objections
Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.42 Petitioner

contends that the Magistrate Judge did not consider all the relevant facts and law that applying to
his sex offender conviction.43 According to Petitioner, when he was released from prison in 1996,
the law in effect provided that he had to register as a sex offender for a period of 10 years, and he
was not “subjected to renew registration and notification duties within that 10 year period.”44
Petitioner contends that if his trial counsel would have investigated this issue she could have filed
a motion to quash the bill of information.45 Petitioner asserts that the result of the proceedings
would have been different if counsel had investigated this issue because there was no evidence to
prove that Petitioner had been compelled to renew his registration.46 Furthermore, Petitioner
contends that he would not have pleaded guilty if his counsel had properly investigated this issue.47

40

Id. at 31.

41

Id.

42

Rec. Doc. 18.

43

Id. at 3.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 3–4.

46

Id. at 4.

47

Id.

7

Petitioner argues that the Magistrate Judge failed to acknowledge that at the time of
Petitioner’s release from prison in 1996, Louisiana Revised Statute § 15:554(A) provided that the
duty to register expired 10 years from the date of the initial registration, provided that during the
10 year period the individual did not again become subject to the sex offender registration
requirements.48 Petitioner contends that the law in effect at the time of his original conviction is
controlling.49 Therefore, Petitioner argues that his duty to register as a sex offender ended ten years
after his release on December 15, 2006, and any changes to the law were ex post facto.50
Accordingly, Petitioner contends that his claim that his counsel failed to conduct adequate
discovery and investigation into the validity of the registration requirements warrants an
evidentiary hearing.51
B.

State’s Opposition
The State of Louisiana did not file a brief in opposition to Petitioner’s objections despite

receiving electronic notice of the filing.
III. Standard of Review
A.

Review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
In accordance with Local Rule 73.2, this case was referred to the Magistrate Judge to

provide a Report and Recommendation. The District Judge “may accept, reject, or modify the
recommended disposition” of a Magistrate Judge on a dispositive matter.52 The District Judge must

48

Id. at 7.

49
Id. at 8 (citing State v. Hyde, 2007-1314 (La. 11/21/07); 968 So. 2d 726; State v. Sorell, 1995-136 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 5/10/95); 656 So. 2d 1045; Massey v. La. Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, No. 2013-2789 (La.
10/15/14); 149 So. 3d 780).
50

Id. at 8–9.

51

Id. at 10, 12.

52

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

8

“determine de novo any part of the [Report and Recommendation] that has been properly objected
to.”53 The District Court’s review is limited to plain error for parts of the report which are not
properly objected to.54
B.

Standard of Review Under the AEDPA
Following the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), the standard of review used to evaluate issues presented in habeas corpus petitions
was revised “to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under
law.”55 For questions of fact, federal courts must defer to a state court’s findings unless they are
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.”56 A state court’s determinations on mixed questions of law and fact or pure
issues of law, on the other hand, are to be upheld unless they are “contrary to, or involve[ ] an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.”57
Regarding this standard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit further explains:
A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court’s
cases. A state-court decision will also be contrary to clearly established precedent
if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from
a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from
Supreme Court precedent. A state-court decision involves an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent if the state court identifies the correct

53

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded
by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).
54

55

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).

56

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

57

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

9

governing legal rule from the Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts
of the particular state prisoner’s case.58
If Supreme Court case law “give[s] no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in [the
petitioner’s] favor, ‘it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established
Federal law.’”59 Additionally, “unreasonable is not the same as erroneous or incorrect; an incorrect
application of the law by a state court will nonetheless be affirmed if it is not simultaneously
unreasonable.”60
IV. Law and Analysis
A.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Petitioner is not entitled to relief

on his claim that his counsel failed to conduct adequate discovery and investigation into the
validity of the registration requirements.61 Petitioner argues that he was released from prison in
1996, and his duty to register as a sex offender ended ten years after his release.62 Petitioner
contends that any changes to the law were ex post facto.63 Petitioner contends that if his trial
counsel would have investigated this issue, she could have filed a motion to quash the bill of
information.64 Because Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the Court
reviews this issue de novo.65

58

Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

59

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (quoting Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)).

