Obioha et al v. AIG Property Casualty Company et al

Filing 80

ORDER AND REASONS: The 68 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendant, AIG Property Casualty Company, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as set forth herein. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey on 8/27/2024. (jls)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CATHERINE OBIOHA ET AL.
VERSUS
AIG PROPERTY CASUALTY
COMPANY ET AL.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-4059
SECTION: “A”(2)
JUDGE JAY C. ZAINEY
MAGISTRATE JUDGE DONNA PHILLIPS
CURRAULT

ORDER AND REASONS
The following motion is before the Court: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Rec. Doc. 68) filed by Defendant, AIG Property Casualty Company (“AIG”). The plaintiffs,
Catherine and Pius Obioha, oppose the motion. The motion, submitted for consideration on
August 7, 2024, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument. For the reasons that
follow, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART.
I.

Background
This suit arises from damages to the plaintiffs’ home caused by Hurricane Ida. Their

home, located in New Orleans, is covered by a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by AIG.
(Rec. Doc. 1-2, ¶¶ 5-6). The plaintiffs allege that Ida caused damage to the roof, walls, ceiling,
windows, and structural integrity of the home, as well as incidental damage to personal property.
Upon discovery, the plaintiffs reported the loss. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11). The plaintiffs assert that, despite
satisfactory proof of loss, AIG failed to sufficiently cover the losses under the policy. (Id. ¶¶ 1415). Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed suit in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans on
August 26, 2022 (Rec. Doc. 1-1), asserting causes of action for breach of insurance contract and
bad faith. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 28-48). On October 20, 2022, the defendants removed the case to this Court
1

on the grounds that diversity of citizenship jurisdiction exists. (Rec. Doc. 1). On August 6, 2024,
the Court denied AIG’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’ jury demand. (Rec. Doc. 77).
AIG now moves for summary judgment on the following: (1) Plaintiffs’ personal
property/contents claim; (2) whether damages caused by surface water are covered; and (3)
Plaintiffs’ claims for landscaping damages. The Court considers these challenges below.
II.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper where there is “no genuine dispute of material fact” and “the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). That is, it is appropriate
where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any,” when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759
(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). A dispute
about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The court must draw all
justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Once the moving party has initially shown “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s cause,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must
come forward with “specific facts” showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Id. (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
Conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated
assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993)).

2

When faced with a well-supported motion for summary judgment, Rule 56 places the
burden on the non-movant to designate the specific facts in the record that create genuine issues
precluding summary judgment. Jones v. Sheehan, Young, & Culp, P.C., 82 F.3d 1334, 1338 (5th
Cir. 1996). The district court has no duty to survey the entire record in search of evidence to support
a non-movant's position. Id. (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1992); NisshoIwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir. 1988)).
III.

Discussion

1. Plaintiffs’ Personal Property/Contents Claim
AIG first argues that the plaintiffs’ personal property claim should be dismissed with
prejudice on the grounds that the plaintiffs have admitted that there was no damage to personal
property or contents. In support of its motion, it provides a portion of Pius Obioha’s deposition,
in which he was asked: “Did you, have you had any damage to the contents in your home?”
(Rec. Doc. 68-6, Deposition of Pius Obioha, at 71:14-15). In response, Obioha stated: “No, we
haven’t, we haven’t done that.” (Id. at 71:16). AIG relies solely on this statement, styling it an
admission, to request summary judgment of all claims of personal property loss. In opposition,
the plaintiffs assert that Obioha’s remark was clearly unrelated to that particular question, stating
that it makes no grammatical sense. Instead, they argue that Obioha’s response was to another
question or was in anticipation of questions regarding the letter’s contents. In support, they
provide the following, more substantive, excerpt of the deposition:
Q: Let me show you what I have labeled as Exhibit #4. A Letter dated December 2, 2021,
from Madeline Smalling.
A: That who [sic] I was, that’s the name I was trying to . . .
Q: And this is addressed to you and your wife.
Q: Do you recall receiving this letter?
A: I think, I think we’ve seen this letter here.
Q: Did you, have you had any damage to the contents in your home?
A: No, we haven’t, we haven’t done that.
3

