Johns v. Francis et al

Filing 21

ORDER AND REASONS: IT ISHEREBY ORDERED that the 9 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants are granted leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the potential applicability of any abstention doctrine, claim preclusion, and/or issue preclusion. Signed by Chief Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on March 10, 2025. (mp) Modified text on 3/10/2025 (mp).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JEREMIAH JOHNS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 24-1064

DONOVAN FRANCIS, et al.

SECTION: “G”
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendants’ Donovan Francis, Tony Hernandez, and The Johns Law
Firm, LLC’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. 1
Defendants contend this case should be dismissed because (1) under the first-to-file rule, this case
mirrors earlier-filed lawsuits; and (2) the Complaint fails to state a valid cause of action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2 In opposition, Plaintiff argues the first-to-file rule does
not apply to state court proceedings. 3 For the reasons stated herein, Defendants have not carried
their burden of establishing that the first-to-file rule applies here. Accordingly, considering the
motion, the opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court denies the motion without
prejudice and grants Defendants leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the potential
applicability of any abstention doctrine, claim preclusion, and/or issue preclusion. 4

1

Rec. Doc. 9.

2

Rec. Doc. 9-1 at 2.

3

Rec. Doc. 15.

While claim or issue preclusion have not been raised here, courts may raise claim preclusion or issue
preclusion sua sponte. R J Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 96 F.4th 863, 875 (5th Cir. 2024).
Additionally, “abstention may be raised by the court sua sponte.” See Murphy v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 168 F.3d 734, 737
n. 1 (5th Cir. 1999).
4

I. Background
On or about August 16, 2017, Plaintiff Jeremiah Johns registered The Law Office of J.
Nathan Johns, LLC with the Louisiana Secretary of State. 5 The entity’s name was subsequently
changed to The Johns Law Firm, LLC. 6 Thereafter, Defendants Donovan Francis and Tony
Hernandez became managing partners at The Johns Law Firm, LLC. 7 The Complaint provides that
on August 16, 2017, Plaintiff, Donovan Francis (“Francis”), and Tony Hernandez (“Hernandez”)
entered into an operating agreement. 8 On December 13, 2017, The Johns Law Firm applied for a
loan stating that Plaintiff was 70% owner. 9 The loan application was signed by Plaintiff and
Hernandez and authorized by Francis. 10 The Complaint provides that operations between the three
members later broke down after Plaintiff learned that Hernandez was allegedly operating an
undisclosed out-of-state company. 11 The Complaint alleges that Hernandez deposited fees he
generated into an undisclosed business bank account. 12
On October 29, 2020, Francis and Hernandez registered a new law partnership and
Louisiana limited liability company called Brogan Francis Hernandez, LLC, comprised of Francis,

5

Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

2

Hernandez, and Blair Brogan. 13 The Complaint alleges that, on the following day, Francis and
Hernandez withdrew $108,000.00 from The Johns Law Firm’s bank account, removed Plaintiff as
a firm manager, and removed Plaintiff’s access to The Johns Law Firm’s communications
devices. 14 Thereafter, the Complaint alleges that Francis and Hernandez threatened to file a bar
complaint against Plaintiff if he emailed clients, directed letters to clients untruthfully stating that
Plaintiff withheld settlement offers, hacked Plaintiff’s personal accounts and destroyed data, and
alleged they possessed nude photographs of Plaintiff’s wife. 15
On or about November 30, 2020, Plaintiff withdrew from The Johns Law Firm. 16 Plaintiff
demanded that Francis and Hernandez immediately cease using his name in connection with The
Johns Law Firm, and Plaintiff demanded a refund of his membership interest and capital
contributions. 17 The Complaint alleges, to date, Defendants have refused to return any portion of
Plaintiff’s capital contributions or membership interest. 18 The Complaint alleges that Defendants
continue to use Plaintiff’s name extensively on their law firm’s website despite Plaintiff’s demands
that Defendants cease using his name. 19
After Plaintiff withdrew from The Johns Law Firm, several clients, including Angela

13

Id. at 3.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 3–4.

