Dang v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. et al

Filing 31

ORDER and REASONS granting 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's claims against TEMA and TMNA are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Sarah S Vance on 5/1/2024. (cbs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DAVID BUI DANG

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 22-4607

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A.,
INC., ET AL.

SECTION “R” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants’ unopposed motion for summary
judgment. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion.

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff David Bui Dang brought this action in Louisiana state court

against defendants Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (“TMS”), 2 Toyota Motor
Engineering and Manufacturing North America, Inc. (“TEMA”), and Toyota
Motor North America, Inc. (“TMNA”).3 Plaintiff alleges that on October 19,
2020, he was driving a 2014 Lexus ES350 on the interstate in New Orleans,
Louisiana, when he involuntarily collided with a guard rail.4 Plaintiff asserts

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2
3
4

R. Doc. 21.
On April 11, 2024, the Court dismissed TMS from the action without
prejudice for plaintiff’s failure to serve process. R. Doc. 27.
R. Doc. 1-1 at 7.
Id. at 7-8; R. Doc. 21-5 at 2.

that the vehicle’s airbags did not deploy upon impact and that, as a result of
the collision and non-deployment of the airbags, he sustained injuries to his
right ankle, right foot, knees, and head.5 Following the accident, the vehicle
was taken to an unknown junkyard by a tow company, after which it was
picked up by an automotive industry company called Copart.6

No

inspections of the vehicle were made by plaintiff or defendants following the
accident.7 Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle was manufactured by defendants
and that it was defective because its airbag safety system failed to deploy
despite a high-impact collision.8 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the airbag
system was unreasonably dangerous in construction and/or composition
and, therefore, seeks to hold defendants jointly liable under the Louisiana
Products Liability Act (“LPLA”). 9
TEMA answered the suit, explaining that it “does not manufacture,
assemble or sell to the public any Toyota or Lexus vehicles or components
for such vehicles,” and “does not provide after sales service for Toyota or
Lexus vehicles.”10 TEMA further stated that although it had “certain limited

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6
7
8
9
10

R. Doc. 1-1 at 8-9.
R. Doc. 21-5 at 3-4.
Id. at 4; R. Doc. 21-1 at 2.
R. Doc. 1-1 at 8.
Id.
R. Doc. 1-2 at 1-2.
2

involvement with the 2014 U.S. bound Lexus ES350, Toyota Motor
Corporation (“TMC”), located in Japan, was responsible for and had overall
design and developmental testing authority for the 2013-2018 U.S. bound
Lexus ES350.”11 TMNA filed an answer, asserting that it is responsible for
business efficiency and coordination among Toyota’s North American sales,
manufacturing, and engineering operations.12

TMNA denied any

responsibility for the “design, developmental testing, manufacture,
assembly, importation, distribution, inspection, sale, marketing, or servicing
of the 2014 U.S. bound Lexus ES350 or any of its systems or component
parts.” 13
TEMA and TMNA removed the action on November 21, 2022, based
on diversity jurisdiction. 14

TEMA and TMNA now move for summary

judgment. 15 They contend that plaintiff never propounded discovery on the
named defendants, never noticed a deposition, and never disclosed any
expert witnesses or provided any expert witness report.16 TEMA and TMNA
further state that, in response to an interrogatory requesting the identity of

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12
13
14
15
16

Id. at 2.
R. Doc. 5-2 at 15.
Id. at 16.
R. Doc. 1.
R. Doc. 21.
R. Doc. 21-1 at 4-5.
3

all persons who may testify on plaintiff’s behalf at trial and the substance of
their testimony, plaintiff responded “none.”17 Plaintiff also indicated in his
response to an interrogatory that he would not produce any reports,
correspondence, or analyses prepared by any experts relating to the vehicle. 18
TEMA and TMNA therefore contend that, besides his own self-serving
testimony or belief that the vehicle was defective, plaintiff does not intend to
call any witnesses who can support his claims or any experts who can offer
an opinion as to why or how the lack of airbag deployment caused his
injuries.19 Without such testimony, TEMA and TMNA assert that plaintiff
cannot prove injury causation under Louisiana law.20
Moreover, TEMA and TMNA contend that plaintiff lacks evidence to
support his LPLA claim, including evidence that TEMA and TMNA are the
“manufacturers” of the allegedly defective product and that the allegedly
unreasonably dangerous characteristic of the product arose during the
product’s reasonably anticipated use when viewed from the perspective of
the manufacturer.21 TEMA and TMNA also argue that there is neither
evidence of the vehicle and its allegedly defective components and condition,

