Lewis v. 21st Century Insurance Company
Filing
36
ORDER and REASONS granting 23 Motion for Reconsideration re 17 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion for partial summary judgment that California law governs the plaintiffs uninsured motori st claim, such that the plaintiff's claims for statutory penalties and attorney's fees under La. R.S. 22:1892 and/or 1973 must be dismissed with prejudice, is hereby GRANTED, as stated within document. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 2/25/2019. (cbs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
VON METRIZ LEWIS
CIVIL ACTION
v.
NO. 18-5013
21ST CENTURY
INSURANCE COMPANY
SECTION “F”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the defendant’s motion to reconsider this
Court’s February 6, 2019 Order and Reasons, in which the Court
denied the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment that
California law governs the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist claim.
For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
Background
This lawsuit arises from a hit-and-run motor vehicle accident
and the victim’s efforts to recover from her insurance carrier.
Von Metriz Lewis is a retired nurse who spends part of her
time at her residence in Louisiana and the other part at her home
in California where her daughter continues to reside.
On November
9, 2017, Lewis was driving her 2015 Jeep Wrangler in New Orleans
when a sedan violently struck her vehicle, causing it to flip onto
the driver’s side.
scene.
Upon impact, the driver of the sedan fled the
Immediately thereafter, Lewis was transported to the
emergency room by ambulance where she was treated for head, neck,
and back pain and admitted for overnight observation.
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Following
the
accident,
Lewis
submitted
a
claim
to
21st
Century Insurance Company for uninsured motorist (“UM”) benefits
under her personal automobile policy.
In hopes of resolving the
matter, Lewis presented 21st Century with an Offer of Settlement
and Satisfactory Proof of Loss.
21st Century responded with a
counteroffer, which Ms. Lewis chose not to accept; she claimed
that her medical expenses exceed the value of the counteroffer.
Believing the hit-and-run driver to be at fault, and believing
that 21st Century had acted in bad faith in handling her claim,
Lewis filed suit in Louisiana state court on April 3, 2018 to
recover damages resulting from the accident, as well as statutory
penalties and attorney’s fees.
21st Century timely removed the
action to this Court, invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction.
Several months later, Lewis presented 21st Century with a
second Offer of Settlement and Satisfactory Proof of Loss, in which
she alleged that the value of her damages exceeds the policy limits
of $100,000.
21st Century, through counsel, rejected that offer,
stating:
[G]iven that this is a California policy,
California law will apply.
And under these
circumstances, a tender is not required and
further investigation is necessary.
Once
additional
discovery
is
completed,
21st
Century Insurance Company will reevaluate
their position regarding your client’s claims.
On January 3, 2019, 21st Century moved for partial summary
judgment, requesting a determination that California law applies
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to the plaintiff’s UM claim, and that the plaintiff’s claims for
statutory penalties and attorney’s fees under La. R.S. §§ 22:1892
and/or 22:1973 must be dismissed with prejudice.
On February 6,
2019, the Court denied 21st Century’s motion for partial summary
judgment.
See Order and Reasons dtd. 2/6/19 (determining “that,
under the facts of this case as they currently exist, 21st Century
has not sustained its burden of establishing that California’s
policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not
applied”).
The defendant now moves the Court to reconsider its
February 6 Order and Reasons, provide clarification relative to
its ruling, and reverse its decision; alternatively, the defendant
requests that the Court issue a ruling that defendant’s reliance
on California law was reasonable and that the plaintiff’s bad faith
penalty claims should not be presented to the jury. 1
I.
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
the defendant’s motion for reconsideration; it states:
(b) Judgement on Multiple Claims or Involving
Multiple Parties. When an action presents more than one
The defendant also requests oral argument on its motion for
reconsideration. It is the Court’s policy to grant oral argument
on motions if one of the following factors is present: (1) there
is a need for an evidentiary hearing; (2) the motion or opposition
papers involve a novel or complex issue of law that is unsettled;
(3) the motion or opposition papers argue for a change in existing
law; (4) the motion or opposition papers implicate a constitutional
issue; or (5) the case itself is of widespread community interest.
Because the motion for reconsideration involves none of the above
factors, the request for oral argument is DENIED.
1
3
claim for relief whether as a claim, counterclaim,
crossclaim, or third-party claim or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all,
claims or parties only if the court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any
order or other decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end
the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be
revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights
and liabilities.
A.
