P.A. et al v. Voitier et al

Filing 87

ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED 73 Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Discovery is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as stated herein. Signed by Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld on 8/28/2024. The privilege issues shall be addressed in a separate Order and Reasons. (lb) Modified on 8/28/2024 (lb).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
P.A., on behalf of minor child, A.A., et al.

* CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-2228
*
VERSUS
* SECTION: “O”(1)
*
DORIS VOITIER, et al.
* JUDGE BRANDON S. LONG
*
* MAGISTRATE JUDGE
* JANIS VAN MEERVELD
*********************************** *
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Compel Discovery. (Rec. Doc. 73). This
Order and Reasons addresses the relevance and proportionality issues raised therein. For the
following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as to Requests for
Production 2, 29, 30-33, 36-37, and 39. The privilege issues shall be addressed in a separate Order
and Reasons.
Background
Plaintiffs in this lawsuit are five students aged 15 to 171 attending public school in St.
Bernard Parish. They each allege that they are disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
Section 504 (three have Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and other mental health
disorders, one has ADHD and dyslexia, and one is described as having a “suspected dyslexia
diagnosis”). They challenge the St. Bernard Parish School Board’s practice of sending expelled
students in grades 6 through 12 to C.F. Rowley Alternative School (“Rowley”). They complain
that expulsions to Rowley are not reported to the state for accountability monitoring and that
students are not provided with due process prior to serving their expulsion. They allege that once
placed at Rowley, students are denied access to education—they spend most of their time

1

Since the filing of suit, plaintiff C.C. has turned 18. (Rec. Doc. 76).

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completing computer Edgenuity courses with little to no live instruction. There are only six
teachers for the entire high school population and none of them teach history or biology. Rowley
students do not have access to courses that could earn college credit or access to scholarships –
both opportunities provided to students at Chalmette High School. They are also barred from
participating in district-wide school-sponsored and extra-curricular activities. Plaintiffs allege that
St. Bernard Parish School Board Disciplinary Policies and Practices as to Rowley violate students’
rights to notice and hearing prior to long-term disciplinary expulsions. Plaintiffs allege that
although the student population in the St. Bernard Parish School Board’s system is 2/3 white, the
population at Rowley is majority Black.
Plaintiffs also allege that the rights of students with disabilities are being violated because
students with emotional and behavioral disabilities are placed at Rowley purportedly because they
require a “smaller setting,” but once there they do not receive the academic and social-emotional
supports their disabilities require. They allege further that students with disabilities placed at
Rowley for disciplinary reasons can only exit Rowley if they meet the exit criteria, but the criteria
are not modified to account for their disabilities.
The plaintiffs here are proceeding under pseudonyms. Plaintiff A.A. was assigned to
Rowley for the latter portion of the 2021-2022 school year and, after returning to Chalmette High
School for the 2022-2023 school year, he was again assigned to Rowley in February 2023. On
that day, he was arrested for a fight on campus. Representatives of the Board appeared at a juvenile
delinquency hearing to advocate for A.A.’s exclusion from Chalmette High School as a condition
of his probation. Among other things, A.A. alleges that the 2023 assignment was retaliatory.
Plaintiff B.B. was assigned to Rowley beginning in sixth grade in 2018. She started high
school at Chalmette High School, but at the beginning of the 2022 school year when she was in

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tenth grade, she was assigned to Rowley following an incident of using mace when several male
students began verbally assaulting and threatening her. Following the administrative hearing,
which resulted in dismissal of her claims of disability discrimination, she and the School Board
reached a preliminary settlement in May 2023—but she alleges she has not received the 400 hours
of tutoring promised therein.
Plaintiff C.C. began attending Chalmette High School in August 2022. Following an
altercation in September 2023, she was assigned to Rowley for the remainder of the school year.
Plaintiff D.D. was first referred to Rowley when he was in seventh grade. In September
2023, when he began ninth grade, he was not permitted to return to Chalmette High School. His
mother withdrew him and enrolled him in a paid homeschool program. In January and February
2024, they were told he would have to go to Rowley if he re-enrolled in public school. They
retained counsel, and in February 2024, D.D. was re-enrolled at Chalmette.
Plaintiff E.E. is currently placed at Chalmette but she was involuntarily placed at Rowley
on August 5, 2022, after being accused of using marijuana on campus during summer school.
Plaintiffs assert claims against the St. Bernard Parish School Board and Doris Voitier in her
official capacity as superintendent for the St. Bernard Parish Public Schools for discrimination
under the ADA, for discrimination and retaliation in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, for violation of their procedural due process rights under the United States and
Louisiana Constitutions, for violation of disciplinary safeguards required by state law, for violation
of the Louisiana Human Rights Act’s prohibitions against disability discrimination, and as to B.B.,
an appeal of the dismissal of her administrative claim due to lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs seek damages as well as declarative and injunctive relief. They seek an order that
placement at Rowley is tantamount to expulsion and that defendants have violated and are