3

Pawlik, transferred representation to Plaintiff’s new law firm, Johns Law Firm, PLLC. 20 Ms.
Pawlik had a life insurance dispute pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas. 21 The Complaint states that Plaintiff represented Ms. Pawlik and resolved her case
approximately ten months after Plaintiff withdrew from The Johns Law Firm. 22 Ms. Pawlik
received a settlement award in the amount of $850,000, and Defendants attempted to intervene to
assert an attorneys’ fee claim, which was denied as untimely. 23 Thereafter, Defendants filed a
lawsuit against Ms. Pawlik in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
seeking to recover a 40% contingency fee from the proceeds of her settlement. 24 Defendants
prevailed and obtained a judgment against Ms. Pawlik for $340,000 in contingency fees. 25 The
judgment was appealed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 26 and was
later affirmed. 27
The Complaint states that The Johns Law Firm, LLC is no longer a business in good
standing in the State of Louisiana. 28 Francis and Hernandez also ended their law partnership

20

Id. at 4.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 5.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Case No. 24-20147.

28

Id.

4

through Brogan Francis Hernandez, LLC. 29
On or about October 30, 2020, Plaintiff states that he accessed the operating agreement
between Plaintiff, Francis, and Hernandez, which was signed by all parties on August 17, 2017.30
The Complaint states that the operating agreement contained an unsigned page stating that Plaintiff
had a 39.5% equity interest in The Johns Law Firm, even though another document stated Plaintiff
had a 70% interest in the firm. 31 The Complaint alleges there were discrepancies in the operating
agreement such as the date the document was created, alleged alterations to the document, and
missing signatures throughout the document. 32 Plaintiff disagrees with the equity allocations in the
saved operating agreement. 33
Plaintiff alleges that Francis and Hernandez have refused to produce Plaintiff’s personal
effects, including the original copy of the operating agreement. 34 According to the Operating
Agreement, Plaintiff, Hernandez, and Francis were required to make cash contributions of $5,000,
$5,000, and $1,000, respectively. 35 Plaintiff contends that he satisfied his capital contribution
obligation, but Plaintiff alleges that Francis and Hernandez have not. 36 Plaintiff states that he has
made additional capital contributions during the course of The Johns Law Firm’s operations,

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 7.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id. at 8.

36

Id.

5

implicating potential adjustments of Plaintiff’s equity stake. 37 The Complaint alleges that prior to
Plaintiff’s withdrawal from The Johns Law Firm, Francis and Hernandez took income distributions
which exceeded Plaintiff’s distributions. 38
On April 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court asserting the following causes
of action: (1) declaratory judgment regarding Plaintiff’s equity in The Johns Law Firm, and an
order dividing the $340,000 settlement proceeds to an account for Plaintiff’s income distributions,
Plaintiff’s capital account, and damages; (2) breach of contract; (3) bad faith breach of contract;
(4) unjust enrichment/quantum meruit; (5) equitable estoppel/detrimental reliance; (6) unfair trade
practice act; and (7) interpleader. 39
II. Parties’ Arguments
A.

Defendants’ Arguments in Support of the Motion
Defendants contend this case should be dismissed because (1) under the first-to-file rule,

this case mirrors earlier-filed lawsuits; and (2) the Complaint fails to state a valid cause of action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 40 On November 1, 2020, Defendants state they
filed a Petition for Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Injunctive Relief, Declaratory
Judgment, and Money Judgment against Plaintiff in the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans. 41 A temporary restraining order was granted enjoining Plaintiff from transferring

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 12–14.

40

Rec. Doc. 9-1 at 2.

41

Id.

