Fink v. St. Bernard Parish Government

Filing 16

ORDER AND REASONS denying 5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on 9/28/2018. (blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RYAN FINK

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 18-5447

ST. BERNARD PARISH
GOVERNMENT

SECTION I
ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is defendant St. Bernard Parish Government’s (“St. Bernard
Parish”) motion to dismiss plaintiff Ryan Fink’s (“Fink”) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the
motion is denied.
I.
Fink was employed by St. Bernard Parish from 2008 until his employment was
terminated in 2017. 1 He worked as the director of the TV and film office. 2 In May
2015, he was diagnosed with a medical condition that restricted him from pushing,
pulling, lifting, or carrying over ten pounds. 3 According to Fink, he was adequately
accommodated with a qualified assistant from May 2015 until his assistant was laid
off in May 2016. 4 Fink immediately requested additional accommodation from the

See R. Doc. No. 1, at 2, 4.
Id. at 2.
3 Id. In his complaint, Fink asserts that he was diagnosed with “pain, decreased
muscular strength and range of motion in both arms in part due to a congenital
narrowing of the spinal canal at C5-C7 levels.” Id.
4 Id.
1
2

chief administrative officer, Ronnie Alonzo (“Alonzo”), who allegedly failed to respond
to the request. 5
In January 2017, a new assistant was hired to work in the TV and film office,
although Fink contends that the assistant was unqualified and refused to assist him
in handling heavy equipment. Fink again requested accommodation from Alonzo,
who allegedly failed to provide such accommodation and refused to meet with Fink to
discuss his needs. 6 Fink alleges that, in addition to failing to properly accommodate
him, St. Bernard Parish failed to compensate him for overtime hours he worked,
despite the fact that he was eligible for such compensation. 7
On March 8, 2017, Fink was written up for “job related deficiencies,” which he
asserts were “attributable to Alonzo’s failure to accommodate [his] disability.” 8 Two
days after he was written up, Fink e-mailed Alonzo to again explain his need for
accommodation. 9 In response, Alonzo stated that there would be a meeting held to
discuss Fink’s needs. 10
On April 5, 2017, Fink was called into Tyrone Ben’s (“Ben”) office. 11 Fink’s
complaint describes Ben as “the St. Bernard Parish appointing authority.” 12
According to Fink, “Ben abruptly notified [him] that he was being terminated

Id.
Id.
7 R. Doc. No. 1, at 3, 4.
8 R. Doc. No. 1, at 4.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
5
6

2

immediately.” 13 Fink alleges that he “was not given any opportunity at all to
understand the specific charges of misconduct which had been leveled against him,
or any opportunity at all to respond to charges of misconduct. Specific charges were
only briefly alluded to in a pre-prepared letter which [he] received at the moment of
his termination.” 14 This meeting was allegedly held in accordance with St. Bernard
Parish Council Ordinance No. 1847-01-17 (the “ordinance”), which sets forth rules
and procedures for adjudicating the employment rights of employees designated as
regular civil service employees (“classified employees”). 15
In October 2017, the St. Bernard Parish Personnel Board held an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether Ben acted lawfully when he terminated Fink. 16 The
hearing was also conducted in accordance with the ordinance. 17 Fink contends that,
at the conclusion of the hearing, “it was established as a matter of fact that [Ben] had
conducted no pre-deprivation hearing[,]” and the Personnel Board decided that Ben’s
decision to terminate Fink was “sanctioned by [the] ordinance.” 18 Fink then filed this
lawsuit against St. Bernard Parish, alleging violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19

Id.
Id. Fink also contends that St. Bernard Parish still has possession of his personal
property. Id. at 4–5.
15 Id. at 5. According to his complaint, Fink had been informed that he was a classified
employee covered by the ordinance. Id. at 3.
16 Id. at 5.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 6.
19 Id. at 6–7.
13
14

3

II.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district
court may dismiss a complaint or part of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to set forth
well-pleaded factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor,
503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547)).
A facially plausible claim is one in which “the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. If the well-pleaded factual allegations “do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” then “the complaint has
alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original).
The Court will generally not look beyond the factual allegations in the
pleadings to determine whether relief should be granted. See Hicks v. Lingle, 370 F.
App’x 497, 498 (5th Cir. 2010); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In
assessing the complaint, however, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true
and liberally construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). “Dismissal is
appropriate when the complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’” Cutrer v.