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violating plaintiffs’ rights. They also seek an order enjoining defendants from future violations and
requiring them to develop procedures to prevent discriminatory placement in the alternative school
program and to provide plaintiffs the opportunity to participate in and benefit from the same
educational and extracurricular services afforded to non-disabled peers, provide plaintiffs with
reasonable accommodations for their disability related needs, and provide them with educational
programs and services in the most integrated setting as required by Section 504 and the ADA.
Trial is set to begin on April 7, 2025. The discovery deadline is January 22, 2025.
The present discovery dispute concerns the plaintiffs’ discovery requests to the School
Board. A separate Order and Reasons to be issued by the Court addresses the privilege issues raised
by the plaintiffs. This memorandum addresses issues concerning the scope of discovery.
Law and Analysis
1. Scope of Discovery
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “parties may obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need
not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. The Rule requires consideration of the
following factors in assessing proportionality: “the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id.
Prior to the 2000 amendments, the Federal Rules provided for discovery of nonprivileged
matter “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending actions.” The 2000 amendments
deleted the quoted language, limiting the scope of discovery to nonprivileged matters “relevant to

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the claim or defense of any party” and allowing for discovery “of any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action” only upon a showing of good cause. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26; see XTO
Energy, Inc. v. ATD, LLC, No. CIV 14-1021 JB/SCY, 2016 WL 1730171, at *12–13 (D.N.M. Apr.
1, 2016) (analyzing the progressive rule changes); see also 8 Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (3d ed.). The change “signal[ed] to the court that it has the
authority to confine discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings, and signal[ed]
to the parties that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are
not already identified in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 2000
amendment. The committee explained that the parties should “focus on the actual claims and
defenses involved in the action,” but that a variety of types of information not directly pertinent to
the incident in suit could be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in a given action.” Id.
Following the 2015 amendments to the Rules (which removed reference “to the subject matter
involved in the action” entirely), courts have concluded that “[r]elevance is still to be ‘construed
broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that
could bear on’ any party's claim or defense.’” XTO Energy, Inc. v. ATD, LLC, No. CIV 14-1021
JB/SCY, 2016 WL 1730171, at *17 (D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2016) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Fayda, No. 14CIV9792WHPJCF, 2015 WL 7871037, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2015), aff'd, No.
14CV9792, 2016 WL 4530890 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2016)); Walker v. H & M Henner & Mauritz,
L.P., No. 16 CIV. 3818 (JLC), 2016 WL 4742334, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2016).
While construing relevance broadly, this Court is anchored by the parties’ pleadings. “To
implement the rule that discovery must be relevant to the claim or defense of any party, district
courts have examined the relationship of the requested discovery and the facts it is intended to
uncover to the specific claims and defenses raised by the parties.” Thibault v. BellSouth

