Autin v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections et al
Filing
79
AMENDED ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that the subject defenses are not appropriate for 64 summary judgment disposition to the extent shown below. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 11/16/2021.(pp)
Case 2:20-cv-01214-ILRL-DPC Document 79 Filed 11/17/21 Page 1 of 13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TROY AUTIN
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 20-1214
ROBERT GOINGS SGT., ET AL.
SECTION “B”(2)
AMENDED ORDER AND REASONS
A previously issued Order and Reasons (Rec. Doc. 76) is hereby
amended to include analysis of the Heck Doctrine defense as to the
newly
added
defendant
Lieutenant
Stringer,
and
to
address
defendants’ qualified immunity defense. For the following reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the subject defenses are not appropriate
for summary judgment disposition to the extent shown below. 1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts of this case are laid out in greater detail in the
Order and Reasons denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(Rec. Doc. 55) and the Order and Reasons deny defendants’ motion
for reconsideration (Rec. Doc. 76). Those facts are incorporated
here by reference along with the summary judgment standards set
forth in the latter Order and Reasons. As seen below, the ultimate
findings of fact will involve a weighing of disputed evidentiary
materials at a trial on the merits. Our recitation of material
This ruling also applies to a second motion for summary judgment filed by
defendants Robert Goings, Jonathan Stringer and Lance Wallace. (Rec. Doc. 64)
1
1
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factual representations by each side at this summary judgment stage
is not determinative of credibility of any party or witness.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil
damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of
the challenged conduct. Murrell v. Chandler, 277 Fed.Appx. 341,
343 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (citing Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d
116, 120 (5th Cir.1996)). A qualified immunity defense alters the
usual
summary
judgment
burden
of
proof,
shifting
it
to
the
plaintiff to show that the defense is not available. See Vann v.
City of Southaven, 884 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hanks
v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017)). The plaintiff cannot
rest on conclusory assertions but must demonstrate genuine issues
of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the official's
conduct. Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, Tex., 564 F.3d 379, 382
(5th Cir.2009) (noting that, to avoid summary judgment on qualified
immunity, a plaintiff need not present absolute proof but must
offer more than mere allegations).
To satisfy this burden and overcome qualified immunity, the
plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test. Morgan v. Swanson, 659
F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011). First, the plaintiff must show “that
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right.” Id.
2
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Second, the plaintiff must show that the right was objectively
unreasonable in light of a clearly established law at the time of
the challenged conduct. Id.
It is within the Court’s discretion
to decide which of the two questions should be addressed first.
See Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2017). The
qualified immunity defense does not change the requirement that
the Court view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. This
standard, even on summary judgment, “gives ample room for mistaken
judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” See Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d
322, 326 (5th Cir.2008). Thus, even if the evidence supports a
conclusion
that
plaintiff’s
rights
were
violated,
qualified
immunity may still be invoked unless “the government official
violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Manis v. Lawson, 585
F.3d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 2009).
i.
Clearly Established Law
It is often appropriate to consider the “clearly established
law” question first, as it may make the constitutional violation
question unnecessary to answer. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
224, 237 (2009). Concerning excessive force claims, the right to
be free from excessive force was clearly established. However, we
must also ask whether plaintiff had a clearly established right to
3
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not have the defendants choke, punch, or kick him while he was
restrained and subdued from resisting. See City of Escondido, Cal.
v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (holding the Court of Appeals
erred in defining the clearly established right at a high level of
generality by saying only that the right to be free of excessive
force was clearly established). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly
told courts ... not to define clearly established law at a high
level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)
(quoting City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765,
1775–76 (2015)). “While there does not have to be a case directly
on point, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the
particular [action] beyond debate.... Of course, there can be the
rare obvious case, where the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct
is sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not
address similar circumstances.... But a body of relevant case law
is usually necessary to clearly establish the answer....” D.C. v.
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 581 (2018).
Plaintiff asserts that the defendants are prohibited from
using a qualified immunity defense because the “right to be free
from excessive/unnecessary force [is] clearly established.” Rec.
Doc. 70.
In support of his claim, plaintiff relies on highly
generalized language that the Eighth Amendment prohibits prison
officials
from
inflicting
cruel
and
unusual
punishment
on
prisoners, including excessive force. That generalized argument is
4
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insufficient. See City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct.
500,
503
(2019).
Rather,
plaintiff
should
point
to
existing
precedent that established the unlawfulness of the defendants’
specific actions were beyond debate.
In Bush v. Strain, the Fifth Circuit held that a certain
degree of force by law enforcement is impermissible after an
arrestee had been “restrained and subdued” and “was not resisting
arrest or attempting to flee.” 513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008).
Likewise, in Est. of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo, the Eleventh
Circuit agreed that the law was well established that striking an
unresisting inmate in the head while other officers restrained his
limbs was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 115 F.3d 1388 (8th
Cir. 1997). While these cases are not directly on point, they both
stand for the proposition that an officer’s use of force on an
unresisting
inmate
or
a
subdued
person
violates
the
Eighth
Amendment. There are material factual differences on whether force
was used by prison guards after plaintiff was restrained from
resisting their attempts to retrieve suspected contraband, i.e.
drugs, or in transporting within the prison.
ii.