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18
19
20
21

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5-6.
4

nor expert opinions supporting the allegedly unreasonably dangerous
characteristic or its causation of his injuries. 22
Finally, TEMA and TMNA assert that plaintiff was intoxicated at the
time of the crash, which they contend negates plaintiff’s claim that his
injuries and damages were solely and proximately caused by the alleged
defect in the vehicle’s airbag safety system. 23 TEMA and TMNA attach to
their motion certified medical records taken at the hospital where plaintiff
was treated after the accident, in which the treating physician stated that
plaintiff reportedly “drank a significant amount of alcohol and then crashed
his car on purpose [in] an attempt to end his life secondary to depression and
suicidal thoughts after a break-up 5 months ago.”24 Additionally, TEMA and
TMNA submit the deposition transcript of Officer Michael Christian, the
investigating officer deployed to the scene of the accident, who stated that
plaintiff told him that he had been drinking before the accident.25 Although
plaintiff denied having used alcohol for the twenty-four hours preceding the
accident in his responses to interrogatories, 26 he did not deny his alcohol
consumption during a later deposition, stating only that he could not

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25
26

Id.
Id. at 6-7.
R. Doc. 24-1 at 1, 3.
R. Doc. 21-7 at 7-8.
R. Doc. 1-3 at 11.
5

remember whether he consumed alcohol on the morning of the accident.27
TEMA and TMNA argue that this evidence undermines the causation
element of plaintiff’s claim, and that the Court is left with no other evidence
from which it can be deduced that “the cause of the accident was anything
other than the actions of the intoxicated plaintiff.”28 TEMA and TMNA
therefore assert that because plaintiff has insufficient evidence to carry his
burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted. Plaintiff does not
oppose the motion. 29
The Court considers the motion below.

27
28
29

R. Doc. 21-1 at 6-7; R. Doc. 21-6 at 29.
Id. at 7.
TEMA and TMNA’s motion for summary judgment was set for
submission on April 3, 2024, making plaintiff’s memorandum in
opposition due on March 26, 2024. See Local Rule 7.5. Plaintiff failed
to respond by that date. Instead, plaintiff filed an opposition fourteen
days later, on April 9, 2024. R. Doc. 26. He did so without seeking
leave of Court, and he offered no explanation for his untimely filing.
Due to a deficiency in plaintiff’s opposition, the Court marked the filing
as deficient, and gave plaintiff seven days to cure the deficiency. R.
Doc. 27. Plaintiff attempted to refile his opposition on April 17, 2024,
but the document was again marked as deficient. R. Doc. 29. Plaintiff
failed to cure the deficiency within seven days and, therefore, the
opposition is stricken from the record and will not be considered by the
Court in ruling on defendants’ motion.
6

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). “When assessing whether a
dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence
in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or
weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness
Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008) (first citing Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); and then citing Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). All
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but
“unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory
facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a
motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d
1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Little,
37 F.3d at 1075 (noting that the moving party’s “burden is not satisfied with
‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory
7

allegations,’ by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of
evidence” (citations omitted)). “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party must put forth evidence that would
“entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”
Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Golden Rule Ins. v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he nonmoving party can defeat the
motion” by either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the
“existence of a genuine dispute of material fact,” or by “showing that the
moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable
fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by
pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
325.