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Telecommunications, Inc., No. CIV.A. 07-200, 2008 WL 4808893, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 30, 2008)
(M.J. Wilkinson).
2. Discovery at Issue
a. Responsive documents withheld but not identified.
Plaintiffs complain that defendants have withheld documents responsive to Request for
Production 29 without identifying them. This appears to be based on the Board’s objection to the
request as overbroad and vague. However, the Board points out that it has already explained to
plaintiffs in correspondence “[w]e provided responsive documents for subparts a and b, but
objected to the remaining subparts.” Ex. 8, ECF No. 73-7, at 30.
In that same correspondence, the Board explained that their production in response to RFP
29 was based on staff reviewing and pulling responsive emails. It noted that it also produced emails
in response to RFP 2 using search terms (apparently some of these would also be responsive to
RFP 29).
The Board is not actively withholding any documents to RFP 29, except as to the
objections, to be addressed below. IT IS ORDERED that identification of documents withheld in
response to RFP 29 will not be required.
b. Request for Production 2 and 29 – Communications Related to Plaintiffs
Request for Production 2 seeks “all documents and communications related to” the
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs previously sought to compel a response to this request, focusing on
communications. The Court ordered the parties to meet and confer to narrow the request using
search terms. Some production has been made, but plaintiffs contend defendants’ response remains
deficient. Request for Production 29 seeks subcategories of communications among staff or
between staff and plaintiffs’ parents related to the plaintiffs, specifically: (c) relating to referral of

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Plaintiffs for an evaluation to determine eligibility for a 504 Plan or IEP, (d) relating to plaintiffs’
Daily Trackers for PBIS at Rowley, (e) related to plaintiffs’ disciplinary referrals or incidents, (f)
relating to the development or implementation of an FBA or BIP for plaintiffs, and (g)
communications between staff and law enforcement relating to plaintiffs. These subparts have not
yet been addressed by the Court.
With regard to RFP 2, defendants agreed to produce emails within 30 days of referral for
each plaintiff A.A., B.B., and C.C.,2 but not as to D.D. and E.E. because the Court has already held
that claims related to the referral of D.D. and E.E. to Rowley have prescribed.3 Plaintiffs insist that
these communications remain relevant to their policy and practice claims. Defendants respond that
plaintiffs have failed to establish the relevance of their request. They submit that processing the
request for communications concerning the referrals of A.A., B.B., and C.C., has been burdensome
and they argue that they should not be required to undertake this burden for claims that have
prescribed. They explain the burden has involved numerous conferences with plaintiffs’ counsel,
running various searches and “hit reports” requested by the plaintiffs that yielded results from
hundreds to over 100,000 emails that took in house staff most of a workweek to complete,4 and
the Board’s review and redaction of the emails for production. They point out that plaintiffs have
acknowledged a “great many” of the emails produced are irrelevant anyway. Plaintiffs deny this.
As to the D.D. and E.E. referral emails, the Board has not addressed why the requested
emails would be irrelevant to the policy and practice claims as plaintiffs contend. One of the

A chart submitted by plaintiffs with their motion indicates that defendants have produced communications 30 days
prior to the referral dates through approximately 15 days after. Ex. 12, ECF No. 73-8, at 3. As noted, the Board arrived
at this production set by a manual review and by searching terms the parties agreed to.
3
In granting plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to join D.D. and E.E. as plaintiffs, the Court held that the claims
of D.D. and E.E. more than one year prior to the motion for leave to amend (including their referrals to Rowley) had
prescribed. ECF No. 39, at 12.
4
Plaintiffs’ memorandum indicates that the first search for exit period emails yielded 7,000 hits, and another hit report
yielded 11,000 emails. After agreeing to a custodian list, plaintiffs say the number of emails came down to 2,917
(apparently for all five plaintiffs).
2

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allegations in this case is that the Board has a practice of coercing parents to waive their due
process rights and accept a placement at Rowley in lieu of a disciplinary hearing that could result
in an “expulsion” on the students’ Record. See Complaint, Par. 60. However, plaintiffs only allege
that A.A. and B.B. were offered waivers, and referral emails as to A.A. and B.B. have already been
produced. Referral related emails as to D.D. and E.E. will not shed light on this claim. Plaintiffs
also allege a policy and practice of placing students at Rowley through methods that discriminate
against them because of their disability. The Court finds the emails requested may bear on these
alleged practices.
The Board objects on the basis of burdensomeness. But at least some of the burden it cites
results from the time spent by the parties as they negotiated the search terms and time periods that
resulted in the production of referral emails as to A.A., B.B., and C.C. If the Board uses the already
agreed to time period and analogous custodians and search terms, the burden of production for
D.D. and E.E. will be reduced. The Court acknowledges the burden is still great, but finds that the
importance of some additional evidence concerning the alleged pattern and practice of
discriminatorily referring disabled students to Rowley outweighs that burden. Importantly, while
a request for all emails pertaining to the referral of every single student to Rowley would result in
an undue burden, expanding the current production of emails to include D.D. and E.E. provides
the plaintiffs with additional evidence of any pattern that may exist—to the extent such pattern
would be reflected in email correspondence—while avoiding the resources that would be required
by both sides for a more voluminous production, as well as pretermitting the privacy concerns that
would be raised by obtaining emails as to other students. IT IS ORDERED that defendants must
produce referral emails for D.D. and E.E., using the same or analogous search parameters as used
for the referral emails as to A.A., B.B., and C.C.