Q: And did you ever submit the forced evacuation receipts that were requested in this
letter?
A: I don’t remember whether we did or not.
(Id. at 71:3-19). Obioha claims that he was referring to the contents of the letter, which stated
that a content inspection and submission of forced evacuation receipts were pending.1 He has
also provided his own affidavit, which states that the answer cited by AIG was not in response to
the question about content losses.2
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must draw all justifiable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. TIG Ins. Co., 276 F.3d at 759 (citing Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255). Regardless of whether the affidavit was properly notarized, the grounds upon which
AIG relies to dismiss this claim—an ambiguous statement during a deposition, at which counsel
did not seek clarification—is not sufficiently clear to grant summary judgment, especially when
viewed in favor of the Obiohas. Indeed, Obioha did not specifically state that they did not suffer
content damages. AIG has not produced sufficient evidence to prove that there are no damages
for personal property or contents, and therefore it has failed to carry its burden. Therefore, this
portion of the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
2. Plaintiffs’ Property Damages Caused by Surface or Ground Water
AIG next moves for summary judgment regarding damages caused by surface or ground
water. In support, it provides the policy’s “Surface and Ground Water” exclusion, which states
that AIG does not cover loss caused by “[f]lood, surface water, waves, tidal water, overflow of a
body of water, or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind,” and that it also does

The final line of the excerpt negates any argument that the statement “we haven’t done that” referred to whether the
evacuation receipts were submitted, because Obioha states that he could not recall whether they were. However, he
may have been referring to other portions of the letter, including whether a content inspection occurred.
2
The Court notes that while the document is a self-proclaimed affidavit and begins with the statement “Before me,
the undersigned notary, personally came and appeared in the presence of two competent witnesses,” there is no
signature or stamp by a notary, nor are there any signatures of witnesses. (See generally Rec. Doc. 75-4).
1

4

not cover loss from “[w]ater below the surface of the ground, including water which exerts
pressure on, or seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk, driveway, foundation, swimming
pool or other structure.” (Rec. Doc. 68-5, at 4). In response, Obioha contends that the damages
were caused by “wind-driven water and/or water from the sky and roof of the building.” (Rec.
Doc. 75, at 5). No further evidence has been provided.
At this stage, the Court will not grant summary judgment on the basis that an exclusion
bars a claim because water may have entered the house in a certain way. First, the burden is on
the insurer to prove that an exclusionary clause applies. Talley v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 760 So.
2d 1193, 1195 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/3/00) (citing Landry v. La. Hosp. Serv., Inc., 449 So. 2d 584
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1984)). AIG has failed to carry this burden, providing no evidence that the
losses claimed by the Obiohas were the result of ground or surface water under the policy.
Second, the source of the water that damaged the property is an issue of fact, best suited for a
jury to decide. Neither party produced evidence in support of their position, and AIG has failed
to carry its burden for summary judgment. Therefore, this portion of its Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED.
3. Plaintiffs’ Claims for Landscaping Damages
Finally, AIG requests that this Court grant summary judgment with respect to all claims
for landscaping damages and resulting repairs. The policy covers certain amounts for losses of
landscaping, which is defined as “your trees, lawn, shrubs, and other plants, not including
forestry or brush, on the grounds of your residence.” (Rec. Doc. 68-5, at 2). The landscaping
provision states that AIG will only pay for losses caused by aircraft; fire, lightning, or explosion;
riot or civil commotion; a vehicle not owned or operated by someone who lives at the residence;
or theft, attempted theft, or malicious mischief. (Id. at 3). AIG notes that the plaintiffs have not

5

alleged that their landscaping was damaged in any of these limited ways; instead, they allege
only that it was damaged by Hurricane Ida. In opposition, the Obiohas argue that “[p]ublic policy
in Louisiana strongly favors broad interpretations of insurance coverage for homeowners,
especially in areas prone to natural disasters such as hurricanes.” (Rec. Doc. 75, at 5). The
Obiohas do not otherwise argue that the landscaping was damaged by one of the covered causes.
The Obiohas’ argument fails. “If the policy wording at issue is clear and unambiguously
expresses the parties’ intent, the insurance contract must be enforced as written.” Cadwallader v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 848 So. 2d 577, 580 (La. 6/27/03) (citations omitted). Importantly, “[c]ourts
lack the authority to alter the terms of insurance contracts under the guise of contractual
interpretation when the policy’s provisions are couched in unambiguous terms.” Id. (citations
omitted). The Obiohas ask this Court to read into this agreement a public policy coverage for
hurricanes. The policy clearly limits the situations in which landscaping damages are covered.
There are no allegations, nor has any evidence been produced showing, that the landscaping was
damaged by anything besides Hurricane Ida. Under the plain terms of the policy, the Obiohas
cannot recover under the landscaping provision. Therefore, this portion of the Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 68),
filed by Defendant, AIG Property Casualty Company, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART.
August 27, 2024
___________________________________
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6