4

McMillan, 308 F. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co.,
794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986)).
III.
Fink alleges that St. Bernard Parish violated his Fourteenth Amendment right
to procedural due process “by failing and refusing to provide [him] with any predeprivation notice, any meaningful pre-deprivation hearing, or any meaningful
opportunity to respond” before he was terminated. 20 However, St. Bernard Parish
moves to dismiss Fink’s procedural due process claim, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
According to St. Bernard Parish, “the rules established by parish ordinances
require that any appeal for judicial review of the . . . Personnel Board’s decision to
terminate an employee must be filed in the 34th Judicial District for the Parish of St.
Bernard.” It is uncontested that Fink has not filed an appeal of the personnel board’s
decision in the 34th Judicial District for the Parish of St. Bernard. However, his
failure to do so is not a bar to relief. 21

R. Doc. No. 1, at 7.
St. Bernard Parish cites a number of cases to support its contention that Fink must
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit in federal court. R. Doc.
No. 5-1, at 4. Those cases do not address constitutional due process claims brought
under § 1983. St. Bernard Parish also attempts to distinguish between
administrative and judicial remedies, see R. Doc. No. 8-2, at 3–4, but such distinction
is unpersuasive. See Romano v. Greenstein, 721 F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that “[t]here is no general requirement that a plaintiff exhaust state
administrative or judicial remedies before [the plaintiff] can pursue a claim under §
1983”) (citing Patsy, 457 U.S. at 516).
20
21

5

The United States Supreme Court has held that § 1983 claims do not require
the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516
(1982); see also Faulk v. Duplantis, No. 12-1714, 2013 WL 4431339, at *5 n.4 (E.D.
La. Aug. 16, 2013) (Zainey, J.) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff
was required to exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with Louisiana’s civil
service rules “because “[a] plaintiff’s ability to bring suit against a state actor under
§ 1983 for vindication of federal right is not subject to state law rules of
administrative exhaustion”). Fink’s decision to file this lawsuit in federal court,
instead of state court, is not grounds for dismissal of his § 1983 claims. 22
IV.
Alternatively, St. Bernard Parish argues that Fink has failed to state a viable
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 23 Specifically, St. Bernard Parish argues that the

In a telephone conference with the Court, see R. Doc. No. 13, St. Bernard Parish
argued that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Myrick v. City of Dallas effectively requires
Fink to exhaust his available remedies and file his lawsuit in state court because,
under Myrick, he cannot forego available state judicial remedies and then challenge
their constitutionality.

22

First, Myrick did not address exhaustion. Second, in Myrick, the Fifth Circuit held
that the plaintiff could not dispute the adequacy of post-deprivation state remedies
after choosing not to avail himself of them. Myrick v. City of Dallas, 810 F.2d 1382,
1388 (5th Cir. 1987). Fink’s claim challenges the adequacy of his pre-termination
hearing.
In its opposition to the motion to dismiss, Fink states that his “larger purpose” in
bringing this lawsuit “is having the offending provisions of [the ordinance] declared
repugnant to the United States Constitution.” R. Doc. No. 5, at 4. In reply, St. Bernard
Parish argues that the ordinance is facially constitutional. See R. Doc. No. 8-2, at 3–
5. However, in the present motion, St. Bernard Parish has only moved for the
dismissal of Fink’s § 1983 claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) analysis
requires the Court to determine whether the factual allegations in Fink’s well23