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Additionally as to RFP 2, Plaintiffs have requested emails within 30 days of each plaintiff’s
exit or attempted exit from Rowley (i.e., 15 days before and 15 days after),5 but defendants have
not produced those emails. Defendants do not address this issue in their briefing. Moreover, they
say they have provided responsive documents for subparts (a) and (b) of RFP 29. The latter of
these subsections seeks communications relating to each plaintiff’s exit from Rowley. This
suggests that defendants have produced emails within the 30 days of each plaintiff’s exit.
Additionally, in his declaration, Joseph Cipollone states that the Board’s IT team ran searches
related to the exit dates for each of the plaintiffs and provided the emails to counsel. This also
suggests that defendants have produced or intend to produce responsive emails. IT IS ORDERED
that to the extent the defendants have not provided emails related to the plaintiffs within 30 days
of each plaintiff’s exit or attempted exit6 from Rowley, they shall do so within 14 days.
Further, plaintiffs argue as to RFP 2 that communications between the negotiated exit and
referral dates are relevant. Defendants do not address this issue with specificity beyond their
argument concerning burden. The Court finds that this request is overbroad because it extends to
any communications related to the plaintiffs. This will necessarily include irrelevant
communications. The Board has recounted the burden of production when limited to time periods
of less than 60 days per “referral” period (at total of 426 days as to A.A., B.B., and C.C.).7 The
Court finds that plaintiffs’ generic request for emails is not sufficiently tailored and amounts to an
overly burdensome fishing expedition. Moreover, plaintiffs have made more specific requests for
communications via RFP 29, discussed below. Within the context of those requests, additional

It is unclear whether defendants agreed to this production or whether plaintiffs simply requested it during
negotiations.
6
The inclusion of “attempted exit” adds two more 30 day periods, one as to D.D. and one as to E.E. Pl.’s Ex. 12, ECF
No. 73-8, at 3-4. It also adds a 30 day period for A.A., but these documents have already been produced as the time
period is also referred to as Referral No. 3. Id. at 3.
7
Pl.’s Ex. 12, ECF No. 73-8, at 5.
5

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production will be required. However, the broad request for any communications related to the
plaintiffs between their exit and entry dates is not proportionate with the needs of this case. IT IS
ORDERED that communications related to the plaintiffs between their exit and entry dates, except
as otherwise ordered produced, are not subject to production.
Plaintiffs also complain as to RFP 2 that defendants produced 280 emails, although their
production log listed 354 emails. In response, the Board submits that it offered to produce the
emails in PDF as a solution to this technical problem. It vaguely refers to “software limitations”
as an explanation for the discrepancy identified by the plaintiffs. The Court finds that the
appropriate solution at this stage is for the Board to produce the PDF versions of the emails, and
IT IS ORDERED that defendants shall do so. If, after receipt and review of the PDF emails, the
plaintiffs can establish good cause for needing these files in native format, the Court will consider
ordering the Board undertake further efforts to obtain and produce them in native form.
Turning to Request for Production 29, the first subpart at issue, subpart (c), seeks
communications relating to referral of Plaintiffs for an evaluation to determine eligibility for a 504
Plan or IEP. Plaintiffs argue they each have claims for failure to identify under Section 504 and the
ADA. Defendants counter that plaintiffs have not alleged any failure to evaluate or determine
eligibility for a 504 Plan or IEP. They add that they have provided all evaluations, 504 plans, and
IEP documents to the plaintiffs and thus, they argue, there is no dispute as to whether and when
plaintiffs were evaluated. Paragraph 64 of the operative complaint alleges that the School Board
has a practice of failing to identify children with mental health diagnoses who require an IEP or
504 Plan. ECF. No. 44, Par. 64. As to specific plaintiffs, they allege that AA was not identified as
disabled until after placement at Rowley. Id. Par. 81, They allege that A.A. has challenged the
school’s failure to implement the IEP. Id. Par. 91. They allege that the School District failed to