6

$60,000.00 of The Johns Law Firm’s funds or converting those funds for Plaintiff’s personal use,
blocking Defendants from accessing The Johns Law Firm, composing any documents that purports
to remove either Hernandez or Francis as managers of The Johns Law Firm, and removing any
moveable property from The Johns Law Firm’s offices. 42
Defendants state that on December 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed reconventional demands alleging
that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to The Johns Law Firm, that Defendants tortiously
interfered with Plaintiff’s business relationships, and Plaintiff requested to be paid his membership
interest pursuant to the terms of the operating agreement. 43 Defendants state that on December 8,
2020, the day before the hearing on Defendants’ temporary restraining order, Plaintiff agreed to
turn over control of the domain and restored access to the LLC’s web hosting provider. 44
Defendants contend that at Plaintiff’s request, the temporary restraining order hearing was
continued, and the injunction against Plaintiff was extended indefinitely. 45
In September 2021, Defendants allege that Plaintiff violated the temporary restraining
order by usurping control of The Johns Law Firm’s website and redirecting all traffic to Plaintiff’s
new Texas firm. 46 Thereafter, Defendants obtained a second temporary restraining order against
Plaintiff, enjoining him from redirecting traffic from The Johns Law Firm’s website, holding
himself out as a member of The Johns Law Firm, representing that The Johns Law Firm and

42

Id. at 2–3.

43

Id. at 3.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

7

Plaintiff’s Texas firm are one in the same, depositing checks written to The Johns Law Firm,
engaging with potential clients, and destroying any communications made through The Johns Law
Firm website or email system. 47
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Damages and Request for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunction in the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish, which was denied by the
court. 48 Defendants contend that the litigation in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans
exceeded $75,000, and Plaintiff did not seek to remove the matter to federal court. 49
On September 10, 2021, The Johns Law Firm moved to intervene to assert a fee lien in the
lawsuit of former client, Ms. Pawlik, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 50
Defendants state that Ms. Pawlik fired The Johns Law Firm and hired Plaintiff through his Texas
law firm, Johns Law Firm, PLLC. 51 The court denied The Johns Law Firm’s motion to intervene. 52
The Johns Law Firm later retained outside counsel who sued Ms. Pawlik directly. 53 The court
ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of The Johns Law Firm and awarded it $340,000
in monetary damages plus interest. 54 The Johns Law Firm also requested attorneys’ fees, which

47

Id.

48

Id. at 4.

49

Id.

50

Id. at 5.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

8

remains pending. 55
Ms. Pawlik appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit but did not post a bond. 56 In
response, The Johns Law Firm filed a Motion for Turnover against Ms. Pawlik requesting that the
$340,000 be transferred to The Johns Law Firm’s trust account. 57 Defendants contend that Plaintiff
has now filed the present action asking to interplead the same funds into this Court and deprive
the U.S. District for the Southern District of Texas of the ability to enforce the judgment it
rendered. 58 Defendants state that the Motion for Turnover remains pending in the U.S. District for
the Southern District of Texas. 59
On September 22, 2021, Plaintiff and his Texas firm, Johns Law Firm, PLLC, sued
Hernandez individually in state court in Harris County, Texas. 60 Defendants state that Plaintiff
sought damages for violations of the Harmful Access by Computer Act, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, slander, defamation, libel, and defamation per se. 61 Defendants contend the
court has dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, and Hernandez’s counterclaims for abuse of process and
damages remain pending. 62
Defendants assert that the issues raised in this case are mirror images of the issues raised

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 6.

62

Id.

9

in multiple previously filed matters. 63 Defendants argue this matter should be dismissed under the
First-to-File rule. 64 Defendants aver that the matters in the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas were filed years before the
instant matter. 65 Defendants state that the matter before the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans is still pending. 66 Defendants contend the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas maintains jurisdiction over this case following the judgment in favor of The Johns Law Firm
for the limited purposes of enforcing the judgment and attorneys’ fees. 67 Defendants argue Plaintiff
filed this lawsuit in an attempt to avoid the ramifications of the litigation in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas. 68
Defendants argue the litigation before the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans
encompassed all disputes regarding the ownership, management, disbursements, funding, and
operation agreement. 69 Defendants contend that Plaintiff attempts to relitigate the judgment issued
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas that awarded Defendants $340,000
against Plaintiff’s client. 70 Defendants state that the Complaint before this Court also references

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 7.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id.