6

availability of a post-termination remedy precludes Fink’s procedural due process
claim. 24
“Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law,
deprives a person ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws.’” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
To state a § 1983 claim for a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to
procedural due process, Fink must “identify a protected life, liberty or property
interest and then prove that governmental action resulted in a deprivation of that
interest.” Baldwin v. Daniels, 250 F.3d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 2001).
As to the first element, whether a plaintiff has a property interest in his job is
determined by state law. Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 607 (1999); McDonald v. City
of Corinth, 102 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1996). Under Louisiana law, a permanent
classified civil service employee has a protected property interest in his job. Wallace
v. Shreve Memorial Library, 97 F.3d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Bell v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Res., 483 So. 2d 945, 949–50 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827
(1986)). Fink’s complaint alleges that he is a civil service employee with a property
interest in his continued employment with St. Bernard Parish, and St. Bernard
Parish does not contest this allegation. 25
As to the second element, the Due Process Clause requires that a state provide
“‘some kind of hearing’ prior to the discharge of an employee who has a
pleaded complaint sufficiently state a claim for relief. Accordingly, the Court does not
now need to consider the ordinance’s constitutionality.
24

25

R. Doc. No. 5, at X.

R. Doc. No. 1, at 7.
7

constitutionally protected property interest in his employment.” Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972)). The hearing need not be elaborate. Id. at 544. At a
minimum, however, the employee must receive “notice and an opportunity to
respond.” Id. at 546. “The . . . employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the
charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity
to present his side of the story.” Id. This Court is asked to decide whether the factual
allegations in Fink’s complaint create the reasonable inference that St. Bernard
Parish failed to provide Fink with the due process required by Loudermill.
St. Bernard Parish argues that Fink’s procedural due process claim is
precluded by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d
709 (5th Cir. 1987). It argues that Fink was “afforded a full hearing on his
termination and the right to appeal any decision upholding that termination” and
that, under Schaper, “the availability of this post-deprivation process precludes any
violation of procedural . . . due process.” 26
In Schaper, the Fifth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court’s
decisions in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517 (1984). Schaper, 813 F.2d at 715–16. “Under the Parratt/Hudson doctrine, a state
actor’s random and unauthorized deprivation of a plaintiff’s property does not result
in a violation of procedural due process rights if the state provides an adequate
postdeprivation remedy.” Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1995). St.

26

R. Doc. No. 5-1, at 6.
8

Bernard Parish has not argued that Ben’s actions were random and unauthorized or
that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine applies to this case. Schaper does not foreclose
Fink’s § 1983 claim. See Alexander, 62 F.3d at 713 (holding that the district court
erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s lawsuit based on the Parratt/Hudson doctrine
because the defendant had not met the “‘random and unauthorized’ element”).
“Assuming that [Fink] could have obtained meaningful judicial review of his
termination by filing an appeal” in state court, “doing so would only have provided
him with a post-termination hearing.” Greene v. Greenwood Pub. Sch. Dist., 890 F.3d
240, 243 (5th Cir. 2018). Fink’s due process claim is based on an alleged lack of predeprivation process, and “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment entitled him to a hearing
before he was terminated.” Id. Contrary to St. Bernard Parish’s argument with
respect to Myrick, the Fifth Circuit has explicitly held that a plaintiff’s “failure to
pursue available ‘postdeprivation remedies has no effect on his entitlement to
predeprivation process.” Id. at 243 & n.6 (quoting Chiles v. Morgan, No. 94-10980,
1995 WL 295931, at *2 (5th Cir. 1995) and citing Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 120
(3d Cir. 2000) (“[I]f the Constitution requires pre-termination procedures, [even] the
most thorough and fair post-termination hearing cannot undo the failure to provide
such procedures.”)).
Fink’s allegations, when taken as true, suggest that he was afforded no pretermination process. Fink contends that when he was called into Ben’s office in April
2017, he “was not given any opportunity at all to understand the specific charges of
misconduct which had been leveled against him, or any opportunity to respond to

9

charges of misconduct.” 27 At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, Fink’s allegations are sufficient
to state a claim for a violation of his procedural due process rights and survive
dismissal.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the St. Bernard Parish Government’s motion to dismiss
is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, September 28, 2018.

_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

27

R. Doc. No. 1, at 4.
10