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implement B.B.’s 504 Plan by referring her for a Bulletin 1508 special education evaluation or by
developing a BIP and that she was not evaluated until June 2023. Id. Par. 108, 120. They allege
that C.C. had a 504 Plan from elementary school but that it was not followed when she transferred
to Middle School and that she was not evaluated until October 2023 after a request from counsel.
Id. Pars. 123-24, 130. They allege that D.D. had an IEP since elementary school, prior to his
placement at Rowley for disciplinary offenses. Id. Pars. 133, 135. They allege that E.E. does not
currently have an IEP or 504 Plan. Id. Par. 152. But in their causes of action section, they do not
appear to have any claims tied to failures to identify plaintiffs as disabled.
Considering that there are no actual claims generating from any failure to evaluate plaintiffs
for an IEP or 504 Plan and that defendants have produced all documentation related to the
plaintiffs’ evaluation, the Court finds that production of communications relating to plaintiffs’
referral for evaluation for these programs is not proportionate with the needs of this case. IT IS
ORDERED that communications relating to plaintiffs’ referral for evaluation for an IEP or 504
Plan are not subject to production.
The next RFP 29 subpart at issue is (d), communications relating to Plaintiffs’ Daily
Trackers for PBIS (Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports) at Rowley. Plaintiffs argue
that whether a student earns enough behavioral points determines whether the student is permitted
to exit Rowley. They argue that whether a student achieved the requisite points but was required
to stay at Rowley is relevant. Further, they argue that the presence or lack of accommodations that
would permit variation from the behavioral points system for students with disabilities would also
be relevant. They submit that the requested communications may contain copies of trackers that
they have not received for all students. Defendants respond that plaintiffs have not claimed that a
failure to provide daily trackers resulted in a denial of plaintiffs’ exits. Defendants say there is no

11

claim that compliance with the behavioral points system prevented the plaintiffs’ exit. Defendants
submit that if plaintiffs have a concern about the completeness of education records produced, that
should be addressed in the context of the requests for student records, not for communications
related to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that students at Rowley must meet behavioral program
requirements to leave Rowley and that these requirements are not subject to accommodations or
modifications for students with disabilities. ECF No. 44, Pars. 50, 69. They allege that due to her
disabilities, B.B. could not satisfy Rowley’s uniform exit criteria. Id. Par. 117. They allege that
D.D. wanted to leave Rowley but was told he could not because he had not earned enough
behavioral points. Id. Par. 139. In their causes of action section, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
violated the ADA and Section 504 by failing to modify their programs to avoid discrimination
against all plaintiffs. Par. 160(e), 169(e).
It appears plaintiffs are asserting a claim concerning the application of behavioral
requirements without modification for disability as to B.B. and D.D.8 The plaintiffs’ Daily Trackers
are relevant to this issue and they have been produced as part of the plaintiffs’ educational file. It
is less clear, though, whether communications related to the trackers will provide any more
information than what has already been provided in the trackers themselves and in such documents
as plaintiffs have themselves. Plaintiffs say that the Rowley Student Parent Handbook requires
communications with parents about whether students are meeting expectations for behavior
recorded in PBIS. Such communications are in the possession of plaintiffs’ parents, who are
plaintiffs themselves. Plaintiffs say the emails may contain trackers that are not contained in the
education files, but they offer no reason to believe trackers are missing from the educational files

Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that could support such a claim as to A.A., C.C., and E.E., and therefore do not
appear to be asserting such a claim as to these plaintiffs.
8