Violation of a Constitutional Right
To establish the use of excessive force in violation of the
Constitution,
a
plaintiff
must
prove:
(1)
injury,
(2)
which
resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly
excessive,
and
(3)
the
excessiveness
5
of
which
was
clearly
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unreasonable. Elizondo v. Green, 671 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2012).
In
the
context
of
an
excessive-force
claim
against
prison
officials, the “core judicial inquiry” is “whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,
or
maliciously
and
sadistically
to
cause
harm.”
Hudson
v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).
Force beyond that which is reasonably required to maintain or
restore discipline is “wanton and unnecessary.” Id. at 7, 112 S.Ct.
995.
An officer's use of deadly force is not excessive, and thus
no constitutional violation occurs, when the officer reasonably
believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the
officer or to others.” Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, Tex., 564
F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d
404, 416 (5th Cir.2007)).
The first and second elements are satisfied by plaintiff’s
testimony that he incurred broken ribs, two black eyes, a swollen
face, and organ failure as a direct result of allegedly unprovoked
(excessive) beatings by defendants. Rec. Doc. 49 at 9-10; Rec.
Doc. 70 at 10 (stating plaintiff was brought into the lieutenant’s
office, viciously attacked, and then brought to the infirmary for
his injuries).
his
injuries.
The complaint also alleges the beating “caused”
Rec.
Doc.
49
at
9.
Plaintiff
denied
resisting
defendants or provoking their use of force, thusly satisfying the
third
prong’s
requirement
that
the
6
use
of
force
was
clearly
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unreasonable. Plaintiff also relies on the deposition testimony of
Keaton Wilson, in which Wilson stated that the defendant Robert
Goings physically assaulted plaintiff while he was cuffed behind
his back and fully restrained. Rec. Doc. 70 at 13; see also Rec.
Doc. 70-6. Plaintiff’s claim for force used after being restrained
survives;
however,
the
claim
for
force
used
prior
to
being
restrained is barred by Heck.
B. Heck Bar Applicability to Defendant Stringer
A claimant who pursues a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must
“(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law.”
Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP V. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257,
260 (5th Cir. 2008); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To determine whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists in a Section 1983 claim, the
court must assess if plaintiff’s claims are barred under Heck v.
Humphrey. Williams v. Lowe, No. 18-916, 2019 WL 1199100, at *2
(E.D.La. March 13, 2019).
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Court held that a plaintiff may not
challenge the constitutionality of his conviction under Section
1983 unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared
invalid or called into question by federal habeas corpus. 512 U.S.
477, 486-87 (1994). “Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in
a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment
7
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in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction of sentence[.]” Id. at 487. If so, the action
must be dismissed, “[b]ut if the district court determines that
the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate
the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the
plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.” Id.
If the Heck bar applies, then the court must grant summary
judgment as there are no genuine issues of material fact. Id. A
court’s
determination
on
whether
to
apply
the
bar
Heck
is
“analytical and fact-intensive, requiring [the court] to focus on
whether success on the excessive force claim requires negation of
an element of the criminal offense or proof of a fact that is
inherently
inconsistent
with
one
underlying
the
criminal
conviction.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has held, “a ‘conviction,’ for
purposes
of
Heck,
includes
ruling
in
a
prison
disciplinary
proceeding that results in a change to the prisoner’s sentence,
including the loss of good-time credits.” Clarke v. Stalder, 154
F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641, 644 (1997) (applying Heck to prisoner’s Section 1983 challenge
to
prisoner’s
plaintiff’s
administrative
good
time
process
credit)).
because
However,
it
the
could
affect
Supreme
Court
clarified that Heck does not categorically apply to all Section
1983 challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings. Wilkinson v.
8
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Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 84 (2005). Instead, Heck may bar a prisoner’s
suit “not because it sought nullification of the disciplinary
procedures but rather because nullification of the disciplinary
procedures would lead necessarily to restoration of good-time
credits and hence the shortening of the prisoner’s sentence.” Id.
For the reasons stated in a previous ruling, the disciplinary
reports
shall
be
admissible
as
reliable,
subject
to
later
reconsideration of the admissibility of both Goings’ report and
Stringer’s report. See Rec. Doc. 55
In
Aucoin
v.
Cupil,
the
plaintiff-prisoner
at
Dixon
Correctional Institute brought claims for excessive force under
Section 1983 against several prison guards and lieutenants. 958
F.3d 379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 567, 208 L. Ed. 2d
183 (2020).
Plaintiff claimed defendants assaulted him in his
cell, in the prison lobby, and in the shower. Id. at 381.
At a
subsequent disciplinary hearing, plaintiff was found guilty of
defiance, aggravated disobedience, and property destruction for
misconduct in his cell. Id. The district court ultimately dismissed
plaintiff’s claims as barred under the Heck doctrine. Id.