10

the ongoing litigation in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. 71 Defendants assert that
Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, bad faith breach of contract,
quantum meruit, and unfair trade practices related to the operating agreement have already been
raised in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. 72 Defendants argue this case plainly
overlaps with these previously-filed cases. 73 Alternatively, Defendants argue this case should be
dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff has failed to state claim
upon which relief can be granted. 74
B.

Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion
Plaintiff opposes the motion. First, Plaintiff argues the first-to-file rule does not apply

because there is no overlapping federal litigation. 75 Next, Plaintiff argues he does have capacity to
sue Defendants. 76 Plaintiff explains that he personally formed a partnership with Hernandez and
Francis, and thus, he has the capacity to sue Defendants. 77 Third, Plaintiff argues Hernandez and
Francis can be sued in their personal capacity because the Complaint includes claims to resolve
ownership interest and capital contribution disputes between the parties. 78

71

Id. at 7–8.

72

Id. at 8.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 9. The Court does not reach these issues at this time.

75

Rec. Doc. 15 at 5.

76

Id. at 7.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 7–8.

11

III. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 79 A motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” 80 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” 81 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” 82 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow
the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” 83
On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,
and all facts pleaded are taken as true. 84 However, although required to accept all “well-pleaded
facts” as true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true. 85 “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” 86
Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

79

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

80

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).

81

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

82

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

83

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

84
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
85

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

86

Id. at 679.

12

statements” will not suffice. 87 The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it
must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action. 88 That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 89 From the face of the complaint, there must be enough
factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each
element of the asserted claims. 90 If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an “insuperable”
bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed. 91
IV. Analysis
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed under the “first-to-file” rule based
on previously-filed litigation in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans and the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
As between federal courts, under the “prior pending action” rule, or “first-to-file” rule,
when two duplicative actions are filed in federal courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which
first-acquired possession of the subject or action, or first-acquired jurisdiction should try the
lawsuit, as a matter of federal judicial comity, since plaintiffs have no right to maintain two actions

87

Id. at 678.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).

Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Metro. Hum. Serv. Dist., No. 09-6470,
2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
91

13

on the same subject in the same court, against the same defendant at the same time. 92
Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the
court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases
substantially overlap. 93 The rule rests on principles of comity and sound judicial administration. 94
“The concern manifestly is to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench
upon the authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a
uniform result.” 95
1.

U.S. Southern District of Texas Litigation

In 2022, The Johns Law Firm filed a Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas against Angela Pawlik to recover pursuant to a contingency fee agreement. 96 The
Johns Law Firm asserted causes of action for breach of contract and quantum meruit. 97 On March
5, 2024, a judge in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered an Order
granting summary judgment in favor of The Johns Law Firm as to its breach of contract claim, and
rendered final judgment in favor of The Johns Law Firm, awarding it $340,000.00. 98 That decision

92

1 Cyc. of Federal Proc., § 2:171 Nature and effect of priority by prior filing (2025).

See Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997); West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v.
ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 1985).
93

94

See Save Power, 121 F.3d at 950; West Gulf, 751 F.2d at 728.

95

West Gulf, 751 F.2d at 729.

96

Rec. Doc. 9-4.

97

Id.

98

Rec. Doc. 9-8.

14

was later affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 99 Because the
Southern District of Texas litigation started prior to the instant matter and the issues are related,
Defendants argue the instant matter should be dismissed pursuant to the first-to-file rule.
Here, Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment regarding Plaintiff’s equity in The Johns Law
Firm, and an order dividing the $340,000 settlement proceeds to an account for Plaintiff’s income
distributions, Plaintiff’s capital account, and damages. 100 Plaintiff explains this amount represents
the judgment Defendants obtained against Ms. Pawlik. 101 While critical issues in the present action
appear to overlap or duplicate the issues in the first-filed action in the Southern District of Texas,
there has been a final judgment issued in the Southern District of Texas litigation and that judgment
was affirmed on appeal. As stated above, under the “first-to-file” rule when related cases are
pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it
if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap. 102 Because a final judgment was entered in
the Southern District of Texas, it does not appear that the “first-to-file” rule is applicable here. 103
It appears to the Court that Plaintiff is using this litigation to attach or claim proceeds
awarded to Defendants from another federal district court’s judgment. Plaintiff cites no authority
to justify seizing the judgment proceeds from one case and holding the funds hostage in another

99

Case No. 24-20147.