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by

submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
8

genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the
pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for
resolution. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 ‘mandates the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).
In the Fifth Circuit, a district court may not grant a “default” summary
judgment on the ground that it is unopposed. See Morgan v. Fed. Express
Corp., 114 F. Supp. 3d 434, 437 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (collecting cases). Even in
the context of unopposed motions for summary judgment, the movant must
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50
F.3d 360, 362 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hibernia Nat. Bank v.
Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir.
1985)). If the moving party fails to meet its burden, the Court must deny its
motion for summary judgment. Id. In determining whether the movant has
met its burden, the Court may accept the movant’s evidence as undisputed.
Morgan, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (quoting UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Long,
227 F. Supp. 2d 609 (N.D. Tex. 2002)).
9

III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings his claims pursuant to the LPLA. The LPLA provides
for “the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused
by their products.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.52; see also Brown v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
LPLA’s remedies are “exclusive”). The elements of a products liability claim
under the LPLA are “(1) that the defendant is a manufacturer of the product;
(2) that the claimant’s damage was proximately caused by a characteristic of
the product; (3) that this characteristic made the product ‘unreasonably
dangerous’; and (4) that the claimant’s damage arose from a reasonably
anticipated use of the product by the claimant or someone else.” Jack v.
Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1256, 1258 (La. 2007) (citing La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 9:280054(A)). A product is “unreasonably dangerous” within
the meaning of the statute “if and only if” it is unreasonably dangerous: (1) in
construction or composition, (2) in design, (3) because of inadequate
warning, or (4) because of nonconformity to an express warranty. La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.54(B)(1)-(4). Thus, the LPLA limits the plaintiff to four
theories of recovery: construction or composition defect, design defect,
inadequate warning, and breach of express warranty. See id.
10

In his interrogatory responses, plaintiff contends that the vehicle at
issue was defective both in construction or composition and in design.30
TEMA and TMNA contend that plaintiff cannot sustain his burden under the
LPLA on either theory of recovery.31 See Caboni v. General Motors Corp.,
398 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he claimant in an LPLA products
liability claim has the burden of proving every element of the claim.” (citing
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.54(D)). First, they argue that plaintiff cannot
prove that they were the manufacturers of the subject vehicle so as to be
liable under the LPLA.32 See Ayala v. Enerco Group, Inc., 569 F. App’x 241,
245 (5th Cir. 2014) (“The LPLA does not provide a cause of action against
sellers of products not falling under the LPLA’s definition of ‘manufacturer.’”
(citing La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.53)). The LPLA defines a manufacturer
as “a person or entity who is in the business of manufacturing a product for
placement into trade or commerce.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.53(1).
“Manufacturing a product” under the Act “means producing, making,
fabricating, constructing, designing, remanufacturing, reconditioning or
refurbishing a product.” Id. The statute further defines a manufacturer to
include (1) an entity that “otherwise holds himself out to be the manufacturer

30
31
32

R. Doc. 1-3 at 8-9, 17.
R. Doc. 21-1.
Id. at 9-10.
11

of the product”; (2) “[a] seller of a product who exercises control over or
influences a characteristic of the design, construction or quality of the
product that causes damage”; (3) “[a] manufacturer of a product who
incorporates into the product a component or part manufactured by another
manufacturer”; or (4) “[a] seller of a product of an alien manufacturer if the
seller is in the business of importing or distributing the product for resale
and the seller is the alter ego of the alien manufacturer.”
§ 9:2800.53(1)(a)-(d).

Id.

TEMA and TMNA denied that they were the

manufacturers of the subject vehicle in their answers and Rule 26
disclosures, and plaintiff has not put forth any evidence or argument
showing that a genuine issue exists as to TEMA and TMNA’s manufacturer
status. Plaintiff has therefore failed to carry his burden of proof at the
summary judgment stage as to this essential element of his LPLA claim. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that summary judgment is proper “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law”); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (holding that a party may support
its motion for summary judgment by showing that there is no evidence to
support an essential element of the non-movant’s claim); see also Stahl v.
12

Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f the non-moving
party can point to nothing in the record supporting its claim, summary
judgment is appropriate.”).
Additionally, TEMA and TMNA assert that summary judgment is
warranted because plaintiff cannot prove a defect either in construction or
composition or in design. First, as to the “construction or composition” or
“manufacturing” defect claim, “plaintiff must establish that, at the time the
product left the manufacturer’s control, ‘the product deviated in a material
way from the manufacturer’s specifications or performance standards for the
product or from otherwise identical products manufactured by the same
manufacturer.’”