60

Puckett v. Epps, 641 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).

61

Rec. Doc. 18.

62

Id. at 8.

63

Id. at 8–9.

64

Id. at 3–4.

65

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

10

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate
both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense.66 If a court finds that a petitioner fails on either of these two prongs, it may dispose of the
ineffective assistance claim without addressing the other prong.67 To satisfy the deficient
performance prong, a petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that the counsel’s conduct
falls within a wide range of reasonable representation.68 Petitioner must show that the conduct was
so egregious that it failed to meet the constitutional minimum guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.69 Courts addressing this prong of the test for ineffective counsel must consider the
reasonableness of counsel’s actions in light of all the circumstances.70 To prevail on the actual
prejudice prong, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 71 A
reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”72
The Supreme Court has held that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to
challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 73 To satisfy the prejudice
prong, the petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,

66

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984).

67

Id. at 697.

68

See Crockett v. McCotter, 796 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1986); Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432, 1441 (5th

Cir. 1985).
69

See Styron v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 438, 450 (5th Cir. 2001).

70

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

71

Id. at 694.

72

Id.

73

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).

11

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”74
In considering Petitioner’s claims on federal habeas corpus review that are repetitive of
claims already made to a state court, the central question “is not whether a federal court believes
the state court’s determination under Strickland was incorrect but whether [it] was unreasonable—
a substantially higher threshold.”75 In addition, “because the Strickland standard is a general
standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not
satisfied that standard.”76 Thus, this standard is considered “doubly deferential” on habeas corpus
review.77
“A defendant who alleges a failure to investigate on the part of his counsel must allege
with specificity what the investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the
outcome of the [proceedings].”78 Petitioner asserts that the result of the proceedings would have
been different if his counsel had investigated the sex offender registration requirements.
Specifically, Petitioner argues that his counsel could have quashed the bill of information charging
Petitioner with failure to register because Petitioner’s duty to register as a sex offender had expired
10 years after his release from prison in 1996.79
Louisiana’s sex offender registration laws were first enacted by in 1992, requiring that
“[a]ny adult residing in this state who has plead guilty or has been convicted of any sex offense

74

Id. at 59.

75

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 112 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478

76

Id.

77

Id.

(2007)).

78

Druery v. Thaler, 647 F.3d 535, 541 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Nelson v. Hargett, 989 F.2d 847, 850 (5th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1989).
79

Id.

12

shall register with the sheriff of the person’s residence.”80 Petitioner was convicted of forcible rape
in 1994, and he was initially released from prison and placed on parole on December 14, 1996.81
However, on January 17, 1997, Petitioner was arrested in Jefferson Parish, and his parole was
revoked.82 He served 15 months in prison, and was released on parole again on April 18, 1998. 83
Petitioner was then arrested again on October 18, 1998, at which time he was charged with a parole
violation and a new charge for possession of cocaine.84 Petitioner was sentenced to a term of five
years imprisonment on the possession of cocaine charge, to run concurrently to the sentence on
the parole violation.85 Petitioner completed the sentence on the parole violation on January 18,
2000,86 but remained incarcerated for the possession of cocaine charge until 2002.87
In 1996, Louisiana law provided that an individual was required to “comply with the
registration and notice provisions for a period of ten years after release from his confinement or
imprisonment.”88 However, the sex offender registration requirements were amended by the
Louisiana legislature in 2007 to require a sex offender to register for a period of 15 years after
release from prison.89 The amended provision further clarified that if an individual began the

80

State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 2000-JO-1767 (La. 2/21/01); 779 So. 2d 735, 738 (quoting La. Rev. Stat.
§ 15:542(A) (1992)).
81
Jackson v. Warden, Allen Correctional Center, No. 2000-2542, Report and Recommendation Rec. Doc.
No. 19, adopted Judgment, Rec. Doc. No. 23 (W.D. La. April 16, 2001).
82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Jackson v. Andrews, 31 F. App’x 833 (5th Cir. 2002).