On review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Heck barred the
§ 1983 claim as to the alleged use of force in his cell—but not as
to the alleged use of force in the prison lobby and shower. Aucoin,
958 F.3d at 384. It reasoned that Heck did not bar claims based on
defendants use of excessive force after the plaintiff was subdued.
9
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The circuit found Heck only bars claims in which a plaintiff’s
factual allegations supporting his claim for excessive force are
necessarily
inconsistent
with
conviction. See Id. at 383.
the
validity
Like Autin,
of
his
criminal
Aucoin testified that
defendants’ use of force and violence against him were unprovoked,
and claimed the defendants beat him after he had surrendered. Id.
at 383. The latter claim challenged the exercise of force which is
distinct and isolated from the facts leading to the disciplinary
conviction. Id. at 383-84. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit ruled
that Heck did not bar claims for excessive force resulting from
the defendants’ actions after plaintiff surrendered. Id. at 384.
In Bush v. Strain, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s
allegation that “at no time did [she] resist her arrest” rendered
her excessive force claims barred by Heck for being inapposite to
the factual basis of her criminal proceeding. 513 F.3d 492, 498
(5th Cir. 2008).
take
this
Although the court acknowledged, “if we were to
statement
at
face
value,
we
might
agree
with
the
defendants,” it ultimately determined that the statement taken in
context with other evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff was
subject to excessive force after she was restrained. Id. at 499.
Upon reversing summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit noted that the
lower court made no findings on how long the plaintiff’s resistance
lasted or the cause of her injuries – both of which the Fifth
10
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Circuit deemed were material facts that were pertinent to her
claim. Id.
The instant action is analogous to Bush and Aucoin, discussed
supra. Like the plaintiff in Aucoin, this plaintiff also pled
excessive force claims against several correctional officers for
their actions allegedly done to the plaintiff both before and after
he was restrained. Plaintiff alleges that defendants used force
against him to subdue him and used excessive force after he was
restrained. Specifically, Autin asserted that Lt. Stringer “kept
his foot on [plaintiff’s] head” while he was restrained on the
floor of the Lieutenant’s office. During the incident on the sun
walk, he alleged that while handcuffed Sgt. Wallace came from the
sun unit and “began kicking Autin in his ribs in the left side.”
Plaintiff also alleged that both Sgt. Wallace and Lt. Stringer
“viciously stomped on [him]” while he was subdued on the ground.
Plaintiff’s claim that he was wholly blameless for the use of
force against him are in direct conflict with his disciplinary
convictions. The disciplinary ruling upheld the initial use of
force to extract suspected contraband from plaintiff.
Thus, a
ruling by this Court of excessive force as to the incident leading
up
to
the
plaintiff’s
restraint
would
ultimately
negate
his
disciplinary conviction. This is precisely the type of claim Heck
seeks to bar and must be dismissed.
11
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However, plaintiff’s excessive force claims based on actions
that occurred after he was restrained and handcuffed are outside
the realm of facts that led to his criminal conviction. See Bourne
v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2019) (permitting the
plaintiff to proceed with his excessive force claim because he
alleged that he was beaten after he submitted and was already
restrained.) These claims are “distinct” from the basis of his
disciplinary conviction because a finding of excessive force would
not negate the prison's finding that Autin violated its policies
and was subject to disciplinary action as a result. As in Bush,
plaintiff challenges the exercise of force that is isolated from
the facts forming the basis for his disciplinary conviction. As a
result, “the factual basis for the conviction is temporally and
conceptually distinct from the excessive force claim[s];” and
thus, the Heck bar is inapplicable.
Regarding plaintiff’s excessive force claims that are not
barred under Heck, plaintiff asserts that he did not resist the
officers
after
being
restrained;
and
instead,
the
defendants
(including Lt. Stringer) attacked him for no reason. See Rec. Doc.
64-1 at 16; see also Rec. Doc. 70 at 11-12. The defendants,
however, allege that Autin “continued to resist [during the sun
walk] by jerking his body back and forth and kicking the officers.”
Rec. Doc. 64-1 at 16. The defendants also assert that plaintiff
continued to “physically resist” after being restrained in the
12
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lieutenant’s office and “refused to comply” with their orders.
Rec. Doc. 64-1 at 4.
Because genuine issues of material fact exist
as to whether the use of force was appropriate after plaintiff was
restrained, summary disposition under Heck is not appropriate. See
Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 492 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding
that the plaintiff demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact
where force was employed after he was handcuffed and shackled on
the
floor,
notwithstanding
the
officers’
contention
that
the
plaintiff continued resisting); Preston v. Hicks, 721 F. App'x
342, 345 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that the plaintiff alleged facts
sufficient to state an excessive-force claim, despite medical
documentation indicating that his injuries might not have been
that severe, where the prison guard twisted the plaintiff's right
arm while he was “face down on the ground”). Accordingly, the
defendant Stringer is not entitled to summary judgment relief under
the Heck doctrine.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 16th day of November, 2021
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13
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