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such that an additional search for emails—with the burdens involved—is warranted here. Thus
the only non-duplicative relevant communications would be those in which staff discussed the
trackers amongst themselves (to the exclusion of emails that merely forwarded trackers). The Court
finds that the burden of a limited production of such emails is justified by the importance such
communications could have to the case. IT IS ORDERED that as to B.B. and D.D., defendants
shall produce emails between staff members that substantively discuss the trackers during the time
these two plaintiffs were at Rowley but only to the extent such time period is within the prescriptive
period applicable to each plaintiff’s claim. Defendants shall determine the relevant custodians to
search based on prior negotiations with the plaintiffs and their knowledge of which staff members
might engage in such substantive discussions. Defendants shall not be required to produce similar
records as to A.A, C.C., and E.E. because no issue has been raised as to their inability to satisfy
the behavioral point system due to their disability.
The next RFP 29 subpart at issue is subpart (e), seeking communications related to
Plaintiffs’ disciplinary referrals or incidents. Plaintiffs submit that discipline issues are one of the
reasons that plaintiffs are not allowed to leave Rowley. They insist they need information about
the disciplinary incidents. Defendants argue this request is duplicative of subsection (a)
(concerning referral of students to Rowley).
As noted above, plaintiffs allege defendants failed to modify programs as needed to avoid
discrimination. Complaint Par.160(e), 169(e). As to plaintiffs B.B. and D.D., they allege that the
defendants failed to provide behavioral supports necessitated by their disabilities. Id. Par. 120-21,
134, 136, 139. The Court finds that defendants’ communications, if any, regarding documented
disciplinary incidents other than those that resulted in referral may be relevant to B.B. and D.D.’s
claims of discrimination because these incidents would impact their ability to exit Rowley and

13

could also reflect the accommodations being provided to address disability related behaviors.
Similar behavior related accommodation issues have not been alleged as to A.A., C.C., and E.E.
IT IS ORDERED that defendants must produce responsive documents for B.B. and D.D. as to
additional documented disciplinary incidents. To reduce the burden related to this production,
plaintiffs shall first identify with specificity each “disciplinary incident,” and defendants’ search
for responsive communications shall be limited to those incidents. Additionally, the production
shall be limited to the time periods when each B.B. and D.D. was at Rowley and only to the extent
such time period is within the prescriptive period applicable to each plaintiff’s claim.
The next RFP 29 subpart at issue is subpart (f) seeking communications relating to the
development or implementation of an FBA (Functional Behavior Assessment) or BIP (Behavior
Intervention Plans) for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that the requested communications are critical to
their failure to accommodate claims, which arise out of their claims that they did not receive
appropriate behavioral interventions or supports at Rowley. Defendants argue that there are no
claims that they failed to provide FBAs or BIPs. They say that there is no dispute as to if and when
these plans were provided because they are in the students’ educational records that have been
produced. As with subsections (e) and (f), the Court finds the requested documents relevant as to
B.B. and D.D, but not the remaining plaintiffs for whom disability related behavior issues have
not been alleged. The Court finds that communications regarding the FBAs and BIPs may be
relevant to the claims of B.B. and D.D. because they may reveal why these assessments and plans
were implemented at a particular time and how the plaintiffs’ disability was or was not considered.
IT IS ORDERED that communications relating to the development or implementation of an FBA
or BIP for B.B. and D.D. shall be produced. Additionally, the production shall be limited to the

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time periods when each B.B. and D.D. was at Rowley and only to the extent such time period is
within the prescriptive period applicable to each plaintiff’s claim.
The final RFP 29 subpart at issue is subpart (g) seeking communications between staff and
law enforcement relating to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged that defendants had a
policy and practice of utilizing the juvenile court process to expel students without notice and the
opportunity to be heard. ECF No. 44, Par. 182(d). They argue that the requested communications
are relevant to the motive behind law enforcement referrals of Plaintiffs. Defendants argue there
is no allegation of discriminatory law enforcement in this litigation. They say they have already
provided a detailed interrogatory response and underlying communications as to alleged retaliation
against A.A. in connection with his juvenile court involvement. The Court finds that this request
seeks information relevant to plaintiffs’ claim that the district uses the juvenile court process to
expel students, and in particular, their allegations as to A.A. It is unclear whether defendants’
production of communications is complete. IT IS ORDERED that if they have not already done
so, defendants must produce documents between staff and law enforcement related to A.A.
Because law enforcement issues have not been plead as to the other plaintiffs, further search for
or production communications will not be required as to the others.
Plaintiffs also complain that defendants have not provided information relating to plaintiff
D.D. and E.E.’s transfer to Rowley as requested by RFP 29 subsection (a) based on the prescriptive
period. This issue was discussed and resolved above as to RFP 2.
Plaintiffs further complain that defendants have not provided information related to
plaintiffs A.A., B.B., and C.C. as to their referrals and exits during 2021 and 2022 based on the
prescriptive period. They argue that earlier communications will help establish a pattern and
practice. The Court finds that further production of referral and exit emails beyond that which has