88

La. Rev. Stat. § 15:544(A) (1992).

89

La. Rev. Stat. § 15:544(A) (2008).

13

period of registration but his parole was revoked, the period of registration would “begin anew on
the day the offender is released from incarceration, with no credit for the period of time in which
the offender complied with registration and notification requirements prior to his incarceration.”90
Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have held that because Louisiana’s sex offender registration law
is non-punitive in nature, retroactive application of the law does not violate the
Constitution’s proscription of ex post facto laws.91
The record does not support a conclusion that Petitioner was out of prison on the aggravated
rape conviction or any subsequent felony conviction for a total of 15 years between 1994 and 2015,
when he was charged with the instant failure to register offense. Petitioner’s argument that he was
not required to register or that his time-period for registering had elapsed before 2015 is unavailing.
Therefore, Petitioner has not established that his counsel would have discovered by further
investigation any reason to have challenged the bill of information. Accordingly, Petitioner has
not shown that his counsel’s performance was deficient or that his counsel’s performance
prejudiced the defense.
Petitioner does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings that Petitioner is not entitled
to relief on his claims that his trial counsel performed ineffectively by: (1) failing to inform him
who was accusing him of being a danger to the community; (2) failing to inform him of the details

La. Rev. Stat. § 15:544(D) (2008). See also La. Rev. Stat. § 15:544(D)(1) (2012) (“If an offender begins
the period of registration and notification and is subsequently incarcerated for any reason other than a misdemeanor
arrest or a misdemeanor conviction or for a felony arrest which does not result in a conviction, then the period of
registration and notification shall begin anew on the day the offender is released from incarceration, with no credit for
the period of time in which the offender complied with registration and notification requirements prior to his
incarceration.”) (version in effect at the time of Petitioner’s 2015 conviction)).
90

91

State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 2000-172 (La. 2/21/01); 779 So. 2d 735; Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional
Center, 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 2001); Criddle v. Kirschenhunter v. Sheriff’s Office, Beauregard Parish, 165 F.
App’x 362, 363 (5th Cir. Feb. 3, 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 913 (2006)).

14

of the right to jury trial before advising him to plead guilty; (3) failing to provide him with a copy
of or review with him the multiple bill before advising him to plead guilty; (4) allegedly
committing perjury by signing the waiver of rights forms indicating that she fully advised
Petitioner of his rights before he pleaded guilty to the charge and the multiple bill; and (5) allegedly
telling Petitioner that if he complained about her representation she would assure that the plea deal
was revoked. Reviewing these issues for plain error,92 and finding none, the Court adopts the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on these claims.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth in this Order and the Report and Recommendation adopted by
this Court, the Court concludes that the state courts’ denial of relief on Petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme
Court law.
B.

Claim that the Guilty Plea was Unconstitutional Because the State Trial Court Failed to
Advise Petitioner of the Evidence Against Him
Petitioner does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Petitioner is not

entitled to relief on his claim that the trial court erred by allegedly failing to advise Petitioner of
the evidence against him before accepting the guilty plea on the multiple offender bill of
information. To the extent Petitioner argues that the trial court violated state law, this claim is not
cognizable on federal habeas review.93 Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown that the state trial
court violated Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights during the multiple offender proceedings.
Accordingly, reviewing these issues for plain error,94 and finding none, the Court adopts the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

92

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

93

Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466, 506 (5th Cir. 1997).

94

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

15

V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has not shown that the state courts’ denial of relief
on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Additionally, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims that the state
trial court erred in failing to advise Petitioner of the evidence against him before accepting the
guilty plea on the multiple offender bill of information. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED.;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation and Petitioner Perry Jackson’s petition for issuance for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ______day of May, 2019.
16th

__________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

16