Stahl, 283 F.3d at 261 (quoting La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 9:2800.55). “In other words, a plaintiff must prove that a product ‘is
defective due to a mistake in the manufacturing process.’” Abrogast v. Timex
Corp., No. 05-2076, 2010 WL 148288, at *5 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2010)
(quoting Stahl, 283 F.3d at 263). Furthermore, “[t]o make this showing, a
plaintiff ‘must demonstrate not only what a manufacturer’s specifications or
performance standards are for a particular product, but how the product in
question materially deviated from those standards so as to render it
unreasonably dangerous.’” Moore v. BASF Corp., No. 11-1001, 2012 WL

13

6025917, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2012) (quoting Welch v. Technotrim, Inc.,
778 So. 2d 728, 733 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2001)).
Here, plaintiff alleges that the vehicle involved in the accident was
defective in its construction or composition because its airbag safety system
failed to deploy despite the vehicle sustaining a high impact front end
collision. 33 In response to an interrogatory asking plaintiff to specify the
alleged manufacturing defect and to identify any specifications or
performance standards from which he contends the vehicle deviated,
plaintiff responded:34
Research was conducted about the manufacturing defects of the
Toyota airbags and it stated that “NHTSA said in April it had
identified two frontal crash events, including one fatal crash
‘involving Toyota products where (electrical overstress) is
suspected as the likely cause’ of airbags not deploying. Both
involved newer Corolla cars.”
Plaintiff’s reference to an undated, general report, which is not itself in
the record, of two accidents involving vehicles of a different make and model
is insufficient to support a manufacturing defect claim. See Brocato v.
DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 2015 WL 854150, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2015)
(noting that a manufacturing defect claim is shown by comparing the

33
34

R. Doc. 1-1 ¶ 6; R. Doc. 1-3 at 17 (“Plaintiff claims that the airbag failing
to come out is dangerous [in construction and/or composition].”).
R. Doc. 1-3 at 8-9.
14

allegedly defective product to identical product models). Plaintiff has also
failed to show how the allegedly defective vehicle’s airbag system materially
deviated from any comparator products’ airbag systems. See Md. Cas. Co. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-1399, 2009 WL 1766856, at *2 (M.D. La. June
19, 2009) (holding that plaintiffs “failed to present any evidence to create an
issue of material fact regarding the issue of defective construction or
composition of” allegedly defective Christmas tree lights because they did not
argue that the defective lights were materially different from exemplar
lights). Because the subject vehicle has been taken to a junkyard, and
plaintiff did not inspect or test the vehicle’s airbag system beforehand,35
plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the product deviated from any “otherwise
identical” product.

See Moore v. BASF Corp., No. 11-1001, 2012 WL

6025917, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2012) (holding that because plaintiffs did
not test the particular paint products used in the allegedly defective product,
and did not show that they “even ha[d] custody of the paint in question so
that tests may be conducted,” plaintiffs failed to show that the products
deviated otherwise identical products).

Moreover, plaintiff has not

submitted or identified any summary judgment evidence, expert or
otherwise, showing what the manufacturer’s specifications or performance

35

R. Doc. 1-3 at 3-4, 16.
15

standards were for the Lexus ES350 and its airbags, or how the plaintiff’s
vehicle and its airbag system materially deviated from these standards so as
to render it unreasonably dangerous. See Lacassin v. Virco, Inc., No. 11-CV2104, 2012 WL 6183682, at *4-5 (W.D. La. Dec. 11, 2012) (granting summary
judgment on manufacturing defect claim when plaintiff did not present “any
objective evidence, expert or otherwise, that a defective condition actually
existed in the [product] at the time it left [the manufacturer’s] control”);
Arant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 13-cv-2209, 2015 WL 1419335, at *4-5
(W.D. La. Mar. 26, 2015), aff’d 626 F. App’x 237 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that
expert testimony was required to prove LPLA claims when the question
before the jury was “not an assessment that a lay person can make from a
mere inspection of the product itself,” and granting summary judgment
because plaintiff failed to submit any expert or other testimony as to the
alleged unreasonably dangerous characteristic). Without such evidence,
plaintiff has failed to identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for
trial as to whether the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous in construction
or composition. See Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So. 3d 607, 613-14 (La. 2015)
(finding no competent summary judgment evidence to support plaintiff’s
“construction or composition” defect claim when plaintiff’s expert was not
confirmed as an airbag expert or an accident re-constructionist, and there
16