21st Century asks the Court to reconsider its ruling that
California law does not apply to the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist
claim; the defendant contends that the facts upon which the Court
based its ruling – the plaintiff’s dual residency and potential
inability to recover under her policy should the issuing state’s
law be applied – have never been used by a Louisiana state or
federal
court
applying
Louisiana
law
as
abrogate another state’s insuring agreement.
a
primary
reason
to
The plaintiff urges
the Court to deny the defendant’s request for reconsideration
pursuant to Rule 59(e) on the ground that 21st Century fails to
identify
any
new
reconsideration.
evidence
or
change
in
the
law
warranting
Applying the more relaxed Rule 54(b) standard to
the defendant’s request for reconsideration, the Court finds that
reconsideration of its February 6 ruling is appropriate.
A motion seeking reconsideration or revision of a district
court ruling is analyzed under Rule 59(e), if it seeks to alter or
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amend a final judgment, or Rule 54(b), if it seeks to revise an
interlocutory order.
See Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 766
(5th Cir. 2017) (determining that the district court’s erroneous
application of the “more exacting” Rule 59(e) standard to an order
granting partial summary judgment was harmless error because the
appellant was not harmed by the procedural error).
Rule 54(b) authorizes a district court to “revise[] at any
time” “any order or other decision . . . that does not end the
action.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864
F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017).
Under this rule, the Court “is
free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems
sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening
change in or clarification of the substantive law.”
Austin, 864
F.3d at 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. &
Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on
other grounds, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.14
(5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
Compared to Rule 59(e), 2 “Rule 54(b)’s
approach to the interlocutory presentation of new arguments as the
case evolves [is] more flexible, reflecting the ‘inherent power of
the
rendering
district
court
to
afford
such
relief
from
Rule 59(e) “‘serve[s] the narrow purpose of allowing a party to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence,’ and it is ‘an extraordinary remedy that
should be used sparingly.’”
Austin, 864 F.3d at 336 (quoting
Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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interlocutory judgments as justice requires.’” Id. at 337 (quoting
Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Greene v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 764 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.)).
B.
The “less exacting” Rule 54(b) governs 21st Century’s request
for reconsideration because the Court’s February 6 Order and
Reasons constitutes an interlocutory order, rather than a final
judgment.
21st Century persuades the Court that California’s
policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not
applied, while the plaintiff offers no colorable argument in
opposition.
21st Century argues that the Court’s decision was largely
based upon a concern for two issues not raised by the parties: (1)
that the plaintiff has not received any payment under her policy,
and (2) that she may be precluded from receiving payment if the
arbitration provisions of such policy were applied as written.
Because Ms. Lewis had received no payment from the defendant - her
UM carrier - or the unidentified hit-and-run driver, and because
the application of California law could foreclose the plaintiff’s
ability to recover under her policy, the Court determined that
Louisiana’s interest in promoting full recovery for innocent tort
victims would be most seriously impaired if its law were not
applied.
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However, after reviewing the parties’ latest more adequately
briefed submissions, the Court recognizes that it arguably placed
undue emphasis upon the plaintiff’s ability to recover.
Although
applying California law could preclude a Louisiana resident from
recovering damages to which she may be entitled, applying Louisiana
law
would
unquestionably
abrogate
a
California
contract
by
exposing the insurance carrier to bad faith statutory penalties
for which it may not have foreseen or negotiated.
Further tipping
the scale slightly in favor of California is the fact that the
plaintiff’s premium for UM coverage was based upon the application
of California law to the contract. 3
See Champagne, 893 So. 2d at
789 (applying Mississippi UM law, rather than Louisiana UM law, in
part, because the “plaintiff’s premium for UM coverage was based
on the application of Mississippi law to the contract”). Moreover,
because Ms. Lewis testified under oath that she never disclosed to
21st Century that she had moved to Louisiana, the insurance carrier
did not reasonably expect to be subject to Louisiana UM law.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED: that
the defendant’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED, and the
In support of its motion for partial summary judgment, 21st
Century submitted the affidavit of Amy Dartez, a Special Claims
Representative, in which she attests:
The policy issued to Von O Metriz R Lewis was issued as
a California personal auto policy. The policy premiums
charged to Von O Metriz R Lewis reflect that the policy
was to cover vehicles garaged in View Park, California
90043.
3
7
Court reverses its prior ruling.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that
defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment that California
law governs the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist claim, such that
the plaintiff’s claims for statutory penalties and attorney’s fees
under La. R.S. §§ 22:1892 and/or 1973 must be dismissed with
prejudice, is hereby GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, February 25, 2019
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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