15

already been produced or ordered by the Court is not proportionate with the needs of the case. IT
IS ORDERED that communications related to related to plaintiffs A.A., B.B., and C.C. as to their
referrals and exits during 2021 and 2022 are not subject to production.
c. Requests for Production 30, 31, 32, 33, and 36
Requests for Production 30, 31, 32, 33, and 36 seek information about other students. The
first four requests seek information in the aggregate. The last seeks information about specific
students, though would allow identifying information to be redacted.
The aggregate requests are as follows. RFP 30 seeks documents showing the number of
students referred to Rowley as a result of a disciplinary incident, including those who received an
alternate placement/expulsion hearing before a hearing officer outcome, the number of students
who completed a waiver form, and the number of students who received an alternate
placement/expulsion hearing before the School Board and the outcome. RFP 31 seeks documents
showing the number of students who exited Rowley, the length of their placement, the date they
exited, and the placement after exiting the program. RFP 32 seeks documents showing the number
of students with IEPs and 504 Plans referred to Rowley as a result of a disciplinary incident or
placement, the number of students for which a manifestation determination review (MDR) was
held and the outcome, and the number of students who were returned to their regular IEP/504
Placement as a result of the MDR. RFP 33 seeks documents sufficient to show the number of
students with IEPs and 504 Plans who exited Rowley, the length of placement, the date they exited,
and each student’s placement after exit.
Defendants object to the request for information about other students as irrelevant. They
argue that courts require a clear demonstration of procedural due process violations before
considering broader claims such as those plaintiffs are attempting to assert here. Defendants point

16

out that the Court has already held that information about other students is irrelevant when it denied
the plaintiffs’ motion to compel IEPs, 405 Plans, discipline records, Edgenuity records and
administrative records for students in Plaintiffs’ academic classes.
The Court finds that the requested records are relevant to plaintiffs’ claimed policy and
practice claims alleging due process violations by the use of waivers and the discriminatory
placement of students with disabilities at Rowley. Additionally, the Court notes that its previous
ruling on Request for Production 22 does not apply equally to Requests 30-33, which seek
information that is more clearly connected to plaintiffs’ claims and that requires production of
aggregated information that does not implicate privacy concerns. Furthermore, at this stage of the
litigation, the Court will not weigh the merits of plaintiffs’ claims in determining discoverability.
IT IS ORDERED that documents responsive to Requests for Production 30-33 must be produced.
RFP 36 seeks daily Session Logs in Edgenuity for all students in Plaintiffs’ academic
classes sufficient to show the start and stop time as well as idle time for the first Monday, second
Tuesday, third Wednesday, fourth Thursday and first Friday of each calendar month in which any
plaintiff attended in-person school at Rowley in the 2022-2023 school year or the 2023-2024
school year. This request is similar to Request for Production 22 previously rejected by the Court.
But unlike that request, the present is much narrower and does not implicate nearly the entirety of
the other students’ educational files. The requested records showing start and stop times do not
implicate the same privacy concerns as those requested in RFP 22, which sought IEP Plans and
disciplinary records. And, importantly, the requested information is tied to plaintiffs’ claims that
Defendants have a pattern and practice of providing subpar education to the students at Rowley.
The time spent by students—including non-plaintiffs—in the computer learning program may bear
on that. Moreover, comparison against the experience of non-plaintiff students may also shed light