100

Rec. Doc. 1.

101

Id.

102

See Save Power, 121 F.3d at 950; West Gulf, 751 F.2d at 728 (5th Cir. 1985).

103
See Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Courts use [the firstto-file rule] to maximize judicial economy and minimize embarrassing inconsistencies by prophylactically refusing
to hear a case raising issues that might substantially duplicate those raised by a case pending in another court.”).

15

case under the factual circumstances here. Further, claim or issue preclusion may also bar
Plaintiff’s claims here. “The rule of res judicata encompasses two separate but linked preclusive
doctrines: (1) true res judicata or claim preclusion and (2) collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion.” 104 “Claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars the litigation of claims that either have been
litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit.” 105 Collateral estoppel or “issue preclusion,”
recognizes that suits addressed to particular claims may present issues relevant to suits on other
claims. 106 This “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a
valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit.” 107
The $340,000 judgment from the Southern District of Texas litigation has already been
awarded to Defendants. If Plaintiff believed he was owed a portion of that money based on some
other reason, it seems Plaintiff should have raised the issue with the Southern District of Texas in
the prior lawsuit. While claim or issue preclusion has not been raised here, courts may raise claim
preclusion or issue preclusion sua sponte. 108 Therefore, the instant motion is denied without
prejudice, and Defendants are granted leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the potential
applicability of claim and/or issue preclusion.

104

Stevens v. St. Tammany Par. Gov't, 17 F.4th 563, 570 (5th Cir. 2021).

105

Id.

106

Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971).

107

Id.

108

R J Reynolds Tobacco Co., 96 F.4th at 875.

16

2.

Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans Litigation

On November 1, 2020, Defendants state they filed a Petition for Damages for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty, Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Money Judgment against Plaintiff
in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. The petition contained allegations regarding
alleged conversion of funds and property and ownership and management disputes regarding The
Johns Law Firm. 109 Here, Plaintiff similarly seeks declaratory judgment regarding Plaintiff’s
equity in The Johns Law Firm and breach of contract damages related to the parties’ Operating
Agreement. 110 Because the Orleans Parish Civil District Court litigation started prior to the instant
matter and the issues are related, Defendants argue the instant matter should be dismissed pursuant
to the first-to-file rule.
While the present action appears to be related to the issues in the first-filed action in Orleans
Parish Civil District Court litigation, the first-to-file rule applies to ongoing litigation in federal
courts. As stated above, under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two
federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised
by the cases substantially overlap. 111 Because there is no ongoing federal litigation, the first-tofile rule is not applicable here. As such, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument. However, it
appears a certain abstention doctrine may apply. “[A]bstention may be raised by the court sua

109

Rec. Doc. 9-5.

110

Rec. Doc. 1.

111

See Save Power, 121 F.3d at 950; West Gulf, 751 F.2d at 728.

17

sponte.” 112 Therefore, the instant motion is denied without prejudice, and Defendants are granted
leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the potential applicability of any abstention doctrine.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Defendants’ arguments regarding the
applicability of the first-to-file are not supported here. Further, it appears claim preclusion, issue
preclusion, and/or certain abstention doctrine could apply. Therefore, the Court denies the motion
without prejudice and grants Defendants leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the
potential applicability of any abstention doctrine, claim preclusion, and/or issue preclusion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss 113 is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Defendants are granted leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the potential
applicability of any abstention doctrine, claim preclusion, and/or issue preclusion.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA this

10th day of March, 2025.

NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

112

See Murphy, 168 F.3d at 737 n. 1.

113

Rec. Doc. 9.

18