Cangelosi v. Jefferson Parish Council et al

Filing 21

ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' 14 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff does not have standing to bring either of his claims because the Complaint fails to allege an injury that may be redressed by this Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's 16 Motion Extension of Time to Answer is DENIED as MOOT. Signed by Judge Eldon E. Fallon on 11/22/2024. (pp) (cc: Plaintiff)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CLAYTON CANGELOSI

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VERSUS
JEFFERSON PARISH, ET AL

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 23-3133
SECTION "L" (1)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before this Court is a motion to dismiss filed jointly by Defendants Jefferson Parish,
Jefferson Parish Council, and Jefferson Parish Councilman Byron Lee (the “Defendants”). R. Doc.
14. Pro se Plaintiff Clayton Cangelosi filed an opposition. R. Doc. 19. The Defendants replied. R.
Doc. 20. Considering the record, briefing, and applicable law, the Court now rules as follows.
I.

BACKGROUND

On August 4, 2023, pro se Plaintiff Clayton Cangelosi filed his Complaint and Ex
Parte/Consent Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. R. Docs. 1, 2. After considering
the duties imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Magistrate granted Plaintiff’s request and
permitted him to proceed under pauper status. R. Doc. 3.
Plaintiff filed suit against Jefferson Parish, the Jefferson Parish Council, and Byron Lee in
his official and private capacity as a Jefferson Parish Councilmember pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging an “abuse of power” violation related to a Jefferson Parish council meeting that
occurred on or about June 15, 2024. Id. At that meeting, Plaintiff claims that Councilman Lee,
acting under the color of law, interrupted and verbally attacked him after he requested public
records related to Lee’s business dealings. Id. Plaintiff contends that this verbal attack was an
improper abuse of power, and that Councilman Lee was retaliating against him for a legal

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challenge Plaintiff made to a prior council permitting decision. Id. Plaintiff has also asserted a state
law defamation claim against the Defendants. Id. He alleges that after the council meeting in
question, Councilman Lee began to spread lies about the Plaintiff and continued to lie about
denying him a permit to sell items in public. Id. Plaintiff requests this Court remove Councilman
Lee from office, provide him a security detail at the expense of the Defendants, and grant him any
other damages it deems appropriate. Id. at 6.
II.

PRESENT MOTION

Defendants move jointly to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on several bases. R. Doc. 14-1. First,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails the constitutional and jurisprudential tests for standing because
he did not suffer an invasion of a concrete interest at the Jefferson Parish council meeting. Id. at
4-9. Second, Defendants argue that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s defamation claims as there is no federal question, no diversity of parties, and no amount
in controversy. Id. at 9-10. Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint merely pleads
conclusory allegations that do not set forth grounds for relief as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8. Id. at 10-27. Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is abusing his in forma pauperis
status by filing multiple frivolous suits against the Defendants, mandating dismissal of all his
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Id. at 28-29. Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has
failed to properly serve Councilman Lee in his personal capacity for over a year, which evidences
his abandonment of his claims and makes this suit ripe for dismissal. Id. at 30-31.
Plaintiff opposes the motion. R. Doc. 19. First, he argues that he has standing because
Councilman Lee improperly revoked his permit. Id. at 2. However, Plaintiff does not indicate when
this action was taken. Second, Plaintiff argues that this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over
his state law defamation claim. Id. at 3. Third, Plaintiff argues that he has plead specific factual