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on whether they were anomalies. IT IS ORDERED that documents responsive to RFP 36 must be
produced.
d. Requests for Production 37 and 39
Requests for Production 37 and 39 seek information about teachers at Rowley. RFP 37
seeks documents to show the dates and times that school employees including teachers, counselors,
special education service providers, tutors, and substitute teachers entered or exited the Rowley
campus in the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 school years. RFP 39 seeks documents and
communications related to the evaluation and assessment of school personnel for each teacher and
administrator at Rowley during the relevant time period. Plaintiffs claim the requested information
is relevant to their claims that they received inadequate education. The evaluations will be relevant,
they say, to rebut any argument by the Defendants that plaintiffs received qualified instruction.
The Court finds RFP 37 seeks irrelevant information. The mere presence of administrators,
teachers, and staff at Rowley does not bear on the quality of information received. There could be
any number of reasons for the time of their presence and any number of implications. Moreover,
as defendants point out, without comparison to the presence of staff at other schools, the
information cannot bear on plaintiffs’ claims. Additionally, the information will require a detailed
review of records from multiple data sources. The documents implicate privacy issues. Whatever
relevance there may be of the requested information is outweighed by the burden of production.
IT IS ORDERED that defendants shall not be required to produce documents responsive to RFP
37.
As to RFP 39, defendants argue that the information is irrelevant to determining if plaintiffs
were provided with general education at Rowley. Again they argue that without comparison to
similar information for other schools, the information will not shed light on whether they received

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any lesser quality education that students in other schools. Defendants admit that they have
provided resumes and qualifications of the teachers at Rowley, but say they did so as a compromise
that should not be held against them.
The Court agrees with the defendants that to the extent the performance reviews reflect the
quality of education received by the plaintiffs, the reviews are irrelevant to the issues in this case
without comparison to the evaluations of teachers at other St. Bernard schools. Such records have
not been requested, and, in any event, the burden of producing the voluminous records of
performance reviews across the district outweighs their importance. IT IS ORDERED that
defendants shall not be required to produce documents responsive to RFP 39.
Conclusion
For the following reasons, plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Compel is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that identification of documents withheld in response to RFP 29 will not
be required.
IT IS ORDERED that defendants must produce referral emails for D.D. and E.E., using the
same or analogous search parameters as used for the referral emails as to A.A., B.B., and C.C.
IT IS ORDERED that to the extent the defendants have not provided emails within 30 days
of each plaintiff’s exit or attempted exit from Rowley, they shall do so within 14 days.
IT IS ORDERED that communications related to the plaintiffs between their exit and entry
dates, except as otherwise ordered produced, are not subject to production.
IT IS ORDERED that defendants shall produce the PDF versions of the 354 emails listed
in their production log.

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IT IS ORDERED that communications relating to plaintiffs’ referral for evaluation for an
IEP or 504 Plan are not subject to production.
IT IS ORDERED that as to B.B. and D.D., defendants shall produce emails between staff
members that substantively discuss the trackers during the time these two plaintiffs were at Rowley
but only to the extent such time period is within the prescriptive period applicable to each
plaintiff’s claim.
IT IS ORDERED that defendants must produce responsive documents for B.B. and D.D.
as to additional disciplinary incidents, subject to the limits discussed herein.
IT IS ORDERED that communications relating to the development or implementation of
an FBA or BIP for plaintiffs B.B. and D.D. shall be produced, subject to the limits discussed herein.

IT IS ORDERED that if they have not already done so, defendants must produce
documents between staff and law enforcement related to A.A.
IT IS ORDERED that communications related to plaintiffs A.A., B.B., and C.C. as to their
referrals and exits during 2021 and 2022 are not subject to production.
IT IS ORDERED that documents responsive to Requests for Production 30-33 must be
produced.
IT IS ORDERED that documents responsive to RFP 36 must be produced.
IT IS ORDERED that defendants shall not be required to produce documents responsive
to RFP 37.
IT IS ORDERED that defendants shall not be required to produce documents responsive
to RFP 39.

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New Orleans, Louisiana, this 28th day of August, 2024.

Janis van Meerveld
United States Magistrate Judge

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