was no factual evidence to support claim); Fernandez v. Tamko Bldg. Prods.,
Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 854, 870-71 (M.D. La. 2014) (holding that plaintiff failed
to point to any evidence that the product failed to conform to manufacturer’s
performance standards or specifications without evidence of the
performance standards or product specifications or evidence of applicable
industry or regulatory standards); Brunet v. Alcon Lab’ys, Inc., No. 07-3618,
2008 WL 1771911, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 2008) (granting summary
judgment on manufacturing defect claim because “plaintiffs [ ] failed to
provide any evidence that suggest[ed] that the [allegedly defective product]
deviated in any way from other [identical products], an essential element of
a manufacturing defect claim under the LPLA”); Lacoste v. Pilgrim Int’l, No.
07-2904, 2009 WL 126847, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2009) (granting summary
judgment because plaintiffs did not put forth evidence of defendant’s
manufacturing specifications or demonstrate how the product in question
materially deviated from such standards).
Turning to plaintiff’s design defect claim, the Court finds that plaintiff
likewise fails to point to evidence of specific facts that create a genuine issue
as to this claim. A product is defective in design if, at the time it left the
manufacturer’s control,
(1) There existed an alternative design for the product that was
capable of preventing the claimant’s damage; and
17

(2) The likelihood that the product’s design would cause the
claimant’s damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed
the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative
design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design
on the utility of the product. An adequate warning about a
product shall be considered in evaluating the likelihood of
damage when the manufacturer has used reasonable care to
provide the adequate warning to users and handlers of the
product.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.56.
Plaintiff has not submitted evidence of any possible alternative designs
for the Lexus ES350’s airbag system that would have lowered the risk of the
airbags not deploying. Indeed, in response to an interrogatory requesting
that plaintiff specify the nature of the alleged design defect and any
alternative designs plaintiff claims would have prevented or lessened his
damages, plaintiff merely responded that he “believe[d] that the accident
happened because there were defects related to the sensors in the vehicle.” 36
Plaintiff’s unspecific, conclusory response based solely on his own belief and
speculation is insufficient to support a design defect claim. And plaintiff has
not presented any evidence to support the elements of this claim, including
evidence that safer alternative designs were in existence at the time the
vehicle left the manufacturer’s control or that the risk avoided by such

36

R. Doc. 1-3 at 8.
18

designs outweighed the burden of adopting the designs. See Morgan v.
Gaylord Container Corp., 30 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Lavespere v.
Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1990)).
Although it is not fatal to plaintiff’s design defect claim that he does not
intend to call any expert witness or present any expert report,37 Malbrough
v. Crown Equip. Corp., 392 F.3d 135, 137 (5th Cir. 2004), plaintiff’s own
testimony, without any “expert testimony or other convincing technical
evidence,” is insufficient to satisfy his burden of proof. Haskins Trucking
Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 07-0585, 2008 WL 1775272, at *5
(W.D. La. Apr. 17, 2008) (“[A] review of the case law involving Louisiana
products liability claims reveals that courts generally demand, or at a
minimum favor, expert testimony to prove an unreasonably dangerous
defect in composition or design of a product.”); see also Belleau v.
Bridgestone/Firestone N. American Tire, LLC, No. 05-192, 2008 WL
565480, at *1 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2008) (holding that plaintiffs’ own
testimony about an accident allegedly caused by defective tire and their
argument that there were issues of fact in defendant’s expert reports was
insufficient evidence to satisfy burden of proof). Plaintiff has therefore failed

37

Id. at 7-8, 16-17.
19

to set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists as to his design
defect claim.
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to present evidence
sufficient to enable a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that he has
established the essential elements of his LPLA claims. The Court therefore
grants summary judgment in favor of defendants.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiff’s claims against TEMA and TMNA are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.

1st day of May, 2024.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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