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allegations that meet the pleading standard required by Rule 8(a). Id. Fourth, Plaintiff argues that
his claim is not frivolous and should proceed without dismissal under § 1915(e)(2). Id. Lastly,
Plaintiff argues that he has not abandoned his suit and requests that the Court allow him to
demonstrate good cause as to any delay in service of his Complaint to the Defendants. Id.
In reply, the Defendants note that Plaintiff may not bring any previously adjudicated claims
related to his revoked permits on the grounds of res judicata and largely reassert their arguments
raised in their motion in support. R. Doc. 20.
III.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff May Not Re-raise Issues Already Adjudicated
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Complaint and Opposition appear to incorporate facts
related to a Jefferson Parish Council meeting that took place in February 2021 where Councilman
Lee allegedly improperly revoked Plaintiff’s permit to sell items in public. R. Doc. 1 at 3; R. Doc.
19 at 3. Any allegations related to Plaintiff’s due process and freedom of speech being violated at
this February 2021 council meeting have already been adjudicated and dismissed by both this
Court and the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson. See Cangelosi v. Jefferson
Par. et al, 23-2305. If Plaintiff is attempting to resurrect the causes of action as pled in Case No.
23-2305 and his state lawsuit, the Court finds that he is barred from bringing any of these
previously adjudicated claims. Thus, the Court will limit its focus to the events that took place at
the June 2023 council meeting.
B. Plaintiff Does Not Have Standing to Bring His Abuse of Power and Defamation
Claims
“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘actual cases or
controversies between proper litigants.’” Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(quoting Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)). “No
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principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government that the
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Daimler
Chrylser Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341–42 (2006) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing
it has standing to bring the claims it asserts. See Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir.
2015). In order to establish standing, the party must: (1) have suffered an “injury in fact” or an
imminent invasion of a legally protected concrete interest; (2) have a causal connection between
the injury and the action of the defendants; and (3) it must be likely that a favorable decision by
the court will redress the alleged injury. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). For
instance, “even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements
of Art. III, the Court has refrained from adjudicating ‘abstract questions of wide public
significance’ which amount to ‘generalized grievances.’” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982) (citing Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). “Redressability is closely related to the requirement of a causal
link between the threatened injury and the conduct to be modified by the relief claimed.” Ry. Lab.
Execs. Ass'n v. Dole, 760 F.2d 1021, 1023 (9th Cir. 1985). “When there is no realistic remedy
available, there is no point in deciding the merits.” Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617. 625 n.8 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
Here, the purported basis for Plaintiff’s “abuse of power” claim is that Councilman Lee
interrupted and verbally attacked him at the June 2023 council meeting. This threadbare allegation,
however, is insufficient for Plaintiff’s claim to survive an Article III standing analysis. Notably,
the Complaint fails to allege a particular injury-in-fact caused by Councilman Lee’s actions, such
as a limitation of Plaintiff’s right to free speech. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Instead, the Complaint

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indicates that Plaintiff was permitted to speak at the June 2023 meeting and allowed to finish his
statement, even after Councilman Lee interrupted him. R. Doc. 1 at 2. Additionally, Plaintiff was
not removed from the meeting and has not been banned from attending any future council
meetings. See id.; R. Doc. 14 at 6. To the extent Plaintiff relies upon an improperly revoked permit
as the alleged injury, the state court has already adjudicated that issue as stated above and found
no constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s abuse of power claim is more
appropriately characterized as a “generalized grievance,” rather than a “redressable injury
sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III.” See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 47475.
Plaintiff’s defamation claim cannot satisfy a standing analysis for similar reasons. The
Complaint again fails to identify a particular injury-in-fact associated with the alleged lies spread
by Councilman Lee after their confrontation at the council meeting. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561;
R. Doc. 1 at 4-5. For instance, there are no allegations that these lies caused Plaintiff any monetary
loss or injury to his character. This lack of injury is even further supported by the fact that Plaintiff
has only requested that Councilman Lee be removed from public office and monetary relief for a
security detail, which would wholly fail to address any alleged harm caused by a defamation claim.
Id. at 6.
Because Plaintiff has no standing, the Court does not reach the other grounds for dismissal
asserted by the Defendants.
IV.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, R. Doc. 14, is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff does not have

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standing to bring either of his claims because the Complaint fails to allege an injury that may be
redressed by this Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion Extension of Time to Answer, R.
Doc. 16, is DENIED as MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 22nd day of November, 2024.

United States District Judge

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